




Regulation of Novel biomedical Technologies: 
1. On Presidents, Agencies and the Stem Cells Between Them: A Legal 
Analysis of President Bush’s and the Federal Government’s Policy on the 
Funding of Research Involving Human Embryonic Stem Cells 
2. The Regulation of the Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive Tissue: 
The Need for Federal Regulation 
3. Patents Versus Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals – Do 








Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of the Science of Law 




















































Regulation of Novel Biomedical Technologies: 
1. On Presidents, Agencies and the Stem Cells Between Them: A Legal Analysis 
of President Bush’s and the Federal Government’s Policy on the Funding of 
Research Involving Human Embryonic Stem Cells 
2. The Regulation of the Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive Tissue: The 
Need for Federal Regulation 
3. Patents Versus Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals – Do We 




This dissertation is the compilation of three separate works of research revolving around 
the theme of regulation of biomedical technologies that are either emerging or that have 
undergone significant developments over the past decade or so.  Each of these three research 
works examines a legal response to a technological development in the areas of biotechnology 
and/or medicine and addresses one or more challenges – ethical, constitutional, legal or one that 
is related to public policy – created by that response.  
The first work of research, which was published in the Administrative Law Review in 
March 2008, examines the legality of the restrictions imposed by the administration of President 
George W. Bush on the funding of research involving human embryonic stem cells.  Reaching 
the conclusion that the Bush Administration’s actions were outright illegal in more than one way, 
the research highlights existing tensions in the division of decision-making power between the 
President and executive agencies and between Congress and the President.  
The second work of research, which was published in the Columbia Science and 
Technology Law Review in August 2010, reviews the regulation of genetic screening and testing 
  
  
of donated reproductive tissue in the United States.  Analyzing the regulation in the federal, state 
and industry level, the research highlights significant shortcomings of the regulation of this area 
and, drawing on the experience of other countries, advocates the regulation of this area by the 
FDA.  
The third and last work of research of which this dissertation consists is dedicated to the 
examination of the newly created regime of statutory exclusivities afforded to biological 
pharmaceuticals under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) as it 
compares to the protection afforded to such products under patent law.  The research concludes 
that allowing biological pharmaceuticals to benefits from parallel protection under both patent 
law and the statutory exclusivities regime established under BPCIA does not contribute to 
incentivizing innovation and might have undesirable ramifications from a public policy 
perspective.  Hence, the research proposes limiting the protection afforded to biological 
pharmaceutical products, namely to the protection under either patent law or BPCIA, by 
suspending the ability to enforce patents covering biological pharmaceuticals against generic 
applicants under BPCIA.  In addition, the research examines the proposition that under some 
circumstances it would be possible to substitute patent protection for statutory exclusivities.  
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ABSTRACT
On August 9, 2001, President George W. Bush announced his policy on 
research involving human embryonic stem cells and proclaimed that 
federal funding would be allocated only to research involving human 
embryonic stem cell lines produced prior to his announcement (the 
Directive).  Immediately thereafter, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
announced that it would act in accordance and full compliance with the 
Directive and took action to implement it.  Since then, the Directive has 
dictated the nature and extent of scientific research involving human 
embryonic stem cells.  Yet, astonishingly, despite being the subject of a 
boisterous debate, the Directive’s legality as well as the legality of the 
NIH’s actions have never been questioned nor ascertained.  This Article 
seeks to fill this gap. 
After analyzing the Directive and the NIH’s ensuing actions in light of 
the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 and the Administrative Procedure Act, 
this Article argues that the Directive and the NIH’s actions taken to 
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implement it were illegal.  Based on this conclusion, the Article discusses 
the possible legal challenges that may be raised with respect to the 
Directive and the NIH’s actions.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 9, 2001 at about 8:00 p.m., surrounded by families of 
children conceived from embryo donations and by members of Congress, 
President George W. Bush addressed the nation from his ranch in 
Crawford, Texas and announced his new policy on federal funding for 
research involving human embryonic stem cells (hESCs).1  President Bush 
started by describing the deep religious and ethical sentiments that brought 
him to make this policy decision2 and ultimately proclaimed that federal 
funding would be allocated only to research involving hESC lines produced 
prior to his Address.3  Immediately following President Bush’s Address, 
the Acting Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Dr. Ruth 
Kirschstein, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
Tommy G. Thompson, both released statements announcing that they 
would act in accordance and in full compliance with the Directive.4  And 
so, President Bush’s Directive became “the law of the land” and stands 
unwavering at the crux of the Federal Government’s policy regarding the 
funding for research involving hESCs. 
The Directive and subsequent policies adopted by the Bush 
Administration have been the topic of a multitude of articles dealing with 
their ramifications.  The Directive has inspired an abundance of state 
legislation either embracing the decision or rejecting and undermining it.5
The Bush Administration’s policies even became one of the focal points of 
Senator John Kerry’s presidential election campaign in 2004 and of the 
                                                          
 1. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 953 (Aug. 9, 2001) [hereinafter President Bush’s Address].  I will subsequently refer 
to this speech as President Bush’s Address, President Bush’s Stem Cell Decision, or 
President Bush’s Directive. 
2. Id. at 955 (“My position on these issues is shaped by deeply held beliefs.  I’m a 
strong supporter of science and technology . . . .  I also believe human life is a sacred gift 
from our Creator.”). 
3. See id. (“I have concluded that we should allow Federal funds to be used for 
research on these existing stem cell lines, where the life and death decision has already been 
made.”). 
4. See Press Release, Ruth Kirschstein, Acting Director of the National Institutes of 
Health, NIH Statement on the President’s Stem Cell Address (Aug. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug2001/od-09.htm [hereinafter Kirschstein Statement] 
(describing President Bush’s Decision as “sound” and expressing “understand[ing of] the 
President’s clear desire to move forward with care”); Press Release, Tommy G. Thompson, 
Secretary, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Regarding the President’s Decision on 
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
news/press/2001pres/20010809.html [hereinafter Thompson Statement] (praising the 
President’s decision as a courageous one that shows leadership and stating that he would be 
proud to carry it out). 
5. See generally Lauren Thuy Nguyen, The Fate of Stem Cell Research and a 
Proposal for Future Legislative Regulation, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 419, 433-37 (2006) 
(detailing efforts in some states such as California and New Jersey to protect and endorse 
stem cell research funding). 
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Democratic Party’s platform in the recent congressional elections.6  Yet, 
with all that has been written and said about President Bush’s Directive and 
the policies implementing it, the focus was always on the economical, 
ethical, scientific, and social implications and justifications; quite 
astonishingly, their legality seems to have never been questioned or 
analyzed.7  This Article seeks to fill this void by answering the question 
whether President Bush’s Directive and the Administration’s policy on 
funding for research involving hESCs is legal. 
Part I of this Article provides the scientific background necessary for 
understanding President Bush’s Directive and surveys the regulatory history 
of research involving embryos and hESCs in the United States.  Part II 
then examines and evaluates the validity of President Bush’s Directive and 
of the ensuing actions taken by the NIH, arguing that they were illegal and 
not legally sustainable.  Part III then discusses the possible legal challenges 
that may be raised with respect to the Directive and the NIH’s actions.  
This Article concludes with predictions about the future of the regulation of 
research involving hESCs. 
I. HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS–SCIENTIFIC AND 
REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A.  Human Embryonic Stem Cells and Their Uses in  
Medicine and Science 
Prior to delving into the legal discussion, it may be helpful to review 
what embryonic stem cells are, their scientific purpose and medical 
potential, and why they incite such a bitter ethical debate. 
Stem cells in general (rather than embryonic stem cells) are living cells 
that are unspecialized; namely, they have not (yet) undergone a process 
called “differentiation,” which turns them into cells that fulfill a specific 
                                                          
6. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Stem Cell Issue Opens Campaign Divide, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 8, 2004, at A1; Dan Vergano, Stem-Cell Debate Another Division Between Bush, 
Kerry, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/ 
politicselections/nation/issues/2004-10-26-stem-cell-research_x.htm. 
 7. A number of articles have dealt with the issue of the legality of President Bush’s 
Directive indirectly by analyzing it alongside similar administrative and presidential actions.  
See, e.g., Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in 
Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 45-47 (2002) (classifying President Bush’s Directive 
as improper because it did not leave the issue for Congress to decide); Christopher S. Yoo, 
Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 
1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 725-26 (2005) (praising President Bush’s Directive for 
what the authors view as being exemplary of his leadership and strong principled pro-life 
stance).  However, President Bush’s Directive itself was never the focus of an in-depth legal 
analysis as it is in this Article. 
4
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function within the body (e.g., red blood cells, heart-muscle cells).8  Under 
certain conditions, they may undergo differentiation into specialized cell 
types that are able to fulfill specific bodily functions.9  Finally, unlike most 
of the other cells in our body, stem cells may continue to divide 
(proliferate) over extended periods of time without “committing” 
themselves to a certain specialized cell type or function—they may remain 
in a “stem cell state.”10
Because of these characteristics, stem cells are a potentially unlimited 
source of specialized cells for research and for transplantation therapies 
meant to “replenish” injured tissues that need specific kinds of cells.  Some 
of these therapies, like bone marrow transplantation,11 already exist, while 
others are currently being researched.12  Furthermore, because of their 
special qualities, stem cells may also have other beneficial uses—in 
research meant to develop methods of prevention and treatment of birth 
defects; in creation of models, which would make drug development 
processes faster and cheaper;13 and in gene therapy.14
Stem cells may be subdivided into three classes.  The first type of stem 
cells, with the most differentiation potential, is “totipotent stem cells,” 
which make up an early embryo, and which are a potential source of any 
                                                          
8. National Institutes of Health (NIH), Stem Cell Basics, I.A., What are stem cells and 
why are they important?, http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics1.asp (last visited Oct. 
21, 2007) [hereinafter Stem Cell Basics]; NIH, Stem Cell Basics, II., What are the unique 
properties of all stem cells?, http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics2.asp (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Unique Properties of Stem Cells]. 
 9. Stem Cell Basics, supra note 8; Unique Properties of Stem Cells, supra note 8. 
 10. Stem Cell Basics, supra note 8; Unique Properties of Stem Cells, supra note 8. 
 11. Bone marrow transplantations are essentially stem cell transplantations where 
patients lacking the capability of replenishing their own blood cells receive hematopoietic 
stem cells (blood stem cells), which are meant to proliferate and differentiate to replenish 
the blood cells they need.  For further discussion of bone marrow transplantation and other, 
more modern techniques for acquiring hematopoietic stem cells, see Jos Domen, Amy 
Wagers & Irving L. Weissman, Bone Marrow (Hematopoietic) Stem Cells, in NIH
REGENERATIVE MEDICINE REPORT 13, 14, 22 (2006), available at http://stemcells.nih.gov/ 
info/scireport/2006report.htm [hereinafter REGENERATIVE MEDICINE]. 
 12. Some of the uses for stem cells, which are currently in the research and 
development stage, include using stem cells as a source of pancreatic cells for treatment of 
diabetes, using dopamine-secreting cells for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease, and so 
forth. See generally id. at 13-34; David M. Panchision, Repairing the Nervous System with 
Stem Cells, in REGENERATIVE MEDICINE, supra note 11, at 35-44 (discussing how stem cells 
could be used to treat nervous system disorders); Thomas P. Zwaka, Use of Genetically 
Modified Stem Cells in Experimental Gene Therapies, in REGENERATIVE MEDICINE, supra
note 11, at 45-52 (illustrating how stem cells can be used in gene therapies for persons with 
cystic fibrosis and severe combined immunodeficiency).   
13. Junying Yu & James A. Thomson, Embryonic Stem Cells, in REGENERATIVE 
MEDICINE, supra note 11, at 3 (illustrating how stem cells can help to identify drug targets 
as well as prevent and treat birth defects).  For further information on the uses of human 
embryonic stem cells (hESCs), see id. at 4, 8. 
14. See, e.g., NIH, Use of Genetically Modified Stem Cells in Experimental Gene 
Therapies, in STEM CELLS: SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
99-105 (2001), available at http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/scireport/PDFs/ 
chapter11.pdf (discussing the benefits of embryonic stem cells in gene therapy). 
5
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cell type in an organism’s body.15  The second type of stem cells, with 
slightly less differentiation potential, is “pluripotent stem cells,” also 
known as embryonic stem cells (ESCs).16  These cells may be a source of 
all of the different kinds of cells that make up an organism’s body, save 
early totipotent embryonic cells.17  Lastly, there are “multipotent stem 
cells,” which have differentiated further than pluripotent stem cells.18
Within this group of multipotent stem cells are “adult stem cells,” which 
serve as a source of replenishment of cells in the bodies of adult 
organisms.19
A general agreement has emerged among leading scientists in the area of 
stem cell research that research involving pluripotent stem cells holds 
numerous advantages over research involving adult stem cells.20  Among 
the reasons for this agreement is the fact that pluripotent stem cells are 
more readily available21 than adult stem cells (which are rare), difficult to 
extract from the tissues in which they reside, and extremely hard to 
proliferate while keeping undifferentiated.22  Another reason is that ESCs’ 
low level of commitment makes them potentially more versatile than other, 
more “committed” stem cells—they may differentiate into more types of 
specialized cells.23
                                                          
15. See NIH, Stem Cell Information, Frequently Asked Questions, http://stemcells.nih. 
gov/info/faqs.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2007) [hereinafter NIH FAQs] (categorizing stem 
cells into three classes). 
16. Id. It is noteworthy that according to recent scientific publications, a group of 
scientists managed to create hESC lines from totipotent cells rather than from pluripotent 
cells.  See Irina Klimanskaya et al., Human Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Single 
Blastomeres, NATURE, Nov. 23, 2006, at 481. 
 17. NIH FAQs, supra note 15. 
18. Id.
19. See NIH, Stem Cell Basics, IV., What are adult stem cells?, http://stemcells.nih.gov/ 
info/basics/basics4.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2007) (describing the differences between adult 
stem cells and embryonic stem cells). 
20. See NIH Statement Before the Senate Appropriations Subcomm. on Labor, Health 
and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies (Apr. 26, 2000), available at
http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/statements/state.asp [hereinafter NIH Statement] (noting that 
human pluripotent stem cells hold promise for advances in the prevention, treatment, and 
diagnosis of many diseases). 
 21. Currently, in the United States there are about 400,000 unused frozen embryos from 
which embryonic stem cells may be extracted, which, if remain unused for a prolonged 
period of time, will be disposed of.  See Junying Yu & James Thomson, Embryonic Stem 
Cells, in REGENERATIVE MEDICINE, supra note 11, at 1, 3. 
22. See NIH Statement, supra note 20; NIH FAQs, supra note 15; NIH, Stem Cell 
Basics, V., What are the similarities and differences between embryonic and adult stem 
cells?, http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics5.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2007) 
[hereinafter Embryonic and Adult Stem Cells]. 
 23. NIH Statement, supra note 20; NIH FAQs, supra note 15; Embryonic and Adult 
Stem Cells, supra note 22. 
6
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To be able to utilize ESCs, researchers have to extract these cells from 
very early embryos and turn them into cell lines24—a process that destroys 
the embryos.25  This practice, when applied in human embryos, encounters 
strong opposition on two main grounds.  The first is an ethical ground 
according to which human embryos have a “special moral status” as “early 
humans,” and thus the practice of destroying such embryos for research 
purposes constitutes a denial of the respect they are entitled to as an early 
form of human life.  The second ground for opposition is established upon 
the religious premise that embryos are endowed with God-given life, and 
that destroying them in the research process constitutes killing.  Despite 
this opposition, since the derivation of the first hESCs in 1998,26 over 120 
hESC lines have been created worldwide.27
B.  The Regulation of Embryo Research Prior to 1998 
Though hESCs were first derived only in 1998, in order to fully 
understand the regulation of research involving hESCs,28 it is necessary to 
revisit some constituting events in the regulation of human embryo 
research, which directly led to and shaped the regulation of research 
involving hESCs. 
                                                          
 24. A cell line is essentially a culture of identical cells that have been transformed in a 
way that allows them to proliferate in culture indefinitely and that have been kept in that 
state (of continuous proliferation) for a prolonged period of time.  In other words, it is an 
“immortal” cell culture that will keep on proliferating for as long as it is provided with 
proper nourishment.  This is as opposed to “normal” cells, which proliferate only a limited 
number of times.  For further information on the method of creating ESC lines, see the 
National Institutes of Health, Stem Cell Basics, III., What are embryonic stem cells?, 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics3.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).  Another method 
of obtaining pluripotent stem cells is by creating embryos solely for research purposes from 
egg and sperm donations.  Id.
 25. It is worth noting that some scientists have recently published claims that they have 
developed methods for creating hESC lines without destroying embryos.  See Klimanskaya 
et al., supra note 16, at 481; Xin Zhang et al., Derivation of Human Embryonic Stem Cells 
from Developing and Arrested Embryos, STEM CELLS, Sept. 21, 2006, available at
http://www.StemCells.com/cgi/content/full/24/12/2669; Constance Holden, Stem Cells 
Without the Fuss?, SCIENCENOW, June 6, 2007; Elizabeth Finkel, Researchers Derive Stem 
Cells from Monkeys, SCIENCENOW, June 19, 2007; Rick Weiss, Lab Cites Stem Cell 
Advance: Method of Harvest Could Leave Embryos Undamaged, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 
2008, at A4.  Yet, these publications have encountered skepticism by both proponents and 
opponents of research involving hESCs.  See, e.g., Alison Abbott, “Ethical” Stem Cell 
Paper Under Attack, NATURE, Sept. 7, 2006, at 12; Nicholas Wade, In New Method for Stem 
Cells, Viable Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2006, at A2; Constance Holden, Life From 
Arrested Development?, SCIENCENOW, Sept. 22, 2006; Scientists Create Stem Cell Line 
from Already Dead Embryo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 22, 2006. 
26. See infra note 68. 
 27. Yu & Thomson, supra note 21, at 6. 
 28. I distinguish between hESC research, which is the research of hESCs, and research 
involving hESCs, which is any research that makes use of hESCs even for purposes that do 
not include learning about the hESCs themselves.  Since President Bush’s Directive affects 
both kinds, I will use the latter more inclusive term—research involving hESCs—
throughout this Article. 
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Throughout the 1980s, HHS did not allocate federal funding for research 
involving human embryos.29  This was because under HHS regulations, 
funding of such research required the pre-approval of an Ethics Advisory 
Board (EAB).30  But since the mandate of the last EAB lapsed in 198031
and no new EAB was appointed in its stead, the HHS practically imposed a 
de facto moratorium on federal embryo research,32 which lasted until 
Congress passed the NIH Revitalization Act (NIHRA) in 1993.33
The change in the federal research policy regarding human embryos 
brought about by the NIHRA can be traced back to a set of events, 
seemingly unrelated to the aforementioned de facto moratorium, about six 
years prior to the passing of the NIHRA.  In October 1987, the NIH 
received a request by some of its own investigators to approve a research 
protocol involving an experimental implantation of human fetal cells taken 
from aborted human embryos into the brain of a Parkinson’s patient.34
Because of the “broad scientific and ethical implications surrounding this 
area of research,”35 although there was no existing regulatory barrier posed 
before such research at that time, the Director of the NIH voluntarily 
decided to request the approval of the Assistant Secretary for Health (ASH) 
to support this study.36  On March 22, 1988, the Assistant Secretary 
announced that he was withholding approval of the project and placed a 
temporary moratorium on the federal support of research involving fetal 
tissue transplantation pending further consideration “of the relevant ethical, 
legal, and scientific issues by an outside group of experts”37 that “would 
                                                          
29. See THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, MONITORING STEM CELL RESEARCH
23 (2004), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/stemcell/pcbe_final_version_ 
monitoring_stem_cell_research.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL REPORT] (explaining 
that members of Congress became concerned about the potential use of aborted fetuses 
following Roe v. Wade). 
 30. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526, 33,529 (Aug. 8, 1975); see also 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY 
COMM’N, ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH 34 (1999), available at
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/stemcell.pdf [hereinafter NBAC REPORT] (describing 
the Ethics Advisory Board’s recommendations with respect to research involving human 
embryos). 
 31. NBAC REPORT, id. at 34. 
32. Id.
 33. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 
Stat. 122 (1993). 
 34. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE DIRECTOR:
HUMAN FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION RESEARCH 1 (1988) [hereinafter HUMAN FETAL 
TISSUE REPORT]. 
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, THERAPEUTIC HUMAN FETAL TISSUE 
TRANSPLANTATION RESEARCH ACTIVITIES FUNDED BY THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 
IN FY 1998: REPORT TO CONGRESS PART III (1999), available at http://ospp.od.nih.gov/ 
policy/fetal.asp [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS] (stating that the ASH advised the NIH 
that it was withholding approval of the project pending consideration of the issues from the 
Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel (HFTTRP)). 
 37. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 36. 
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examine comprehensively the use of human fetal tissue from induced 
abortions for transplantation” and advise “whether this kind of research 
should be performed, and if so, under what circumstances.”38  Pursuant to 
these instructions, the NIH formed the Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation 
Research Panel (HFTTRP) to the Advisory Committee to the Director 
(ACD).39  The HFTTRP held numerous meetings and, in December 1988, 
submitted its report to the ACD.40  The HFTTRP found the use of tissue 
from induced abortions in therapeutic transplantation research to be 
“acceptable public policy” and proposed guidelines to assure that such 
research would be conducted in an ethical manner.41  The ACD 
unanimously accepted the recommendations42 and passed them on to the 
Director of the NIH, who also accepted them and recommended to the 
Secretary to lift the moratorium.43  Interestingly, in November 1989, 
Secretary Louis Sullivan decided to reject these recommendations and 
continue the moratorium on federal funding for transplantation research 
involving human fetal tissue indefinitely.44
However, Secretary Sullivan’s moratorium did not go unchecked by 
Congress.  Outraged by the Secretary’s actions,45 in a clear and rare 
expression of discontent with the administrative handling of legislatively 
delegated powers and of legislative intent to promote human embryo 
research, Congress passed the NIHRA in 1993.46  The NIHRA explicitly 
abolished Secretary Sullivan’s moratorium,47 rescinded the requirement for 
an EAB’s approval of research applications involving embryo research,48
                                                          
 38. Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel; Advisory Committee to the 
Director; Meeting, 53 Fed. Reg. 24,500 (June 29, 1988). 
39. Id. The Advisory Committee to the Director of the NIH was formed in 1966 to 
“assist the Office of the Director, NIH, in the making of major plans and policies, especially 
those related to the allocation of NIH funds and resources.” Advisory Committee to the 
Director, Charter of the ACD, http://www.nih.gov/about/director/acd/index.htm (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2007). 
 40. HUMAN FETAL TISSUE REPORT, supra note 34, at 2. 
41. Id. at 4-5; see also S. REP. NO. 103-2, at 13 (1993) (describing the HFTTRP and its 
recommendations).
 42. HUMAN FETAL TISSUE REPORT, supra note 34, at 4-5. 
 43. S. REP. NO 103-2, at 13. 
44. Id.  Congress lifted this moratorium in 1993 in the National Institutes of Health 
Revitalization Act (NIHRA).  See Michael Specter, Fetal-Tissue Research Ban Formally 
Extended; Moral and Ethical Problems Said To Outweigh Possible Benefits, WASH. POST,
Nov. 3, 1989, at A5. 
 45. S. REP. NO 103-2, at 13. 
 46. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 
Stat. 122 (1993). 
47. Id. § 113, 107 Stat. at 132. 
48. See S. REP. NO 103-2, at 12-15.  Congress actually turned the HHS’s de facto 
moratorium on research involving embryos “upside down” so that the default would no 
longer be that grant applications for research involving embryos could not be accepted 
unless ethically approved, but rather that such research proposals were eligible for funding 
unless an independent Ethics Advisory Board explicitly recommended otherwise.  For 
further discussion, see infra Part II.B.1. 
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and imposed restrictions on the HHS’s ability to withhold funds for 
research on ethical grounds so that such a withholding could not take place 
without the recommendation of an independent EAB.49
Following the enactment of the NIHRA, the NIH began to receive 
applications for funding of research involving human embryos.50  The 
Secretary of HHS at that time, Donna Shalala, aware of the bioethical 
issues stemming from such research, decided to establish an EAB in 
accordance with the NIHRA, and instructed the NIH to proceed 
accordingly.51  The NIH, acting under these instructions and in accordance 
with the requirements of the NIHRA,52 formed the Human Embryo 
Research Panel.  The Panel’s mandate was to “consider various areas of 
research involving the ex-utero preimplantation human embryo53 and to 
provide advice as to those areas that (1) [were] acceptable for Federal 
funding, (2) warrant additional review, and (3) [were] unacceptable for 
Federal support.”54  In September 1994, after seven months of work, the 
Human Embryo Research Panel published its final report and 
recommendations regarding research involving human embryos.55  First, 
the Panel concluded that in principle, and pending the fulfillment of some 
preliminary requirements, there were numerous types of research involving 
preimplanted human embryos that were ethically permissible.56  Most 
importantly, the Panel determined that creation of human embryos solely 
for research purposes was permissible if such research could not otherwise 
be conducted and when “a compelling case can be made that [the research] 
is necessary for the validity of a study that is potentially of outstanding 
scientific and therapeutic value.”57  The report also specifically held that 
research aimed at the development of human embryonic stem cells should 
                                                          
 49. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 § 101, 107 Stat. at 126.  For 
further discussion of the NIHRA and its requirements, see infra Part II.B.1. 
50. See Doe v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421, 1424-25 (D. Md. 1994) (“With the passage 
of the Revitalization Act, NIH in fact received a number of applications seeking financial 
support of research. . . .”). 
51. Id.
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 289a-1(b)(5) (2000). 
 53. The Human Embryo Research Panel used the term “ex-utero preimplantted 
embryo” to describe human embryos that were the result of IVF treatments, which yielded 
more embryos than the women treated actually cared to have implanted in them and which 
were therefore kept frozen.  See 1 THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE 
HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL, at ix (1994).
 54. Id.
55. Id. at x-xx. 
56. Id. at x-xi, xvii.  These preliminary requirements included conditions such as: that 
the research on the human embryo could not be otherwise accomplished by using alternative 
means (e.g., experimentation with animals), that strict informed consent requirements had 
been met, that only the minimum number of embryos possible for the purposes of the 
research would be used, that the embryos used would not be older than fourteen days, and so 
forth.
57. Id. at xii. 
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be permitted, subject to the conditions that the source of the embryos used 
for the creation of the hESCs would be surplus embryos produced for 
infertility treatments or clinical research and that the progenitors 
consented.58  On December 1, 1994, the NIH’s ACD unanimously accepted 
the Panel’s Report,59 but on the very next day, President Clinton released a 
terse statement (President Clinton’s Embryo Decision) instructing the NIH 
not to allocate funds for supporting the creation of embryos for research 
purposes.60  Thus, President Clinton’s Embryo Decision negated one of the 
Panel’s most controversial recommendations, namely the creation of 
embryos exclusively for research purposes.  Nevertheless, his Decision did 
not prohibit research involving surplus embryos left from in-vitro 
fertilization (IVF) treatments, and so the NIH proceeded to develop 
guidelines for funding research using embryos not created solely for 
research purposes.61  However, on January 26, 1996, before the NIH was 
                                                          
58. Id. at xvii.  In addition, the Panel recommended not to support numerous kinds of 
research that were deemed to pose “serious ethical concerns,” including research involving 
human cloning, research of embryos beyond the stage of the closure of the neural tube, 
pre-implantation diagnosis for the purpose of sex selection, development of human-
nonhuman chimeras, cross species fertilization, and more.  See id. at xix-xx. 
59. NBAC REPORT supra note 30, at 34. 
60. See William J. Clinton, Statement on Federal Funding of Research on Human 
Embryos, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2459, 2459-60 (Dec. 2, 1994) [hereinafter 
President Clinton’s Embryo Decision]. President Clinton’s Embryo Decision only noted the 
following:
The Director of the National Institutes of Health has received a report regarding 
federal funding of research on human embryos.  The subject raises profound ethical 
and moral questions as well as issues concerning the appropriate allocation of 
Federal funds.  I appreciate the work of the committees that have considered this 
complex issue, and I understand that advances in vitro fertilization research and 
other areas could derive from such work.  However, I do not believe that Federal 
funds should be used to support the creation of human embryos for research 
purposes, and I have directed that NIH not allocate any resources for such research. 
In order to ensure that advice on complex bioethical issues that affect our society 
can continue to be developed, we are planning to move forward with the 
establishment of a National Bioethics Advisory Commission over the next year. 
Id. President Clinton’s Embryo Decision was not backed or followed by any officiating 
action such as issuing an executive order and was never published in the Federal Register, 
but rather only in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.  See id. at 2459-60.
For further discussion of President Clinton’s Embryo Decision and its legal status, see infra
Part III.A.  Interestingly, President Clinton repeated the practice of instructing executive 
agencies not to fund certain kinds of research that he perceived as bioethically problematic 
at least once more in a statement released to the media and titled “memorandum,” where he 
explicitly directed “that no Federal funds will be used for human cloning.”  See President 
William J. Clinton, Memorandum on the Prohibition on Federal Funding for Cloning of 
Human Beings, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 281 (Mar. 4, 1997) [hereinafter President 
Clinton’s Cloning Decision]. 
Ironically, as I will later show, President Bush’s Directive seems to have been the spitting 
image of President Clinton’s Embryo Decision. 
61. See IRENE STITH-COLEMAN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: HUMAN EMBRYO 
RESEARCH 2 (1998), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/ 
crsdocuments/95-910_STM.pdf (stating that after the President’s December 1994 Order, the 
agency proceeded with plans to develop guidelines to support research using spare 
embryos); see also NBAC REPORT, supra note 30, at 34. 
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able to approve any application for funding embryo research,62 Congress 
passed the Dickey Amendment, which amended the 1996 Departments of 
Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act,63 cutting the NIH’s efforts short. 
The Dickey Amendment prohibited federal funding for research 
involving “the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research 
purposes”64 and any research in which “a human embryo or embryos are 
destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death” 
greater than a measure allowed by the regulations governing research on 
fetuses in utero.65  Congress has passed similar clauses in the respective 
appropriations bill every year since,66 thus rendering research involving the 
creation, harming, or destruction of human embryos ineligible for federal 
funding.  And since the creation of hESC lines inevitably involves the 
                                                          
62. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 29, at 25 (noting mildly that 
Congress “did not endorse this course of action”). 
63. The Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128(2), 110 Stat. 
26, 34 (1996). 
64. Id. The Dickey Amendment, which was named after former Representative Jay 
Dickey who originally sponsored it, reiterated President Clinton’s Embryo Decision from 
1994 and provided it with legislative backing.  For further discussion of this point, see infra
Part III.A. 
65. The Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I, § 128(2), 110 Stat. at 34.  The full 
language of the Amendment includes: 
None of the funds made available [in this Act] may be used for— 
(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes; or 
(2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or 
knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for research 
on fetuses in utero under 45 CFR 46.208(a)(2) and 42 U.S.C. 289g(b) [of the Public 
Health Service Act].   
For purposes of this section, the phrase “human embryo or embryos” shall include 
any organism, not protected as a human subject under 45 CFR 46 as of the date of 
the enactment of this Act, that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, 
or any other means from one or more human gametes. 
Id.
66. See, e.g., Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 512, 
110 Stat. 3009-270 (1996); Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and 
Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-78, § 513, 111 Stat. 
1467, 1517 (1997); Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 511, 112 Stat. 2681-386 (1998); Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 510, 113 Stat. 1501A-275 (1999); Consolidated Appropriations 
Act–FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 510, 114 Stat. 2763A-71 (2000); Departments of 
Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-116, § 510, 115 Stat. 2177, 2219 (2002); Consolidated Appropriations 
Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 510, 117 Stat. 11 (2003); Consolidated Appropriations Act,  
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 510, 118 Stat. 3277 (2004); Consolidated Appropriations Act,  
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 509, 118 Stat. 2809-3163 (2004); Departments of Labor, 
Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. 
L. No. 109-149, § 509, 119 Stat. 2833-80 (2005). 
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destruction of a human blastocyst,67 the Dickey Amendment has rendered 
research involving the creation of such hESC lines similarly ineligible for 
federal funding.68
C.  Federal Regulation of Stem Cell Research Between  
Two Presidents—1998 to the Present 
The news about the creation of the first hESC line in late 1998 brought 
about an abundance of regulatory activity aimed at evaluating the moral 
and legal status of such cells.  In November 1998, President Clinton asked 
his National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) to “undertake a 
thorough review of the issues associated with human stem cell research, 
balancing all ethical and medical considerations.”69  In the meantime, it 
was unclear whether the Dickey Amendment, which excluded the creation
of hESC lines with federal funding—because such creation inevitably 
involves the destruction of embryos—also meant that the federal 
government could not partake in research involving such hESC lines that 
already existed, and which were created without federal funding.70  To 
answer this question, the Director of the NIH, Dr. Harold Varmus, 
approached the General Counsel of HHS, Harriet Rabb, and asked for her 
opinion regarding the legality of federal funding for research involving 
hESC lines that were created without federal support.71  On January 15, 
1999, in a legal opinion sent to Dr. Varmus, Harriet Rabb opined that the 
wording of the Dickey Amendment did not prevent the NIH from funding 
research involving already-created hESC lines because such hESCs—once 
extracted from an embryo—did not meet the definition of a human embryo, 
and hence did not fall under the Amendment’s prohibition on the funding 
                                                          
67. See infra Part I.A and text accompanying note 25. 
 68. Congress, however, did not prohibit such research from taking place altogether; it 
was (and still is) possible for private entities to conduct such research.  Hence, when a group 
of scientists led by Dr. James Thomson from the University of Wisconsin finally managed 
to create hESC lines from embryos donated by couples undergoing IVF treatments, they did 
so without federal funding.  See James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines 
Derived from Human Blastocysts, SCIENCE, Nov. 6, 1998, at 1145-47; see also Statement of 
Harold Varmus, M.D., Director, NIH, Department of Health and Human Services, Before 
the Senate Appropriations Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and 
Related Agencies (Dec. 2, 1998), available at http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/statements/ 
120298.asp [hereinafter Statement of Harold Varmus] (“Federal funds were not used in 
either of the experiments that you will hear about today.”). 
 69. Letter from President William J. Clinton to Dr. Harold Shapiro, Chair of the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (Nov. 14, 1998), reprinted in NBAC REPORT,
supra note 30, at 88. 
70. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 29, at 27 (describing this confusion). 
 71. Statement of Harold Varmus, supra note 68. 
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of the destruction of human embryos.72  In other words, the Rabb Opinion 
held that federal funding could be granted for research involving hESCs, so 
long as the destruction of the embryos that led to the creation of the hESC 
lines had not been federally funded.73  Pursuant to the Rabb Opinion, the 
NIH assigned a Working Group to develop guidelines and oversight 
mechanisms for research involving human stem cells, and announced a 
withholding of funds for such research74 until the Working Group 
developed such guidelines.75
In September 1999, the NBAC at last published the report requested by 
President Clinton almost one year earlier.76  The underlying premise of the 
NBAC Report was that “although the human embryo and fetus deserve 
respect as forms of human life, the scientific and clinical benefits of stem 
cell research should not be foregone.”77  In its report, the NBAC 
recommended, first and foremost, that federal legislation and regulation be 
changed so as to allow funding for the use and derivation of hESCs from 
embryos remaining unused after infertility treatments (namely, not embryos 
created solely for research purposes).78  The NBAC further recommended 
that any donation of such embryos must fulfill numerous requirements, 
including obtaining informed consent from the embryos’ donors, 
approaching potential donors only once they had already decided to discard 
their excess frozen embryos, informing the donors that their embryos 
would be destroyed, and regulating the entire area of research through 
“appropriate regulations that include public oversight and review.”79
                                                          
72. See Memorandum from Harriet S. Rabb, General Counsel of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, to Harold Varmus, M.D., Director, NIH, on Federal Funding 
for Research Involving Human Pluripotent Stem Cells (Jan. 15, 1999), http://www. 
georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/documents/rabbmemo.pdf [hereinafter Rabb Opinion].  
According to the Rabb Opinion, hESCs are not subject to the definition of an “embryo” 
under the Dickey Amendment because an embryo is defined under the Amendment as an 
“organism” whereas scientific and medically accepted definitions of “organism,” namely an 
individual constituted to carry out all life functions, do not cover hESCs. 
73. Id.  It is noteworthy that even though the Rabb Opinion was accepted as legally 
valid and as “stay[ing] within the letter of the law,” it was nonetheless criticized for 
“contradict[ing] both the spirit of the law and the principle that underlies it.”  See
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 29, at 27; O. Carter Snead, The Pedagogical 
Significance of the Bush Stem Cell Policy: A Window into Bioethical Regulation in the 
United States, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 491, 494 (2005). 
 74. The source of the NIH Director’s authority to announce this (yet another) 
moratorium on human embryonic research is not clear, especially in light of the provisions 
of the NIHRA, which explicitly require a prior EAB recommendation to impose such a 
moratorium. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 289a-1(b)(1), (3) (2000). 
 75. Statement of Harold Varmus, supra note 68.   
 76. NBAC REPORT, supra note 30.   
77. Id. at xi. 
78. Id. at iii-iv.
79. Id. at iv-ix. 
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Pursuant to the publication of the NBAC Report, and having considered 
its recommendations,80 the NIH Working Group that was appointed in early 
199981 finished developing its guidelines for ensuring that NIH-funded 
hESC research “is conducted in an ethical and legal manner.”82  In 
December 1999, the NIH published these proposed guidelines, calling for 
comments from the public (Proposed Guidelines).83  The Proposed 
Guidelines followed the recommendations of the NBAC Report and 
allowed federal funding for research utilizing hESCs if: (1) the hESCs were 
derived from surplus embryos that were originally created for infertility 
treatments; (2) the decision to donate excess embryos was clearly separate 
from the decision to create the embryos; and (3) the decision to donate was 
made at the time the donors decided to dispose of the embryos.84  The 
Proposed Guidelines also outlined areas of research involving hESCs that 
were ineligible for NIH funding, including the derivation of hESCs from 
human embryos and research on hESCs that were derived from embryos 
created for research purposes (thus explicitly applying the Dickey 
                                                          
 80. Press Release, National Institutes of Health, NIH Publishes Draft Guidelines for 
Stem Cell Research (Dec. 1, 1999), http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/dec99/od-01.htm (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2007).   
81. See NIH, NIH Fact Sheet on Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Research Guidelines 
(Jan. 2001), http://stemcells.nih.gov/news/newsarchives/stemfactsheet.asp (last visited Dec. 
2, 2007) [hereinafter NIH Fact Sheet] (“In April 1999, the NIH convened a working group 
of the Advisory Committee to the Director.”). 
 82. National Institutes of Health, Draft National Institutes of Health Guidelines for 
Research Involving Human Pluripotent Stem Cells (December 1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 67,576, 
67,576 (Dec. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Proposed Guidelines]. 
83. Id.  It is worth noting that since the Proposed Guidelines involved “a matter relating 
to . . . public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts,” the NIH was presumably 
exempt from following the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act in promulgating them.  See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(a)(2) (2000).  However, the NIH, like all other HHS agencies, has been subject since 
1971 to a direction by the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) to “utilize the public participation procedures of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553” 
regardless of the exemption.  See Statement of Policy: Public Participation in Rule Making, 
36 Fed. Reg. 2,532, 2,532 (Feb. 5, 1971).  As a result of this voluntary election to abide by 
the notice and comment requirements of § 553, courts have held the HHS to strict 
compliance with these requirements.  See, e.g., Mt. Diablo Hosp. Dist. v. Bowen, 860 F.2d 
951, 956-57 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988) (“In 1971 . . . the Secretary waived the public benefits 
exception . . . .  Rules promulgated by the Secretary after 1971 are therefore subject to the 
normal section 553 requirements.”); Cubanski v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 
1986) (“The Secretary voluntarily waived the APA ‘benefits’ exception in 1971 . . . .  The 
[HHS] thereby imposed upon itself procedural requirements ‘not required by law’. . . .  The 
Secretary’s waiver has a binding effect independent of the APA.”); Buschmann  
v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 352, 356 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982); Humana of S.C., Inc. v. Califano, 590 
F.2d 1070, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[T]he Secretary in 1971 elected to waive the exemption 
and to submit to the normal requirements of the [APA], and regulations promulgated since 
that time are subject to mandatory rulemaking procedures.”) (citation omitted).  For 
discussion of the NIH’s compliance with the APA’s requirements in repealing the 
Guidelines, see infra Part II.C. 
84. Proposed Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. at 67,577.  Other requirements set by the Draft 
Guidelines include strict and detailed informed consent requirements, privacy requirements 
and more. Id. at 67,577-78. 
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Amendment to the context of research involving hESCs), human-
nonhuman research, and various kinds of cloning research.85  In addition, as 
the NBAC recommended, the Proposed Guidelines suggested the creation 
of mechanisms to oversee research involving hESCs, including a Human 
Pluripotent Stem Cell Review Group (HPSCRG), which would review 
applications for research involving hESCs submitted to the NIH.86
On August 25, 2000, almost nine months after the publication of the 
Proposed Guidelines and extensive review of comments received on 
them,87 the NIH published the Guidelines for Research Using Human 
Pluripotent Stem Cells (Final Guidelines) in the Federal Register.88  The 
Final Guidelines included all the main components of the Proposed 
Guidelines as mentioned above (including the areas of research ineligible 
for funding and the establishment of the HPSCRG)89 and lifted the 
moratorium on research using human pluripotent stem cells derived from 
human embryos that was announced by the Director of the NIH in January 
1999.90  Yet, it took the NIH almost another seven months to appoint the 
HPSCRG and start receiving requests for funding for research in 
accordance with the Final Guidelines.91  In fact, the process of the 
regulation of funding for research involving hESCs was so slow, and 
lingered for so long, that even after more than two years following the 
initiation of the process by President Clinton and his Director of NIH, it 
was still not possible to receive federal funding for such research. 
                                                          
85. Id. at 67,579. 
86. Id.
 87. During the comment period, “[t]he NIH received approximately 50,000 comments 
from members of Congress, patient advocacy groups, scientific societies, religious 
organizations, and private citizens.”  See National Institutes of Health Guidelines for 
Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976, 51,976-79 (Aug. 25, 
2000) [hereinafter Final Guidelines]. 
88. Id.; see also Press Release, National Institutes of Health, NIH Publishes Final 
Guidelines for Stem Cell Research (Aug. 23, 2000), http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug2000/ 
od-23.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2007) (announcing the publication of the Final Guidelines). 
89. Final Guidelines, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,976-81. 
90. Id. at 51,976.  See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
91. See NIH, Approval Process for the Documentation of Compliance with NIH 
Guidelines on the Use of Human Pluripotent Stem Cells in NIH Research Proposed for 
Support Under Grants and Cooperative Agreements, Notice OD-02-007 (Nov. 7, 2001), 
available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-01-003.html [hereinafter 
Notice OD-02-007] (stating that the first meeting of the Human Pluripotent Stem Cell 
Review Group (HPSCRG) would take place on March 15, 2001); NIH, Approval Process 
for the Documentation of Compliance with NIH Guidelines on the Use of Human 
Pluripotent Stem Cells in NIH Intramural Research (Jan. 16, 2001), available at
http://stemcells.nih.gov/news/newsarchives/irpnotice_011601.asp; NIH Fact Sheet, supra
note 81 (“The NIH is in the process of finalizing the members of the HPSCRG in 
preparation for a March deadline for the receipt of requests for NIH funding for human 
pluripotent stem cell research.”). 
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In January 2001, close to the beginning of President Bush’s presidency, 
the NIH was still dragging its feet regarding the appointment of the 
HPSCRG in preparation for the submission of research applications 
involving hESCs, which were due by March 15, 2001.92  It soon became 
clear that the change in office was going to have a radical influence on the 
administration’s policy regarding stem cell research.  Almost as soon as 
President Bush took office, he charged his Secretary of HHS, Tommy 
Thompson, with conducting a review of the Final Guidelines and with 
putting the Guidelines “on hold” pending the results of that review.93  In 
addition, in April 2001, HHS officials ordered the Acting Director of the 
NIH, Ruth Kirschstein, to indefinitely postpone a scheduled meeting of the 
newly appointed HPSCRG, which was supposed to review the first 
applications for research grants under the Final Guidelines,94 thus de facto 
revoking the Final Guidelines. 
Although the legality of this de facto revocation was highly 
questionable,95 a district court order upheld and even bolstered the Bush 
Administration’s actions.96  On March 8, 2001, a group of plaintiffs 
consisting of religious groups and pro-life activists filed an action against 
the Government seeking an order and declaratory relief, which would 
determine that the Final Guidelines were unlawful and would enjoin the 
Government from applying them and from funding research involving 
                                                          
92. See Notice OD-02-007, supra note 91 (illustrating the schedule for receipt and 
review by the HPSCRG).   
 93. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 29, at 28; Gretchen Vogel, Stem Cell 
Review Setback, SCIENCENOW, Apr. 16, 2001. 
 94. Though such an order or instruction was never officially published, and though it 
was not known whether Secretary Thompson or President Bush gave this order, the HHS 
Spokesman, Bill Hall, admitted that such instruction was in fact given and explained that 
“the department felt that it makes the most sense to hold off until the guideline review that 
the department is doing is complete.”  See Rick Weiss, Bush Administration Order Halts 
Stem Cell Meeting; NIH Planned Session to Review Fund Requests, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 
2001, at A2; Nicholas Wade, Grants for Stem Cell Work Are Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 
2001, at F6. 
 95. According to federal case law “an agency decision which effectively suspends the 
implementation of important and duly promulgated standards . . . constitutes rulemaking 
subject to notice and comment requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553.”  See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. 
v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 816-17 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 
915, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The suspension or delayed implementation of a final regulation 
normally constitutes substantive rulemaking under APA § 553.  Thus . . . [it is] subject to 
APA notice and comment provisions.”) (citations omitted); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 
v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 761-63 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[The] EPA’s action in indefinitely 
postponing the effective date of the amendments . . . was subject to the APA’s rulemaking 
requirements.”).  The Bush Administration’s suspension of the Final Guidelines did not 
meet the notice and comment requirements of the APA. Thus, the suspension of the Final 
Guidelines was illegal.  For further discussion of why the APA’s notice and comment 
requirements apply to the Final Guidelines despite the exemption of matters involving 
grants or benefits from these requirements, see supra note 83. 
 96. Nightlight Christian Adoptions v. Thompson, No. 1.01 CV 00502-RCL (D.D.C. 
May 4, 2001) (order staying lawsuit). 
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hESCs.97  Ironically, the Bush Administration was apparently only  
too happy to comply with the Plaintiffs’ demands.  The Administration 
quickly yielded to them and entered into a stipulation in which the 
Administration took it upon itself to avoid: (1) any funding of hESC 
research; (2) the approval of any application thereof; and (3) the convening 
of the HPSCRG, at least until the completion of its own review of the Final 
Guidelines, which was not subject to any timetable.98  On May 4, 2001, 
Judge Lamberth of the District Court cemented the agreement between the 
parties by entering an order to stay the proceedings subject to the terms of 
the parties’ stipulation.99  Thus, the Judge gave his stamp of approval to the 
Bush Administration’s illegal suspension of the Final Guidelines100 and 
effectively sealed their indefinite suspension,101 which continues until 
today. 
During the following months, President Bush was engaged in the 
reexamination of the issue of research involving hESCs.  He consulted with 
clergymen (including the late Pope John Paul II), religious groups, ethicists 
(including the bioethicists Daniel Callahan and Leon Kass, whom President 
Bush would later appoint to be the head of his Council on Bioethics), 
members of Congress, patient groups, and scientists (including a group of 
NIH scientists who told President Bush that more than sixty-five hESC 
lines existed at that time).102
                                                          
 97. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Nightlight Christian 
Adoptions v. Thompson, No. 1.01 CV 00502-RCL (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2001). 
 98. Nightlight Christian Adoptions v. Thompson, No. 1.01 CV 00502-RCL (D.D.C. 
May 4, 2001) (order staying lawsuit).
99. Id.
100. See supra note 95. 
101. Id.; see also Joseph Curl, Judge Halts Stem Cell Research Pending HHS Review,
WASH. TIMES, May 11, 2001, at A3 (summarizing recent political and judicial efforts to 
curtail stem cell research).  It is worth noting that shortly after the Nightlight decision, a 
group of scientists led by the creator of the first hESC lines, Dr. James Thomson, and three 
patients, including the late actor Christopher Reeve, filed another lawsuit in the same court 
asking the court to declare the Final Guidelines legal and instruct the government to apply 
them.  See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Thomson v. Thompson, No. 
1:01-CV-00973-RCL (D.D.C. May 8, 2001); see also Gretchen Vogel, Researchers Sue to 
Study Stem Cells, SCIENCENOW, May 22, 2001.  On August 8, 2001, a day before President 
Bush’s Statement, Judge Lamberth landed a final blow to the application of the Final 
Guidelines by staying this lawsuit “pending the decision by [the Government] whether to 
provide federal funding for human embryonic stem cell research.”  Thomson v. Thompson, 
No. 1:01-CV-00973-RCL (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2001) (order staying lawsuit).  Thus, Judge 
Lamberth’s decision practically afforded the government unlimited time to review the Final 
Guidelines.   
 102. Richard Lacayo, How Bush Got There, TIME, Aug. 12, 2001, at 17; Allessandra 
Stanley, Bush Hears Pope Condemn Research in Human Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 
2001, at A1.  Apparently, the number of hESC lines, which scientists claimed already 
existed at that time made a crucial impact on the formulation of President Bush’s Directive.  
See Lacayo, supra.
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At this point, with respect to the issue of federal funding for research 
involving hESCs, President Bush no longer made a distinction between his 
opinions and those of his Administration.  Rather, he viewed the issue as 
his own personal matter, which was to be decided solely and exclusively by 
him.  This position was well-reflected in some of President Bush’s 
descriptions of the way he approached the issue of research involving 
hESCs and in the way he addressed it.103  For example, President Bush 
repeatedly stressed that he personally, was the one considering the issue of 
research involving hESCs, that he was the one who encountered the 
dilemmas involved in this issue, and that he was taking his time making his
decision.104  President Bush’s posture in this respect was well-reflected in 
the language he used in his Address: 
     I’ve asked those questions and others of scientists, scholars, 
bioethicists, religious leaders, doctors, researchers, Members of 
Congress, my Cabinet, and my friends.  I have read heartfelt letters from 
many Americans.  I have given this issue a great deal of thought, prayer, 
and considerable reflection.  And I have found widespread disagreement. 
     . . . .  
     My position on these issues is shaped by deeply held beliefs.  I’m a 
strong supporter of science and technology . . . .  
     I also believe human life is a sacred gift from our Creator. 
     . . . . 
     I have concluded that we should allow Federal funds to be used for 
research on these existing stem cell lines . . . . 
     . . . I have made this decision with great care, and I pray it is the right 
one.105
And so, when President Bush finally made his decision with respect to 
the funding of research involving hESCs, he chose to deliver it directly to 
his constituents in the first televised address he made since taking office.106
                                                          
103. See Lacayo, supra note 102 (“For a while this year it seemed that George W. Bush 
buttonholed everybody he met to get his or her view on stem-cell research.”). 
 104. President Bush said: “I take this issue very seriously . . . . It’s also an issue that has 
got serious moral implications, and our nation must think carefully before we proceed . . . . 
And, therefore, my process has been, frankly, unusually deliberative for my administration.  
I’m taking my time.”  Stanley, supra note 102.  In another place, President Bush explained 
his Decision by saying that “[u]nder my policy, existing stem cell lines, to be used in 
publicly supported research, must be derived (1) with the informed consent of donors,  
(2) from excess embryos creates solely for reproductive purposes and (3) without any 
financial inducements to the donors.”  See George W. Bush, Stem Cell Science and the 
Preservation of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2001, at WK13 [hereinafter President Bush’s 
Op-Ed Piece] (emphasis added). 
 105. President Bush’s Address, supra note 1, at 954-56 (emphasis added). 
106. Id.
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On August 9, 2001, President Bush delivered his Stem Cell Decision, 
which allowed only for funding of research involving hESC lines that were: 
(1) created prior to his Address;107 (2) made of excess embryos created 
strictly for reproductive purposes; (3) where the embryos were obtained 
with the informed consent of the donors; and (4) without any financial 
inducement to the donors.108  In addition, President Bush’s Directive 
forbade any funding of research involving the creation of human embryos 
solely for research purposes and the cloning of human embryos for any 
purpose.109
A curious fact about President Bush’s Directive is that, unlike most 
presidential executive orders and directives, it was never published in the 
Federal Register and was only delivered as a televised Address (along with 
a Fact Sheet).  Failing to publish the Directive seems even stranger in light 
of the fact that President Bush did sign an executive order establishing his 
new Council on Bioethics, which he also announced in his Address,110 but 
refrained from doing the same with respect to the crux of his Address, 
namely the prohibition on funding for research involving hESCs created 
thereafter.111
                                                          
 107. According to the NIH, “prior to his Address” means that the hESC derivation 
process should have been initiated prior to 9:00 p.m. EDT on August 9, 2001.  See NIH 
Update on Existing Human Embryonic Stem Cells (Aug. 27, 2001), http://stemcells.nih.gov/ 
policy/statements/082701list.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2007) [hereinafter NIH Update]. 
 108. President Bush’s Address, supra note 1. 
 109. The White House Fact Sheet: Embryonic Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001), 
http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-1.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2007) 
[hereinafter Fact Sheet].  It is interesting to note that in delivering his decision, President 
Bush refrained from directly referring to the kinds of research that may not receive federal 
funding, and used a rhetoric which only addressed the types of research he would allow his 
Administration to fund.  The “forbidden” types of research were thus enumerated only in a 
“fact sheet,” which was released concurrent with the Address and which strictly held that 
“[f]ederal funds will only be used for research on existing stem cell lines” and that “[n]o 
federal funds will be used for . . . the derivation or use of stem cell lines derived from newly 
destroyed embryos.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The use of this language allowed President 
Bush’s Administration and supporters to portray his Decision as actually allowing funding
for stem cell research rather than withholding such funding.  See, e.g., Rick Weiss, 
Promising More–and Less; Scientists See Growth in Field, Lament Limits, WASH. POST,
Aug. 10, 2001, at A1; President Council’s Report, supra note 29, at 28; Testimony of 
Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services Before the Senate Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions Comm. (Sept. 5, 2001), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
news/speech/2001/010905.html (“President Bush has opened the laboratory door.  Now, 
let’s get our best and brightest scientists into the lab so they can go to work.”).  However, it 
is important to note that it was in fact the Administration’s actions prior to President Bush’s 
Address that hindered the implementation of the Final Guidelines, which would have 
probably allowed for such funding much sooner. 
 110. Exec. Order No. 13,237, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,851 (Nov. 28, 2001).  The established 
Council, which was headed by Dr. Leon Kass and which was mostly manned by members 
holding a conservative viewpoint, later published its report on stem cell research, which 
retroactively, ethically endorsed President Bush’s Directive.  See generally PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 29. 
 111. For further discussion of this omission and its possible reasons, see infra Part II.A 
and note 283. 
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Despite the fact that President Bush did not “formalize” his Directive 
and did not specifically instruct HHS and the NIH to follow his Stem Cell 
Decision, within hours of his Address, both Secretary Thompson and the 
Acting Director of the NIH, Ruth Kirschstein published their endorsement 
of President Bush’s Directive,112 and thus sealed the fate of the portion of 
the Final Guidelines that dealt with hESCs.113  Two weeks after President 
Bush’s Address, the NIH announced that it was initializing a new process 
to enable funding of research involving hESCs in accordance with 
President Bush’s Directive and a prohibition on its intramural investigators 
(in what was apparently yet another moratorium) to conduct research on 
any hESCs until the new procedures were in place.114
On November 7, 2001, the NIH officially announced that it was 
accepting grant applications for research involving hESC lines that 
complied with President Bush’s Directive115 and the creation of hESC 
registry, which included all of the hESC lines that met those 
requirements.116  Notably, around the time of President Bush’s Address, 
there was some confusion and disagreement regarding the actual number of 
viable and available hESC lines that complied with President Bush’s 
Directive.117  To date, the NIH hESC registry includes sixty-seven lines, 
and only twenty-one are actually available for researchers who wish to 
apply for federal funding.118
                                                          
 112. Kirschstein Statement, supra note 4; Thompson Statement, supra note 4. 
 113. Ironically, it was Ruth Kirschstein who only a year earlier, signed the publication of 
the Final Guidelines.  For further discussion of Ruth Kischstein’s actions, see infra Part II.C. 
 114. NIH Funding of Research Using Specified Existing Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 
NOT-OD-01-058 (Aug. 23, 2001), available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/ 
not-od-01-058.html, superseded by NOT-OD-01-059 (Aug. 27, 2001). 
 115. Notice of Extended Receipt Date and Supplemental Information Guidance for 
Applications Requesting Funding that Proposes Research with Human Embryonic Stem 
Cells, NOT-OD-02-006 (Nov. 7, 2001), available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/ 
notice-files/not-od-02-006.html; Notice of Criteria for Federal Funding of Research on 
Existing Human Embryonic Stem Cells and Establishment of NIH Human Embryonic Stem 
Cell Registry, available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-02-005.html. 
116. See NIH, NIH Human Embryonic Stem Cell Registry, http://stemcells.nih.gov/ 
research/registry (last visited Dec. 2, 2007) (listing the derivations of stem cells that are 
eligible for federal funding).   
 117. While one NIH publication stated that there were sixty-four hESC lines, another 
mentioned seventy-eight, a third mentioned seventy-one, and so forth.  See NIH Update, 
supra note 107 (sixty-four); Department of Health and Human Services, Fact Sheet–
Embryonic Stem Cell Research (July 14, 2004), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/ 
20040714b.html (seventy-eight); NIH, NIH’s Role in Federal Policy–Stem Cell Research 
(Aug. 12, 2005), http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/NIHFedPolicy.asp (seventy-one). 
 118. Yu & Thomson, supra note 21, at 6.  The discrepancy between the number of hESC 
lines in the registry and the number of such lines actually available results from various 
reasons.  According to the NIH hESC registry, some of the hESCs never became cell lines 
due to halted growth or failure to remain undifferentiated.  One line was withdrawn by its 
donor, others are “unavailable for shipping,” and so forth.  The number of hESC lines 
available for research is significantly smaller than the number of such lines President Bush 
was led to believe were available prior to reaching his Stem Cell Decision, which was 
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On November 14, 2001, the NIH announced the demise of the parts of 
the Final Guidelines dealing with funding for research involving hESCs.119
The only reason mentioned by the NIH for the withdrawal of the Final 
Guidelines was that “[t]he President has determined the criteria that allow 
Federal funding for research using existing embryonic stem cell lines . . . .  
Thus, the NIH Guidelines as they relate to human pluripotent stem cells . . . 
are no longer needed.”120  This last notice essentially gave the regulatory 
framework for research involving hESCs its final form as it exists today. 
Since August 2001, Congress has tried to change the regulatory scheme 
of funding for research involving hESCs numerous times121 without much 
success.122  Most notably, on July 18, 2006, the Senate passed the Stem 
Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005.123  This Act was supposed to add 
§ 498D to the Public Health Service Act (PHSA),124 which would have 
instructed the Secretary of HHS to start conducting and supporting research 
involving hESCs so long as the hESC lines involved in the research 
complied with the following “ethical requirements”: 
(1) The stem cells were derived from human embryos that have been 
donated from in vitro fertilization clinics, were created for the purposes 
of fertility treatment, and were in excess of the clinical need of the 
individuals seeking such treatment. 
(2) Prior to the consideration of embryo donation and through 
consultation with the individuals seeking fertility treatment, it was 
determined that the embryos would never be implanted in a woman and 
would otherwise be discarded. 
                                                          
actually even smaller at the time he gave his Address—only one or two in the spring of 
2002! See President Bush’s Op-Ed Piece, supra note 104; NIH FAQs, supra note 15. 
 119. National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent 
Stem Cells, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,107 (Nov. 14, 2001). 
 120. Notice of Withdrawal of NIH Guidelines for Research Using Pluripotent Stem 
Cells, NOT-OD-02-007 (Nov. 7, 2001), available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/ 
notice-files/not-od-02-007.html. 
121. E.g., Stem Cell Replenishment Act of 2005, H.R. 162, 109th Cong. (2005); Human 
Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection Act of 2003, S. 303, 108th Cong. (2003); 
Science of Stem Cell Research Act, H.R. 4011, 107th Cong. (2002); Stem Cell Research 
Act of 2001, H.R. 2059, 107th Cong. (2001); Stem Cell Research for Patient Benefit Act of 
2001, H.R. 2747, 107th Cong. (2001) (sought to codify the Final Guidelines); New Century 
Health Advantage Act, H.R. 2838, 107th Cong. (2001) (sought to require the NIH to 
conduct human embryonic stem cell research and repeal the Dickey Amendment).  
 122. None of Congress’s bills or acts, save two, were ever voted into law, and the only 
bills that were actually voted for by both Houses were vetoed by President Bush. See infra
notes 126-31. 
 123. Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 810, 109th Cong (2006). 
 124. Public Health Service Act, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 201-300ii-4 (2000)). 
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(3) The individuals seeking fertility treatment donated the embryos with 
written informed consent and without receiving any financial or other 
inducements to make the donation.125
The passing of the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act by a 
Republican Congress126 expressed an unequivocal congressional discontent 
with the current regulatory scheme for funding research involving hESCs, 
which is based on the policy set by President Bush’s Directive.  Yet 
eventually, on July 19, 2006, President Bush vetoed the Stem Cell 
Research Enhancement Act.127  Attempts to raise the two-thirds majority in 
the House failed and the Act was abandoned.128  In 2007, the newly formed 
Democratic majority in Congress again passed the Stem Cell Research 
Enhancement Act.129  Once more, President Bush vetoed the Act130 and 
there was no two-thirds majority in Congress to override the veto.131  And 
so, since President Bush’s Address in August 2001, and until today, the 
only federal funding available for research involving hESCs is for research 
that uses the twenty-one hESC lines that meet President Bush’s Directive’s 
criteria.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT BUSH’S DIRECTIVE 
AND HIS ADMINISTRATION’S ENSUING POLICY
Having described the regulatory framework of research involving 
hESCs, it is now possible to begin its legal examination.  The first step in 
analyzing President Bush’s Directive and the NIH’s ensuing actions is to 
identify the type of presidential directive it is and the ramifications of the 
Directive’s form, if any, on its enforceability.  Once the question of form is 
addressed, this Article will discuss the main substantive question of 
whether President Bush had the legal authority to give his Directive and 
                                                          
 125. These requirements are almost identical to those set in President Bush’s Directive 
except for the fact that they do not restrict federal funding to hESC lines created prior to 
August 9, 2001, at 9:00 p.m.  In this respect, the Human Stem Cell Research Enhancement 
Act of 2005 would have essentially enacted the Final Guidelines into law. 
 126. Despite the fact that the first session of the 109th Congress was clearly Republican, 
the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005 passed by a majority of 238-194 in the 
House of Representatives, and 63-37 in the Senate. 
 127. Press Release, White House, Message to the House of Representatives, 2006 WL 
2007324 (July 19, 2006). 
 128. In a vote in the House of Representatives that same day, the supporters of the Act 
managed to raise a majority of 235 yeas against 193 nays. 
 129. On January 11, 2007, the House of Representatives passed a bill identical to the 
Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005.  See Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act 
of 2007, H.R. 3, 110th Cong. (2007).  Three months later, on April 11, 2007, the bill passed 
in the Senate.  See S. 5, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 130. Press Release, White House, President Bush Discusses Stem Cell Veto and 
Executive Order, 2007 WLNR 11640195 (June 20, 2007). 
131. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Vetoes Bill Removing Stem Cell Limits, Saying ‘All 
Human Life is Sacred’, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at A21 (“Democrats concede they do not 
have enough votes for a veto override.”). 
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require the NIH to comply, and—assuming he had such authority—
whether he used it appropriately.  Finally, if the answer to the previous 
question is in the affirmative, in order to evaluate the legality of the current 
regulatory scheme of funding for research involving hESCs, it is necessary 
to determine whether the NIH’s actions implementing President Bush’s 
Directive were in accord with the NIH’s own authorities, duties, and 
responsibilities under the law. 
A.  Classification of President Bush’s Directive’s Form and  
Evaluation of Its Validity from a Procedural Standpoint 
It is said that presidential directives are the “most elusive in [their] 
capacity to be legally analyzed and constrained.”132  There are over twenty 
types of such ill-defined presidential directive instruments including, but 
not limited to: executive orders, proclamations, presidential memoranda, 
and signing statements.133  In addition, neither the Constitution nor any 
statute or case law defines exactly what presidential directives are, how to 
distinguish among their different kinds,134 how the President may use them 
and to what end, what procedural requirements must be fulfilled in using 
them in general and each of them in particular, and what is the permissible 
scope of their substance.135  The only exceptions are those presidential 
directives categorized as executive orders and proclamations, which are 
subject to the Federal Register Act136 and to Executive Order No. 11,030.137
Therefore, so long as their directives bear forms other than “executive  
                                                          
 132. PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF & CYNTHIA R. FARINA, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTS 193 (10th ed. 2003). 
133. See Harold C. Relyea, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: 
Presidential Directives: Background and Overview (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/crs/98-611.pdf (providing an overview of the different kinds of directives used by 
presidents in the twentieth century). 
134. See Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders and Other 
Presidential Directives, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 267, 282, 290-91 (2001) (discussing the 
difficulties in discerning between different presidential directives); see also COMMITTEE ON 
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS: A
STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 1 (1957) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL STUDY OF 
EXECUTIVE POWER] (“There is no law or even Executive order which attempts to define the 
terms ‘Executive order’ or ‘proclamation.’”). 
135. See Gaziano, supra note 134, at 282 (emphasizing the broad discretion presidents 
have in using directives). 
 136. The Federal Register Act, ch. 417, 49 Stat. 500 (1935) (codified as amended at 44 
U.S.C. §§ 1501-1511) (1964), requires that executive orders and proclamations generally be 
published in the Federal Register.  See 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a). 
 137. Exec. Order. No. 11,030, 27 Fed. Reg. 5847 (June 21, 1962).  The Order requires, 
among other things, that executive orders and proclamations “contain a citation of the 
authority under which [they are] issued” and that they be submitted to the Attorney General 
who must approve their substance, form, and legality.  Id.; see also Gaziano, supra note 
134, at 292-93 (discussing procedures for issuing proclamations and executive orders). 
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orders” or “proclamations,” presidents may tailor their directives in any 
way they want, giving them any title they want, and using them for any 
means they see fit, without having consequences on the enforceability of 
the directives from a formal standpoint.138
President Bush and his Administration, probably well aware of this 
situation, seem to have taken advantage of it in designing President Bush’s 
Directive so as to ensure that its form would be impervious to judicial 
review.139  First, the President delivered his Address orally, on television, 
and it was never published in the Federal Register.140  The accompanying 
Fact Sheet was never published in any formal government publication.141
Second, neither the Address nor the Fact Sheet bears the signature of the 
President, and the Address does not include any specific operational 
instructions directed at executive officers, but is merely a vague 
pronouncement of moral preferences.142  Finally, the Address and Fact 
Sheet carry none of the conventional titles, which could have helped to 
classify them under one of the known forms of presidential directives  
(e.g., “executive order” or “memorandum”).143  Thus, President Bush’s 
Directive does not seem to fall squarely under any of the known types of  
                                                          
 138. According to Gaziano, “a new President and a creative bureaucracy could come up 
with twenty-four new ‘types’ [of presidential directives] if they wished to do so.”  See
Gaziano, supra note 134, at 291. 
 139. Had the Administration chosen to issue the Directive in the more conventional form 
of an executive order, it would have been obliged to state its source of authority as well as to 
have its content approved by the Attorney General.  See supra notes 136-37.  As I will later 
show, the Bush Administration would have been hard pressed to do either of these things.  
See infra Part II.B.  And so, it is prudent to assume that the Administration’s omission to 
cement the Stem Cell Decision—which is one of President Bush’s Administration’s 
landmark policies—in such a duly issued executive order since August 2001 has not been 
the result of neglect, but rather of a deliberate effort by the Administration to avoid having 
to state the Directive’s source of authority, which might cast its legal legitimacy in a 
questionable light. 
 140. President Bush’s Address was only published in the Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents, and in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States.  See
President Bush’s Address, supra note 1; President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation 
on Stem Cell Research, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1151 (Aug. 9, 2001). 
 141. The Fact Sheet seems to be available only through the White House Office of the 
Press Secretary.  See Fact Sheet, supra note 109. 
142. Id. The “operative” part of President Bush’s Directive only surfaces in the 
accompanying Fact Sheet. 
 143. The title of the written version of the Address is “President Discusses Stem Cell 
Research,” and the title of the Fact Sheet is “Fact Sheet: Embryonic Stem Cell Research.”  
According to Gaziano, the primary method of classification of presidential directives relies 
almost exclusively on the title they are given.  See Gaziano, supra note 134, at 288-89;  
see also CONGRESSIONAL STUDY OF EXECUTIVE POWER, supra note 134, at 1; Branum, supra
note 7, at 7. 
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presidential directives.144  As a result, there are no formal or procedural 
requirements applicable to it, so it cannot suffer from any formal or 
procedural flaw, which might have affected its validity or enforceability. 
B.  Analysis and Evaluation of President Bush’s Authority
to Issue His Directive and Enforce It on the NIH 
Similar to the lack of regulation characterizing the formal and procedural 
aspects of presidential directives, there is very little law regulating the 
President’s authority to issue such directives145 and how one can evaluate 
the legality of such directives.  Except for the axiomatic premise that 
presidential acts must be based on a legal source of authority (or else the 
President would actually be acting as an autocrat),146 the most important 
source of guidance on these issues is found in Justice Jackson’s famous and 
highly influential opinion in the matter of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.  
v. Sawyer.147  According to Justice Jackson, when evaluating the legitimacy 
of presidential actions, a court should weigh the actions’ sources of 
statutory and constitutional authority, and assess their compatibility with 
congressional powers and legislation.148  Justice Jackson describes three 
“tiers” of authority for presidential actions.149  In the “first tier” are 
presidential actions taken “pursuant to an express or implied authorization 
                                                          
 144. President Bush’s Address does bear some resemblance to a loosely defined, 
somewhat obscure, class of presidential directives mentioned by Relyea, called “Presidential 
Announcements” and defined as “oral presidential directives . . . captured in an 
announcement which records what the President has prescribed or instructed.”  See Relyea, 
supra note 133, at 12. Yet, Relyea adds that Presidential Announcements “often are 
recorded in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents . . . .  However, they do not 
appear in the Federal Register or in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States.”  Id.  President Bush’s Address, while not published in the Federal Register, was
published in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, and thus falls outside 
the definition of this type of presidential directive. 
     It is interesting to note that a similar conclusion could also be drawn with respect to 
President Clinton’s 1993 Embryo Decision, which was titled “Statement on Federal Funding 
of Research on Human Embryos” and was never published in the Federal Register but rather 
only in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents and in the Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States. See supra note 60; see also President William J. Clinton, 
Statement on Federal Funding of Research on Human Embryos, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2142 (Dec. 
2, 1994).  Hence, President Clinton’s Embryo Decision may also be viewed as falling 
outside of any of the known types of presidential directives. 
 145. Such authority is sometimes mentioned in particular statutes or may be construed as 
implied from powers constitutionally or statutorily granted to the President.  See Gaziano, 
supra note 134, at 271-72, 276. 
 146. Some analogize such a president, who makes unrestricted use of executive power, 
to a “regulatory policy czar” or even to a king.  See Cynthia R. Farina, The “Chief 
Executive” and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 181 (1997); 
Branum, supra note 7, at 1, 33. 
 147. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
148. Id. at 635-38 (“Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their 
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”). 
149. Id.
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of Congress,” in which the President’s authority “is at its maximum.”150
The “second tier” includes presidential actions taken “in absence of either a 
congressional grant or denial of authority.”151  Finally, the “third tier” 
includes presidential actions that are “incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress,” in which the President’s power “is at its lowest 
ebb.”152  This Article begins its examination of the validity of President 
Bush’s Directive with a survey of the law governing the area of funding for 
scientific research in general and research involving hESCs in particular.  
Then, this Article classifies President Bush’s Directive and analyzes its 
validity under the appropriate “tier” offered in Justice Jackson’s 
Youngstown opinion (Youngstown Analysis). 
1. The Legal Framework of Federal Funding for Scientific Research 
Generally, the authority to fund biomedical research is granted to the 
Secretary of HHS, who acts through officers within NIH.  The Public 
Health Service Act (PHSA) provides that “the Secretary is authorized 
to . . . make grants-in-aid to universities, hospitals, laboratories, and other 
public or private institutions, and to individuals for . . . research 
projects.”153  Section 405 of the PHSA authorizes the Secretary, acting 
through the Directors of the NIH’s Research Institutes154 to “encourage and 
support research, investigations, experiments, demonstrations, and studies 
in the health sciences.”155  All funding decisions are subject to policies set 
by the Director of NIH, who is authorized to make such policies for the 
entire NIH.156
Several statutes expressly affect the funding of human embryo 
research.157  The most important is the Dickey Amendment.  According to 
the Amendment: 
None of the funds made available in [HHS Appropriations Acts] may be 
used for . . . the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research 
purposes . . . or . . . research in which a human embryo or embryos are 
destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death 
greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero.158
                                                          
150. Id. at 635. 
151. Id. at 637. 
152. Id.
 153. 42 U.S.C. § 241(a)(3) (2000). 
 154. The NIH itself is an assemblage of individual research institutes, each of which 
charged with a particular area of research.  See id. § 281. 
155. Id. § 284(b)(1)(A). 
156. Id. § 282(b)(1). 
 157. For instance, the NIHRA determines that “[t]he Secretary may conduct or support 
research on the transplantation of human fetal tissue for therapeutic purposes.”  See id.
§ 289g-1(a)(1). 
 158. The Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128(2), 110 Stat. 
26 (1996). 
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In light of the Rabb Opinion, which found that the NIH could fund 
research involving already-created hESC lines because such research 
would not qualify as the destruction of human embryos under the Dickey 
Amendment, it is widely accepted that the Dickey Amendment does not 
prohibit the funding of research that indirectly involves the destruction of 
human embryos (e.g., research involving stem cell lines created from 
destroyed embryos).159  When read alongside each other, the Dickey 
Amendment and the PHSA authorize the Directors of the NIH’s Research 
Institutes to support and conduct research involving hESCs so long as the 
research does not involve the creation of hESC lines or pose substantial 
risk to human embryos. 
Most importantly, all funding for research conducted and supported by 
the NIH, including research involving embryos and hESCs, is also subject 
to the general instruction of § 101 of the NIHRA: 
(b) Ethical review of research 
(1) Procedures regarding withholding of funds 
If research has been recommended for approval . . . the Secretary [of 
HHS] may not withhold funds for the research because of ethical 
considerations unless— 
(A) the Secretary convenes an advisory board in accordance with 
paragraph (5) to study such considerations; and 
(B)(i) the majority of the advisory board recommends that, because of 
such considerations, the Secretary withhold funds for the research; or 
(ii) the majority of such board recommends that the Secretary not 
withhold funds for the research because of such considerations, but the 
Secretary finds . . . that the recommendation is arbitrary and capricious. 
. . . 
(3) Applicability 
The limitation established in paragraph (1) . . . shall apply without regard 
to whether the withholding of funds on such basis is characterized as a 
disapproval, a moratorium, a prohibition, or other characterization. 
. . . 
                                                          
159. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  Interestingly, by allowing for funding 
for research involving hESC lines (even if very few) President Bush’s Directive seems to 
have accepted this premise.  This position is also reflected in President Bush’s op-ed piece, 
in which he explicitly stated that “[f]ederal funding for research on existing stem cell lines 
will move forward.”  See President Bush’s Op-Ed Piece, supra note 104. 
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(5) Ethics advisory boards 
(A) Any advisory board convened for purposes of paragraph (1) shall be 
known as an ethics advisory board . . . 
(B)(i) An ethics board shall advise, consult with, and make 
recommendations to the Secretary regarding the ethics of the project of 
biomedical or behavioral research with respect to which the board has 
been convened. 
(ii) . . . [T]he board shall submit to the Secretary . . . a report describing 
the findings of the board regarding the project of research involved and 
making a recommendation under clause (i) of whether the Secretary 
should or should not withhold funds for the project. . . 
(C) An ethics board shall be composed of no fewer than 14, and no more 
than 20, individuals who are not officers or employees of the United 
States. The Secretary shall make appointments to the board from among 
individuals with special qualifications and competence to provide advice 
and recommendations regarding ethical matters in biomedical and 
behavioral research. Of the members of the board— 
(i) no fewer than 1 shall be an attorney; 
(ii) no fewer than 1 shall be an ethicist; 
(iii) no fewer than 1 shall be a practicing physician; 
(iv) no fewer than 1 shall be a theologian; and 
(v) no fewer than one-third, and no more than one-half, shall be scientists 
with substantial accomplishments in biomedical or behavioral 
research.160
The basis of this section was Congress’s belief that “[c]ontinued 
progress in health research is seriously threatened by . . . administrative 
actions that undermine the peer review process at NIH and block research 
that holds promise for millions of Americans suffering from disease.”161
Accordingly, § 101 was “intended to prohibit unilateral actions that block 
research approved by the merit review system”162 by forbidding 
“unreasonable prohibitions . . . imposed in an arbitrary manner on 
exceptional and promising research that have received approval by NIH’s 
rigorous scientific, technical, and ethical review system”163 and to “restore 
the freedom of inquiry essential to the continued success of the country’s 
biomedical research.”164
                                                          
 160. 42 U.S.C. § 289a-1(b)(1)-(5). 
 161. S. REP. NO. 103-2, at 13 (1993). 
162. Id. at 15. 
163. Id. at 13. 
164. Id. at 15. 
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To achieve these goals, § 101 establishes a “default” under which such 
funding for scientifically meritorious research should be granted unless it is 
duly withheld.165  Furthermore, while the Secretary, acting through his 
subordinates, has authority to support and conduct research involving 
hESCs that meets the restrictions of the Dickey Amendment, § 101 takes 
away the Secretary’s authority to withhold funding from scientifically 
meritorious research involving hESCs because of ethical considerations  
without first receiving a recommendation to do so from an independent, 
duly-appointed Ethics Advisory Board.  With this conclusion in mind, it is 
now possible to turn to the Youngstown Analysis of President Bush’s 
Directive.
2. Classification of President Bush’s Directive Under Justice Jackson’s  
 Taxonomy 
The question is now: under which of the “tiers” described by Justice 
Jackson does President Bush’s Directive fall?  In order to fall under the 
“first tier,” a presidential action should rely on express or implied statutory 
authority.166  If this had been the case, we could have expected that 
President Bush’s Address or the Fact Sheet would state the source of 
authority which they may have relied on,167 yet neither of them does.168
Therefore, we must determine whether President Bush’s Directive could 
have relied on such an express or implied authorization in legislation. 
A survey of congressional legislation reveals that no statute explicitly 
grants the President the authority to decide the permissible object or means 
of scientific research in general or for purposes of funding in particular.  
                                                          
165. Id. at 20 (“It is the committee’s intent that . . . all research proposals that are 
approved by the merit review system and are awarded funding, and for which there is no 
justifiable reason for withholding or withdrawing funding, should be funded.”); see also
supra note 48. 
 166. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (noting that in such cases, the President’s power is at its maximum). 
 167. According to Branum, presidential directives normally state the source of their 
authority (whether legal or constitutional).  In the rare case that a presidential directive 
totally disregards the issue of its authority, courts tend to question the validity of the 
presidential directive.  See Branum, supra note 7, at 67-68. 
 168. Puzzlingly, no one has ever explicitly stated the source of President Bush’s 
authority to give his Directive and enforce it upon the NIH.  The only reference I was able 
to find to the possible source of President Bush’s authority to give his Directive was by  
O. Carter Snead, the General Counsel of President Bush’s own Council on Bioethics.  In an 
article dedicated entirely to President Bush’s Stem Cell Decision, Snead briefly mentioned 
that “the Bush policy demonstrates . . . a robust exercise of the President’s authority as head 
of the executive branch to allocate the appropriated funding according to the 
Administration’s priorities” (emphasis added).  See Snead, supra note 73, at 498.  Hence, 
according to Snead, the President’s source of authority to give his Directive was simply his 
being the “head of the Executive Branch.”  As will be explained later in this section, this 
laconic explanation insinuates an “inherent” or “aggregate” constitutional presidential 
authority based on Article II of the Constitution.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
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Hence, the question becomes whether President Bush’s Directive relied on 
implied statutory authority. 
Examining the statutes that regulate HHS and NIH funding of scientific 
research169 reaffirms that the legislative language, on its face, does not lend 
itself to a construction implying that the President has the authority to 
intervene in the regulation of the funding for any type of scientific research, 
either inside or outside the context of research involving hESCs.  
Nevertheless, some scholars argue that there is more to the concept of 
implied presidential statutory authority. 
The issue of implied presidential statutory authority is part of a lively 
debate regarding the measure of the President’s control over the way 
executive officers carry out their statutorily-granted discretionary 
authorities and the President’s power to affect the policies and decisions 
they make.  This dispute is part of the longstanding and hotly debated 
controversy over the “unitary executive.”170  In this particular context, the 
debate revolves around the existence of a presidential takeover power—
whether the President has the power to set policies and make decisions for 
executive agencies by “taking over” the duties bestowed upon them in 
legislation.171  One of the most prominent proponents of this “presidential 
takeover power” stemming from an implied presidential statutory authority 
is Dean Elana Kagan.  According to Dean Kagan, the President has (and 
should have) the power to direct executive agencies by setting their policies 
and making decisions for them.172  Yet, unlike most proponents of the 
“unitary executive” theory, Dean Kagan does not find the source of the 
President’s authority to take over the powers granted to agencies in the 
Constitution; rather, she reads legislation in a way that includes an implied 
presidential authority to take control of almost all of the legislative powers 
granted by Congress to particular agencies and executive officers.173  Dean 
Kagan asserts that where a statute does not explicitly exclude the President  
                                                          
169. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300ii-4 (2000). 
 170. For opposing views on the issue of the “unitary executive” and presidential powers 
to exert control over administrative agencies, see generally Yoo et al., supra note 7; Martin 
S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996).  See also Elana 
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2272-81 (2001).  This dispute 
will be further discussed later in this section.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 171. For further discussion of this issue, see infra Part II.B.3.a. 
172. See Kagan, supra note 170, at 2320, 2326-28 (noting that the President does not 
have authority to direct officials from independent agencies without the express grant of 
Congress).
173. Id.  Kagan bases this construction of legislation on public policy reasons rather than 
on an historical reading of the Constitution.  See id. at 2331-46. 
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from having the power to possess the discretionary authorities it grants to 
executive agencies, the statute should be construed to imply that the 
President has the power to use such authorities as his own.174
Under Kagan’s Doctrine, President Bush had the power to take over all 
of the authorities granted to the HHS and the NIH with respect to the 
funding of scientific research, including hESC research.  Thus, to the extent 
that the HHS and the NIH had the authority to make a policy decision 
prohibiting the allocation of funding to research involving hESCs created 
after August 9, 2001, Kagan’s Doctrine would assert that President Bush 
had the same authority and could have relied on this power in issuing his 
Directive.
However, even if we accept Dean Kagan’s argument—which some 
scholars vehemently do not175—President Bush’s Directive could not have 
relied on this supposed implied statutory authority because NIHRA § 101 
explicitly prevents HHS and the NIH from withholding funding for 
scientific research on ethical grounds without the prior recommendation of 
a duly appointed EAB.176  Even if we espouse Kagan’s Doctrine and 
presume that President Bush had all of the powers Congress granted to 
HHS and the NIH, he could still not have had a power that Congress did 
not grant to these agencies.  In other words, since HHS and the NIH lack 
the authority to make decisions regarding the funding of scientific research 
based on ethical grounds without the prior approval of an EAB, so does 
President Bush. 
We can surmise that President Bush’s Directive could not have relied on 
an express or implied statutory authority, and thus does not fall within the 
boundaries of the “first tier” described in Youngstown.  In addition, in light 
of the legislation regulating the funding of biomedical research177—which
indicates that Congress did not leave this area “an open field” for 
presidential action—we can determine that President Bush’s Directive does 
                                                          
174. Id. at 2251.  It is important to note that to date there seems to be no court decision 
implementing or even mentioning Dean Kagan’s unitary executive theory (Kagan’s 
Doctrine) or anything similar in analyzing presidential powers. 
 175. Some of the most convincing arguments against Kagan’s Doctrine’s basis and 
rationales are made by Kevin Stack.  See Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers 
to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006).  One of Stack’s main arguments is 
that, contrary to Dean Kagan’s assertions, Congress’s practice of granting, in a handful of 
cases, legislative authorities to the President in name indicates that when Congress intends 
to grant the President legislative powers it does so explicitly and hence that her inference 
that wherever Congress did not do so indicates the existence of presidential powers goes not 
only against interpretation principles but also against common sense.  See id. at 268, 276-99.  
Stack makes a compelling case against Kagan’s Doctrine.  His arguments and examples put 
the thesis promoted by Dean Kagan in a new light and substantially undermine the statutory 
construction that lies at the base of Kagan’s Doctrine.
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 289a-1(b) (2000); see also supra Part II.B.1. 
177. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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not fall under Justice Jackson’s “second tier,” which applies to presidential 
acts in the absence of a congressional grant or denial of authority.178
Subsequently, and taking into consideration the language of NIHRA  
§ 101—a language which explicitly seeks to remove from executive 
officers the power to make bioethical decisions with respect to the funding 
of research and requires them to have the bioethical issues properly 
deliberated in a highly visible public forum beforehand—President Bush’s 
Directive seems to fall neatly under the definition of the “third tier” 
described in Youngstown.  In giving his Directive, President Bush did 
exactly what Congress expressly sought to prohibit: in his capacity as the 
highest executive officer in the federal government, he made a decision to 
withhold funding for biomedical research involving hESCs.  He did so 
based on his own moral and ethical beliefs, and without first receiving a 
recommendation to do so from an independent EAB, thus rendering his 
actions incompatible with § 101.  Having reached this conclusion, this 
Article will now proceed to analyze the validity of President Bush’s 
Directive under the premises of the “third tier.” 
3. Analysis of the Validity of President Bush’s Directive as Presidential 
Action Incompatible with the Expressed Will of Congress 
According to Justice Jackson: 
     When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed 
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he 
can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any 
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.  Courts can sustain 
exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the 
Congress from acting upon the subject.  Presidential claim to a power at 
once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for 
what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional 
system.179
Following this “roadmap” for judicial review of presidential actions, we 
will assess the validity of President Bush’s Directive by weighing the 
possible constitutional powers, which may have granted him the authority 
to give his Directive despite NIHRA § 101. 
Lacking express constitutional language granting the President the 
authority to decide on matters involving scientific research and its funding, 
President Bush’s Directive’s only other possible source of authority is 
                                                          
178. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637, 639 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that “in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of [presidential] authority,” Congress and the President have concurrent authority, 
which requires a more flexible examination than under either the “first tier” or the “third 
tier”). 
179. Id. at 637-38. 
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inherent presidential authority under the “Vesting Clause.”180  In order to 
determine whether such inherent authority could have empowered 
President Bush to give his Directive, we need to answer the following two 
questions: (1) what is the measure of direction Presidents may exert over 
executive agencies and does the presidential power to direct executive 
agencies, which presumably stems from the President’s inherent authority, 
include the authority to set policies for agencies as President Bush did in 
his Directive; and (2) could inherent authority have empowered President 
Bush to “override” and act in variance with NIHRA § 101. 
a. Inherent Presidential Authority and Its Applicability to 
 President Bush’s Directive 
“Inherent” or “aggregate” authority, as it has been referred to, is a 
somewhat controversial source of presidential constitutional power.  The 
central proposition of the claim of inherent presidential constitutional 
authority is that under the auspices of the Vesting Clause,181 the President, 
as Chief Executive, is endowed with the power to direct the actions of 
executive agencies. 
The controversy surrounding the existence of an inherent authority 
derives not only from its origin and undefined scope,182 but mostly from the 
fact that the Supreme Court has never explicitly acknowledged the 
existence of such authority.183  This may be attributed, at least in part, to the 
                                                          
 180. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America.”). 
181. Id.
182. See PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION, 4-5 (2002) (discussing the origins of “inherent authority”).  
Similar and even stricter words may be found in Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in 
Youngstown:
  Loose and irresponsible use of adjectives colors all non-legal and much legal 
discussion of presidential powers.  “Inherent” powers, “implied” powers, 
“incidental” powers, “plenary” powers, “war” powers and “emergency” powers are 
used, often interchangeably and without fixed or ascertainable meanings. 
  The vagueness and generality of the clauses that set forth presidential powers 
afford a plausible basis for pressures within and without an administration for 
presidential action beyond that supported by those whose responsibility it is to 
defend his actions in court. . . . While it is not surprising that counsel should grasp 
support from such unadjudicated claims of power, a judge cannot accept self-
serving press statements of the attorney for one of the interested parties as authority 
in answering a constitutional question . . . .  But prudence has counseled that actual 
reliance on such nebulous claims stop short of provoking a judicial test. 
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646-47 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 183. The Supreme Court has referred to the concept of inherent presidential authority on 
numerous occasions, but the author is unaware of any case in which the Supreme Court has 
ever actually acknowledged the existence of an inherent authority in the President as a 
source of presidential power in a matter before the court.  See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 516-17 (2004); id. at 552 (Souter J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 
concurring in the judgment); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 773 (1996); see also
Branum, supra note 7, at 68; George v. Ishimaru, 849 F. Supp. 68, 71-73 (D.D.C. 1994) 
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fact that the language of inherent authority only surfaces when it is clear 
that the President does not have any other identifiable source of authority 
from which his acts may draw legitimacy.184
Nonetheless, in light of the frequent invocation of inherent authority 
arguments by the Government—especially by the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations185—and for the sake of completeness of the analysis of 
President Bush’s Directive, this Article assumes that inherent authority is 
as valid a source of presidential power as these Administrations have held 
it out to be.  Thus, this part of the analysis assumes that, hypothetically, 
President Bush could have established his Directive on his Article II power 
to direct administrative agencies’ actions and policies.186
                                                          
(“This court rejects the argument that the President has ‘inherent’ appointment authority 
under the Take Care Clause of Article II of the Constitution to appoint persons to positions 
like this one. . . . No court has ever recognized that the President has such inherent authority. 
. . . The important work of the Commission on Civil Rights should not be impeded by 
continuing to argue about “inherent” Presidential power which no court in the nation’s 
history has ever recognized.”). 
 184. Henry Monaghan captured the essence of this phenomenon: 
[W]hen . . . no readily identifiable legislative warrant exists, and arguably the 
President is implementing presidential policy alone, a different constitutional 
vocabulary surfaces. The Vesting Clause, the Take Care Clause, the Presidential 
Oath to ‘preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the United States,’ and the 
Presidents ‘inherent,’ . . . or ‘aggregate’ powers are all invoked in defense of the 
President’s conduct . . . . Each of these terms is simply a different formulation of 
the fundamental claim that the President’s conduct is valid even though no 
statutory authority exists. 
See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 
(1993).
185. See, e.g., Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 
203, 211 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting an inherent power argument made by the Clinton 
Administration); Ishimaru, 849 F. Supp. at 71-72 (rejecting the argument that the President 
has “inherent” appointment authority under Article II of the Constitution); Hamdi, 542 U.S. 
at 516-17 (avoiding the issue of inherent presidential authority by finding that Congress 
authorized the President to order the plaintiff’s detention); ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 
754, 780-81 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (holding that the President, as Commander in Chief, did not 
have inherent power to authorize the NSA to intercept international telephone and internet 
communications without a warrant); see also Yoo et al., supra note 7, at 729-30 (“Support 
for the unitariness of the executive branch does not necessarily require supporting the broad 
claims of inherent executive authority advanced by the Bush Administration.”); Kagan, 
supra note 170, at 2320-21 (addressing “President Clinton’s repeated invocation of a 
vaguely defined ‘executive authority’ to direct administrative officials to adopt certain 
presidential policies”); Gaziano, supra note 134, at 281 (“Some of President Clinton’s 
claims of implied and inherent authority were outrageous.”). 
 186. Despite my approach to the concept of “inherent authority” in this part of the 
Article, it is my opinion that “inherent authority” is a superfluous and sometimes even 
dangerous concept that the courts must not allow to exist as a valid source of presidential 
authority.  In most cases in which the government raises “inherent authority” arguments, the 
use of this concept is misleading and mistaken and the government actually means to argue 
that the authority for the presidential action was implied from one of the President’s express 
constitutional powers.  (This type of mistake often occurs with relation to the President’s 
powers under the “Commander in Chief” Clause.)  Yet, in other cases, as described by 
Monaghan, the government has been invoking “inherent authority” to bolster arguments that 
the President had the power to take certain actions unsanctioned by any other express or 
implied constitutional or statutory authority.  See Monaghan, supra note 184, at 24-32 
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However, President Bush’s Directive did much more than merely 
provide direction to the NIH with respect to the funding of research 
involving hESCs: it set its policies for it.  Can the President do that?  Does 
the scope of the President’s inherent authority include the ability to set 
policies for executive agencies?  As mentioned above, a lively dispute 
persists with respect to the extent of control the President may exert over 
administrative agencies’ actions and the measure of his ability to direct 
their policies. 
i. The Unitary Executive Debate over the Presidential Power 
 to Direct Executive Agencies 
Three schools of thought predominate the debate surrounding the 
President’s power to control discretionary authorities granted to executive 
officers.  The first school, which I will refer to as Constitutional 
Unitarianism, envisions the President as somewhat of a “super-executive” 
who may, under the Constitution, “take over” almost any responsibility 
assigned to any inferior officer,187 including policymaking authorities, and 
act in their stead in his own capacity as President or, alternatively, nullify 
the actions of which he does not approve.188  According to this school of 
thought, the “presidential takeover power” exists even when the 
authorizing statute explicitly grants a discretionary executive power to a 
particular officer.189
The main rationale of Constitutional Unitarianism is that the Vesting 
Clause grants “executive power” solely and exclusively to the President, 
who is the source of the executive power in the Government and who 
merely delegates it to entities and officers that Congress has charged with 
tasks, whereas these entities and officers are otherwise powerless to act 
                                                          
(critiquing this approach).  I believe that accepting the government’s inherent authority 
arguments in such cases may be dangerous since it would ratify the existence of presidential 
powers beyond those granted to the President by the Constitution or in legislation and thus 
beyond the checks and balances set forth in our constitutional scheme and the framework of 
the Separation of Powers Doctrine.  This type of authority resembles the kind of power that 
an autocrat would have, not a President of a democracy.  See Branum, supra note 7, at 33. 
 187. The exception to this is quasi-judicial administrative functions, namely when an 
agency is required to make decisions which affect specific individuals in specific cases.  See
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (explaining that the President has no power 
to influence or control executive officers when they are acting in a quasi-judicial manner); 
Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1546-48 (9th Cir. 
1993) (acknowledging that “when an agency performs a quasi-judicial . . . function its 
independence must be protected” and that “[t]here is no presidential prerogative to influence 
quasi-judicial administrative agency proceeding”). 
188. See Yoo et al., supra note 7, at 607. 
189. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 595 (1994) (“Because the President alone has the 
constitutional power to execute federal law, it would seem to follow that, notwithstanding 
the text of any given statute, the President must be able to execute that statute.”). 
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unless and until such presidential delegation takes place.190  Therefore, 
according to Constitutional Unitarians, Congress simply cannot grant 
executive power to any entity that is beyond the reach of the President,191
who is vested with the residual power to do, essentially, “whatever remains 
to be done after the formal Article I lawmaking process is concluded.”192
Accordingly, under Constitutional Unitarianism, executive agencies are 
merely a means to “assist” the President in carrying out the duties of the 
Chief Executive.193  Thus, under the Constitutional Unitarian theory, 
because President Bush himself was the source of the NIH’s authorities, he 
had the authority to make funding decisions and set funding policies for the 
NIH, as he did in his Directive, as well as to nullify the NIH’s previously 
promulgated Final Guidelines, which he did not approve of and which did 
not align with his Stem Cell Decision. 
The second school of thought, which I will refer to as Non-Constitutional 
Unitarianism, believes, like Constitutional Unitarians, that the President has 
takeover powers as well as the power to nullify executive policies and 
actions.  However, unlike Constitutional Unitarians who rely on originalist-
historical arguments, Non-Constitutional Unitarians argue that the 
President ought to have such Powers as a matter of public policy and 
desirable constitutional interpretation.194  For the purposes of the analysis 
of President Bush’s Directive, the Non-Constitutional Unitarian view is 
identical to that of the Constitutional Unitarian theory in the sense that it 
too would perceive President Bush’s Directive as properly relying on a 
presidential authority to set and nullify policies for executive agencies. 
Finally, the third school of thought, which I will call Moderate 
Unitarianism, consists of those who believe that the President’s authorities 
to direct executive agencies do not and must not entail the power to set 
policies and make decisions for agencies and in their stead but merely 
allow the President to “stir them in the right direction” through various 
means.195  Unlike the two previous schools of thought, Moderate Unitarians 
                                                          
190. See id. at 593 (“[T]he Executive Power Clause grants ‘the executive Power’ solely 
and exclusively to the President. . . .  Until and unless the President delegates ‘the executive 
Power’ to . . . entities or officers, they are constitutionally disempowered from acting.”). 
191. Id.
 192. Farina, supra note 146, at 181 (emphasis omitted) (criticizing the Constitutional 
Unitarian approach). 
 193. Constitutional Unitarians believe that although the President is the one who has the 
executive power, the President obviously cannot fulfill all the tasks imposed by Congress 
upon executive agencies alone and thus enlists the assistance of executive officers.  See
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 189, at 593-94, 597-98. 
194. See Kagan, supra note 170; see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994) (basing their support of a 
unitary executive on constitutional interpretation). 
195. See Farina, supra note 146 (condemning what she referred to as “the cult of the 
Chief Executive”); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 
968 (1997) [hereinafter Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking] (arguing that President Clinton’s 
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perceive the President as more of a “manager” and view presidential power 
over executive agencies as stopping short of the ability to dictate policies 
for and instruct such agencies on how they should use their discretionary 
powers.196  Under the Moderate Unitarian approach, agencies “have 
relationships with the President in which he is neither dominant nor 
powerless.”197  Moderate Unitarians therefore contend that in matters 
involving substantive decisions, executive officers are required to resist 
attempts by the President to impose his opinions upon them.198  In a 
nutshell: supervision and direction are acceptable and even welcome, but 
substitution is not. 
The Moderate Unitarian contention most relevant to this Article is that in 
setting policies for agencies, the President undermines the Separation of 
Powers Doctrine by partaking in the agencies’ rulemaking function, 
thereby overstepping into the “quasi-legislative” dimension of agencies.199
                                                          
practice of “owning” administrative actions “insufficiently respects the tension inherent in 
the Constitution between Congress’s power . . . and the fact of a single chief executive”); 
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch] (proposing a framework for analysis of the relationship between the 
President and agencies that balances the need for presidential oversight of the agencies with 
congressional authority and role in government); see also Richard H. Pildes & Cass  
R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995) (claiming 
that the President cannot make decisions for executive agencies if Congress previously 
allocated authority to the agencies).  Moderate Unitarianism acknowledges that the 
President has (and should have) various means of influencing agencies, like the 
constitutional power to remove executive officers and appoint others in their stead (with the 
limited exception of independent commissions created by Congress) as well as numerous 
‘procedural’ authorities over agencies including the authority to provide information to 
agencies so as to promote coordination in matters touching upon national policies, the 
authority to require agencies’ response on policy concerns relevant to them, or even the 
authority to direct agencies to further consider certain perspectives on a certain policy issue.  
See Strauss, Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, supra, at 649-50.  See generally
Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal 
Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986). 
 196. For a discussion of policy issues as they relate to Constitutional and  
Non-Constitutional Unitarianism as opposed to Moderate Unitarianism, see generally 
Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM.
U. L. REV. 443, 445-63 (1987). 
 197. Strauss, Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, supra note 195, at 583;  
see also Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, supra note 195, at 981-84 (arguing that the 
President may inquire into the duties delegated to agencies as long as he understands that 
the final decisions regarding the duties belong to the agency). 
198. See Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, supra note 195, at 973 (“That means that it is 
[an executive officer’s] right, and in some cases it may be his obligation, to refuse the 
President’s direction, even if he realizes that his disappointed boss may immediately send 
him out of office.”). 
199. See id. at 967-68 (finding that the President’s practice insufficiently respects the 
tension between Congress’s power and his own office, namely “between the legal and the 
political”); see also Kagan, supra note 170, at 2320 (“Congress indeed has delegated 
discretionary power, but only to specified executive branch officials; by assuming 
responsibility for this power, the President thus exceeds the appropriate bounds of his 
office.”). 
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In addition, Moderate Unitarians contend that the Executive Office of the 
President lacks the resources necessary for making decisions, which require 
expertise and are therefore better left to executive agencies and officers.200
Thus, under the Moderate Unitarian theory, President Bush was prohibited 
from setting policies regarding the funding of research involving hESCs for 
the NIH, could not have simply nullified the Final Guidelines’ part 
regulating such research, and did not have the power to give a presidential 
directive to that effect. 
ii. The Unitary Executive Debate in Court—Which School  
 of Thought Prevails? 
Courts seem to have never directly endorsed any of the above schools of 
thought.201  Yet, in numerous cases involving issues pertaining to the 
“unitary executive” debate, the Supreme Court rejected the Constitutional 
Unitarian positions and leaned more toward the theory of Moderate 
Unitarianism.  The most obvious example of this judicial inclination is the 
pair of presidential removal-power cases, Myers v. United States202 and 
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.203  In both cases, the issue was the 
extent of the President’s authority to remove executive officers, and in both 
cases, the Government, taking the Constitutional Unitarian stance, argued 
that the President had constitutional authority to remove any executive 
officer at will.  In Myers, the Supreme Court found that the President has 
an almost unlimited removal power stemming from the Article II vested 
executive powers.204  But only nine years later, the Supreme Court in 
Humphrey’s Executor ruled that Congress may restrict the President’s  
                                                          
 200. See Farina, supra note 146, at 185 (“[I]t is unrealistic to think that the President can 
supervise the entire regulatory enterprise in any comprehensive and meaningful way.”).  
Allowing presidential involvement in such decisions would obviously increase the political 
component in these decisions at the expense of the expertise component.  The Moderate 
Unitarian stance is that in this politics/expertise tradeoff, we must not allow “politics” to 
completely take over “expertise,” which plays a vital role in many executive decisions. 
201. See Kagan, supra note 170, at 2250, 2271, 2322 (asserting that “the courts never 
have recognized the legal power of the President to direct even removable officials as to the 
exercise of their delegated authority”); see also Stack, supra note 175, at 270 (mentioning 
that although the question of whether the President has directive authority when a statute 
grants power to an executive officer was already prevalent during the nineteenth century, it 
“has never been squarely addressed by the Supreme Court”). 
 202. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 203. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
204. Myers, 272 U.S. at 134-35.  In Myers, the Supreme Court decided the constitutionality 
of a statute providing that certain postmasters could only be removed with the approval of 
the Senate.  The Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional due to its infringement 
upon the principle of separation of powers and thus upheld the President’s removal of a 
postmaster without the approval of the Senate.  However, it is important to note that the 
Myers Court acknowledged, though in dictum, that Congress may be able to limit the 
President’s ability to direct executive officials.  Id. at 135. 
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removal power, thus practically rejecting the Constitutional Unitarian 
contention that Article II, § 1 grants the President an almost unlimited 
power to run the executive branch as the President sees fit.205
Another example of the Supreme Court’s rejection of the Constitutional 
Unitarian position is the seminal case of Morrison v. Olson.206  In 
Morrison, the Supreme Court was once again called on to decide the 
constitutionality of a statute, namely the Ethics in Government Act, which 
insulated the position of Special Prosecutor from the influence and control 
of the President.  The Supreme Court held that the Act was constitutional 
and that the Attorney General, as the President’s representative, lacked the 
power to remove the Special Prosecutor at will (i.e. without “good cause”) 
or control the way in which the Special Prosecutor carried out those duties.  
By doing so, the Supreme Court once again acknowledged Congress’s 
ability to insulate certain executive officers and functions from the control 
of the President, and basically declined to accept the Constitutional 
Unitarian argument regarding the exclusivity and scope of the President’s 
reign over all that is executive.207
These cases may suggest the existence of a “judicial trend” in the 
Supreme Court towards Moderate Unitarianism in general.208  Notably, 
these cases lie at the base of the conventional scholarly view, which also 
seems to follow the Moderate Unitarian approach: that the President lacks 
the authority to set policies and make decisions for executive agencies and 
in their stead.209  However, it appears that a “judicial trend” and a scholarly 
                                                          
205. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629-32.  The issue in Humphrey’s Executor was 
similar to that in Myers. Once again the President sought to remove an executive officer, 
only this time the officer was a Federal Trade Commissioner and the Supreme Court had to 
decide whether Congress could limit the President’s powers of removal as it did with respect 
to FTC Commissioners.  The Supreme Court ruled that Congress’s law “insulating” the FTC 
Commissioners from the removal powers of the President was constitutional.  However, the 
Court distinguished this case from Myers by holding again that actual participation of 
Congress in the removal process would be unconstitutional. 
 206. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
207. See id. at 693-96 (“It is undeniable that the Act reduces the amount of control or 
supervision that the Attorney General and, through him, the President exercises over . . .  
investigation and prosecution . . . .  The Attorney General . . . does not determine the 
counsel’s jurisdiction; and his power to remove a counsel is limited.”). 
 208. A much earlier indication of this “trend” (and possibly one of its precursors) is 
dictum in the Supreme Court’s decision in Kendall v. United States, which seems to 
advocate the Moderate Unitarian approach with respect to presidential takeover powers.  37 
U.S. 524, 610 (1838). 
209. See Kagan, supra note 170, at 2320, 2324.  As Dean Kagan observed: 
The conventional view in administrative law, in apparent accord with [Myers and
Humphrey’s Executor], holds that the President lacks the power to direct an agency 
official to take designated actions within the sphere of that official’s delegated 
discretion.  The President has no authority to act as the decisionmaker, either by 
resolving disputes in the OMB process or by issuing substantive directives.  This is 
because Congress, under the removal precedents, can insulate administrative 
policymaking from the President, and Congress has exercised this power by 
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convention are not authoritative enough to provide us with an unequivocal 
determination regarding the President’s power to set policies for executive 
agencies.  Furthermore, any attempt to predict whether this Moderate 
Unitarian inclination of the Supreme Court—which appears to have existed 
when Morrison was decided about twenty years ago210—will persist 
(especially in the realigned Roberts Court), should be taken with a grain of 
salt.  Therefore, it appears that we remain without any conclusive answer 
regarding the existence of presidential takeover powers in general and their 
applicability to President Bush’s Directive in particular. 
Nonetheless, as before, for the sake of completeness of the analysis, this 
Article will make the assumption that setting a policy for the NIH was 
within the boundaries of President Bush’s constitutional inherent authority.  
This is not to say that in the particular case of President Bush’s Directive, 
he properly used this inherent authority or that he may set funding policies 
for the NIH as he did, but merely that in principle, it is assumed that he 
could have found the power to do so with the inherent authority arguably 
vested in him.  Thus, it is now necessary to determine whether President 
Bush’s presumable inherent authority (to set policies for the NIH) gave him 
the power to override NIHRA § 101. 
b.  Inherent Authority as a Power to Override NIHRA § 101 
This Article will now return to the “third tier” framework laid out in 
Youngstown and use it to evaluate the validity of President Bush’s actions.  
At the heart of this part of the discussion lies the question of whether 
President Bush’s supposed inherent authority to set policies for the NIH 
enabled him to give his Directive in spite of the NIHRA’s instruction that a 
recommendation from a duly-established EAB precede an administrative 
decision to withhold federal funding from scientific research on ethical 
grounds. 
A longstanding Supreme Court rule prohibits the President from acting 
in variance with a clear and valid statutory instruction,211 even in a state of 
                                                          
delegating the relevant discretion to a specified agency official, rather than to the 
President. 
Id. at 2323, 2325; see also Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 195, at 24 (“What we might call 
the conventional view relies on the following three points[:] . . . (c) the President has no 
authority to make the decision himself, at least if Congress has conferred the relevant 
authority on an agency head.”). 
210. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text. 
211. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804) (holding that the 
congressional statute was clear and that the President had no power to expand its scope);
see also CONGRESSIONAL STUDY OF EXECUTIVE POWER, supra note 134, at 10; Pildes  
& Sunstein, supra note 195, at 24-25 (“[N]either the President nor the agency head may 
violate the law, and to that extent both must follow the substantive statutory standard, 
whatever their policy views may be.”). 
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emergency.212  Yet, in light of the fact that the presidential act in the matter 
before us claims reliance on an inherent constitutional power, the issue at 
hand is somewhat more intricate than that which came before the Court in 
Little v. Barreme, which set this precedent. 
Using “third tier” terminology, we can say that in his Directive, 
President Bush “took a measure” that was clearly “incompatible with the 
expressed will of Congress,” as manifested in NIHRA § 101.  Hence, 
President Bush’s power was “at its lowest ebb,” and he could only have 
relied on his Constitutional powers, which presumably consisted of the 
President’s inherent authority to direct executive agencies.  Following 
Justice Jackson’s scheme, we should determine whether this presidential 
power supersedes Congress’s constitutional legislative power under  
Article I, §§ 1 and 18 to legislate the NIHRA.  According to Youngstown,
presidential measures incompatible with the will of Congress would only 
be upheld by the courts where the President can claim an exclusive power 
to act and where such claim has been “scrutinized with caution” by the 
court.  In other words, courts would only uphold presidential acts that go 
against clear statutory instructions in cases where it is clear that the 
Constitution empowers the President to act exclusively and Congress has 
no business interfering.213  But is funding for scientific research in general, 
or for research involving hESCs in particular, an area that the Constitution 
designates as exclusively within the realm of the President’s powers?  The 
answer appears to be in the negative and so the conclusion of this 
Youngstown Analysis is that President Bush’s Directive could not have 
overridden the NIHRA, even if it did rely on an inherent presidential 
authority to set funding policies for the NIH. 
Still, as convincing and widely quoted as Justice Jackson’s Youngstown
opinion may be, it is only dicta, and is therefore not instructive, but rather 
suggestive, and so are the conclusions it yields.  Nevertheless, several court 
decisions dealing with presidential acts that violated congressional statutes 
bolster our conclusion that President Bush’s Directive could not have 
overridden the NIHRA. These decisions indicate that Justice Jackson’s 
opinion in Youngstown is a true reflection of the law, of the way courts 
perceive presidential acts that transgress congressional legislation, and of 
the very narrow latitude they are willing to afford to such acts. 
                                                          
212. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (rejecting the 
argument that the President’s “inherent power” to take action in a state of emergency 
legitimized the seizure of the steel mills); see also Monaghan, supra note 184, at 24-32 
(“Whether or not any president can live with it, the literary theory of ‘The executive Power’ 
recognizes no presidential license to disregard otherwise concededly applicable legislation, 
even in an emergency.”). 
 213. Examples of such cases may include the President’s powers to set foreign policies 
(not including the signing of treaties) and to act as Commander in Chief. 
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The first example is, appropriately, the Youngstown Court’s own 
majority opinion, which examined the validity of an executive order that 
facilitated the governmental seizure of privately owned steel mills.214
Indeed, the presidential directive in Youngstown, which, according to the 
Government, relied on the President’s inherent authority,215 did not directly 
violate any particular congressional statute.  However, as the Court 
acknowledged, the executive order not only failed to comply with statutory 
requirements for governmental seizures,216 but also strove to settle a labor 
dispute by using seizure—a method Congress had previously refused to 
adopt.217  Hence, the presidential directive in Youngstown, which the court 
refused to uphold, was really an attempt by the President to circumvent 
Congress’s will by ignoring the law in much the same way President 
Bush’s Directive simply ignored NIHRA § 101 requirements and the 
congressional will behind it. 
Furthermore, in analyzing the Government’s claim of inherent 
constitutional authority to issue the executive order, the Youngstown Court 
ruled that: 
In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that 
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a 
lawmaker . . . .  The President’s order does not direct that a congressional 
policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—it directs that a 
presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the 
President.218
Accordingly, the Youngstown Court upheld the District Court’s 
injunction against the President’s executive order. 
This case demonstrates the Supreme Court’s reluctance to uphold an 
executive order, which implemented a presidential policy that both 
contravened and was at the expense of congressional policy properly set in 
legislation.219  Although the majority’s opinion in Youngstown apparently 
                                                          
214. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582-83. 
215. See id. at 582-84 (noting that the Government asserted that “a strike disrupting steel 
production for even a brief period would so endanger the well-being and safety of the 
Nation that the President had ‘inherent power’ to do what he had done”). 
216. See id. at 585-86 (“There are two statutes which do authorize the President to take 
both personal and real property under certain conditions.  However, the Government admits 
that these conditions were not met and that the President’s order was not rooted in either of 
the statutes.”). 
217. See id. at 586 (“Moreover, the use of the seizure technique to solve labor disputes in 
order to prevent work stoppages was not only unauthorized by any congressional enactment; 
prior to this controversy, Congress had refused to adopt that method of settling labor 
disputes.”). 
218. Id. at 587-88. 
219. See id. at 588 (“The power of Congress to adopt such public policies as those 
proclaimed by the order is beyond question.”).  As explained above, the congressional 
policy took shape in two forms: one, in two statutes regulating governmental taking of 
property, and two, in refusal to allow for taking as means of settling labor disputes. 
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would have perceived the presidential action there as falling within the 
boundaries of the “second tier,” it nonetheless reflects the general 
sentiment expressed in Justice Jackson’s opinion with respect to 
presidential actions that circumvent legislation. 
Another testament to the validity of the insights encapsulated in Justice 
Jackson’s opinion and to their applicability to President Bush’s Directive 
may be found in two cases—State Highway Commission of Missouri  
v. Volpe220 and Train v. City of New York221—both of which deal with the 
President’s power to set money spending policies where such policies go 
against positive statutory instruction to spend certain sums.  Though these 
cases did not involve direct judicial review of presidential instruction of 
executive officers, in both cases, the courts acknowledged that the 
administrative act under review was the result of a presidential instruction 
to act in spite of federal legislation.222  Subsequently, in both cases, the 
courts overruled the administrative acts that implemented the presidential 
instruction not to spend,223 thus once again indicating the courts’ aversion 
to presidential policies and acts that are in clear conflict with legislation.  
These cases are also a testament to the courts’ unwillingness to defer to 
presidential instruction of executive agencies to implement presidential 
policies in a manner blatantly inconsistent with the law.  Applying State
Highway and Train v. City of New York to President Bush’s Directive not 
only indicates that courts would not accept the Directive, but also that the 
courts would frown upon the NIH’s implementation of President Bush’s 
Stem Cell Decision.224
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Reich225—the
second case ever in which a presidential executive order was overruled in 
its entirety226—is another example of the courts’ unwillingness to tolerate 
                                                          
 220. 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973). 
 221. 420 U.S. 35 (1975). 
 222. In State Highway, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a decision by the Secretary of 
Transportation to defer his authority to allocate funds apportioned by Congress to highway 
development in Missouri due to a presidential policy to limit government expenditures to 
control the inflation.  479 F.2d at 1103, 1108.  In Train v. City of New York, the Supreme 
Court reviewed a decision by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) not to allot the 
City of New York funds appropriated by Congress for development of water and sewage 
infrastructure, whereas the EPA’s decision was the result of a direct instruction by the 
President to limit the sums which were originally appropriated for this purpose.  420 U.S. at 
40.
223. See State Highway, 479 F.2d at 1118 (enjoining the defendants from withholding 
authority to appropriate funds under the Federal Aid Highway Act in Missouri); City of New 
York, 420 U.S. at 44, 47 (finding that the letter from the President and the Administrator’s 
withholding of the funds could not “be squared with the statute”). 
 224. For a discussion of the NIH’s policy implementing President Bush’s Directive, see 
infra Part II.C. 
 225. 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
226. See Branum, supra note 7, at 38 (explaining that President Clinton was “only the 
second President to have an executive order struck down by the courts in its entirety”). 
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presidential actions intended to circumvent statutes.  In Reich, the 
Government attempted to defend an executive order issued by President 
Clinton, which clearly contradicted a congressional act, by arguing that 
another later, though more general statute granted the President the 
authority to issue his order in abrogation of the former statute.227  The D.C. 
Circuit did not accept the Government’s arguments and held that the 
earlier, more specific statute preempted President Clinton’s executive 
order.228 Although the Court’s reasoning in this matter seemed to involve 
mere statutory construction, its decision indicated the Court’s reluctance to 
uphold a presidential action that stands in clear conflict with a valid 
statute.229
Lastly, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Building & Construction  
v. Allbaugh230 addressed the validity of an executive order issued by 
President George W. Bush that prohibited executive agencies entering into 
agreements with contractors from requiring or prohibiting the 
implementation of certain pro-union labor practices,231 and which was 
presumably in conflict with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).232
In its arguments during the trial, the Government contended that the 
President’s authority to issue the executive order stemmed from his 
inherent constitutional power to direct executive agencies.233  The District 
Court did not accept the Government’s arguments regarding the President’s 
authority to issue the order, but rather found it to be “presidential 
lawmaking” a lá Youngstown, and overruled the relevant part in the 
executive order as preempted by the NLRA.234  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit 
accepted the Government’s argument that the President’s authority to issue 
the executive order stemmed from his “supervisory authority over the 
Executive Branch”235 in an area of regulation that is not preempted by the 
                                                          
227. See Reich, 74 F.3d at 1332-33 (rejecting the argument that the Procurement Act of 
1949 granted broad power to the President over the more specific National Labor Relations 
Act). 
228. Id. at 1332-39. 
229. See id. at 1338-39 (concluding that “the Executive Order is regulatory in nature and 
is pre-empted by the NLRA which guarantees the right to hire permanent replacements”);
see also Gaziano, supra note 134, at 287 (“Reich stands for the seemingly obvious 
proposition that the President may not use his statutory discretion in one area to override a 
right or duty established in another law.”). 
 230. 295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 231. Exec. Order No. 13,202, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,225 (Feb. 17, 2001). 
 232. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000)); see Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d 
138, 162 (D.D.C. 2001) (making two sections of President Bush’s executive order invalid 
because they were preempted by the NLRA). 
233. See Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (“Defendants’ constitutional argument rests 
on the ‘well-established’ power . . . to supervise and guide subordinate executive officials to 
ensure the consistent execution of the laws.”). 
234. Id. at 172. 
235. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 32-33. 
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NLRA,236 and thus overturned the District Court’s decision and upheld the 
executive order.237  Yet, the important part of the D.C. Circuit’s decision 
for our purposes is its reasoning.  The D.C. Circuit did not base its decision 
on the premise that the President’s inherent authority empowered him to act 
in variance with congressional statutes, but rather on the fact that the 
disputed segment in the executive order was preceded by the words “[t]o 
the extent permitted by law.”238  In the eyes of the D.C. Circuit, the prefix 
“to the extent permitted by law” was assurance enough that “if [an agency 
implementing the executive order] is prohibited, by statute or other law, 
from implementing the Executive Order, then the Executive Order itself 
instructs the agency to follow the law.”239  In fact, the D.C. Circuit found 
the redeeming qualities of this prefix so great that had the presidential 
directive in Youngstown been supplemented with this qualification, the 
court opined that it would have made most of the discussion regarding its 
validity moot.240 Building & Construction therefore demonstrates once 
more the courts’ view that presidential actions are permissible and will be 
tolerated only to the extent they do not contravene valid congressional 
legislation.
The aforementioned cases indicate that Justice Jackson’s opinion is a 
true crystallization of how courts perceive and rule in matters involving 
presidential actions that run against valid statutory instruction.  Evidently, 
courts tend to be suspicious of presidential directives that do not comport 
with legislation, and they tend not to uphold such directives or their 
progeny.241  The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that Justice 
                                                          
236. Id. at 34. 
237. Id. at 36.
238. Id. at 33. 
239. Id.
240. Id. Thus, it appears that according to the D.C. Circuit, if all presidential directives 
had the prefix “to the extent permitted by law” there would never be questions regarding 
their legality or validity.  As a side note, I find it worth adding that I believe the D.C. Circuit 
was wrong in its decision that practically allows the President to leave the legal inquiry 
about the legality of his executive orders’ instructions to agencies and expect them to find 
what is “permitted by law” and what is not.  Turning the phrase “to the extent permitted by 
law” into a “kosher stamp” for just any presidential directive—outrageous and outright 
illegal as it may be—might encourage the President to issue directives of dubious legality 
which might eventually be enforced by executive officers who wish to avoid direct 
confrontations with the President.  This clearly undesirable situation cannot simply be cured 
via semantic maneuvers. 
 241. Notably, an even broader possible implication of these cases is that courts would 
not hastily acknowledge and enforce a presidential claim of authority that has no, or hardly 
any checks on it, especially as Justice Jackson says, when such a right is in direct 
contradiction of the legitimate use of constitutional authority by another branch of the 
government (e.g., Congress’s Article I authority to legislate the NIHRA).  See Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952).  The Youngstown decision and 
the majority opinion in Morrison both support this proposition.  According to the Morrison 
Court, the President’s powers may not be construed to be entirely separate or detached from 
the powers granted to the other branches of government.  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 
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Jackson’s opinion may well be viewed as the judicial standard—or 
blueprint for such a standard—that courts would apply in cases of 
presidential claims of inherent authority to instruct executive agencies to 
take action in contravention of legislation.  Application of this standard 
would mean that inherent authority may not serve the President as a power 
to override federal statutes in general, and that to the extent that President 
Bush relied on such an authority in giving his Directive, it could not have 
enabled him to give his Directive in contradiction to the NIHRA. 
Having found that inherent authority—despite the permissive 
assumptions made here regarding its existence and expansive scope—could 
not have empowered President Bush to give his Directive in contravention 
to the NIHRA, and with the lack of any other source of authority that 
President Bush’s Directive could have relied on, we must determine that 
the Directive is illegal, and thus invalid. 
C.  The NIH’s Actions Examined 
The immediate implication of President Bush’s Directive’s invalidity is 
that it did not, and does not carry any authority over executive agencies.  
However, prior to discussing the implications of its illegality in more detail, 
there is merit in an examination of the measures taken by the NIH 
following President Bush’s Address and their legality. 
Professor Peter Strauss once wrote that “[i]t is far easier [for an 
executive officer] to act as a servant, than as an independent authority 
under instructions from one’s principal.”242  This epigram seems to 
concisely capture the NIH’s response to President Bush’s Directive.  On 
the day President Bush gave his Address, Dr. Ruth Kirschstein, the Acting 
Director of the NIH at that time, subordinated her discretion243 and the  
                                                          
693-94 (1988).  In other words, the Morrison Court opined that the President’s actions do 
not occur in a “vacuum,” but rather are in constant interaction with other powers that exist 
within the Government—powers which the President’s actions must reckon with.  See also
William J. Olson & Alan Woll, Executive Orders and National Emergencies: How 
Presidents Have Come to “Run the Country” by Usurping Legislative Power, 358 CATO 
INST. POLICY ANALYSIS 8-10 (1999) (“The Court’s preference for constitutionally enacted 
laws over presidential directives not clearly based on constitutional or statutory authority is 
evident from its treatment of the implementation of regulations promulgated under such 
directives.”).
 242. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, supra note 195, at 974. 
 243. Under 42 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1), the Director of NIH has the authority to set policies 
for the entire NIH.  For further discussion of this policymaking authority, see supra Part 
II.B.1. 
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discretion of the Directors of the NIH’s Research Institutes244 to that of the 
President by immediately and unreservedly endorsing President Bush’s 
Stem Cell Decision.245
A Moderate Unitarian scrutiny of the NIH’s actions following President 
Bush’s Directive implicates that the NIH’s actions amounted to unjustified 
obsequiousness towards the President, which is not only repugnant to 
principles of proper administration, but is also illegal.  According to 
Moderate Unitarianism, regardless of NIHRA § 101, the NIH’s Acting 
Director had an obligation to not simply accept President Bush’s 
imposition of his own personal policy upon the NIH, even if that would 
have meant that she might risk her office.246  Rather, Dr. Kirschstein, as an 
acting head of an agency, was duty bound to use her autonomous 
discretion.  She ought to have seriously considered the President’s stance 
on the issue of research involving hESCs247 (and was indeed under a 
constitutional obligation to do so), but nonetheless eventually make the 
decision by herself and with the best interests of the public in mind rather 
than the personal sentiments of the President.  Thus, under a Moderate 
Unitarian approach, the submissiveness of the NIH and its Acting Director 
constituted an illegal substitution of their own discretion with that of the 
President.  Moreover, under Moderate Unitarian theory, the NIH’s actions 
amounted to abandonment of its public stewardship and statutory charge, 
which are meant to serve as an important check on the President’s 
executive authority from becoming all-inclusive and all-reaching.248  In 
simpler terms, the Moderate Unitarian approach would hold that the NIH 
forsook its duties and acted as the President’s lackey, thus allowing the 
President’s beliefs to become the law of the land.  Hence, under the 
Moderate Unitarian approach, the NIH’s actions pursuant to President 
Bush’s Directive constituted a capricious executive decision and an abuse 
of the NIH’s discretion to make its own research funding decisions, such 
that a court should set them aside.249
                                                          
 244. Under 42 U.S.C. § 284(b)(1), the Secretary, acting through the Directors of the 
NIH’s research institutes, may grant funding for scientific research. 
245. See Kirschstein Statement, supra note 4.  For a detailed discussion of the actions 
taken by the NIH to implement President Bush’s Directive, see supra Part I.C. 
246. See supra text accompanying note 198. 
247. See Stack, supra note 175, at 314 (stating that executive officials are subject to “an 
obligation to carefully consider the President’s position[s]”). 
248. See id. at 316 (“[T]he mere possibility of resistance [by executive officials to the 
President’s preferred construction or use of a statute] creates a legal check on presidential 
abuse internal to the executive branch. . . .”). 
249. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) (directing reviewing courts to hold unlawful and 
set aside actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law”).  For further discussion of this possible cause of action, see infra Part 
III.D.
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However, it appears that Dr. Kirschstein’s NIH did not share the 
Moderate Unitarian viewpoint.  In what seems to be the NIH’s only 
explanation for its unqualified acceptance of President Bush’s Directive, 
the NIH proclaims on its website: 
As the head of the executive branch of the federal government, which 
includes the National Institutes of Health, the President of the United 
States has the final responsibility and authority to set federal government 
policy for funding human embryonic stem cell research.  But Congress 
has appropriations authority and can possibly override the President’s 
decision.250
Indeed, this is a true statement of the Constitutional Unitarian view.  And 
yet, even under a Constitutional Unitarian approach, the NIH’s actions 
were clearly illegal. 
First and foremost, regardless of President Bush’s authority to give his 
Directive, the Directors of the NIH Research Institutes and its Acting 
Director (NIH Officers) were still bound to follow the numerous 
requirements of NIHRA § 101,251 including the requirement that, before 
they impose a moratorium on certain kinds of scientific research  
(e.g., involving hESCs produced after August 9, 2001 at 9:00 p.m.), they 
must receive a recommendation to do so from a duly-established Ethics 
Advisory Board.252  Having not fulfilled this requirement, the NIH 
Officers’ actions pursuant to President Bush’s Directive were in excess of 
the Officers’ statutory authority, and thus illegal.253
Moreover, the NIH’s announcement of its withdrawal of the Final 
Guidelines’ part relating to research involving hESCs (the Repeal) 
constitutes in and of itself an illegal action under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  Since the Final Guidelines came under the definition of a 
                                                          
250. NIH FAQs, supra note 15. 
251. See supra Part II.B.1.  It is worth noting that both the NIH’s Research Institutes 
Directors’ authority to fund scientific research under 42 U.S.C. § 284(b)(1) and the NIH 
Director’s authority to make general policies for the entire NIH under 42 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1) 
stem from the power of the Secretary.  Specifically, both sections state that the duties and 
authorities they grant are actually the Secretary’s, who is acting through his subordinates, 
the NIH Officers.  Hence, to the extent that the funding granting authority in 42 U.S.C.  
§ 284 and the policymaking authority in 42 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1) are being used by the NIH 
Officers, these Officers are duty-bound by limitations imposed on the source of their own 
authority, namely the Secretary, such as those enumerated in the NIHRA § 101.  This 
proposition is also supported by the principle that a principal may not delegate powers 
greater than the powers she possesses herself.  Thus, a delegate cannot possibly have more 
power than the principal could have delegated to her and the NIH Officers could not have 
ignored the NIHRA § 101 simply because it is addressed to the Secretary. 
 252. 42 U.S.C. § 289a-1(b) (2000). 
 253. It is also worth mentioning in the context of the grants’ allocation proceedings, 
which the NIH Officers failed to follow, that although there is no question that the NIH 
Officers had ample discretion in making funding decisions with respect to particular kinds 
of research or a particular research project, they did not have such discretion with respect 
whether or not to consider the allocation of such funding to begin with. 
49
114 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [60:1 
“rule”254 in the APA and were not exempt from its notice and comment 
requirements,255 their promulgation and repeal were subject to these 
requirements.256  These requirements dictate that prior to repealing the 
Final Guidelines or a part thereof, the NIH was under an obligation to 
publish a general notice in the Federal Register about its intention to repeal 
the Guidelines, provide interested parties an opportunity to comment on the 
planned repeal, consider the comments and the relevant matters presented, 
and only then use its discretion to make an informed decision about 
repealing the Guidelines.257  The NIH indeed published a notice in the 
Federal Register announcing the Repeal.258  Yet, it did not provide 
interested parties the opportunity to comment on the planned Repeal and 
subsequently, did not weigh any opposition prior to the Repeal.  Rather, the 
announcement unilaterally imposed the restrictions in violation of the 
APA’s notice and comment requirements259 (which, as mentioned earlier, 
HHS undertook to follow260).  It appears that the NIH attempted to justify 
these omissions by arguing that President Bush’s Directive made 
compliance with these requirements unnecessary, thus invoking the “good 
cause” exception to the notice and comment requirements.261  Specifically, 
in its withdrawal notice, the NIH stated that “[t]he President has 
determined the criteria that allow Federal funding for research using 
existing embryonic stem cell lines . . . .  Thus, the [Final] Guidelines as 
they relate to [hESC] derived from human embryos are no longer 
needed.”262  Nonetheless, although HHS’s undertaking to follow the notice 
and comment requirements does not apply to cases where the “good cause” 
exception is applicable,263 it is doubtful whether courts would accept this 
explanation as justification for the NIH’s noncompliance with the APA’s 
notice and comment requirements.  According to several Courts of 
Appeals’ decisions, the “good cause” exception would not only be 
narrowly construed, but would also apply only in a limited set of 
                                                          
 254. The Final Guidelines fell under the definition of a “rule” under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), 
and therefore, their repeal was considered “rulemaking” under 5 U.S.C. § 551(5). 
255. See supra note 83. 
 256. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); see also Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 
F.2d 425, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 816 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 761-65 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 257. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 258. National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent 
Stem Cells, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,107 (Nov. 14, 2001). 
259. Id.
260. See supra note 83. 
 261. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). 
 262. Guidelines for Research Using Stem Cells, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57,107. 
 263. Because the HHS’s undertaking involves only matters of grants and benefits, it does 
not necessarily apply to matters coming under the premise of 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), i.e., “when 
the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon are 
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).  
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circumstances that do not exist in this case.264  Hence, it seems that the 
NIH’s explanation of its noncompliance with the APA’s notice and 
comment requirements was not sufficient to exempt it from these 
requirements, and the Repeal was illegal under the APA. 
An interesting question that arises in this context is whether President 
Bush’s Directive was authoritative enough to enable the NIH to simply 
disregard the APA’s instructions.  In other words, could the President have 
lawfully given the NIH instructions and empowered it to act in violation of 
the APA?  Following the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Franklin  
v. Massachusetts,265 it may be argued that, just like presidential actions are 
not reviewable under the APA out of “respect for the separation of powers 
and the unique constitutional position of the President,”266 agency actions 
that follow and implement such presidential actions may be exempt from 
the APA.267  Applying this proposition to the matter at hand would result in 
the conclusion that since President Bush’s Directive’s disregard of the 
APA’s notice and comment requirements is not reviewable under the APA, 
so too are the pursuant actions taken by the NIH to implement the 
Directive.  However, even if we assume that President Bush’s Directive’s 
violation of the APA would be deemed non-reviewable under the APA,268
                                                          
 264. According to 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), there are three grounds for finding “good 
cause,” namely when “notice and comment” would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or 
contrary to the public interest.”  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).  “Impracticability” is interpreted as 
applicable in cases of emergency.  Am. Fed’n Gov’t Emp. v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1156 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (limiting use of the good cause exceptions to “emergency situations”).  
However, no such emergency existed in the matter of President Bush’s Directive, and so it 
is unlikely that courts would accept a “good cause” for emergency argument. See Consumer 
Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 447-48 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that an 
emergency does not exist when an agency finds regulations to be defective); see also Envtl. 
Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 915, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 
v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 764 (3d Cir. 1982). As for non-necessity, according to the D.C. 
Circuit, this ground would have applied only had the Repeal been a “routine determination, 
insignificant in nature and impact and inconsequential to the industry and to the public.”  
See Util. Solid Waste Activities Group v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749, 755 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting 
South Carolina v. Block, 558 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 (D.S.C. 1983)).  Since the Repeal is 
anything but “routine,” “insignificant in nature and impact,” and is consequential to the 
industry and the public, this ground too, would not be available to the NIH in attempting to 
rely on the “good cause” exception.  And as for the “public interest” ground for the “good 
cause” exception, according to the D.C. Circuit it would only apply when “the interest of the 
public would be defeated by any requirement of advance notice.” Id. at 755 (quoting United 
States Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure 
Act 31 (1947)).  As before, it is hard to see how following the notice and comment 
requirements in this case would defeat the public’s interest, and so we should surmise that 
none of the grounds enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) are applicable to the Repeal and 
thus that the NIH could not have relied on them. 
 265. 505 U.S. 788 (1992). 
266. Id. at 800-01. 
 267. In so doing, courts following Franklin would actually accept a narrow set of 
circumstances in which the President may act in violation of the APA. 
 268. Opposing this proposition is the aforementioned courts’ intolerance of presidential 
actions that may contradict valid law.  See supra Part II.B.3. 
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this conclusion seems to be far-fetched with respect to the NIH.  The APA 
is unequivocal about its applicability to agency actions.269  Despite the 
Franklin Court’s holding that applying the APA to the President would 
require an express statement by Congress to this effect,270 Congress has 
made it clear that the APA applies to executive agencies.  Therefore, it is 
highly unlikely that courts would require a further “statement of 
applicability” of the APA to executive actions, including actions that are 
the direct result of presidential directives.  In other words, even if we 
accept the proposition that presidential actions may legitimately run in the 
face of the APA, it does not follow that agencies may wield Franklin as a 
shield against judicial review when they are acting under such Presidential 
instructions.271  Hence, the NIH could not have used President Bush’s 
Directive as a justification for its disregard of the APA’s notice and 
comment requirements.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ILLEGALITY OF PRESIDENT BUSH’S
DIRECTIVE AND OF THE ENSUING ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE NIH
The severity of the findings reached in the previous Part—that President 
Bush’s Directive lacked authority and that the NIH’s implementation of his 
Directive was blatantly illegal (the Contestable Actions)—is undeniable 
and invites a judicial challenge.  This Part will discuss some possible 
challenges that the Contestable Actions may face and enumerate some legal 
remedies called for by such challenges.  But, prior to discussing such 
challenges, it is important to address the preliminary issue of standing. 
One would assume that scientists seeking to secure federal funding for 
scientifically meritorious research proposals272 involving hESC lines 
created after August 9, 2001, or otherwise not in compliance with President 
Bush’s Stem Cell Decision would have standing.  Such scientists would 
                                                          
269. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2000) (‘“[A]gency’ means each authority of the Government 
of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another 
agency. . . .”). 
270. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 801. 
 271. Such a situation not only runs against the basic principle that agency action must be 
based on legal mandate, but also goes directly against the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
and the important principle of checks and balances since it proposes a sphere in which a 
President may be allowed to act and authorize actions that go against the law without such 
actions being subject to judicial review.  It is most improbable that courts would seriously 
consider such a proposition. 
 272. It may be argued that scientific merit and allocation of funding thereof is a matter 
“committed to agency discretion by law” under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), and therefore, not 
subject to judicial review.  See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192-94 (1993).  However, the 
arguments possibly raised by scientist-plaintiffs with respect to the Contestable Actions 
would not involve the non-allocation of research funds by the NIH for hESC research, but 
rather the actions taken by the NIH with respect to the repeal of the mechanism that would 
have allowed for the allocation of such funding.  Hence, 5 U.S.C. § 702(a)(2) should not be 
a justiciability barrier in the matter at hand. 
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probably not have a particular hardship establishing that their claims fall 
within the “zone of interests”273 under the APA274 as well as under the 
NIHRA.275  However, a question may arise with respect to such scientists’ 
ability to show that the Contestable Actions have caused them an injury-in-
fact276 and that they have a personal stake in the lawsuit’s outcome.277
Presumably, since there is no certainty that such scientists would have been 
able to secure discretional funds from the NIH to support their hESC 
research had the Final Guidelines been in place, it is unclear whether they 
may be able to convince a court that they have been injured by the 
Contestable Actions and therefore, have a personal stake in overturning 
them. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the issue of injury-in-fact and stake in the 
outcome of the proceedings would bar scientists whose research involves 
hESCs from establishing that they would have standing.  First, the Supreme 
Court has held in cases involving a hardship posed by the government to 
obtain a benefit, that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that she 
would have obtained the benefit “but for the hardship” in order to establish 
standing.  Rather she must show only that the she is able and ready to apply 
for the benefit and that the governmental policy is preventing her from 
doing so.278  Second, the Supreme Court has held on more than one 
occasion that the injury-in-fact requirement may be satisfied not only by 
demonstrating an economic injury, but that an injury may be of other 
kinds.279  For example, a group of hESC researchers could claim that their 
                                                          
 273. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 156 
(1970); see also Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987) (discussing the 
“zone of interests” test). 
 274. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000); see also Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154 (“Where statutes 
are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest 
administrative action.”). 
 275. 42 U.S.C. § 289a-1 (2000). 
276. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152 (“The first question is whether the plaintiff 
alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”). 
277. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 2.12(f)(2), 
91 (7th ed. 2004) (“Whether a party has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues’ 
is, we are told, ‘the gist’ of the question of standing.”). 
278. Id.; see, e.g., N.E. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am.  
v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993).  Notably, this case involved an equal protection 
matter and the injury-in-fact element therein was “the [plaintiffs’] inability to compete on an 
equal footing in the bidding process, not the loss of a contract.” Id.  Similarly, it may be 
argued that in the matter at hand the scientist-plaintiffs’ injury-in-fact has been their 
inability to apply for federal funding for research involving hESCs not in accordance with 
President Bush’s Directive rather than the loss of the funds themselves. 
279. See, e.g., Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154 (“That interest, at times, may reflect 
‘aesthetic, conservational, and recreational’ as well as economic values.” (quoting Scenic 
Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965))); United States  
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686-89 
(1973) (granting standing where aggrieved party claimed injury due to diminished use and 
enjoyment of local natural resources). 
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injury relates to their interest in the advancement of science as it pertains to 
hESC research, which is hindered by the impediments to scientific progress 
put in place by the Contestable Actions.  Similarly, they may argue that 
their injury relates to an interest they have as biomedical researchers in the 
harm caused to the public’s health by the impediments on advancement of 
stem cell based therapies placed by the Contestable Actions.  It therefore 
appears that researchers partaking in research involving hESCs may 
arguably have standing to challenge the Contestable Actions. 
A.  Challenging President Bush’s Directive 
A challenge to President Bush’s Directive is likely to be based on the 
argument that it essentially constitutes forbidden presidential lawmaking.  
President Bush’s and the NIH’s emphasis that the Directive is “the
President’s policy”280 bolsters this argument.  Furthermore, the fact that the 
Directive runs against the explicit instructions of the NIHRA makes it all 
the more clear that President Bush’s Directive “does not direct that a 
congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—it 
directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the 
President.”281
The basic premise of this challenge is that allowing President Bush’s 
Directive to persist despite its clear undermining of a constitutionally valid 
congressional statute would legitimize the usurpation of legislative 
authority by presidents.282  Furthermore, in issuing his Directive, despite 
his likely awareness of his lack of authority to promote his policy (i.e., his 
Stem Cell Decision),283 President Bush’s actions run against one of most 
basic understandings about the nature of the Government of the United 
States, namely that it is “a government of laws, and not of men.”284  Thus, 
courts would likely find that President Bush’s Directive is in clear violation 
of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers and strike it down in its entirety, 
despite their basic reluctance to revoke presidential directives.285
“But He [the Democratic President] Started It” 
A popular defense argument among Presidents whose actions are 
challenged is that their actions did not go beyond prior unchallenged 
                                                          
280. See supra Part I.C, notes 102-05 and accompanying text. 
 281. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952). 
282. See Olson & Woll, supra note 241, at 8 (“Although some directives are proper 
exercises of executive power, others are clearly usurpations of legislative authority.”). 
 283. It is highly improbable that President Bush and his advisors were unaware of the 
potential conflict between his Stem Cell Decision and the NIHRA.
 284. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
285. See Branum, supra note 7, at 59-60, 78-79 (emphasizing how few presidential 
directives have been modified, revoked or struck down). 
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Presidential acts.286  Thus, the Government might try to defend President 
Bush’s Directive by arguing that similar directives issued by President 
Clinton went unchallenged and that President Bush’s Directive “operates” 
in an area that has already been influenced by the actions of President 
Clinton and should be left to work its effect without court interference.287
Indeed, President Clinton’s use of presidential directives to impose his 
policies on executive agencies288—like in the cases of his Embryo Decision 
and Cloning Decision mentioned earlier289—sometimes amounted to 
presidential lawmaking.290  And indeed, it appears that President Clinton’s 
Embryo Decision,291 which was never challenged although it too prohibited 
funding for certain kinds of embryo research in abrogation of NIHRA  
§ 101, is almost identical in its legal circumstances to President Bush’s 
Directive.292  However, President Clinton’s earlier illegal directives cannot 
immunize or cure the similar illegality of President Bush’s Directive.  The 
contention that one defective presidential action may draw legitimacy from 
                                                          
286. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646 (“The Solicitor General lastly grounds support of 
the seizure upon nebulous, inherent powers never expressly granted but said to have accrued 
to the office from the customs and claims of preceding administrations.”). 
 287. Branum alludes to this argument contending that President Bush was forced to give 
his Directive because of the Clinton Administration’s allegedly illegal prying into this area, 
which required President Bush “to negate actions of President Clinton that had effectively 
taken the policy decision away from the legislature and placed it in the realm of the 
executive.”  See Branum, supra note 7, at 45. 
 288. See Executive Orders and Presidential Directives: Hearing Before the House 
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. 2 (2001) [hereinafter Hearing on Presidential Directives] (criticizing this “attitude” 
and quoting President Clinton’s Senior Domestic Policy Advisor, Paul Begalla, who said 
“Stroke of a pen, law of the land, kind of cool.”); Gaziano, supra note 134, at 272-73; 
Kagan, supra note 170, at 2249, 2290; Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, supra note 195, at 
967.
289. See supra note 60. 
290. See Branum, supra note 7, at 36-37 (“Clinton may have misused executive orders 
more blatantly than his predecessors . . . .”); Kagan, supra note 170, at 2320-21 (contrasting 
President Clinton’s invocation of “executive authority” with Justice Black’s opinion in 
Youngstown); see also Hearing on Presidential Directives, supra note 288, at 2 (discussing 
the threat posed to legislative authority from the Executive branch’s prevalent use of 
executive orders and citing President Clinton’s administration as an example). 
291. See supra note 60. 
 292. Neither directive mentions its source of authority nor was published in the Federal 
Register.  See supra note 144.  Also, both directives have an undefined form, and both run 
in clear violation of the NIHRA.  President Clinton’s Embryo Decision even blatantly 
disregarded the recommendations of a duly appointed EAB, the Human Embryo Research 
Panel.  See supra Part I.B, notes 51-60 and accompanying text.  It is worth noting that 
President Clinton’s Cloning Decision also violates the NIHRA in much the same way as 
President Clinton’s Embryo Decision and President Bush’s Directive.  See supra note 60.  
Yet, unlike President Bush’s Directive that has been subject to ongoing challenges by 
Congress (see supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text), President Clinton’s Embryo 
Decision was ratified by Congress’s subsequent passing of the Dickey Amendment.  See
supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.  Interestingly, it appears that should Congress 
henceforth refrain from reenacting the Dickey Amendment as it has been doing every year, 
President Clinton’s Embryo Decision would lose its “blanket of legitimacy” making it as 
illegal as President Bush’s Directive. 
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the defectiveness of an earlier similar presidential action seems too feeble 
to hold water in court.  Hence, although the aforementioned directives 
issued by President Clinton also appear to constitute a usurpation of 
legislative authority, they do not in any way justify such usurpation by 
President Bush’s Directive.  Rather, they too are challengeable as 
presidential lawmaking. 
B.  Challenging the NIH’s Withholding of Funding 
for Research Involving hESCs 
Probably the most significant challenge to the NIH’s actions pursuant to 
President Bush’s Directive would rely on the fact that these actions were 
taken in spite of, and contrary to, the instructions of the NIHRA.  As 
explained above, the NIHRA prevents NIH officers from withholding 
funding for scientific research due to ethical reasons.293  Hence, a challenge 
to the NIH’s withholding of funding for research involving hESCs would 
contend that taking these actions without relying on the recommendation of 
a duly-established EAB constituted an imposition of a moratorium on 
research involving hESCs and an ongoing violation of the NIHRA.294
In other words, a challenge to the NIH’s denial of funds for research 
involving hESC lines that do not comply with President Bush’s Stem Cell 
Decision would argue that unless and until the NIH abides by the 
requirements of the NIHRA, it may not withhold funding from research 
involving any kind of hESCs and must allocate funding for such research 
projects subject only to their scientific merit.295  It therefore follows that the 
NIH is currently acting outside of its statutory authority and in violation of 
statutory limitations imposed on it,296 and thus its withholding of funding is 
unlawful and courts should set it aside. 
C.  Challenging the NIH’s Unilateral Repeal 
of the Final Guidelines 
As explained above, the Repeal violated the APA’s notice and comment 
requirements.297  A possible challenge posed to the Repeal would argue that 
it should have complied with the notice and comment requirements of  
5 U.S.C. § 553, namely, that it should have taken place after giving 
interested parties an opportunity to comment on the planned withdrawal, 
weighing of the objections, and only then making an informed and properly 
reasoned decision on the withdrawal of the Final Guidelines.  This kind of  
                                                          
293. See supra Part II.C, notes 251-52 and accompanying text. 
 294. 42 U.S.C. § 289a-1(b)(1), (3)-(5) (2000). 
295. Id.
 296. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2000). 
297. See supra Part II.C, notes 254-71 and accompanying text. 
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challenge would stress that the NIH’s failure to take these measures 
constituted a substantive flaw in the Repeal that conflicts with the APA’s 
requirements.298  As a result, courts should set aside the Repeal, thereby 
reinstating the part of the Final Guidelines that regulates the funding of 
research involving hESCs.  The practical implication of such a ruling 
would be that parties seeking federal funding for research involving hESC 
lines that do not comply with President Bush’s Stem Cell Decision, would 
be able to do so subject to the more lenient standards of the reinstated Final 
Guidelines.299
D.  Challenging the NIH’s Decision to Abide  
by President Bush’s Stem Cell Decision 
One may pose several challenges to the NIH’s adoption and 
implementation of President Bush’s Stem Cell Decision.  First, one can 
argue that Acting Director Kirchstein’s surrender of statutory authority to 
President Bush to make policy decisions for the NIH by adopting his Stem 
Cell Decision without actually using her own discretion was an abuse of 
her discretion to set policies for the NIH,300 which amounted to an unlawful 
abuse of discretion under the APA.301  One could further contend that the 
Acting Director’s adoption of President Bush’s Stem Cell Decision as the 
NIH’s own policy in its entirety—without any qualms or reservations, 
without paying respect to its underlying rationale and considering its 
alternatives,302 without considering whether it promotes good public policy, 
and without weighing such considerations—may also tag her actions, and 
thus the actions of the NIH, as arbitrary and capricious.303
Furthermore, Moderate Unitarians would probably add that the Acting 
Director’s omission of her own discretion in this matter was not in 
accordance with her statutory duty304 to make such a discretionary decision 
by herself under the authority granted to her in the Public Health Service 
Act.305  Should a court accept this argument, it may serve to justify an 
                                                          
 298. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). 
299. See supra Part I.C, notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
 300. 42 U.S.C. § 282(b). 
 301. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 302. It may be argued that the NIH’s policy, which is in fact President Bush’s Stem Cell 
Decision, did not properly weigh different aspects of the issues related to research involving 
hESCs.  One could argue, for example, that the NIH’s policy gives excessive weight to 
ethical and religious considerations while giving very little if any weight to important 
scientific and public policy considerations.  See, e.g., Ryan Fujikawa, Note, Federal 
Funding of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An Institutional Examination, 78  
S. CAL. L. REV. 1075 (2005). 
 303. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also supra Part II.C. 
304. Id. § 706(2)(C).
 305. 42 U.S.C. § 282(b).  This argument would be based on the Moderate Unitarian 
reading of statutory duties as applying exclusively to the specific executive officers named 
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injunction against the NIH, enjoining it from enforcing President Bush’s 
Directive and instructing the Director of the NIH to use her own discretion 
in making a decision regarding the NIH’s funding policy of research 
involving hESCs (to the extent the NIHRA leaves this issue to the 
discretion of the Director of the NIH). 
It is worth adding a few words in this context on the standard of review 
courts would probably apply to such challenges.  Courts generally grant 
agencies’ discretionary decisions and actions a great measure of deference 
and are not easily persuaded to set them aside.306  However, in order to 
merit this measure of deference, agency decisions must be based on the 
agency’s expertise in the area of regulation it is charged with 
implementing.307  Without demonstration of reliance on such expertise by 
the agency, courts would not defer to the agency’s decision.308
Accordingly, since the NIH’s policy on the funding of research involving 
hESCs does not reflect its expertise on this issue, but merely its reliance on 
the President’s opinions,309 courts would probably not grant it the deference 
they normally would have under the Chevron Doctrine.310  Furthermore, 
courts only defer to and uphold agency decisions that are properly 
reasoned.311  According to the Supreme Court, this is especially true where, 
                                                          
in the authorizing statute.  However, it is important to note that to date there is no court 
decision accepting such Moderate Unitarian contentions, so it is hard to assess how willing 
courts would be to entertain this argument.
306. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 
(1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an 
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme. . . . .”).
307. See Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1505 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (“While we acknowledge our deference to the agency’s expertise in most cases, we 
cannot defer when the agency simply has not exercised its expertise.”). 
308. Id.
 309. Despite his outspoken efforts to inform himself prior to making his Stem Cell 
Decision, President Bush may not be considered an expert in the area of research involving 
hESCs.
 310. In addition, in the NIHRA, Congress directly spoke on the precise question of 
withholding of federal funding for scientific research on ethical grounds and its instruction 
on this matter constitutes an explicit congressional prohibition on actions such as those 
taken by the NIH with respect to the funding of research involving hESC.  Therefore, courts 
should not grant Chevron deference to the NIH’s policy on funding for research involving 
hESCs.  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.  It is also worth mentioning that, according to 
Stack, courts should only grant Chevron deference to agency actions and decisions that 
follow presidential directives where a statute expressly grants authority to make such a 
decision specifically to the President. See Stack, supra note 175, at 263, 268-69, 307, 310-
11.
311. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (“[T]the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory 
explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.’”) (citation omitted); see also BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 1215, 1222 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Where the agency has failed to provide a reasoned explanation, or where 
the record belies the agency’s conclusion, we must undo its action.” (quoting Petroleum 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 1164, 1172 (D.C. Cir.1994))). 
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as here, the agency is repealing a previous policy.312  The NIH failed to 
provide a reasoned explanation for its actions and only justified the Repeal 
and its adoption of President Bush’s Stem Cell Decision as its policy by 
stating that these measures were compatible with President Bush’s Stem 
Cell Decision.313  Arguably, even under the assumption that agency action 
may be greatly influenced by presidential policy preferences, this hardly 
seems like the kind of reasoning that courts would accept in order to uphold 
an agency’s decision.  Hence, it is likely that in a challenge to the NIH’s 
policy—like the ones mentioned above—a court would not grant it 
Chevron deference, but would find the policy lacking in reasoning and 
would thus set it aside as arbitrary and capricious. 
In conclusion, an interesting question arises: if there are so many ways 
and reasons to challenge President Bush’s Directive and its implementation 
by the NIH, how can we explain the fact that no one has ever raised such 
challenges in court?  One plausible explanation may lie in Dean Kagan’s 
description of a shift in what Strauss called the “psychology of 
government”314—namely, that executive officers have become so 
“desensitized” to the accelerating use of presidential directives that impose 
policies on them and have become so used to the Constitutional Unitarian 
rhetoric accompanying such directives that they no longer doubt the 
applicability or validity of such directives.  A second parallel phenomenon 
apparently has accompanied this phenomenon and intensified its effects.  
The media, and as a result the general public, have grown “numb” to the 
ever increasing intrusions of presidential directives—especially during the 
Clinton and Bush Administrations315—into what used to be perceived as 
the sole domain of executive agencies’ discretion.316  By the time President 
Bush gave his Directive, the public, the media, and the agencies themselves 
had grown so accustomed to such presidential assertions of authority that 
evidently no one proceeded to challenge what seemed to be yet another 
assertion of the rising presidential power, no more or less outrageous than 
many others before it.  Add to these factors what Gaziano describes as a 
low level of public understanding of the legal foundation and proper uses 
                                                          
312. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-42 (“[A]n agency changing its course by rescinding 
a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be 
required when an agency does not act in the first instance.”). 
313. See supra text accompanying note 120. 
 314. Kagan, supra note 170, at 2299; Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, supra note 195, 
at 986. 
315. See generally Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, supra note 195; Branum, supra
note 7; Olson & Woll, supra note 241 (discussing President Clinton’s presidential 
directives).
 316. For a similar argument related to the regulation of funding of research involving 
hESCs, see Branum, supra note 7, at 46-47.
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of presidential directives317 and the legal community’s preoccupation with 
the debate over the “unitary executive,”318 and the result is that President 
Bush’s Directive and its progeny were allowed to pass unchallenged. 
Another, less dramatic explanation as to why President Bush’s Directive 
and the ensuing NIH policy remain uncontested may be that no party 
partaking in research involving hESCs in the United States has been ready 
and willing to spend the time, money, and effort necessary to challenge 
them in court.  Despite these hurdles, I hope that this Article would serve to 
encourage interested parties to challenge President Bush’s Directive and its 
implementation by the NIH. 
CONCLUSION
For over six and a half years, President Bush’s Stem Cell Decision has 
been dictating the nature and extent of scientific research involving human 
embryonic stem cells.  Yet, astonishingly, despite being the subject of a 
boisterous debate, its legality, as well as that of the actions taken by the 
NIH to carry it out, have never been questioned nor ascertained.  This 
Article sought to fill this vacuum. 
This Article has shown that even under the most permissive assumptions 
President Bush’s Directive cannot be reconciled with NIHRA § 101.  This 
Article further demonstrated that the actions taken by the NIH to 
implement President Bush’s Directive constituted clear violations of the 
NIHRA and the APA—the extent of which depends on one’s viewpoint in 
the “unitary executive” debate.  Finally, this Article argued that these flaws 
render both President Bush’s Directive and the ensuing actions taken by the 
NIH illegal and thus challengeable in court.  I anticipate that such 
challenges would result in striking down President Bush’s Directive and in 
setting aside the NIH’s adoption of his Stem Cell Decision as its policy.  
Furthermore, such a challenge may also prompt a court to overrule the 
NIH’s withdrawal of the Final Guidelines’ language dealing with research 
involving hESCs and to reinstate language allowing federal funding for 
types of research involving hESCs disallowed by President Bush’s 
Directive.
An interesting issue that remains, which may justify a separate, more 
elaborate inquiry, is what President Bush and the NIH could do in order to 
legally enforce President Bush’s Stem Cell Decision.  Arguably, the NIH 
may entrust the entire issue of the ethical soundness of research involving 
hESCs to an Ethics Advisory Board, which it could establish pursuant to 
the NIHRA.  Alternatively or additionally, President Bush might use his 
                                                          
 317. Gaziano, supra note 134, at 269-70. 
318. See supra Part II.B.3.a.i. 
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authority to direct executive agencies in a less controversial manner to pile 
up procedural requirements or obstacles for any attempt to actually fund 
such research involving hESCs, so as to render such funding practically 
impossible or prohibitively burdensome. 
Though it is hard to anticipate whether the current Administration would 
elect to take any of these measures or whether President Bush’s Directive 
and the NIH’s ensuing actions will eventually face a challenge in court, it is 
prudent to assume that President Bush’s Stem Cell Decision will eventually 
be discarded.  With the newly formed Democratic majority in Congress, we 
should probably expect more bills akin to the Stem Cell Research Act of 
2005, which would seek to impose federal funding for research involving 
hESCs, though potential presidential vetoes await.  Furthermore, rapid 
encroachments on the efficacy of the current federal government’s policy 
by state funding and international research, increasing public pressure to 
fund research involving hESCs, development of new techniques to produce 
hESCs without destroying embryos, and the United States’ incentive to stay 
in the forefront of scientific research will all, sooner or later, bring the 
demise of the current policy in favor of one that is more permissive.  
President Bush’s Stem Cell Decision swims against the current and—as 
other cases of ethically controversial though useful scientific technologies 
teach us—will eventually yield to progress; it is only a matter of time.  Yet, 
the way this chapter in our regulatory history will end may have bearing on 
crucial issues regarding the nature of the Chief Executive and the extent of 
its “unitariness.”  Will it finally be limited by courts or by Congress, or will 
it remain uninhibited as is reflected in President Bush’s Directive?  In 
addition, hopefully Congress will take heed of the regulatory knot 
described in this Article as a cue that the time has finally come to create a 
federal mechanism for the formulation of government-wide bioethical 
policies, as other countries have done. 
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THE REGULATION OF GENETIC ASPECTS OF DONATED REPRODUCTIVE TISSUE—THE NEED 




It is estimated that egg and sperm donations account for more than 
60,000 births every year in the United States.  However, surprisingly, and 
despite common misconceptions, there are no federal requirements and 
barely any state requirements to screen and test sperm and egg donors for 
genetic diseases.  The only nationwide standards for genetic screening and 
testing of donated reproductive tissue are guidelines created by 
professional organizations, but compliance with those guidelines is 
voluntary so they cannot be enforced effectively.  Furthermore, the few 
reported cases involving children born from genetically-compromised 
reproductive tissue illustrate the court system’s failure to afford such 
children and their families the relief they need and deserve.  With a 
continuing rise in the number of babies born each year who are conceived 
with donated reproductive tissue, it is necessary to create a regulatory 
framework requiring the screening and testing of reproductive tissue 
donors for genetic diseases.  This article makes the case for federal 
regulation of the genetic aspects of donated reproductive tissue under the 
authority granted to the FDA by the Public Health Service Act. 
                                                
1 J.S.D. Candidate Columbia Law School; LL.M. 2004 Columbia Law School; LL.B. 2000 Tel 
Aviv University; B.A. (biology) 2000 Tel Aviv University; Associate, Goodwin Procter LLP. I 
wish to thank Professors Harold Edgar and Gillian Metzger for their continued mentorship and 
invaluable comments, Drs. Assaf Jacov and Michael Birnhak and the participants of the Law & 
Technology Workshop in Tel Aviv University for their comments on an earlier version of this 
article, Andrew Radsch for his regulatory analysis, and last but not least, my wife, Danielle, for 
lending me a shoulder and supporting this project all the way. 
63
    244 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine John and Jane, a couple with a common problem experienced by one in 
every six couples in the United States:2  infertility.3  John and Jane seek medical advice 
and discover that one of them is sterile. They decide to take advantage of one of the 
numerous assisted reproductive technologies (ART)4 now available to couples suffering 
from difficulties such as theirs and start looking for a suitable donor.  Browsing through 
online donor catalogues, they find a donor whose sperm or eggs they would like to use.  
The sperm/egg bank assures them that their chosen donor—a young, tall, good-looking, 
gifted, intelligent, and athletic graduate student—has undergone careful screening and 
was tested5 for health problems as required by all applicable federal and state laws.  
Having received such assurances, John and Jane attempt to conceive using the donated 
reproductive tissue (DRT)6 they have procured from the bank.  They are successful and 
soon thereafter Jane gives birth to twins, Jean and Juan.  Alas, after the birth, Jean is 
                                                
2 See S. Rep. No. 102-452, at 1 (1992); ISLAT Working Group, ART into Science: Regulation of 
Fertility Techniques, 281 Science 651, 651 (1998) [hereinafter ISLAT Working Group]. 
3 Infertility is commonly defined as the inability to get pregnant after trying for one year.  See 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Assisted Reproductive Technology:  Home, 
http://www.cdc.gov/art (last visited May 9, 2010).  
4 According to the CDC, ART consists of all clinical treatments and laboratory procedures—
including the handling of human oocytes and sperm, or embryos—conducted with the intent of 
conceiving, e.g., in-vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian 
transfer, sperm, oocyte or embryo donation, and gestational surrogacy.  See Implementation of 
the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992–A Model Program for the 
Certification of Embryo Laboratories, 64 Fed. Reg. 39374, 39383 (CDC July 21, 1999) 
[hereinafter CDC Model Program].  
5 For purposes of this article, “testing” is defined as any procedure involving direct clinical 
examination of a potential donor or her tissue, whereas “screening” is any inference of clinical 
information through indirect examination of a donor’s background.  For example, questioning a 
potential donor in order to identify possible genetic risk factors in her family’s medical history is 
a screening procedure, while verifying that her genes do not contain certain genetic mutations by 
attempting to identify certain genetic markers in a cell sample taken from her would be 
considered testing.  Notably, direct testing of the genes of a potential donor is not the only readily 
available method of testing donor candidates.  For example, ECG could assist in identifying heart 
conditions whose genetic background may be unclear or otherwise difficult to ascertain.  See 
Barry J. Maron et al., Implications of Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy Transmitted by Sperm 
Donation, 302 JAMA 1681, 1684 (2009) (reporting that an electrocardiogram could assist in 
identifying 80-95% of the cases of hypertrophic cardiomyopathy in adults with left ventricular 
hypertrophy, a hereditary and potentially lethal cardiac anomaly).    
6 The term “donated reproductive tissue” includes all forms of reproductive cells that can be 
used in ART, namely sperm and ova (eggs) in different developmental stages and in different 
media.  
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diagnosed with cystic fibrosis (CF)7 and a few years later Juan is diagnosed as suffering 
from autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease (ADPKD).8  John and Jane are 
devastated.  Inquiries conducted by their (very expensive) attorneys reveal that their 
donor was a carrier of a CF mutation.  Moreover, after overcoming numerous legal 
hurdles, John and Jane find out that their donor’s aunt and grandmother died from kidney 
failure.  They sue the DRT bank for regular and punitive damages under numerous causes 
of action including negligence, products liability, wrongful life, infliction of emotional 
distress and fraud.  Yet, the court rejects the majority of their claims as a matter of law.  
Furthermore, the court is unsympathetic to the family’s situation and holds that children 
do not have the “right to be born free of diseases” regardless of whether they were 
conceived naturally or through ART.  The tissue bank issues a press release truthfully 
stating that it is meticulously following and is in full compliance with all federal and state 
legislation and regulation.  It quickly reaches a quiet and relatively cheap settlement with 
the Does regarding their remaining claims; if it is a member of a professional 
accreditation organization, such as the American Association of Tissue Banks (AATB), it 
might lose its membership for a short while.   
This hypothetical scenario illustrates actual cases litigated in the United States9 
and foreshadows more that are likely to be brought under the current federal and state 
                                                
7 CF is a hereditary disease whose symptoms usually appear shortly after birth and include 
digestion problems, breathing difficulties and respiratory infections; in the past it was almost 
always fatal in childhood, but nowadays patients commonly live long past childhood.  CF is an 
autosomal recessive condition, meaning that in order to have an affected child both parents must 
carry the mutated gene and pass it along to the child, which has a one in four (1:4) likelihood of 
happening with each pregnancy.  See National Human Genome Research Institute, Glossary, 
http://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih1/genetic/other/glossary/act1-gloss2.htm (last 
visited May 9, 2010); National Genome Research Institute, Learning about Cystic Fibrosis, 
http://www.genome.gov/10001213 (last visited May 9, 2010).  
8 According to the Human Genome Research Institute, ADPKD is one of the most common 
forms of polycystic kidney disease (PKD), a genetic disorder characterized by the growth of 
numerous cysts in both kidneys.  As the disease progresses, the cysts get filled with fluid and 
slowly replace much of the normal mass of the kidneys, thus reducing kidney function and 
leading to kidney failure.  PKD can also cause cysts in the liver and problems in other organs 
such as the pancreas, the heart and the brain, as well as high blood pressure (hypertension), 
abdominal wall hernias, and more.  As indicated by its name, ADPKD is an autosomal dominant 
disease, which means that if a child inherits one copy the ADPKD gene he or she will likely 
develop the disease. Each child of a parent having an ADPKD gene has a 50-50 chance of 
inheriting the ADPKD gene. See National Human Genome Research Institute, Learning About 
Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease, http://www.genome.gov/20019622 (last visited 
May 9, 2010).   
9 See Johnson v. Superior Court (Johnson II), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding that the kidney disease of a child born from DRT (DRT child) was caused by a gene in 
the sperm rather than by either the sperm bank or the bank’s physician’s actions in improperly 
approving the sperm donor, and thus, that the child could not recover general damages or lost 
earnings); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811-12 (N.Y. 1978) (rejecting “wrongful life” as 
a cognizable cause of action and holding that a child does not have a fundamental right to be born 
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regulation of DRT.  Yet, an even greater source of concern is the vast and growing 
number of children born every year in the United States from DRT10 who, to their and 
their families’ misfortune, might become a part of such a tragedy.11  According to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in 2006 there were 5,393 babies born 
in the United States from donated eggs and embryos.12  There is no current data regarding 
the number of babies born from donated sperm,13 but a survey conducted by the former 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) estimated the number of births from artificial 
insemination (AI) by a donor at 30,000 per year in 1986-87.14  In 1998, the ISLAT 
                                                                                                                                            
as a whole, functional human being); Paretta v. Medical Officers for Human Reproduction, 760 
N.Y.S.2d 639, 644 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (re-stating that a child does not have the right to be born 
free of genetic defects, regardless of how she was conceived, and thus, that a DRT child born 
with CF did not suffer a legally cognizable injury and her parents did not have a valid claim for 
damages for the emotional distress they experienced as a result of having a child with a genetic 
disease).  
10 See Elizabeth A. Conrad et al., Current Practices of Commercial Cryobanks in Screening 
Prospective Donors for Genetic Disease and Reproductive Risk, 41 Int. J. Fertil. 298, 303 (1996); 
see also CDC, Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates—National Summary and 
Fertility Clinics Reports 2004, 52 (2006) [hereinafter CDC 2004 Report]; Peggy Orenstein, Your 
Gamete, Myself, N.Y. Times Magazine, July 15, 2007, at 36. 
11 There are no official statistics regarding the transmission of genetic diseases through DRT.  
See Conrad, supra note 10, at 299.  Thus, it is difficult to accurately evaluate the risks of genetic 
diseases involved in using DRT.  
12 See CDC, 2006 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates: National Summary and 
Fertility Clinic Reports 59 (2008).  Unofficial estimates currently speak of 7,000-10,000 births 
from egg donation a year. 
13 The author is not aware of any source of statistical data regarding the number of donor 
sperm specimens sold or of babies born from such DRT yearly in the United States.  The 
legislation authorizing CDC to collect information from “embryo laboratories” regarding egg 
donations and IVF success rates does not apply to sperm donations and sperm use success rates.  
See infra notes 32-33.  Thus, there are no official statistics regarding the number of semen 
specimens sold and children resulting from artificial insemination (AI) in the United States each 
year. 
14 See Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Artificial Insemination Practice in the United 
States: Summary of a 1987 Survey 3 (Aug. 1988) [hereinafter OTA 1988 Survey].  According to 
the survey, in 1986-87, 172,000 women underwent artificial insemination, resulting in about 
65,000 births, 35,000 of which were from artificial insemination by the husband.  See id.  
With respect to DRT, one should distinguish between “directed donations,” in which the 
recipient receives DRT from a person whom she knows and is known by prior and unrelated to 
seeking the donation, and anonymous donations, in which the recipient does not know the identity 
of the donor (or—in case the donor agrees to expose his/her identity—the recipient knows who 
the donor is but did not know him or her prior to the acquisition of the DRT).  It is important to 
note that the discussion of DRT in this article focuses almost exclusively on anonymous 
donations. 
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Working Group estimated that egg and sperm donations account for more than 60,000 
births every year.15  Yet, despite the significance of these numbers, there is a dearth of 
state law16 and a total lack of federal law regulating the genetic aspects of DRT.17  Court 
decisions addressing the failure of DRT institutions18 to screen and test donors for genetic 
                                                
15 See ISLAT Working Group, supra note 2, at 652.  Due to a lack of accurate data, it is 
difficult to determine whether these numbers have grown or dropped as a result of  advancements 
in ART.  Regardless, it is clear that the number of DRT children is very significant.  See Judith F. 
Daar & Robert G. Brzyski, Genetic Screening of Sperm and Oocyte Donors: Ethical and Policy 
Implications, 301 JAMA 1702, 1702 (2009) (reporting that nearly 3 in every 100 births in the 
United States is attributable to some form of assisted conception and arguing that the numbers of 
births using DRT have been steadily increasing since the introduction of IVF in 1978). 
16 Only two states—New York, and Ohio—require genetic screening and testing of DRT 
donors for some genetic diseases.  See infra Part II.B.  
17 See Maron et al., supra note 5, at 1681, 1683 (describing a series of cases in which a 
genetically inherited disease was transmitted through anonymous sperm donation and 
characterizing this type of risk as “a problem largely unappreciated by the medical community 
and agencies regulating tissue donation”; “[a]lthough not required by FDA, some sperm banks 
test for cystic fibrosis, thalassemia anemia, sickle cell trait, Tay-Sachs, and other genetic diseases 
. . . ”) (emphases added).   
In this article, the term “genetic aspects of DRT” includes (1) screening and testing of DRT 
donors based on genetic criteria, (2) keeping genetic information on record, (3) informing DRT 
recipients about relevant donor genetic information and its potential ramifications, and (4) 
notification of proper authorities and institutions engaging in collection and distribution of DRT 
and recipients of adverse events having a genetic background or suspected as having a genetic 
background.  For purposes of this article, this term does not apply to genetic aspects of any 
infectious diseases, e.g., viral infection (such as HIV, herpes, etc.) that influences the nucleic acid 
makeup of human cells.   
The term “genetic aspects of DRT” also does not include the genetic screening and testing of 
potential DRT recipients.  Arguably, genetic screening and testing of DRT recipients would be 
less cost-effective and more cumbersome than the screening and testing of potential DRT donors.  
This is because DRT donors (mostly sperm donors) are normally the source of a large number of 
DRT specimens used to conceive many DRT children while any DRT recipient would normally 
have a few children at most.  Admittedly, only a minority of the candidates eventually become 
DRT donors, yet DRT programs may test only potential donors that make it through earlier 
selection stages.  Also, a requirement for genetic screening and testing of potential DRT donors 
rather than DRT recipients is more feasible and more defensible from a privacy perspective 
because DRT donors normally submit themselves to medical evaluations as part of the selection 
process and thus, are more readily available and likely to give their consent to have their genetics 
tested.   
18 For purposes of this article, a DRT institution is any individual or entity engaged in the 
manufacture of DRT; “manufacture,” according to the FDA, includes but is not limited to “any or 
all steps in the recovery, processing, storage, labeling, packaging, or distribution of any human 
cell or tissue, and the screening or testing of the cell or tissue donor.”  See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(e) 
(2005).  DRT institutions include, e.g., sperm banks and institutions that harvest donor oocytes as 
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diseases are sparse and ambivalent.  Thus, the only means of protection from genetic 
disease afforded to DRT children and their families are the standards set by professional 
organizations.19  However, membership in such organizations is purely voluntary and 
non-compliance does not seem to carry any real sanctions.20  Hence, currently, in the 
United States, there is no effective protection of DRT recipients from acquiring 
genetically defective DRT or of DRT children from having such diseases even where 
there are effective means of testing for and preventing the transmission of such diseases.  
Despite repeated warnings since the late 1970s regarding the insufficiency of 
genetic screening and testing of DRT and subsequent calls for regulation,21 there are no 
signs that the current framework of regulation of genetic aspects of DRT (or lack thereof) 
is about to change.  Legislators, in general, are averse to legislating about issues 
pertaining to human reproduction22 and regulators show a similar disinclination.23  It thus 
appears that no one is going to address this void unless forced to do so by the occurrence 
of a highly publicized tragedy.  Furthermore, additional discoveries of genetic bases of 
diseases and development of means of testing for such diseases in the future would only 
accentuate the problems existing under the current regulatory scheme.  Fortunately, there 
is a way to correct the situation and fill the regulatory vacuum before more tragedies 
occur.  
On May 25, 2005 the FDA promulgated regulations pertaining to communicable 
disease aspects of DRT, including requiring the screening and testing of DRT donors for 
infectious diseases.24  Yet, the FDA refrained from taking similar steps with respect to the 
genetic aspects of DRT.25  I argue that by stepping into the area of regulation of DRT, the 
                                                                                                                                            
well as small clinics that serve smaller populations so long as they manufacture donor DRT.  This 
definition of DRT, however, does not include clinics that merely harvest DRT for directed 
donations.  
19 See infra Part IV (discussing professional standards set by the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the American Association of Tissue Banks (AATB)). 
20 See infra notes 181 and 196 and accompanying text.  
21 See infra Part II.D.1. 
22 See George J. Annas, The Shadowlands—Secrets, Lies, and Assisted Reproduction, 339 
New Eng. J. Med. 935, 937 (1998); Stacy Huse, The Need for Regulation in the Fertility Industry, 
35 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 555, 556 (1996-1997).  
23 See Cynthia B. Cohen, Unmanaged Care: The Need to Regulate New Reproductive 
Technologies in the United States, 11 Bioethics 348, 357 (1997); Richard A. Merrill, Human 
Tissues and Reproductive Cloning: New Technologies Challenge FDA, 3 Hous. J. Health L. & 
Pol’y 1, 63 n.332 (2002). 
24 FDA, Guidance for Industry, Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, 
and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 69 F.R. 29786-01 (May 25, 2004) [hereinafter FDA 
Final Donor Eligibility Rule].  
25 The FDA provided no explanation for its avoidance of the area of genetic aspects of DRT.  
See infra Part IV (discussing possible reasons for the FDA’s inaction).  
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FDA has created the necessary infrastructure for expanding its regulatory scheme to 
include the regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT and has positioned itself as the 
preferable regulator of this area.  The FDA’s authority under the Public Health Service 
Act (PHSA)26 provides it with ample authority to regulate not only the communicable 
diseases aspects of DRT but also their genetic aspects, as is done in other countries.  This 
article makes the case for such federal regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT by the 
FDA.  
Part II of this Article will describe the current regulation of DRT in the United 
States with emphasis on its genetic aspects and the compelling public policy reasons for 
the regulation of this area.  Part III will survey the regulation of genetic screening and 
testing of DRT in the European Union, the United Kingdom and Ireland and highlight 
some of the mechanisms they employ to overcome reoccurring problems typical to such 
regulation.  Implementing some of the mechanisms applied abroad to the unique 
circumstances of the United States, Part IV will offer a framework for the regulation of 
genetic aspects of DRT by the FDA and will discuss some of the issues involved in and 
obstacles to such regulation.  Part V will conclude this Article with a call for the FDA to 
rise to the challenge of filling the regulatory vacuum.  
II. THE REGULATION OF GENETIC SCREENING AND TESTING OF DONATED REPRODUCTIVE 
TISSUE IN THE UNITED STATES 
The regulation of DRT in the United States has been repeatedly described as 
lacking in its protection of DRT recipients and DRT children.27  This Part will explain 
why this criticism is particularly justified with respect to the regulation of the genetic 
aspects of DRT.   
A. Federal Regulation 
Although the federal government has regulated several aspects of ART,28 there is 
no federal law addressing the genetic aspects of DRT.  The lack of such regulation is 
peculiar in light of the federal government’s actual involvement in the regulation of two 
aspects of DRT, specifically the creation of a model program for the accreditation of 
fertility clinics to be carried out by the states29 and the regulation of DRT as human 
                                                
26 Public Health Service Act (PHSA), Ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (July 1, 1944), codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 201–300, Ch. 6A. 
27 See generally OTA, Infertility: Medical and Social Choices 24-26 (1988) [hereinafter OTA’s 
Infertility Report]; Huse, supra note 22, at 571-72; Charles Marwick, Artificial Insemination 
Faces Regulation, Testing of Donor Semen, Other Measures, 260 JAMA 1339 (1988); Judith 
Lynn Bick Rice, The Need for Statutes Regulating Artificial Insemination by Donors, 46 Ohio St. 
L.J. 1055 (1985). 
28 See infra Parts II.A.1-II.A.2. 
29 See CDC Model Program, supra note 4, at 39374.   
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tissue.30  Both regulatory schemes stop just short of addressing the genetic aspects of 
DRT.  
1. The Regulation of ART by the CDC  
In 1992, concerned with information indicating that some fertility clinics misled 
patients by making false and exaggerated representations of success rates in achieving 
pregnancies and provided substandard services,31 Congress legislated the Fertility Clinic 
Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 (FCSRCA).32  FCSRCA instructed the CDC 
to develop a model program for the accreditation of embryo laboratories33 which would 
be carried out by the states.34  The CDC published the Model Program devised under 
FCSRCA in the Federal Register on July 21, 1999.35  Although FCSRCA strove to 
regulate the quality of embryo laboratories, it did not include any requirement for the 
assurance of the safety of the procedures employed by such laboratories, and so neither 
did the resulting CDC Model Program.36  Thus, although Congress may have sought to 
protect consumers acquiring the services of fertility clinics from false representations and 
poor quality of services,37 it neglected to create a more comprehensive regulatory scheme 
that would protect DRT recipients and DRT children from such hazardous practices as 
improper testing of DRT for genetic diseases.   
                                                
30 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2009) [hereinafter Human Tissue Regulations].  
31 See S. Rep. No. 102-452, at 2565-67 (1992); 137 Cong. Rec. E4145-02 (1991) (statement of 
Rep. Wyden).  
32 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 (1992).  
33 FCSRCA § 8 defines an “embryo laboratory” as “a facility in which human oocytes are 
subject to assisted reproductive technology treatment or procedures based on manipulation of 
oocytes or embryos which are subject to implantation.”  42 U.S.C. § 263a-7 (1992). 
34 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2 (2008).  
35 See CDC Model Program, supra note 4, at 39374. 
36 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(d) (2008). 
37 See note 31 supra.  Notably, Congress was well aware that FCSRCA was far from 
providing a sufficiently comprehensive protection for ART consumers in general, and in 
particular with respect to genetic aspects of DRT.  Addressing the House of Representatives in his 
presentation of FCSRCA, Rep. Wyden said: “I would like to alert my colleagues to another area 
deserving of vigorous Congressional oversight—the $170 million artificial insemination industry.  
A study by the Office of Technology Assessment has revealed a startling lack of oversight, 
particularly in doctor’s offices, which could have significant adverse public health effects. . . . 
[H]alf [of the physicians who provide AI services] don’t screen for genetic defects.”  137 Cong. 
Rec. E4145-02 (1991) (statement of Rep. Wyden). 
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Even further demonstrating its lack of effectiveness, the CDC Model Program is 
only voluntary for states38 and embryo laboratories alike.39  Thus, even had the CDC 
Model Program been sufficiently comprehensive, it would probably not have contributed 
to the safety of DRT children.  
2. The FDA’s Human Tissue Regulations 
Repeated calls for a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of donated 
tissue, including DRT,40 prompted the FDA to announce in March 1997 that it intended 
to create a regulatory scheme for “cellular and tissue based products”41 (including DRT) 
which would include donor eligibility standards and donor screening and testing 
requirements.42  After a lengthy “notice and comment” process,43 in January 2001 the 
FDA published the first of three installments of regulations that would eventually become 
                                                
38 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(e) (2008).  Under the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine, the federal 
government may not instruct the states to adopt legislation but rather may merely try to convince 
them to do so through incentives. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1992); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924-25 (1997).  Hence FCSRCA could not compel the 
states to apply for the CDC Model Program.  Notably, except for coverage of inspections of 
fertility institutions by funds collected from participating DRT institutions, the CDC Model 
Program does not seem to include any real incentive for the states to apply to participate in it.  See 
FCSRCA § 7; CDC Model Program, supra note 4, at 39382.  This lack of incentive may account, 
at least in part, for the fact that no state has submitted a request with the CDC to join the Model 
Program.  Telephone Interview with CDC Division of Reproductive Health Helpdesk 
representative, Feb. 23, 2010 (on file with author). 
39 See CDC Model Program, supra note 4, at 39382.  
40 See FDA, Reinventing the Regulation of Human Tissue (Feb. 1997) [hereinafter Reinventing 
the Regulation of Human Tissue], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/TissueTissueProducts/RegulationofTissues/ucm136
967.htm.   
41 See generally Proposed Approach to Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-Based Products: 
Availability and Public Meeting, 62 Fed. Reg. 9721 (FDA Mar. 4, 1997) [hereinafter FDA’s 
Proposed Approach].  Notably, as early as 1993, the FDA published an interim rule that required 
the screening and testing of some human tissue for HIV and hepatitis.  See Human Tissue 
Intended for Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. 65514 (FDA Dec. 14, 1993).  However, this rule, 
whose final version was published in 1997, 62 Fed. Reg. 40429 (FDA July 29, 1997), did not 
apply to DRT.  See 21 C.F.R. § 1270.3(j)(5) (2005).  
42 See Reinventing the Regulation of Human Tissue, supra note 40, at 1 (“The agency would 
require infectious disease screening and testing be done for cells and tissues transplanted from 
one person to another.”).  
43 See 66 Fed. Reg. 5448 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001) (describing the process); 69 Fed. Reg. 29786, 
29786-87 (FDA May 25, 2004) (same).  
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the Human Tissue Regulations,44 which required all DRT institutions to register with the 
FDA.45  In May 2004, the FDA published its draft Donor Eligibility Rule,46 which 
eventually went into effect on May 25, 2005.47  
Under the FDA’s Final Donor Eligibility Rule, DRT banks must make donor 
eligibility determinations48 based on donor screening and testing for an array of infectious 
diseases that might pass to children born through the use of DRT, including HIV-1 and 
HIV-2, human cytomegalovirus, hepatitis B and C, syphilis, gonorrhea, chlamydia, West 
Nile virus and more.49  Such donor eligibility determinations must be based on an 
assessment of the donor’s risk factors in light of his or her medical records50 and the 
results of tests performed on the donated tissue,51 with additional specific requirements 
                                                
44 Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products: Establishment of 
Registration and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5448 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001).  
45 21 C.F.R. § 1271.1 (2005).  For inclusion of DRT institutions in the Human Tissue 
Regulations, see 21 C.F.R. § 1270.10(a)(4)(i)(c).  According to the FDA’s Human Cell and 
Tissue Establishment Registration (HCTERS), as of May 2009 there were 554 establishments 
involved in the recovery, processing and distribution of semen and 472 establishments involved 
in recovery, processing and distribution of oocytes registered with the FDA.  See FDA, Find a 
Tissue Establishment, http://www.fda.gov/cber/tissue/tissregdata.htm (last visited May 9, 2010). 
46 See generally FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule, supra note 24. 
47 Id. at 29786.  The third “installation” of the Human Tissue Regulations was published in its 
final form in Nov. 2004 and became effective on May 25, 2005.  See Current Good Tissue 
Practice for Human Cell, Tissue, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Product Establishments: 
Inspection and Enforcement, 69 Fed. Reg. 68612 (FDA Nov. 24, 2004).   
48 21 C.F.R § 1271.50 (2005).  
49 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.3(r), 1271.50, 1271.75, 1271.80, 1271.85 (2005).  See also FDA, Testing 
HCT/P Donors: Specific Requirements, 
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/TissueSafety/ucm151757.htm 
(last visited June 17, 2010).  Tissue manufacturers are also under an obligation to screen and test 
donors for diseases not enumerated in the FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule that (1) carry a risk of 
transmission, (2) potentially have sufficiently severe effects and (3) may be screened or tested for.  
See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(r)(2) (2005).  
50 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75 (2005).  Although the regulations do not mention specific “risk factors” 
that would render a person ineligible to donate tissue, such risk factors are enumerated in a 
“Guidance for Industry” document released by the FDA in February 2007.  See Guidance for 
Industry: Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-
Based Products: Availability, 72 Fed. Reg. 9007 (FDA Feb. 28, 2007) [hereinafter FDA’s 
Guidance for Industry Announcement]. 
51 21 C.F.R. § 1271.85 (2005).  
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set forth for the testing of DRT.52  “A donor whose specimen tests reactive”53 or who is 
“identified as having . . . [a] risk factor for or clinical evidence of any”54 of the diseases 
enumerated in the Human Tissue Regulations is deemed ineligible to donate.55  In 
addition, tissue manufacturers must investigate and report to the FDA any serious adverse 
reaction related to donated tissue.56  Notably, the FDA’s Final Donor Eligibility Rule was 
complemented by a “Guidance for Industry,”57 which reflected the “FDA’s current 
thinking” on eligibility determination by tissue manufacturers.58  
Despite its outspoken intention to create a comprehensive regulatory framework 
for cells and tissue-based products, which “would provide physicians and patients with 
the assurance of safety that the public has come to expect from . . . products overseen by 
the FDA,”59 from the outset, the FDA narrowed the possible scope of its regulatory 
scheme and limited it to the prevention of infectious diseases.60  Most importantly, in 
                                                
52 DRT must also be tested for Chlamydia trachomatis and Neisseria gonorrhea.  See 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1271.85(c) (2005).  
53 21 C.F.R. § 1271.80(d)(1) (2005).  
54 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75(d)(1) (2005).  
55 Notably, there are exceptions to this rule.  For instance, when DRT is donated by a sexually 
intimate partner of the recipient for reproductive use the rule does not apply.  See 21 C.F.R. § 
1271.90(a) (2005).   
56 21 C.F.R. § 1271.350 (2005).  
57 See FDA’s Guidance for Industry Announcement, supra note 50, at 1.  
58 Id.  It is important to note that according to the FDA, the Guidance for Industry “does not 
create or confer any rights for or on any person and does not operate to bind FDA or the public” 
but is rather a detailed explanation of the FDA’s expectations from tissue manufacturers with 
respect to their duties under the FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule.  Id. 
59 See 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5448 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001); FDA’s Proposed Approach, supra note 
41, at 7.  See also Tissue Banks: is the Federal Government’s Oversight Adequate: Hearing 
before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th 
Cong. 106 (2001) (statement by Kathryn C. Zoon, Ph.D., Director, Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation 
and Research, FDA), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=f:73395.pdf [hereinafter Zoon Statement] 
(“FDA can assure the Committee that we are committed to establishing a regulatory framework, 
which not only helps to ensure the safe use of human tissue for transplantation, but also . . . 
instills public confidence.”); Reinventing the Regulation of Human Tissue, supra note 40 (“FDA . 
. . has designed a new regulatory framework for cells and tissues that would protect the public 
health . . . .”).  
60 In its Proposed Approach, the FDA described five public health and regulatory concerns, 
which do not lend themselves to any reading that would include the prevention of spreading of 
genetic diseases.  See FDA’s Proposed Approach, supra note 41, at 9.  Moreover, in addressing 
safety and efficacy aspects of human tissues having “reproductive function,” the FDA’s Proposed 
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promulgating the Final Donor Eligibility Rule, the FDA relied only on PHSA § 361,61 
which grants it authority to promulgate regulations “necessary to prevent the 
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases”62 and which has no 
bearing on the prevention of transmission of genetic diseases.63  Similarly, the FDA 
structured its new regulatory scheme in a way that includes DRT under a new FDA-
invented category of “minimally manipulated tissue,”64 which is subject only to 
regulation under the Human Tissue Regulations.65 
Interestingly, at least at one time, the FDA considered the possibility of requiring 
the testing of DRT for genetic diseases.66 It is unknown why the FDA ultimately did not 
address this issue at all.67  As I will show later in this Article, this exclusion of genetic 
aspects of DRT from the FDA’s Human Tissue Regulations was not only undesirable 
                                                                                                                                            
Approach plainly stated that “[f]ailure of reproductive tissue generally does not have life-
threatening or systemic adverse effects except for fertility per se.”  Id. at 20.  This statement does 
not seem to consider the possible adverse effects that genetically compromised DRT might have 
on DRT children.  
61 See 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5449 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001).  
62 See PHSA § 361 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2008)); infra note 278 and accompanying 
text.  The authority under PHSA § 361 was originally granted to the Surgeon General and was 
later transferred to the Assistant Secretary of Health who delegated it to the FDA.  See 66 Fed. 
Reg. 5447, 5449 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001).   
63 See infra Part IV.A.  Consequently, for example, the requirement in the Human Tissue 
Regulations to evaluate the donor’s medical history only applies to the donor’s own medical 
history and not to that of her family.  21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(n) (2005).  Similarly, the Human Tissue 
Regulations do not include any requirement for testing of potential DRT donors for any genetic 
conditions.   
64 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(f) (2005).  The term “minimally manipulated tissue” designates tissue 
that did not undergo substantial processing.  Under § 1271.3(f)(2), DRT is considered minimally 
manipulated tissue.  
65 21 C.F.R. § 1271.10(a)(4)(ii)(c) (2005).  This diminished regulatory burden exempts DRT 
from additional, possibly more stringent and comprehensive, regulatory requirements under 
PHSA.  
66 See Letter from Diane E. Thompson, Associate Commissioner for Legislative Affairs, 
DHHS, to Bernice Steinhardt, Director, HEHS, GAO (Oct. 23, 1997), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98025.pdf (warning against the insufficiency of the FDA’s 
existing regulation and proposed regulatory approach with respect to the risk of introduction of 
genetic diseases through DRT).  
67 Notably, a report issued in 2007 by the FDA appointed Human Tissue Task Force did not 
even mention the issue of genetic screening and testing of DRT.  See Press Release, FDA, FDA 
Releases Human Tissue Task Force Report (June 12, 2007) [hereinafter HTTF Report], available 
at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2007/ucm108932.htm.   
74
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from a public policy perspective but also could have been avoided had the FDA used a 
different set of authorities available to it to regulate DRT in general.68  
B. State Regulation 
Although state law has traditionally regulated most aspects of public health and 
the licensing of medical personnel and facilities,69 most states do not require any level of 
screening or testing of DRT for genetic diseases.70  Roughly half of the states have some 
kind of regulation pertaining to the screening and testing of DRT donors for infectious 
diseases,71 yet only two states—New York and Ohio72—impose requirements on DRT 
institutions to screen and test DRT for genetic risk factors.73  
                                                
68 See infra Part IV.A.  
69 See Kathleen M. Peterson, Federal Regulation of Artificial Insemination Donor Screening 
Practices: An Opportunity for Law to Co-Evolve with Medicine, 96 Dick. L. Rev 59, 84 (1991).  
70 See Lori B. Andrews & Nannette Elster, Adoption, Reproductive Technologies, and Genetic 
Information, 8 Health Matrix 125, 135-36 (1998); Alexander Hecht, Note, The Wild Wild West: 
Inadequate Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 1 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 227, 
252-53 (2001) (noting that most state statutes do not set up requirements regarding donors’ 
medical conditions).  
71 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1644.5 (1989); Del. C. Ann. tit. 16, § 2801 (1988); Fla. Stat. 
Ann. § 381.0041 (2002); Ga. Code Ann. § 44-5-151 (1988); Id. Code Ann. §§ 39-3703 (1988), 
39-5404 (1982), 39-5408 (1986); Id. Admin. Code §§ 16.02.07.004, 16.02.07.009; 20 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 2310/2310-325 (2000); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-41-14-5 (1993); 410 IAC § 25-2-2 
(1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.281 (1990); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:1062.1 (1988), 
40:1299.143 (1987); Md. Code Ann., Health – General, § 18-334(e) (1988); Mich. Comp. Laws 
Ann. §§ 333.9123 (1988), 333.16273 (1988), 333.20179 (1988); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-16-1008 
(1989); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 168-B:10 (1990), 168-B:14 (1990); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:5C-22 
(1997); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, §§ 52-8.5–52-8.9 (1991); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 
130A-148 (1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.91 (2000); Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. § 3701.246 
(1989); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 2151.1 (1988); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 677.370 (1997); 28 Pa. 
Code §§ 27.151 (2002), 27.21a (2002); R.I. Gen. Laws 1956, § 23-18.6.1-12 (2006);Va. Code 
Ann. § 32.1-45.3 (1995); 12 Va. Admin. Code §§ 5-90-240, 5-90-260 (1998); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
252.15(2)(am)(1) (1995).  Notably, out of these twenty-one states, twelve (Delaware, Georgia, 
Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and 
Virginia) only require the screening and/or testing of DRT for AIDS.  The other twenty nine 
states do not seem to impose any requirement of their own on DRT institutions to screen and/or 
test DRT donors for diseases, whether genetic or communicable.  
72 See supra note 71. 
73 Two more states, Idaho and Oregon, impose a duty on semen donors (only) not to donate if 
they are aware that they have “any disease or defect known by [them] to be transmissible by 
genes.”  See I.C. 39-5404 (1982); O.R.S. § 677.370 (1997).  However, the subjective element of 
these statutory duties seems to make them extremely difficult to enforce.  Indeed, the author is 
75
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Ohio requires that in order to use semen from an anonymous donor, “[a] complete 
medical history of the donor, including, but not limited to, any available genetic history 
of the donor, [must be] obtained . . . [and] [t]he donor [must undergo] a physical 
examination” within one year prior to the donation.74  In addition, practitioners using 
anonymously donated frozen semen must test the donor’s semen or blood using 
“appropriate” laboratory studies for the genetic diseases Tay-Sachs75 and sickle-cell 
anemia76 and perform karyotyping77 of the DRT.78  Subsequently, the DRT practitioners 
are explicitly required to determine whether the results of such tests “are acceptable.”79  
                                                                                                                                            
unaware of any case in which a donor was prosecuted or sued based on a cause of action 
stemming from these provisions.  
An interesting question is why only New York and Ohio have relatively comprehensive 
regulatory schemes with respect to the genetic aspects of DRT while other states, like 
California—which hosts the nation’s largest DRT institution and several others—do not.  
Different explanations could be offered for the adoption of comprehensive regulation or lack 
thereof.  For example, states with a significant medical industry, such as New York, could be 
expected to have progressive medically-related regulation.  Similarly, states having a significant 
DRT industry, such as California and New York, could be expected to have a strong anti-
regulation lobby.  On the other hand, states having a strong DRT industry may strive to have 
stricter regulation to protect their industry from out-of-state competition.  Yet, none of these 
possible explanations seems to provide a full explanation as to why only New York and Ohio 
adopted relatively comprehensive regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT while other states, 
such as California and Massachusetts, did not.   
74 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.91(B)(1)(a)-(b) (2000). 
75 Tay-Sachs is a fatal genetic disorder in which harmful quantities of a fatty substance build 
up in tissues and nerve cells in the brain. Infants with Tay-Sachs disease appear to develop 
normally for the first few months of life but then suffer an ongoing deterioration of mental and 
physical abilities until the child’s inevitable death before the age of five.  The incidence of Tay-
Sachs is particularly high among people of Eastern European and Ashkenazi Jewish descent.  
Patients and carriers of Tay-Sachs disease can be identified by a simple blood test.  Tay-Sachs 
disease is an autosomal recessive condition, meaning that in order to have an affected child both 
parents must carry the mutated gene and pass it along to the child, which has a one in four (1:4) 
likelihood of happening with each pregnancy.  See National Institute of Neurological Disorders 
and Stroke, NINDS Tay-Sachs Disease Information Page, 
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/taysachs/taysachs.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).  
76 Sickle cell anemia is a disease in which the body makes sickle-shaped red blood cells (i.e. 
red blood cells that are shaped like a “C”) rather than normal disc-shaped blood cells.  Sickle-
shaped cells do not move easily through blood vessels and tend to form clumps and get stuck in 
the blood vessels thus blocking blood flow in the blood vessels that lead to the limbs and organs. 
Blocked blood vessels can cause pain, serious infections, and organ damage.  Like Tay-Sachs 
disease, sickle cell anemia is an autosomal recessive condition.  See Nat’l Heart, Lung and Blood 
Institute, Diseases and Conditions Index, What is Sickle Cell Anemia?, 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/Sca/SCA_WhatIs.html (last visited Jun. 17, 2010).  
77 Karyotyping is a test to examine the number and structure of chromosomes used to diagnose 
numerous types of genetic diseases resulting from irregular chromosome number or structure, 
76
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While Ohio’s relevant law only applies to the screening and testing of semen,80 
New York’s law also applies to donated eggs, thereby making it the only state in which 
both sperm and oocytes81 are subject to a requirement of screening and testing for genetic 
diseases.82  The New York Regulations require practitioners to “screen and . . . assess 
donors for conditions that may adversely affect the quality of [DRT] or impair the 
recipient's and/or the offspring's health.”83  Under the New York Regulations, such 
screening must include a physical examination of the prospective DRT donor84 as well as 
collection of “[a] complete medical history, both individual and family, including first-
degree and second-degree relatives.”85  The donor and her family’s medical history must 
be evaluated according to numerous criteria including:  (1) the existence of major genetic 
disorders, autosomal or X-linked, dominant or recessive,86 (2) a history of an occupation 
with increased risk of or exposure to radiation or chemicals,87 and (3) other conditions as 
determined by the DRT institution.88  If the donor’s ethnic or racial group or family 
history indicates an increased risk of carrying89 Tay-Sachs disease, thalassemia,90 cystic 
                                                                                                                                            
e.g., Down’s Syndrome.  See Medline Plus, Karyotyping, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003935.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).  
78 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.91(B)(2)(b) (2000). 
79 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.91(B)(2)(c) (2000).  
80 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.91 (2000).  
81 Unlike sperm banks, for scientific and technical reasons having to do with difficulties in 
preserving oocytes, “egg banks” essentially only mediate between recipients and potential egg 
donors who are willing to undergo the medical procedures necessary for harvesting their eggs.  
Hence, “egg banks” are not “banks” in the same sense as sperm banks, as they do not store eggs 
for immediate dispensing. 
82 The New York regulations refer to “reproductive tissue” in general.  See N.Y. Comp. Codes 
R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 52-8.5 (1991). 
83 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 52-8.5(a).  
84 Id. 
85 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.5(b).  
86 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.5(b)(2).  
87 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.5(b)(10).  Such exposure could, supposedly 
increase the prevalence of genetic mutations in the donor’s gametes.  
88 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.5(b)(13).  
89 For the purposes of the discussion herein, a carrier is an individual who is a heterozygote—
i.e., only has one copy of a recessive allele—for a disease that would only manifest itself if the 
individual has two recessive copies of the gene, e.g., CF, Tay-Sachs, etc.     
77
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fibrosis and/or sickle cell disease genes, he or she must be tested for these genetic 
conditions.91  All such test results must be made available to the donor, as well as to the 
practitioner who intends to use the DRT.92  
In addition, the New York Regulations require notification of the recipient’s 
physician if, at the time of donation, the donor was older than forty-four in the case of a 
sperm donor or older than thirty-four in the case of an egg donor.93  Furthermore, to avoid 
repeated adverse results caused by DRT use, practitioners must report the outcomes of 
any use, including such adverse results, to the DRT institution which must record them.94  
Finally, the DRT institution must receive informed consent from the recipient “after a 
physician has explained the risks and benefits of the procedure, [and] made available 
details of the medical history of the donor or donors.”95  New York is the only state with 
comprehensive regulation pertaining to the genetic aspects of DRT.   
C. Genetic Screening and Testing of Donated Reproductive Tissue in the Courts 
There are very few reported cases involving claims stemming from deficient 
genetic screening and testing of DRT.96  Yet, the little case law that does exist indicates 
that it is extremely difficult for plaintiffs97 to recover damages for their injuries.98  
                                                                                                                                            
90 Thalassemia is a blood disorder causing the body to make fewer healthy red blood cells and 
less hemoglobin than normal, which could lead to mild to severe anemia.  Beta thalassemia 
occurs when one or both genes are altered and the severity of the disease depends on how badly 
the gene or genes are affected.  Thalassemia occurs most often among people of Italian, Greek, 
Middle Eastern, Asian, and African descent.  Thalassemia is easily diagnosed in a blood test.  See 
Nat’l Heart, Lung and Blood Inst., Diseases and Conditions Index, What Are Thalassemias?, 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/Thalassemia/Thalassemia_WhatIs.html (last visited 
May 9, 2010).  
91 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.6(h). 
92 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.6(k).  
93 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.5(d).  
94 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.9(e).   
95 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.8.  
96 There are, generally, very few reported court cases involving claims of deficient ART 
practices.  Several commentators have argued that this dearth of case law in the area of ART is 
the result of a strong inclination of DRT institutions and practitioners to settle claims against 
them.  See Karen M. Ginsberg, FDA Approved? A Critique of the Artificial Insemination Industry 
in the United States, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 823, 828 (1997) (“The rarity of litigation over unsafe 
artificial insemination techniques . . . may stem from the fact that most of these cases are resolved 
in hushed, out-of-court settlements intended to conceal the risks of [artificial insemination] from 
the public. . . .”); Hecht, supra note 70, at 233-34 (arguing that the likely explanation to the lack 
of litigation is the reproductive industry’s preference for anonymous, out-of-court settlements 
which serves its attempts to avoid “negative headlines that could deter potential customers from 
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Plaintiffs seeking to bring a negligence claim relying on a theory of malpractice 
against DRT institutions or practitioners (defendants) have to show that the defendants 
(1) owed them a duty of care, (2) which the defendants breached, and (3) that the breach 
caused (4) the injury they suffered.99  Yet, it is extremely difficult to prove all of these 
elements in cases involving genetically compromised DRT.100  First, many courts are 
unwilling to recognize the existence of a duty of care to persons who did not yet exist at 
the time the allegedly tortious actions took place.101  Similarly, most jurisdictions are 
unwilling, conceptually, to entertain and flatly reject claims for “wrongful life,” i.e. 
claims that are based on the premise that tortious acts brought about the existence of a 
                                                                                                                                            
undergoing such procedures”); Anita M. Hodgson, The Warranty of Sperm: A Modest Proposal 
to Increase the Accountability of Sperm Banks and Physicians in the Performance of Artificial 
Insemination Procedures, 26 Ind. L. Rev. 357, 358, 363-64 (1993) (arguing that the lack of 
litigation arising from improper artificial insemination is the result of “quiet, out-of-court 
settlements designed to prevent anxious consumers from discovering the risks involved in the 
procedure” as well as to protect clinicians’ professional reputations and avoid large judgments by 
sympathetic juries).  It is likely that such a strong inclination to settle cases involving DRT 
institutions and practitioners would also account for the very few cases involving genetic aspects 
of DRT.  Regardless of the reason, the few cases that actually address human reproduction (not 
just in the context of the genetic aspects of DRT) demonstrate not only a plethora of different 
approaches but also sharp inconsistencies in analysis and results between different courts 
(sometimes even in the same jurisdiction). See Matthew Browne, Preconception Tort Law in an 
Era of Assisted Reproduction: Applying a Nexus Test for Duty, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2555, 2588-
91, 2596-97 (2001); Hodgson, supra at 361-62 (suggesting a UCC-based breach of warranty 
claim as another possible cause of action for plaintiffs to utilize in litigation since negligence 
claims are often difficult to prove). 
97 The term “plaintiffs” as it is used herein refers to DRT children suffering from genetic 
defects resulting from deficient screening and testing of the donors of the DRT used in their 
conception and their legal parents.  
98 The difficulties faced by plaintiffs may well deter such potential plaintiffs from suing, 
which may, in turn, explain the dearth of case-law in matters involving claims stemming from 
deficient genetic screening and testing of DRT.  
99 See Black’s Law Dictionary 1133 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “negligence” as, inter alia, “[a] 
tort grounded in [the failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person 
would have exercised in a similar situation] . . . expressed in terms of the following elements: 
duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages”).  
100 See The President’s Council on Bioethics, Reproduction and Responsibility, The 
Regulation of New Biotechnologies 70-71 (2004) [hereinafter Council on Bioethics Report], 
available at 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/index.html.  
101 See Browne, supra note 96, at 2555-56, 2558, 2563 (arguing that existing case law 
illustrates that a doctor-patient relationship between the physician and a potential mother “does 
not automatically create a duty of care flowing from the doctor to the patient’s future child”). 
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severely injured person who would have otherwise (i.e., but for the allegedly wrongful 
acts) not existed.102   
Second, the lack of regulatory standards with respect to the duties of DRT 
institutions and practitioners to screen and test DRT for genetic diseases, report adverse 
events, etc., both at the federal and state level,103 makes it difficult to establish the 
existence of a duty of care owed by such potential defendants to injured DRT children 
                                                
102 Black’s Law Dictionary 1752 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “wrongful-life action”).  The reason 
for what appears to be courts’ aversion to “wrongful life” claims is the result of what came to be 
known as the “non-identity problem.”  See generally C. Foster, T. Hope & J. McMillan, 
Submissions from Non-Existent Claimants: The Non-Identity Problem and the Law, 25 Med. & L. 
159 (2006) (explaining how courts dismiss wrongful life claims because of the non-identity 
problem). A good illustration of how most courts approach wrongful life claims is the case of 
Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).  Becker involved two cases:  in one, a couple 
sued for giving birth to a child suffering from Down’s Syndrome after not being informed by 
their doctors of the increased risk of Down’s Syndrome in women over 35 years of age or about 
the availability of the amniocentesis test.  Id. at 896.  In the second case, a couple who gave birth 
to a child with polycystic kidney disease, who died five hours after birth, were allegedly told by 
their obstetricians that the disease was not hereditary, which was not the case.  See supra note 8.  
As a result, the couple became pregnant again and gave birth to a child who also suffered from 
PKD and who died from it at the age of two and a half years.  Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 896.  Both 
couples sued for “wrongful life,” claiming that had it not been for their physicians’ actions and 
omissions they would have chosen not to give birth to or conceive their injured child.  The New 
York Court of Appeals (the highest court of New York State) held that both complaints “failed to 
state legally cognizable causes of action” because “it [did] not appear that the infants suffered any 
legally cognizable injury.” Id. at 811-12.  With respect to the parents’ causes of action, the Court 
of Appeals ruled that it is impossible to assess their damages since “notwithstanding the birth of a 
child afflicted with an abnormality . . . parents may yet experience a love that even an 
abnormality cannot fully dampen.  To assess damages for emotional harm endured by the parents 
of such a child would, in all fairness, require consideration of this factor in mitigation of the 
parents’ emotional injuries” which remains “too speculative to permit recovery.” Id. at 814.  
Judge Wachtler expressed an even stricter opinion that “a doctor who provides prenatal care to an 
expectant mother should not be held liable if the child is born with a genetic defect” because “the 
physician cannot be said to have caused the defect.” Id. at 816 (Wachtler J., dissenting in part).  
See also Browne, supra note 96, at 2558 (arguing that some courts find the policy considerations 
involved in a finding of a pre-conception tort to be “so momentous” that they prefer leaving such 
a decision to the legislature), 2588-97 (pointing at the inconsistency of analytical approaches and 
outcomes between different jurisdictions and courts with respect to children who “enter the world 
‘carrying the seal of another’s fault’”). 
Compare this situation to other types of reproduction related causes of action which do not 
raise the non-identity problem such as actions for failure to provide appropriate treatment to a 
fetus in-utero (“regular” negligence) or failure to advise parents about the risks of having a child 
with birth defects.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 1752 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “wrongful-birth 
action” as “[a] lawsuit brought by parents against a doctor for failing to advise them prospectively 
about the risks of their having a child with birth defects.”).   
103 See supra Parts II.A-B.  
80
Vol. XI The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2010 
 
   261 
and their families.104  Last, there is inherent difficulty in proving that the acts and 
omissions of the defendants, rather than the genetic qualities of the DRT used, were the 
cause of a DRT child’s injuries.105  
Plaintiffs seeking to avoid the hardships involved in bringing a negligence action 
against a DRT institution might find that they have very few, if any, other possible 
avenues of recourse.  They usually cannot sue a DRT donor who failed to report a genetic 
disease that eventually passed to the DRT child because the secrecy in which such private 
medical information is normally kept makes it very difficult to obtain.106  Furthermore, 
almost every state excludes breach of warranty causes of action in matters involving 
human tissues, including cases where deficient DRT screening and testing practices 
would have otherwise constituted a breach of warranty by defendants.107  Moreover, 
those plaintiffs who overcome the above-described legal hurdles, and eventually sue for 
damages, might encounter an overtly unsympathetic and sometimes even scornful court 
that might refuse (or fail) to accept the proposition that defendants’ mistakes and 
omissions constituted negligence.108  Ultimately, the genetically injured DRT children 
                                                
104 See Hodgson, supra note 96, at 361-62.  As discussed infra, Part II.D, with the narrow 
exception of the states of Ohio and New York, the only standards existing in this respect are non-
committing self imposed inter-industry guidelines.  See Andrews & Elster, supra note 70, at 136. 
Courts, however, might not consider such standards authoritative enough to be indicative of the 
existence of a duty of care in malpractice claims.  See OTA’s Infertility Report, supra note 27, at 
249.  For an explanation of the inherent difficulty in proving the existence of a duty in situations 
where no established standard of care exists, see The Food and Drug Law Institute, The 
Regulation of Human Tissues and Organs, 46 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 1, 150 (1990) [hereinafter 
Human Tissues and Organs] (presentation of Geoffrey R.W. Smith).  Notably, while it is a “well 
known tort doctrine that proof of compliance with the applicable ‘industry’ standard will not 
insulate a defendant from liability when the standard itself is inadequate,” the author is unaware 
of any case that even mentions the fertility industry’s guidelines with respect to genetic screening 
and testing of DRT as a possible standard of care.  Lambert v. Park, 597 F.2d 236, 239 (10th Cir. 
1979).  
105 See Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 816 (Wachtler J., dissenting in part).  
106 See OTA’s Infertility Report, supra note 27, at 249; see also infra Part II.C.1(discussing 
Johnson v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)). 
107 As far back as 1993, Hodgson pointed out the shortcomings of this policy with respect to 
the screening and testing practices of DRT and called for its abandonment and for the application 
of the U.C.C. to sperm transactions.  See Hodgson, supra note 96, at 364-86.  Yet, this policy, 
which essentially views transactions between DRT banks and consumers as performance of 
“services” rather than as “sales,” remains in place.  See Condos v. Musculoskeletal Transplant 
Found., 208 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229-30 (D. Utah 2002) (“No court has ever applied strict liability 
to the distribution of human tissue . . . . This is consistent with a general policy throughout the 
nation . . . against applying strict liability to the distribution of human tissue.”); Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 19(c) and cmt. c. (1998); but see I.C. § 39-3702 (1987) (excepting 
paid sale of organs and tissue from the application of this rule).  
108 See Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998).  Harnicher involved a 
“mix-up” of a chosen donor’s sperm with that of another donor, leading to the birth of triplets 
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and their families are left to bear not only the suffering but also, at least to some extent, 
the costs and damages resulting from the DRT children’s injuries.  Two relatively recent 
cases exemplify many of the abovementioned problems and difficulties in litigating 
claims stemming from deficient genetic screening and testing of DRT donors.  
1. Johnson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County 
In the first case exemplifying the difficulties experienced by plaintiffs suing for 
the mishandling of genetic aspects of DRT, Diane and Ronald Johnson bought sperm 
from the California sperm bank Cryobank.109  A successful insemination led to the birth 
of a girl (Brittany) who, six years later, was diagnosed with a severe form of ADPKD.110  
Since ADPKD is an autosomal dominant disease of which the Johnsons had no family 
history, they suspected that the disease was transferred to their daughter from the sperm 
donor.111  After long and burdensome legal proceedings,112 it was eventually revealed that 
                                                                                                                                            
who did not resemble their recipient-father thus thwarting recipients’ intention to believe and 
represent that the “recipient-father” is the biological father of the DRT children.  The recipients 
sued for malpractice, alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress due to the fact that they 
have “suffered severe anxiety, depression, grief, and other mental and emotional suffering and 
distress which has adversely affected their relationship with the children and with each other.”  
Id. at 68.  The Utah Supreme Court chose to accept the trial court’s holding that despite an expert 
opinion stating that plaintiffs have suffered physical symptoms as a result of their distress, they 
failed to convince the court that they have indeed suffered such injuries and thus cannot recover.  
Id. at 70-71.  Notably, in affirming the trial court’s findings, the Utah Supreme Court observed 
that “[plaintiffs] became the parents of three normal, healthy children whom the couple suggest 
do not look as much like [the recipient-father] as different children might have and whose blood 
type could not be descended from his.  This result thwarted the couple’s intention to believe and 
represent that the triplets are [the recipient-father’s] biological children.  Exposure to the truth 
about one’s own situation cannot be considered an injury and has never been a tort.  Therefore, 
destruction of a fiction cannot be grounds for either malpractice or negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.” Id. at 72 (emphasis added).  Contrast, however, the insightful dissent of 
Associate Chief Justice Durham, who argued that “[the majority’s conviction that the loss of an 
unassailable assurance that one’s children carry one’s genes is of negligible value] is belied by 
the extraordinary lengths to which thousands of people in this era will go to pursue biological 
parenthood” and that “[m]ost troubling. . . and unnecessary to the result of the majority opinion is 
its general tone of disdain for and belittlement of the nature of the suffering claimed by 
[plaintiffs].  This loss of genetic continuity is an important factor for the husband to discuss and 
to accept.  No matter how well the donor is matched to the husband, this loss is real and has to be 
grieved over . . . .”  Id. at 75, 77-78.  
109 See generally Johnson v. Superior Court (Johnson II), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002).  
110 According to a declaration from Brittany’s doctor, she had “cysts [on her kidneys] . . . and 
clearly has a highly penetrant form of ADPKD. . . .  [S]he [will] likely progress much more 
rapidly than most patients with ADPKD who don’t develop cysts until their 4th or 5th decade of 
life.”  Johnson v. Superior Court (Johnson I), 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
111 Johnson II, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654.  
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Cryobank’s personnel, who interviewed the donor, knew that he had a family medical 
history that indicated the existence of ADPKD.113  Still, Cryobank accepted him as a 
donor without further investigation to determine whether he might indeed carry the 
ADPKD gene, and later sold his sperm to the Johnsons without warning them about the 
possible genetic risks involved.114  Furthermore, Cryobank represented to the Johnsons 
that the sperm “had been tested and screened for infectious and ‘reasonably detectable 
genetically transferred’ diseases and medical abnormalities and therefore could safely be 
used.”115  
The Johnsons sued Cryobank and its employees for failing to disclose that the 
sperm they had used came from a donor with a family history of ADPKD, fraud, breach 
of contract and, later, also filed a motion to amend their complaint to add a claim for 
punitive damages.116  The trial court rejected the Johnsons’ fraud claim, held that Brittany 
was not entitled to recover general damages or damages for lost earnings, and denied the 
Johnsons’ motion to add punitive damages to their claim.117   
On appeal, while acknowledging that there were substantial policy reasons in 
favor of allowing for punitive damages, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s denial of the Johnsons’ motion to add punitive damages to their claim.118  Most 
importantly, the California Court of Appeals subscribed to the trial court’s 
characterization of Brittany’s claim as one for “wrongful life” and thus held that under 
California Supreme Court case law she was not entitled to recover general damages or 
damages for lost earnings.119  In making this decision, the Court of Appeals “recognize[d] 
                                                                                                                                            
112 The Johnsons sought to discover the identity and medical record of their donor.  See 
Johnson I, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868.  After a long struggle, the California Court of Appeals 
eventually was willing to compel the donor to appear at a deposition to answer questions and 
produce documents regarding his medical condition and his family’s medical history, but without 
having to expose his identity.  See Johnson I, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875, 878-79; Johnson II, 124 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654-55.   
113 Johnson II, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655 (“[The donor’s] affirmative answers to the questions 
concerning the presence of kidney disease in his mother and his aunt/uncle were circled, a 
question mark was written next to each ‘X,’ and the notation ‘at risk for kidney disease’ was 
written directly above the ‘X’ denoting his mother’s kidney disease.”). 
114 Id. at 654. 
115 Johnson v. Superior Court (Johnson II), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 654 (Cal. Ct. App.2002). 
116 Id. at 653-54.  
117 Id. at 654-56,  
118 See id. at 656-64 .   
119 Id. at 664-66.  The Court of Appeals explained that since it cannot be said that Defendants 
caused Brittany’s inherited abnormalities, wherein these abnormalities were caused by the 
defective donated gene, under Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) and Andalon v. 
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the harshness of the rules set forth [by the California Supreme Court] but was admittedly 
‘bound’ by them.”120  Eventually, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for further 
proceedings addressing only the Johnsons’ negligence and fraud claims.121  After almost 
another ten months of procedural back and forth in the trial court and almost seven years 
after the Johnsons filed their original claim, the parties settled the case for $1,250,000, of 
which Brittany and her parents eventually received, after deductions of expenses and 
attorneys’ fees, $750,440.56.122   
Perhaps the most disturbing fact in the Johnson case is that according to the 
Johnsons’ complaint, defendants may have sold to other recipients as many as 1,600 
sperm specimens originating from the same donor whose sperm was used to conceive 
Brittany.123  These specimens may have resulted in an unknown number, possibly 
hundreds, of DRT children who might carry the ADPKD gene originating from 
Brittany’s donor, develop ADPKD later in their lives, and pass the ADPKD gene along to 
their own offspring.124  As mentioned earlier, this case was settled so the trial court did 
not proceed to address this allegation.  
2. Paretta v. Medical Offices for Human Reproduction 
Josephine and Gerard Paretta underwent IVF using an ovum from an egg donor 
who was represented to them as “not hav[ing] a history of mental illness or genetic 
diseases.”125  Although the New York Supreme Court found that “[t]he custom and 
practice of the [ovum donor] program was to screen [and test] donors for various diseases 
                                                                                                                                            
Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), Brittany’s damages were the result of 
her coming into being and thus one cannot calculate them in a reasoned non-arbitrary manner.  
120 Johnson II, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 666.  
121 Johnson v. Superior Court (Johnson II), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 666 (Cal. Ct. App.2002). 
122 Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition Approve Compromise of Claim at 1-2, Johnson v. 
Cal. Cryobank, Inc., No. SC043434 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 13, 2003). Of this sum, each parent 
received $250,000 minus a quarter of the expenses and $100,000 attorneys’ fees. Brittany 
received the remainder, $750,000 minus $241,862.22 for additional fees and expenses, leaving 
her with $508,137.78. 
123 See Fourth Amended Complaint for Fraud, Negligent Misrepresentation/Suppression, 
Professional Negligence, Unfair Business Practices, at ¶¶ 63-64, 69, Johnson v. Cal. Cryobank, 
Inc., No. SC043434 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2003). 
124 Id. 
125 Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).  
Other details given to the Parettas about the donor included “that she was white, a second-time 
donor, a heterosexual, an only child of an Irish father and English mother, a Protestant, that she 
was five feet six inches tall, that she had dark brown hair and brown eyes, was long necked with 
small eyes and ears, that she had a short thin nose, dimples and high cheekbones, and that she did 
not have freckles.” Id.  
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and cystic fibrosis” and to “inform the patient that there was a donor or that a potential 
donor was a carrier,”126 the program did not inform the Parettas that their egg donor was 
a carrier of cystic fibrosis.  Subsequently, Mr. Paretta, who provided the sperm for the 
fertilization, did not undergo genetic testing to make sure that he was not a carrier of the 
CF gene—which he was—and the baby born from the fertilized egg (Theresa) was 
afflicted with CF.127   
In October 2000, the Parettas, including Theresa, sued the medical centers and 
units involved in their fertilization treatments for medical malpractice for failing to (1) 
properly screen and test the egg, (2) inform the Parettas that it tested positive for the CF 
gene and (3) test Mr. Paretta for the CF gene.128  The parents also sued for emotional pain 
and suffering as parents of a child affected with CF and asked that punitive damages be 
awarded for defendants’ “egregious, grossly negligent and reckless conduct.”129  
Interestingly, the Parettas avoided the difficulties in establishing the causation element of 
their negligence claim by explicitly claiming that it was the defendants who “introduced 
the agent, which caused [cystic fibrosis] and manipulated the embryonic material [that] 
was implanted into Mrs. Paretta.”130   
Relying on the New York Court of Appeals decision in Becker v. Schwartz,131 the 
New York Supreme Court held that Theresa’s claims were for “wrongful birth” and 
denied them in their entirety.132  The Supreme Court further ruled:  
Theresa . . . , like any other baby, does not have a protected right to be 
born free of genetic defects.  A conclusion to the contrary permitting 
infants to recover against doctors for wrongs allegedly committed during 
in vitro fertilization would give children conceived with the help of 
modern medical technology more rights and expectations than children 
conceived without medical assistance.  The law does not recognize such a 
distinction and neither will this court.133 
                                                
126 Id. at 641.  
127 Id. at 641-42.  According to the New York Supreme Court, “[f]or the first two months, 
Theresa was in intensive care.  She underwent several surgeries and wore a colostomy bag for a 
month.  According to plaintiffs she ‘will have to take medication for the rest of her life . . . [and] 
will remain under a doctor’s and/or hospital’s care for the rest of her life.’” Id. at 642. 
128 Id. at 642.  
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 643.  
131 See supra note 102.  
132 Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 643-46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2003).  
133 Id. at 646.  
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The New York Supreme Court also denied the Parettas’ claims for emotional 
distress as a result of their daughter’s birth with a congenital disease.134  Relying once 
again on Becker, the court explained:  
[T]here can be no recovery for the emotional distress a parent may 
experience as a result of having a child with a genetic disease.  There is no 
compelling legal authority permitting a distinction where a child has been 
conceived with the help of a medical technology and is born with a genetic 
disease.  This court cannot treat the emotional distress and psychic pain 
suffered by parents who give birth to a sick child after in vitro fertilization 
any differently from that sustained by other parents.  The emotional 
distress experienced as a result of watching a genetically diseased child 
suffer, horrible as it may be, is the same regardless of how the child was 
conceived.[135]  It unfortunately is not compensable.136 
The New York Supreme Court then went on to dismiss Mr. Paretta’s claim for 
loss of consortium as “predicated on and inextricably interwoven with the emotional 
injuries suffered by Mrs. Paretta.”137  The court did hold, however, that the action did not 
have to be dismissed in its entirety:  that “the Parettas can pursue recovery for the 
pecuniary expense they have borne and continue to bear for the care and treatment of 
their sick infant” and for punitive damages.138  Having limited the Parettas’ claims in this 
manner, the Supreme Court encouraged the Parettas “to vigorously pursue recovery.”139  
The parties proceeded to trial and, similar to the Johnsons, after about ten more months, 
eventually settled their claims for $1,300,000.140 
                                                
134 Id. at 645.  
135 See infra Part II.E. 
136 Paretta, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 646.  
137 Id. at 647.  
138 Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).  
The New York Supreme Court also did not dismiss Mrs. Paretta’s claims for compensation 
related to her decision to leave her job so that she could care for Theresa on a full-time basis and 
for the reasonable value of her services even though the court stated that it was “far from 
convinced of the viability of recovery of lost earnings.”  Id. 
139 Id. at 648.  
140 The case was settled before trial on Feb. 2, 2004.  See 
http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcivil/FCASSearch (index no. 122555-2000).  The court records 
do not provide any further information about the terms of the settlement. 
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Leaving any critique of the Johnson and Paretta decisions aside,141 these cases 
exemplify not only how restricted the avenues of legal recourse available to injured DRT 
children and their families are, but also how burdensome, time consuming, expensive and 
legally difficult it is to recover for genetic injuries associated with DRT.  Furthermore, 
even if we assume that the settlement amounts in the above cases were sufficient to 
compensate the DRT children and their families for their damages—which is highly 
doubtful142—it is not clear that they are sufficiently high to create a deterrent effect that 
would improve the genetic screening and testing practices of DRT institutions and 
practitioners.  
D. Self Regulation by Professional Organizations 
1. The Need for Genetic Screening and Testing of Donated Reproductive Tissue 
Recognized 
The lack of effective DRT screening and testing practices in the United States and 
the need for further regulation was described as early as 1979 by Martin Curie-Cohen.143  
Curie-Cohen surveyed 711 physicians who indicated that they were “likely to perform 
artificial insemination by [a] donor.”  Of the 471 who responded to the survey, 379 
reported that they actually performed artificial insemination.  According to Curie-Cohen, 
although the risk of genetic diseases was a concern of many recipients, the survey 
revealed very little, if any, screening and testing of donors.144  While many DRT 
practitioners could indicate whether the donor was part of a “select donor pool” (medical 
students automatically qualifying as select), screening was largely superficial.  Though 
96% of the physicians participating in the survey asked questions regarding donors’ 
family medical history, the questioning often did not entail more than asking the donor if 
                                                
141 Some of the courts’ rationales in denying some of the plaintiffs’ causes of action are 
controversial while others simply are not convincing.  For instance, the Johnson court’s decision 
not to allow the Johnsons to add punitive damages to their claim despite the existence of policy 
reasons to the contrary arguably did not allocate enough weight to what appeared to be egregious 
and fraudulent behavior of Cryobank’s personnel in that case.  As for the Paretta court, in 
holding that “[t]he emotional distress experienced as a result of watching a genetically diseased 
child suffer . . . is the same regardless of how the child was conceived” the court seems to have 
simply ignored the fact that it was Defendants’ acts and omissions that led to the birth of Theresa 
with the debilitating genetic disease that brought about the Parettas’ suffering.  See supra notes 
129 and 136 and accompanying text. 
142 For example, the settlement amounts do not reflect the loss of potential earnings of the 
respective DRT children had they not been afflicted with their debilitating genetic disorders.   
143 See Martin Curie-Cohen et al., Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the 
United States, 300 N. Eng. J. Med. 585, 589 (1979).   
144 Id. at 585-86 (“[d]onors of semen were . . . only superficially screened for genetic 
diseases”).  
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there were any genetic diseases in the family.  Also, many of the DRT practitioners 
expressed an underlying expectation that medical student and hospital resident would 
“screen themselves before donating semen.”145  The survey revealed that while 94.7% of 
the physicians said they would reject a carrier of Tay-Sachs disease, only 1% of them 
said that they actually tested donors for it and only 28.8% of the physicians performed 
any biomedical test on donors in addition to blood typing.146  Furthermore, the data 
collected by the survey revealed that many of the physicians had little understanding of 
genetic diseases.  For example, 71.4% of the surveyed physicians said they would 
exclude a healthy donor who had a family history of hemophilia.147  According to Curie-
Cohen, only 37% of physicians surveyed actually kept records about the children born 
from DRT that they provided and only 30% kept any records on donors.148  Curie-Cohen 
concluded that the screening and testing of donors for genetic diseases was inadequate 
and called for the establishment of a list of genetic traits that would be routinely screened 
and tested for, evaluation by “people trained in recognizing and evaluating genetic traits,” 
and a recordkeeping minimum that would include the outcome of pregnancies achieved 
through DRT and paternity.149 
Two case studies published in 1981 further illustrated the dangers of which Curie-
Cohen warned.  In one case, a girl was born with Tay-Sachs disease to a mother of an 
ethnic group in which this disease is not prevalent and the sperm of an anonymous donor, 
who, as it turned out, was a carrier of the disease’s gene.150  In the second case, two 
consecutive artificial inseminations resulted in the transmission of a rare and lethal 
                                                
145 Id. at 586.  
146 Id. at 588. 
147 Id.  Hemophilia is a rare bleeding disorder in which a person’s blood does not clot 
normally.   Hemophilia is caused by a defect in one of the genes located on the X chromosome 
that determine how the body makes blood clotting factors VIII and IX.  Females have two X 
chromosomes, while males have one X and one Y chromosome.  Since only the X chromosome 
carries the genes related to clotting factors a male who has the abnormal gene on his X 
chromosome will have hemophilia while a female must have the abnormal gene on both of her X 
chromosomes to have hemophilia, which is very rare.  This also means that while healthy females 
might be carriers of a hemophilia allele, males cannot possibly be carriers of this allele without 
actually having the disease.  See generally National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute Diseases and 
Conditions Index, What is Hemophilia?, 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/hemophilia/hemophilia_what.html (last visited May 
9, 2010).  
148 Curie-Cohen, supra note 143, at 588. 
149 Id. at 589.  
150 William Johnson et al., Artificial Insemination by Donors: the Need for Genetic Screening. 
Late-Infantile GM2-Gangliosidosis Resulting From This Technique, 36 N. Eng. J. Med. 572, 755 
(1981). 
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genetic disease to two siblings conceived from the sperm of a single donor.151  Tragically, 
the second insemination, leading to the birth of the second afflicted child, had already 
taken place by the time the doctors diagnosed the lethal disease in the older sibling.  Both 
siblings died very young—at sixteen and three months, respectively—as a result of the 
genetic disease they inherited from the sperm donor.152 
During the 1980s, these data prompted more calls for regulation of DRT in 
general and their genetic aspects in particular.  A 1988 survey of the former Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) revealed that donor screening and testing practices were 
“quite varied.”  For example, while many physicians routinely rejected potential donors 
for such traits as “psychological immaturity,” “less than a high school education” and 
“less than average height,” only about half of the physicians tested any of their potential 
donors for any genetic diseases.153  The OTA 1988 Survey further revealed that only 44% 
of the physicians performing AI required screening and testing for genetic diseases for 
which the potential donors were at high risk.154  The Survey found that while all of the 
fifteen DRT institutions that responded to the survey did some testing of varying nature 
and extent, two of the fifteen DRT banks reviewed did not test for ethnically prevalent 
genetic diseases such as Tay-Sachs, sickle-cell anemia and thalassemia.155  In addition, 
the Survey disclosed that only two-thirds of the DRT banks ever rejected a donor for 
having a family history of a serious genetic disease or for being over forty years of age.156 
Another OTA report published in 1988 further revealed that only 20% of the 
physicians who regularly performed AI indicated that a family history of genetic disease 
would prompt them to require further genetic testing of a potential donor and only 18% 
indicated they would do so with a potential donor from a high risk ethnic group.157  The 
OTA 1988 Infertility Report concluded that “genetic testing is not routine for donors, 
including those in higher than average risk groups.”158   
                                                
151 David Shapiro & Raymond J. Hutchinson, Familial Histiocytosis in Offspring of Two 
Pregnancies after Artificial Insemination, 36 N. Eng. J. Med. 573, 757 (1981).  Shapiro and 
Hutchinson called for extreme caution in using sperm from the same donor for artificial 
insemination when a child conceived from the sperm is afflicted with an unknown disorder.  Id. at 
759.  
152 Id. at 757-58.  
153 See OTA 1988 Survey, supra note 14, at 9, 33-35, 66-70.   
154 Id. at 9.  
155 Id. at 11, 68. 
156 Id. at 67.  Like Curie-Cohen, the 1988 OTA Survey also found that 49-63% of the 
physicians performing AI would reject a healthy potential donor for having a family history of X-
linked genetic diseases although it would be impossible for such a donor to transmit those defects 
to their offspring.  Id. at 10; see also supra note 147. 
157 See OTA’s Infertility Report, supra note 27, at 35.  
158 Id.  
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The OTA’s 1988 reports proved to be a benchmark in the calls for the regulation 
of DRT in general, and their screening and testing in particular.159  Later commentators 
have also recognized the importance of genetic screening and testing of DRT donors and 
their evaluation by genetics specialists.160  Ultimately, it was not government authorities 
who rose to the challenge but rather professional organizations, such as the American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the American Association of Tissue 
Banks (AATB).   
2. The ASRM Guidelines for Gamete and Embryo Donation 
The ASRM Guidelines161 set out to “provide the latest recommendations for 
evaluation of potential sperm, oocyte, and embryo donors, incorporating recent 
information about optimal screening and testing for . . . genetic diseases.”162  With 
respect to semen donation, the ASRM Guidelines determine that the “main qualities to 
seek in selecting a donor . . . are an assurance of good health status and the absence of 
genetic abnormalities . . . [and] [t]he donor should be . . . ideally, less than 40 years of 
age;”163 oocyte donors should preferably be between the ages of 21-34.164  The ASRM 
Guidelines specify that potential sperm and egg donors should undergo genetic screening 
                                                
159 See Marwick, supra note 27, at 1339 (describing [then] Senator Albert Gore’s criticism of 
the FDA’s non-regulation of AI in light of the OTA 1988 Survey). 
160 See, e.g., Lisa Kump et al, The Importance of Genetic Screening for Oocyte Donors, 78 
Fertility & Sterility S43, S43 (2002) (describing the genetic screening and testing of 607 
prospective egg donors, which resulted in the exclusion of 71 of them, i.e., more than 12%, and 
concluding that genetic screening of prospective egg donors that included detailed family history 
and testing for a number of diseases should be encouraged “to assure optimal short-term and 
long-term outcomes for pregnancies achieved through . . . donation”); Rubens L.C. Tavares et al., 
The Value of Genetic Screening of Oocyte Donors Couples, 80 Fertility & Sterility S138, S138 
(2003) (reporting that genetic screening of prospective egg donors resulted in the exclusion of 
more than 20% of the prospective donors for such reasons as having sickle cell anemia and 
having prior children with mental retardation); Robert Wallerstein et al., Genetic Screening of 
Prospective Oocyte Donors, 70 Fertility & Sterility 52, 52 (1998) (reporting the exclusion of 
eight out of 73 egg donor candidates (11%) due to “serious genetic findings” and concluding that 
“[a] thorough genetic evaluation, including a history and laboratory [test]ing, is essential to any 
oocyte donation program to maximize positive outcomes”). 
161 See generally The Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reproductive Med. and the 
Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech., 2006 Guidelines for Gamete and 
Embryo Donation, 86 Fertility & Sterility S38 (2006) [hereinafter ASRM Guidelines]. 
162 Id. at S38.  
163 Id. at S40 § VI.A.1-2. 
164 If a prospective donor is older than 34, the Guidelines require that the donor’s age be 
revealed to the recipient as part of the informed consent discussion concerning the possible effect 
of donor age on genetic risks.  Id. at S44 § VI.B.3, 5.  
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and testing for heritable diseases, including carrier status for CF in all donors and other 
genetic testing as indicated by the donor’s ethnic background and in light of the family 
history.165  The ASRM Guidelines also set an explicit “minimum” standard for genetic 
screening and testing of DRT donors, according to which donors and their first degree 
relatives (parents, siblings and children) must not have (1) any major Mendelian disorder, 
such as Huntington’s disease;166 (2) any major functional or cosmetic malformation of 
complex cause, such as spina bifida167 or heart malformation;168 or (3) any significant 
familial disease with a major genetic component.169  The ASRM Guidelines further 
require that donors must not carry any known karyotypic abnormality that might result in 
chromosomally unbalanced gametes and that donors should be tested for carrier status of 
CF and genetic disorders for which they are in a high-risk group.170   
3. The American Association of Tissue Banks (AATB) Standards for Tissue 
Banking 
Like the ASRM Guidelines, the AATB Guidelines171 are meant to “prevent 
disease transmission”172 and preliminarily require compliance with any and all applicable 
                                                
165 See id. at S40 § VI.B.2 (sperm donors); see also id. at S44 §§ VI.B.7, VI.C.1 (egg donors).  
Notably, the ASRM Guidelines clarify that as new tests for genetic risk factors become available, 
“every effort should be made” to have samples of sperm that are cryopreserved tested in 
accordance with the new standards.  Id. at S42 § IV.B.6.d.   
166 Huntington’s disease (HD) results from a genetically programmed degeneration of brain 
cells in certain areas of the brain which causes uncontrolled movements, loss of intellectual 
faculties, and emotional disturbance.  HD is an autosomal dominant disease, which means that if 
a child inherits the HD gene he or she will develop the disease.  Each child of an HD parent has a 
50-50 chance of inheriting the HD gene.  A person who inherits the HD gene will sooner or later 
develop the disease.  See Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Huntington’s Disease 
Information Page, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/huntington/huntington.htm (last visited 
May 9, 2010).  
167 Spina bifida (SB) is a disorder involving incomplete development of the brain, spinal cord, 
and/or their protective coverings caused by the failure of the fetus’s spine to close properly during 
the first month of pregnancy.  Infants born with SB sometimes have an open lesion on their spine 
where significant damage to the nerves and spinal cord has occurred.  See Nat’l Inst. of 
Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Spina Bifida Information Page, 
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/spina_bifida/spina_bifida.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).   
168 Notably, the ASRM Guidelines acknowledge that “’major’ is a matter of judgment.”  
ASRM Guidelines, supra note 161, at Appendix A S50.  
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 See generally Am. Ass’n of Tissue Banks, Standards for Tissue Banking (10th ed. 2002) 
[hereinafter AATB Guidelines]. 
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statutory and regulatory standards.173 The AATB Guidelines state that donor suitability 
should be evaluated based upon medical, social and sexual history,174 physical 
examination and laboratory tests.175  The evaluation should include “any history of 
chemical and/or radiation exposure as well as family medical history and genetic 
background;”176 specifically, it should entail an evaluation by a person knowledgeable in 
clinical genetics of at least three generations of the donor’s family history.177  The AATB 
Guidelines set an age limit of forty years for semen donors and thirty-five years for egg 
donors178 and require that “[a]ny condition in a prospective donor or donor’s family 
history that would pose a risk of producing an offspring with a genetic disease or defect 
greater than the risk in the general population shall disqualify him/her as a donor.”179  
The Guidelines further explicitly require that if there is an indication of a risk of Tay-
Sachs disease, thalassemia, sickle cell anemia or CF in the donor’s medical history, 
family history or ethnic background, the donor should be tested for such conditions.180 
Interestingly, although the AATB Guidelines use compulsory language, their sole 
sanction for non-compliance is withdrawal of accreditation “upon a determination . . . 
that significant non-compliance, such as repeated violations, one or more egregious 
violations, uncorrected violations or deliberate falsehoods, have occurred.”181  
                                                                                                                                            
172 Id. at iv.  
173 Id. at 1 § A1.000.  
174 According to the AATB Guidelines, the medical history should be reviewed by a “trained 
individual” and include previous medical records, test results, and conversation with attendant 
medical staff.  Id. § D4.230.  
175 Id. at 31 § D4.100.  
176 Id. at 34 § D4.220.  
177 AATB Guidelines, supra note 171, at 35 § D4.221.   
178 Id. at 45-46 § D4.400.  
179 Id. 
180 Id.  
181 Id. at iv-v, 1 § A1.000. 
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4. Contemporary Genetic Screening and Testing Practices of DRT Institutions and 
Adherence to the Professional Guidelines  
Relatively recent studies indicate that not much has changed since the 1980s with 
respect to the genetic screening and testing practices of DRT.182  According to a study 
published in 2007, the four participating DRT institutions tested potential donors for 
blood type, Rh factor, drugs and sexually transmitted infections, gave them psychological 
evaluations and required them to prepare a detailed family health history for three 
generations.183  Yet, none of the DRT institutions had a requirement for any mandatory 
genetic testing and not even all of them had the donors’ medical history evaluated by a 
genetics specialist who, presumably, could have indicated whether further testing was 
necessary.184 
Another survey attempted to determine how the practices of DRT institutions 
which are members of the AATB vary from the AATB Guidelines.185  According to this 
survey, while all sixteen sperm banks that responded186 required prospective donors to 
provide their medical and family history and undergo a physical examination, only 
thirteen (81% of the DRT institutions) tested men of ethnic risk groups for Tay-Sachs 
disease, sickle cell anemia and thalassemia; only four (25%) tested all donors for CF; 
only eight (50%) reported they would test for CF even if there was a positive family 
history of the disease;187  and only six had a genetic professional on staff.188  Amazingly, 
three DRT institutions (19%) rejected prospective sperm donors based on a positive 
family history of color blindness and seven banks (44%) did so with a family history of 
                                                
182 See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Human Tissue Banks: FDA Taking 
Steps to Improve Safety, but some Concerns Remain 14-15 (1997) [hereinafter GAO 1997 
Report] (discussing non-compliance of AATB members with the AATB Guidelines).  
183 Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the 
Medical Market in Genetic Material, 72 Am. Soc. Rev. 319, 324, 327-28 (2007) (discussing how 
the social process of bodily commoditization varies based on sex and gender in the context of egg 
and sperm donations). 
184 Id. at 328.  
185 See Conrad, supra note 10, at 298.  
186 Notably, another twenty-one DRT institutions chose not to participate in the survey.  
According to Conrad, those DRT institutions that participated in the survey “were primarily 
large-volume, private, nationally based commercial cryobanks, in contrast to regional cryobanks 
serving a limited population.”  See id. at 299.  Presumably, the non-participating DRT institutions 
were in even poorer compliance with the AATB Guidelines than the participating DRT 
institutions.     
187 See id. at 298.  
188 Id. 
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hemophilia.189  The survey’s conclusion was that “[c]onsiderable differences exist among 
semen bank practices in accordance with guidelines published by national agencies.”190 
A similar survey focusing on the compliance of 159 oocyte donation programs 
with the ASRM Guidelines revealed “considerable variability” in the practices of 
screening and testing for genetic disorders.191  According to this survey, only 72% of the 
oocyte donation programs tested donor candidates from ethnic groups at higher risk for 
sickle cell anemia and only 77% did so with respect to Tay-Sachs disease.192  The survey 
had several even more alarming findings, e.g., that only 62% of the participating 
programs said they would exclude applicants with first-degree relatives who had 
ADPKD.193  In other words, more than a third of the programs that took the survey 
confirmed that they would knowingly expose babies born from eggs originating from 
donors who had a first degree relative with ADPKD to a risk of 25% of developing 
ADPKD.194  The survey’s conclusion was that while most programs followed ASRM 
Guidelines, “a significant minority . . . do[] not use well-established [genetic] . . . 
tests.”195  The findings of the abovementioned surveys are underscored by the fact that 
not all DRT institutions participate in professional accreditation programs, such as those 
of the AATB and ASRM.196   
                                                
189 Id. at 300.  Like hemophilia, color blindness is an X-linked recessive disorder.  As 
explained above, such rejection could have no medical/genetic basis.  See supra note 147.  
190 Conrad, supra note 10, at 300. 
191 Vivian Lewis et al., Survey of Genetic Screening for Oocyte Donors, 71 Fertility & Sterility 
278, 278 (1999).   
192 Id. at 279.  
193 Id. at 280 (Table 1).  Similarly, only 76% of the programs reported they would do so in the 
case of Huntington’s disease.  Id.  For a discussion of Huntington’s disease, see supra note 166.  
194 See supra note 8 (discussing ADPKD).  With only 62% of the programs taking the survey 
confirming that they would exclude applicants with first-degree relatives who had ADPKD, the 
implication is that 38% of the programs would not exclude applicants with first-degree relatives 
who had ADPKD.  This means that these programs would actually include in their DRT donation 
programs individuals with first-degree relatives having ADPKD.  Statistically speaking, this 
would mean that these egg donation programs would knowingly sell eggs from donors having a 
50% chance of having ADPKD themselves.  Since a child has a 50% chance of getting the 
ADPKD gene from a parent having this gene, children born from eggs originating from such 
donors have a 25% chance (50% of 50%) of having the ADPKD gene themselves.  See supra note 
8. 
195 Lewis et al., supra note 191, at 280-81.  
196 For example, out of an estimated 400 or more tissue banks existing in the United States in 
the early 1990s, only forty were inspected and accredited by the AATB.  See Barbara Indech, The 
International Harmonization of Human Tissue Regulation: Regulatory Control Over Human 
Tissue Use and Tissue Banking in Select Countries and the Current State of International 
Harmonization Efforts, 55 Food & Drug L.J. 343, 348 (2000).  In 2003, out of 115 sperm banks 
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Importantly, by 2005 the FDA was aware of the non-uniform compliance of DRT 
institutions with self-imposed professional standards.  According to the FDA Final Donor 
Eligibility Rule, only 80% of the examined institutions providing ART services adhered 
to professional standards and guidelines.197  Moreover, while the FDA estimated that 
compliance of tissue banks with professional standards of donor screening and testing 
neared 100% for several types of tissues, it recognized that “facilities handling 
reproductive tissue [were] the primary exception to this finding” and that most sperm 
banks did not follow voluntary industry standards.198  The FDA also acknowledged that 
only a small percentage of the sperm banks surveyed were members of the AATB and 
followed its Guidelines on screening and testing.199 
In conclusion, despite the existence of professional guidelines setting clear 
requirements for genetic screening and testing of DRT, effective enforcement 
mechanisms and deterring sanctions are lacking.  As such, compliance by DRT 
institutions with such guidelines is varied and depends on the level of commitment of 
each individual DRT institution.  Persistent findings of non-compliance with self-
imposed professional guidelines since the 1990s indicate that this picture of non-uniform 
                                                                                                                                            
nationwide, only 11 were accredited by the AATB.  See Gail Schmoller Philbin, Web of 
Conception; Couples Turning to Internet Sites to Secure Donated Sperm, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 
20, 2003, at C1.  Similarly, the GAO 1997 Report disclosed that only approximately one-third of 
the reproductive laboratories in the United States existing at that time were accredited by the 
ASRM.  See GAO 1997 Report, supra note 182, at 10.  The reality of non-participation in 
professional regulation of DRT is easily noticeable upon browsing through internet websites of 
DRT banks:  out of about a dozen internet websites of sperm banks visited by the author, while 
all of the sperm banks boasted the “quality” of their DRT, only one sperm bank clearly indicated 
that the bank is a member of the AATB.  Notably, this fact is a further indication of the low 
enforceability of professional guidelines on DRT institutions.  The fact that many DRT 
institutions are not members of the ASRM and AATB is also an indication that DRT institutions 
might not be concerned that such non-membership would have a detrimental effect on their 
ability to do business, which, in turn, reflects on the ability of the ASRM and AATB to enforce 
their guidelines on those DRT institutions that are members.  In other words, the fact that there 
are, apparently, many DRT institutions that are not even members of or accredited by the AATB 
and ASRM is an indication that non-compliance with the guidelines of such professional 
organizations is of little or no concern to DRT institutions and that the potential implications of 
such non-compliance (if any) carry little (if any) deterrent effect.  
197 The FDA’s survey covered 110 sperm banks and 400 establishments providing ART 
services.  See FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule, supra note 24, at 68654.  This data was part of 
the FDA’s reasoning for the need for federal regulation of DRT institutions with respect to 
communicable diseases. 
198 Id. at 29817-18.   
199 Id.   
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compliance is not transitory and is unlikely to change without government 
intervention.200  
E. Why the Current Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive Tissue is 
Insufficient and the Need for Additional Protection of DRT Recipients and DRT Children 
1. The Insufficiency of Self-Regulation 
Evidently, and as recognized by fertility professionals and the FDA, self-
regulation is insufficient for ensuring the health and welfare of DRT children and their 
families.201  There is persistent data showing that a significant portion of DRT institutions 
are not even members of the ASRM or AATB.202  Even those establishments that are 
members of ASRM and AATB often do not adhere to the professional guidelines set by 
these organizations,203 and there is significant variance in genetic screening and testing 
                                                
200 See also Conrad, supra note 10, at 301 (pointing out that despite more than a decade (at 
that time) of proposals for genetic screening and testing of DRT, no changes have taken place in 
the practices of DRT institutions).    
201 See also 66 Fed. Reg. 5452 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001) (expressing the FDA’s view that, in the 
context of communicable diseases, “extending regulation to reproductive cells and tissues will 
remedy a significant gap in oversight.  Although we recognize the value of professional efforts to 
self-regulate, and of regulatory efforts of other agencies and the States, we disagree that these 
piecemeal, often voluntary, efforts are adequate”); Cohen, supra note 23, at 352 (expressing 
doubts regarding the ability of the medical profession to effectively self-regulate the field of 
ART); Ginsberg, supra note 96, at 829 (arguing that the lack of established mechanisms to police 
compliance with professional guidelines causes irregular compliance); Jennifer L. Rosato, The 
Children of ART: Should the Law Protect them from Harm?, 57 Utah L. Rev. 57, 62-63 (2004) 
(“Although there is some self-regulation of fertility practices through professional medical 
organizations, the system is not well-equipped to curb harmful or unethical practices.”). 
Notably, some commentators have expressed concerns that the current regulation of genetic 
aspects of DRT also fails to recognize and promote the interests and well-being (not only the 
safety) of DRT children and their families as well as those of society as a whole.  See Council on 
Bioethics Report, supra note 100, at 195; Erik Parens & Lori Knowles, Reprogenetics and Public 
Policy—Reflections and Recommendations, Hast. Ctr. Rep., July-August 2003, at S3, S7-S9 
(2003). 
202 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.  This non-compliance with self regulation 
requirements was apparently one of the rationales for the FDA’s creation of the Human Tissue 
Regulations.  See also 66 Fed. Reg. 5450 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001) (“[FDA has] considered the efforts 
of professional organizations and we will continue to do so as we implement the new regulations.  
However, not all [tissue] establishments belong to or are accredited by such groups and voluntary 
programs are not enforceable.”).  
203 See GAO 1997 Report, supra note 182, at 14-15; ISLAT Working Group, supra note 2, at 
651 (“Despite the existence of voluntary guidelines . . . abuses continue to occur”); Human 
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standards between DRT institutions.204  The resultant risks of this reality are further 
exacerbated by the general vulnerability of DRT recipients.  In particular, many DRT 
recipients do not possess the medical or scientific background necessary to enable them 
to “ask the right questions” or properly evaluate some of the risks involved.205 
Moreover, the current scheme of self-regulation relies primarily on the diligence 
and integrity of practitioners as well as on donors volunteering pertinent information 
about their medical history and that of their families.  However, practitioners operate in a 
highly competitive market that creates strong financial incentives that do not necessarily 
coincide with the best interest of DRT recipients and DRT children.206  Potential donors’ 
answers regarding their medical history and that of their families are also often 
insufficient to properly evaluate the genetic risks they might pose.207  Furthermore, the 
financial benefit to donors accompanied by the absence of a clear legal duty to accurately 
                                                                                                                                            
Tissues and Organs, supra note 104, at 56 (presentation of Armand M. Karow) (“Perhaps the 
most important problem here is the inability of private groups to compel compliance . . . 
voluntary standards are just that—voluntary.”).  In addition, the enforcement mechanisms of 
professional societies are ineffective and the only penalty for non-compliance is revocation of 
membership.  See Daar & Brzyski, supra note 15, at 1704 (“[D]ata suggest the majority of sperm 
banks and egg donor agencies do not follow the established screening protocols . . . Even in 
centers that did report testing, most did not fully follow the guidelines set forth by the American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine.”); Alicia Ouellette et al., Lessons Across the Pond: Assisted 
Reproductive Technology in the United Kingdom and the United States, 31 Am. J.L. & Med. 419, 
430 (2005) (“[T]here are no legal consequences for non-accredited U.S. programs . . . there is 
also ‘no consumer-recognized seal of approval or standard symbol that conveys that any 
minimum standards of quality have been met.’”); Rosato, supra note 201, at 66-67.  
204 See, e.g., The N.Y. State Task Force on Life and the Law, Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies, Analysis and Recommendations for Public Policy 251 (1998) (“The type of family 
history information that would disqualify a prospective egg donor varies considerably at 
programs in New York State.”); Daar & Brzyski, supra note 15, at 1704 (“Current use of genetic 
screening by sperm and egg donor enterprises is best described as inconsistent.”).   
205 See Julie Marquis, Gift of Life, Questions of Liability, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 9, 1997, at 
A1 (describing the Johnson Case and referring to Diane Johnson’s admission that she “didn’t 
even know what to ask”); see also Rosato, supra note 201, at 71 (arguing that future parents tend 
to want to achieve pregnancy as quickly as possible thereby making them more prone to take 
unnecessary risks), Meena Lal, Comment, The Role of the Federal Government in Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies, 13 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 517, 535 (1997) 
(arguing that “consumers” of IVF treatments, are often too emotionally involved to “maintain an 
objective and cautious stance toward the practices of institutions and individuals providing the 
service”). 
206 See, e.g., Rosato, supra note 201, at 71-72 (describing the strong incentives fertility 
practitioners have to provide couples with a pregnancy as quickly as possible).  
207 See GAO 1997 Report, supra note 182, at 37 (disclosing a study conducted by one tissue 
bank which found that 9.8% of 1,000 donors whose families provided a medical history that did 
not indicate genetic risk factors were rejected upon testing or autopsy).  
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disclose such information208 might render the current screening practices—which rely 
mostly on questioning of potential donors—unreliable because they create an incentive 
for potential donors to hide negative medical facts about themselves and their families.209  
As a result, a significant number of the many thousands of children born every year from 
DRT are exposed to a heightened risk of having severe genetic diseases which could have 
been avoided through proper genetic screening.   
2. The Inadequacy of the Relief Afforded by Courts 
One would have expected that once the risks embedded in the current system 
came to bear on a particular child, such individual born from genetically defective DRT 
would be able to obtain appropriate relief in court.  Yet, the few published cases 
pertaining to genetic injuries of children born from DRT raise significant doubts as to the 
adequacy of the court system for providing sufficient and timely remedies to such 
children and their families or to create the deterrent effect needed in order to avoid 
similar future injuries.210  
First, in order to make a viable claim, injured DRT children and their families 
have to trace their maladies back to the acts and omissions of a DRT institution—a legal 
and scientific feat in and of itself.211  Second, as demonstrated by the Johnson and 
Paretta cases, the causes of action available to plaintiffs in such matters are limited212 
and difficult to establish.213  Finally, to the extent that Johnson and Paretta are 
representative of cases involving injuries caused by genetically defective DRT, the 
                                                
208 Only two states explicitly require potential donors to disclose relevant medical information 
fully and accurately.  See supra note 73.  
209 See Curie-Cohen, supra note 143, at 588.  
210 Annas, supra note 22, at 936 (arguing that the courts’ deference to the contractual 
relationship between DRT manufacturers and parent-consumers is inadequate due to its failure to 
acknowledge and protect underlying interests of children, parents and society); Amy Shelf, A 
Need to Know Basis: Record Keeping, Information Access and the Uniform Status of Children of 
Assisted Conception Act, 51 Hastings L.J. 1047, 1067 (2000) (raising doubts as to the sufficiency 
of tort claims to create an incentive for DRT manufacturers to perform genetic testing and 
compile medical records).  
211 See supra Part II.B (discussing this issue); see also supra note 112 and accompanying text.   
212 The current law, at least in California and New York, does not provide injured DRT 
children with effective means of suing for their injuries.  See supra Part II.C; see also Annas, 
supra note 22, at 938 (arguing that the current regulatory framework is a “bad way to protect 
children” because it focuses on “provid[ing] the adults involved with what they want” rather than 
making the children born the first priority).   
213 But see Browne, supra note 96, at 2608-09 (suggesting a different approach to establishing 
liability of DRT manufacturers that would circumvent some of the problems and hardships 
inherent to the current legal framework).  
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settlement amounts in such cases are arguably too low to create a real incentive for DRT 
institutions to improve their genetic screening and testing practices.214   
Even if we ignore the fact that lawsuits impose significant financial burdens that 
not everyone is capable of bearing, judicial remedies are, by definition, case-specific and 
retrospective and, therefore, too late for the genetically injured child and her family; by 
the time of the trial, the child and her family have already experienced pain and suffering 
and will live with the consequences of the genetic injury for the rest of their lives.215  
Additionally, because the genetic risks to DRT children might manifest many years after 
the treatment took place, medical malpractice litigation may not be an effective venue for 
obtaining “real time” quality control.216  
3. DRT Recipients and DRT Children are Entitled to and It Is Desirable that They 
Have Additional Legal Protection 
The Paretta court’s proposition that DRT children’s injuries are not compensable 
where similar injuries of non-DRT children would not be compensable217 is unjustifiable 
and ignores significant differences between the circumstances of conception and 
gestation of DRT and non-DRT children.  First, the conception of DRT children always 
involves a third party—a “middleman”—that normally makes certain representations, 
both direct and implied, to the recipients regarding the DRT, which often create certain 
expectations—reasonable or not—regarding the characteristics of the DRT and future 
                                                
214 Since Johnson and Paretta are the only two reported cases available, it is difficult to make 
an inference from them as to all matters involving injuries resulting from genetically defective 
DRT.  Still, Johnson and Paretta may be indicative of how plaintiffs in such cases perceive their 
chances in court and therefore their leverage in settlement negotiations.  See also Hecht, supra 
note 70, at 258 (“[The] unfavorable trial conditions force plaintiffs to settle for less, while clinics 
are not required to improve the safety of their facilities.”); Hodgson, supra note 96, at 364 
(observing that while settlement amounts in cases involving defective sperm ensure minimal 
compensation, they do little to compel sperm banks and physicians to take action that would 
circumvent similar defects in the future). 
215 See Cohen, supra note 23, at 353 (arguing that the court system does not provide an 
adequate method of regulation in the area of ART, where it is necessary to avert permanent harm 
in advance); Ginsberg, supra note 96, at 841 (arguing that litigation is an inadequate enforcement 
mechanism because it is retrospective, deals with injuries of individual parties, results in ad-hoc 
policy limited to case-specific circumstances and generally fails to deter abuses in the AI 
industry); Hodgson, supra note 96, at 364 (observing that once a genetic disease has manifested 
in a child, it is difficult to compensate for the pain and suffering resulting from the injury); Shelf, 
supra note 210, at 1067 (arguing that tort remedies, by nature, are insufficient to recover lost 
genetic and medical information). 
216 See ISLAT Working Group, supra note 2, at 651.  
217 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
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DRT child.218  Second, in assisted reproduction, gametes go through an “in-vitro stage,” a 
period of time in which they are external to the donor and recipient’s body alike.  This 
period of time, even if short, creates a unique opportunity to manipulate the DRT or 
subject it to selection that is meant to achieve favorable results in the future DRT child219 
and which, as before, often creates expectations regarding the future DRT child and her 
genetic makeup.  Thus, the Paretta court was mistaken in its refusal to distinguish 
between assisted and non-assisted reproduction, especially in the context of DRT.220  
Furthermore, the proposition that parents cannot have reasonable expectations that 
their DRT children will not suffer from genetic diseases221 flies in the face of reality as 
DRT recipients often have an underlying—many would say justified—expectation that 
their DRT children would have significantly lower chances of having genetic diseases 
than non-DRT children.222  In fact, many DRT recipients seek to use DRT precisely 
because they wish to avoid the risk of their child having a genetic disease and ensure 
“high quality” genetic traits.223  Thus, denying DRT recipients the assurance of genetic 
                                                
218 The third party is also usually well informed and aware of the medical risks typical to the 
use of DRT.  This makes the representations of the third party—normally a medical 
practitioner—credible and therefore more likely to be relied upon.  Unsurprisingly, it is that “third 
party” that is usually being sued.  Arguably, parties choosing to procreate in a non-assisted 
manner have, at least hypothetically, sufficient opportunity to inform each other and become 
informed with respect to their respective medical condition and genetic makeup.  
219 E.g., manipulation of sperm to select the sex of the future child, picking sperm from a 
donor who resembles the future father to maintain semblance between him and the future DRT 
child and more. 
220 Rather than refuse to distinguish between assisted and non-assisted reproduction, the 
Paretta Court should have determined whether the DRT institution had a duty toward the 
recipients and DRT child based on the particular circumstances of the case and regardless of the 
question of comparability to non-assisted reproduction.  The court should have left the 
comparability question to later cases addressing the issue from the non-assisted reproduction 
perspective, i.e., whether children conceived via unassisted reproduction could receive the same 
type of relief as children conceived via assisted reproduction. 
221 See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.  
222 See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 10, at 39 (“[Future parents seeking to use DRT to achieve a 
pregnancy instead of adopting a child] wanted the opportunity to hand-pick a donor’s genes rather 
than gamble on a birth mother’s and father’s.”); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the 
Era of Genomics, 29 Am. J.L. & Med. 439, 460 (2003) (“[U]sing gamete and embryo selection 
technologies to ensure healthy offspring [is] of great importance to individuals.”); Amy Harmon, 
First Comes the Baby Carriage, N.Y. Times Oct. 13, 2005, at G.1 (“You’re paying for it, so you 
kind of want the best of the best.”). 
223 This incentive was acknowledged by the Johnson Court.  See Johnson v. Superior Court 
(Johnson II), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“A wide variety of factors leads 
individuals to their decision to use [AI] including genetic disorders.”); Helen M. Alvare, The 
Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children’s Rights Perspective, 40 Harv. J. on 
Legis. 1, 25 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he industry is in the business of selling superior genetic 
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quality that many of them seek by not affording them appropriate legal remedies when 
they and their DRT children are injured defeats one of the main reasons for using DRT. 
From a torts policy point of view, the current regulatory scheme is contrary to 
notions of justice and economic efficiency.224  As explained above, DRT recipients are 
the least informed and least equipped party to assess the genetic risks involved in the use 
of DRT.  Moreover, under the current regulatory scheme, DRT recipients run the most 
significant risk involved in the use of DRT—giving birth to very sick individuals.  
Meanwhile, DRT institutions that could have prevented the injury most efficiently and 
effectively, and which are also the “deep pocket,” are left practically unscathed.225  This 
situation is not only inefficient from an economic standpoint but also offensive from 
distributive and corrective justice points of view.   
It is prudent to assume that with the persistently high number of individuals using 
DRT, constant improvement in preconception diagnosis technology and the maturation of 
DRT children (and manifestation of dormant genetic diseases), claims of DRT children 
and recipients, which are still relatively rare, will increase in number.226  In other words, 
unless the regulatory framework is changed, the problems stemming from the current 
regulatory scheme are only going to be aggravated.   
In sum, the DRT market, given its particular characteristics, is currently under-
regulated to an extent that poses a significant risk to the lives, health and welfare of a 
large and ever growing population of DRT recipients and DRT children.227  In the several 
decades since ART became available to the public, the federal government, states, courts 
and professional organization have all failed to create a coherent regulatory scheme that 
would protect DRT recipients, DRT children and the public from avoidable genetic 
hazards involved in DRT.228  This type of systemic failure calls for the involvement of 
                                                                                                                                            
inheritances for high fees”); Ginsberg, supra note 96, at 823, 827-28 (“[M]any recipients use 
artificial insemination to avoid passing a genetic disease to their children.”); Peterson, supra note 
69, at 62-63 (asserting that the second most common reason for the use of AI is that the intended 
father carries a genetic mutation which the intended parents fear transmitting to their child).   
224 See Hodgson, supra note 96, at 359 (calling for increased moral accountability and legal 
liability where economizing the results of the creation of “low-cost, low-quality human 
offspring”).  
225 Indeed, the settlement amounts of over $1M in the Johnson and Paretta cases are 
significant.  Yet, they did not include any punitive component and, arguably, were not substantial 
enough to create a deterrent effect.  
226 See Browne, supra note 96, at 2591.  See also Denise Grady, As the Use of Donor Sperm 
Increases, Secrecy Can Be a Health Hazard, N.Y. Times, June 6, 2006, at F5, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/06/health/06opin.html.  
227 See Parens & Knowles, supra note 201, at S12, S14 (arguing that although many groups 
and federal agencies have commented on or asserted authority over DRT, “there is, at best, a 
patchwork system of oversight” which calls for improved government oversight) 
228 Notably, numerous commentators have highlighted the lack of protection of DRT children 
as especially problematic.  See generally Alvare, supra note 223, at 25-26 (arguing that the DRT 
industry accommodates and prefers the interests of adults over the needs and well-being of 
101
Vol. XI The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2010 
 
   282 
the federal government.229  As discussed infra in Part IV, the FDA is the federal 
government branch best positioned for and capable of regulating the genetic aspects of 
DRT and has the authority to do so.  By way of comparison, the next section describes 
the federal-like regulation of genetic aspects of DRT in the European Union and 
exemplifies some of its features that may be “imported” to a similar future scheme in the 
United States.  
III. THE REGULATION OF GENETIC ASPECTS OF DONATED REPRODUCTIVE TISSUE IN 
EUROPE 
Given its unique history and circumstances, regulation in the United States 
generally, and that of reproductive technologies in particular, is not comparable to the 
regulation in other countries. However, there is merit in observing how some of the 
problems that plague the regulation of this area in the United States are addressed in 
Europe so that similar solutions may be crafted for the regulation of DRT in the United 
States. 
A. The European Union 
Article 152(4)(a) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community gives the 
European Union (“E.U.”) the mandate to pass laws on the quality and safety of human 
tissues and cells.230  In light of the fact that many DRT recipients acquire their DRT 
through cross-border exchange, the E.U. sought to create uniformity of standards among 
member states so that E.U. citizens would benefit from the same protection as they would 
under the laws of their own country.231  Accordingly, in 2004, the E.U. issued the Tissues 
and Cells Directive, which established rules and principles meant to ensure the safety and 
quality of DRT in E.U. countries.232  The 2004 Directive recognized that  
                                                                                                                                            
children); Rosato, supra note 201, at 62, 69 (noting that “[t]he market rules and no one in the 
entire contracting process speaks for the future child” and “it does not appear that self-regulation 
sufficiently protects children and is unlikely to do so in the near future”).  Some commentators 
reached the same conclusion over a decade ago.  See Ginsberg, supra note 96, at 823-41 (arguing 
that state-by-state regulation, self-imposed guidelines and private adjudication have all proven 
inadequate for regulating the artificial insemination industry and calling for federal regulation of 
the screening and testing of donated sperm).  
229 See Annas, supra note 22, at 938 (concluding that “it will probably take federal action to 
move children to the center of consideration in the fertility business”).   
230 Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community art. 152, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C321) 115, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:pdf.  
231 See Press Release, Europa, Questions and Answers on Human Tissues and Cells (Feb. 8, 
2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/66. 
232 See Council Directive 2004/23, 2004 O.J. (L102) 48-58 (EC) [hereinafter 2004 Directive].   
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[t]he use of tissues and cells for application in the human body can cause 
diseases and unwanted effects . . . [most of which] can be prevented by 
careful donor evaluation and the testing of each donation in accordance 
with rules established and updated according to the best available 
scientific advice.233   
Accordingly, the 2004 Directive required each member state to establish a system for the 
accreditation of tissue establishments and for notification regarding adverse events linked 
to the testing and distribution of tissue.234  The 2004 Directive further required setting 
donor selection criteria and donor testing requirements and stipulated that member states 
were required to pass appropriate laws and regulations to implement the 2004 Directive 
no later than April 7, 2006.235   
Subsequently, in 2006, the European Commission issued two additional directives 
expanding on the 2004 Directive.  The first directive, 2006/17, covered the collection and 
processing of reproductive tissue.236  Recognizing that “[r]eproductive cells have, due to 
the specific nature of their application, specific quality and safety characteristics,”237 
2006/17 requires that the use of reproductive cells other than for directed donation must 
meet several criteria, including:238  (1) donors must be selected on the basis of their age, 
health and medical history, as determined based on a questionnaire and a personal 
interview performed by healthcare professionals;239 (2) a decision to use any particular 
DRT must be based on an assessment of the risk of transmission of inherited conditions 
known to be present in the donor’s family and genetic testing for autosomal recessive 
genes known to be prevalent in the donor’s ethnic background; and (3) the recipient must 
receive a clear explanation of all of the information about the risks associated with using 
the DRT and the measures undertaken to mitigate them. 
Later in 2006, the European Commission issued another directive, 2006/86, that 
imposed several additional requirements related to the processing of DRT and to the 
traceability and reporting of serious adverse events.240  2006/86 requires tissue 
manufacturers to have procedures in place to retain records of tissues and cells they 
                                                
233 Id. at Whereas 17.  
234 Id. at Whereas 25; arts. 11, 15.  
235 Id. at arts. 28, 31.  
236 See Council Directive 2006/17 2006 O.J. (L38) 40-52 (EC) [hereinafter 2006/17].  
237 Id. at Whereas 4.  
238 Id. at Annex III § 3.  
239 Specifically, the 2006 Directive requires that different sources of information be used to 
obtain the relevant information, including an interview with the donor (mandatory), review of the 
donor’s medical records and their evaluation by a qualified health professional, interview with the 
donor’s treating physician and physical examination of the donor.  Id. at Annex IV § 1.2.  
240 See Council Directive 2006/86 2006 O.J. (L204) 23-36 (EC) [hereinafter 2006/86]. 
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procured and to immediately report to the appropriate authorities and other tissue 
establishments serious adverse conditions in a donor that may reflect on the quality and 
safety of a donated tissue.241  The Directive further stipulates that the records must be 
kept for a period of at least thirty years and that all data be coded in a unified single 
European identification code system.242      
In conclusion, the E.U. adopted a mandatory framework requiring, among other 
things, the genetic screening and testing of DRT donors and reporting adverse events, 
including those suspected as having a genetic background.  I will now discuss 
implementation of the 2004 and 2006 Directives (E.U. Directives) in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland.  
B. The United Kingdom 
Even before the European Commission issued the E.U. Directives, matters 
involving DRT were regulated in the United Kingdom under the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act (HFE Act).243  On May 25, 2007, a new set of regulations went into 
effect that extensively amended and supplemented the HFE Act to comply with the E.U. 
Directives.244  The HFE Regulations included a list of requirements pertaining to the 
procurement and distribution of DRT, operation of a DRT institution and engaging in 
various related activities.  In particular, the HFE Regulations required DRT institutions to 
keep records containing information regarding the quality and safety of gametes and 
embryos and any information necessary to trace gametes and embryos back to their 
donors.245  The HFE Regulations further required that the British Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) investigate serious adverse events related to DRT and 
fertilization and communicate to the European Commission and parallel authorities in 
other member states relevant information which may assist in withdrawal of 
compromised DRT.246 
Most importantly, with respect to donations of gametes or embryos other than 
between partners, the HFE Regulations stipulate that DRT institutions must comply with 
the selection criteria for donors and the requirements for laboratory tests set forth in 
Section 3 of Annex III of 2006/17.247  Specifically, the HFE Regulations require the 
                                                
241 Id. at art. 5, Annex VI.  
242 Id. at arts. 9-10.  
243 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.). 
244 Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Quality and Safety) Regulations, 2007, S.I. 
2007/1522 (U.K.) [hereinafter HFE Regulations].  
245 Id. at § 13.  
246 Id. at §§ 10, 18.  
247 Id. at § 30, Annex 3A § 7.  
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selection of donors on the basis of their age, health and medical history and an 
assessment of the risk of transmission of inherited conditions known to be present in the 
donor’s family as well as genetic testing for autosomal recessive genes known to be 
prevalent in the donor’s ethnic background.248  In other words, in order to receive a 
license under the HFE Act, a DRT institution must have in place an appropriate 
framework for the minimization of the genetic risks to DRT children.  
In addition, the HFEA has published a Code of Practice that expands upon and 
clarifies the requirements set forth in the amendments to the HFE Act.249   According to 
the HFEA Code, DRT institutions must not collect sperm from donors older than forty-
six or harvest ova from donors older than thirty-six250 and should not use DRT from any 
specific donor in more than ten families.251  The HFEA Code requires DRT institutions to 
take donors’ family medical histories and test donors as necessary based on the risk 
factors identified.252  The HFEA Code further directs DRT institutions to follow 
contemporary professional guidance of relevant professional bodies on the genetic tests 
and screening techniques they should implement.253  In particular, the HFEA Code 
mentions the guidelines of the British Andrology Society and the British Fertility 
Society.254   
                                                
248 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.  Notably, an additional requirement is that the 
recipient must receive a clear explanation of complete information on the genetic risks associated 
with the gametes received and on the measures undertaken for their mitigation. 
249 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Code of Practice (7th ed. 2008) 
[hereinafter HFEA Code], available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Seventh_Edition__R3.pdf.  
250 Id. at §§ G.4.2.1-G.4.2.2.  
251 Id. at § G.4.6.1. 
252 Id. at §§ G.4.7.1-G.4.7.2.   
253 Id. at § G.4.9.1.   
254 Id.  See also Ass’n of Biomedical Andrologists et al., UK Guidelines for the Medical and 
Laboratory Screening of Sperm, Egg and Embryo Donors, 11 Human Fertility 201, 201 (2008) 
[hereinafter British Professional Guidelines].  The British Professional Guidelines set forth an 
extensive list of tests that DRT institutions and practitioners should perform and instructions to be 
followed as part of the donor screening and selection procedures.  Importantly, the British 
Professional Guidelines stipulate that when taking medical histories of potential donors, inquiries 
should be made to ensure that the donor does not have “familial disease with a major genetic 
component . . . any significant Mendelian disorders, such as (but not exclusively) albinism, 
hemophilia, hemoglobin disorders,” “familial disease with a known or reliably indicated major 
genetic component, such as debilitating asthma, juvenile diabetes mellitus, epileptic disorder,” “a 
chromosomal rearrangement that may result in unbalanced gametes,” and more.  Id. at 203.  The 
British Professional Guidelines further instruct that “the potential donor should ordinarily not be 
heterozygous for an autosomal recessive gene for a disease known to be prevalent in the donor’s 
ethnic background, e.g., CF in Caucasian populations, α0 or β-Thalassemia in Mediterranean 
populations, sickle cell disease in African & Afro-Caribbean populations and Tay-Sachs disease 
105
Vol. XI The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2010 
 
   286 
Finally, the HFEA Code imposes duties on DRT institutions to notify the 
appropriate authorities, other institutions and recipients once they discover “that a gamete 
donor has a previously unsuspected genetic disease or is the carrier of a deleterious 
recessively inherited condition.”255 
C. Ireland 
As a member state in the European Union, Ireland was also required to 
incorporate the E.U. Directives into its legislation and did so with two sets of regulations 
promulgated by the Irish Minister for Health and Children and administered by the Irish 
Medicine’s Board (IMB).256  Under S.I. No. 158, in order to be licensed to engage in the 
collection and distribution of DRT, institutions must comply with numerous donor 
selection and testing requirements.257  S.I. No. 158 stipulates that donors must be selected 
on the basis of their age, health and medical history, which the donor should provide on a 
questionnaire and in a personal interview by a healthcare professional.258  S.I. No. 158 
further requires the “[g]enetic [test]ing for autosomal recessive genes known to be 
prevalent . . . in the donor’s ethnic background and an assessment of the risk of 
transmission of inherited conditions known to be present in the family” and stipulates that 
“[c]omplete information on the associated risk and on the measure undertaken for its 
                                                                                                                                            
in Jews of Eastern European descent.  The British Professional Guidelines also dictate that 
inquiries should be made to verify that the potential donor’s genetic parents, siblings and 
offspring are free of (1) major malformations listed in the British Professional Guidelines, (2) 
non-trivial disorders showing Mendelian inheritance e.g., autosomal dominant disorders, such as 
Huntington’s disease and  autosomal recessive diseases, particularly if such diseases have a high 
frequency in the population such as CF, (3) a chromosomal abnormality (unless the donor has a 
normal karyotype) and (4) in egg and embryo donors, a history of any mitochondrial disorders.  If 
there is any evidence of any of the above, the British Professional Guidelines instruct that a 
qualified clinical geneticist should evaluate the risk.  Id.  The British Professional Guidelines also 
require that “[a]ll donors should undergo appropriate genetic/cytogenetic testing” which includes 
karyotyping of all donors, and testing according to ethnic background for α0 or β-Thalassemia, 
sickle-cell disease, Tay-Sachs disease and common mutations of CF.  Id. at 204. 
255 HFEA Code, supra note 249, at § G.4.10.5. 
256 See European Communities (Quality and Safety of Human Tissues and Cells) Regulations 
2006 (S.I. No. 158 of 2006) (Ir.) [hereinafter S.I. No. 158], available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2006/en/si/0158.html (implementing 2004/23 and 2006/17); 
European Communities (Human Tissues and Cells Traceability Requirements, Notification of 
Serious Adverse Reactions and Events and Certain Technical Requirements) Regulations 2007 
(S.I. No. 598 of 2007) (Ir.) [hereinafter S.I. No. 598] available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2007/en/si/0598.html (implementing 2006/86). 
257 S.I. No. 158 at §§ 5-6, 11(2), 11(6).  
258 Id. at Schedule 3, § 3.1. 
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mitigation must be communicated and clearly explained to the recipient.”259  S.I. No. 598 
supplements the regulatory framework created in S.I. No. 158 by imposing traceability 
and adverse events reporting requirements as directed by 2006/86.260  
The European model of regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT could be 
characterized as relying on three premises.  First and foremost, the recognition that 
“while those seeking assisted reproductive treatment deserve and can expect proper 
consideration of their medical and social needs, licensed treatments may result in children 
who would not otherwise have been born and whose interest must be taken into 
account.”261  Second, the structure of the European regulations reflects the recognition 
that the protection of DRT children (and their families) requires the uniformity and 
authoritativeness that can only be afforded by legislation and regulation.  And third, the 
European regulatory framework, while setting general principles and requirements, 
leaves the actual “nuts and bolts” to be decided by professionals who have the necessary 
technical knowledge and expertise; in this respect, state authorities serve as a facilitator 
and enforcer of professional standards. 
An additional advantage of the European model of regulation is that it enables 
state authorities to defer possible bioethical issues to professionals who, by virtue of their 
expertise and involvement in the regulated area, are best equipped to tackle such 
issues.262  The “importation” of professional standards into the regulatory framework 
enables state authorities to avoid having to spend the time and money necessary for 
tackling bioethical issues as well as possible political strife (which administrative entities 
are loathe to provoke) involved with delving into bioethical debates.263 
Despite the particularities of the United States legal system, the three 
abovementioned premises of the European regulation of genetic aspects of DRT can be 
adapted into a feasible model for federal regulation in the United States’ in a fashion that 
would resolve many of the problems that characterize the current regulation of genetic 
aspects of DRT.   
IV. TOWARDS FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE GENETIC ASPECTS OF DONATED 
REPRODUCTIVE TISSUE—THE CASE FOR FDA REGULATION 
The first and most important advantage of federal regulation of genetic aspects of 
DRT would be the institution of a uniform and feasibly enforceable standard of conduct 
that would increase adherence of DRT institutions to testing standards thereby promoting 
safety for DRT children regardless of the origin of the DRT from which they were 
                                                
259 Id. at Schedule 3, § 3.6.  
260 See S.I. No. 598 at §§ 5-22.  
261 HFEA Code, supra note 249, at § 1.2.  
262 For further discussion, see infra Part IV.B.4.  
263 Notably, this approach may be especially fitting to the United States, where disagreements 
on bioethical issues often run deep. 
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conceived.264  In other words, the main function of federal regulation of the genetic 
aspects of DRT would lie in its general applicability.  Assuming that most DRT 
institutions and practitioners would do their best to conform to such standards, the safety 
of using DRT from a genetic standpoint could increase dramatically.265   
Second, the high enforceability of federal regulations266 and adherence to them 
would serve to preempt many occurrences of transmission of genetic diseases to DRT 
children in the first place, thereby providing an ex ante solution to avoid cases like 
Johnson and Paretta.   
Third, the imposition of a federal standard of conduct would diminish the need for 
injured DRT children and their families to resort to ex post solutions. Third, the 
imposition of a federal standard of conduct would, at the very least, strengthen the legal 
stances of DRT children and their families.  A standard set by federal regulations may be 
accepted by courts as the standard of conduct by which the actions of DRT professionals 
should be evaluated when a negligence claim is brought, thereby enabling a quick and 
efficient resolution of such matters.267  Federal standards of conduct set by federal 
                                                
264 See Annas, supra note 22, at 938 (“it will probably take federal action to move children to 
the center of consideration in the infertility business”); Human Tissues and Organs, supra note 
104, at 46-47, 56 (“Unfortunately for those of us in the semen banking business we don’t 
necessarily know which states have [put regulations in place]. . . I would highly support the FDA 
in regulating semen banking;” “FDA standard seems far more likely to prevent state variances 
than voluntary standards.”). 
265 Human Tissues and Organs, supra note 104, at 56 (“[A]nother advantage of government 
standards is their ability to reassure the public . . . FDA’s involvement would moot [the] concern 
[that voluntary standards and adherence to them are lacking.]”).  Federal regulation of genetic 
aspects of DRT would also serve to assure consumers in every state and U.S. territory that the 
DRT they acquire is indeed safe without them having to become experts in clinical genetics.   
The need for a generally applicable regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT is further 
highlighted by the lack of such applicability of state regulation.  Since many DRT recipients order 
their DRT from states other than those in which they live, even the few states that do seek to 
regulate the genetic aspects of DRT are likely to find the enforcement of such regulation difficult, 
if not impossible.  It would be impractical and unrealistic to expect that New York State, for 
example, would verify that every semen specimen sent via overnight delivery to consumers 
within its borders was processed, screened and tested in accordance with the New York 
Regulations. 
266 It is preferable that—like the Human Tissue Regulations—federal regulations pertaining to 
the genetic aspects of DRT be enforced by the FDA.   
267 Since the Human Tissue Regulations only address the communicable diseases aspects of 
DRT, DRT institutions sued for negligence in their genetic screening and testing of DRT donors 
could raise a regulatory compliance defense arguing that they are in full compliance with the 
federal standard of practice with respect to the genetic screening and testing of DRT and therefore 
cannot be held liable for incompliance with higher standards set by the states.  Similarly, DRT 
institutions could raise federal preemption arguments seeking to preempt such heightened state 
standards in view of the non-existent federal standard of practice with respect to the genetic 
aspects of DRT.  For a discussion of regulatory compliance and federal preemption defenses, see 
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regulations could also serve to preempt outright refusal by courts to recognize the 
existence of additional causes of action available to DRT recipients, as was done by the 
Paretta court.268  Finally, the imposition of duties as part of federal regulation may 
potentially provide plaintiffs with additional causes of action for breach of statutory duty, 
which may further assist in securing appropriate relief for genetically injured DRT 
children and their families.269   
The FDA is the natural and most promising candidate for carrying out and 
enforcing federal regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT.  As discussed above, the FDA 
has been involved in regulation of donated tissues since the late 1990s and DRT since 
2001.  It is prudent to assume that the FDA has acquired much of the technical expertise 
and understanding of the DRT market necessary to also regulate the genetic aspects of 
DRT in an effective and efficient manner.  Thus, it would be desirable to utilize the 
FDA’s acquired expertise as well as its proven abilities in enforcing the Human Tissue 
Regulations270 in the regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT.271  
The idea of having the federal government, and specifically the FDA, regulate the 
genetic aspects of DRT is not a new one and has been raised time and again, at least since 
1988.272  And yet, in promulgating its relatively recent Human Tissue Regulations, the 
                                                                                                                                            
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194-95 (2009); Carl Tobias, FDA Regulatory Compliance 
Reconsidered, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1003, 1004 (2008).  A discussion of federal preemption is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  A comprehensive federal regulatory standard of practice could 
prevent DRT institutions from avoiding liability by raising these defenses.  See also supra note 
101 and accompanying text.  
268 See supra notes 134 and 136 and accompanying text.  
269 For additional possible advantages of setting uniform regulatory standards for DRT see 
Human Tissue and Organs, supra note 104, at 53-54.   
270 See, e.g., HTTF Report, supra note 67 (discussing the FDA’s enforcement of the Human 
Tissue Regulations).  
271 In this respect, due to the rapidly changing and technically complicated nature of the area 
of genetic medicine and ART, the FDA would also be better suited than Congress to address 
issues as they arise.  See Alvare, supra note 223, at 32 (“The size and scope of the legislative 
project—even the definition of individual and the social dilemmas to be approached—may appear 
too large and too rapidly changing a target for legislatures.”).  The regulation of genetic aspects of 
DRT may coincide with the FDA’s own perception of its mission with relation to the regulation 
of human tissue.  See Zoon Statement, supra note 59, at 88-89, 101 (“FDA has prioritized the 
regulation of human cellular and tissue-based products, and the public should be confident that 
the FDA is committed to regulating these products in a manner where benefits to patients are 
maximized and risks to patients are minimized;” “FDA’s goals are to protect the public from 
unsafe tissue products.”).  
272 See GAO 1997 Report, supra note 182, at 3-4, 31 (“FDA should also add to its oversight 
plans provisions that would require . . . disclosure of genetic tests that have been performed on 
donated reproductive tissues.”); Annas, supra note 22, at 935; Marwick, supra note 27, at 1340 
(describing [then] Senator Gore’s call for FDA regulation of DRT, including its genetic aspects, 
to ensure the safety and welfare of DRT children).  
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FDA sought only to regulate the communicable diseases aspects of DRT.273  Notably, the 
FDA did not address the genetic aspects of DRT at any point in the process of 
promulgating the Human Tissue Regulations and the issue never arose in any of the 
abundant public commentary on the proposed FDA regulations.274   
It is highly unlikely that the FDA was unaware of the genetic aspects of DRT in 
2005 when it issued the Final Donor Eligibility Rule.275  In fact, at the time it 
promulgated the Final Donor Eligibility Rule, the FDA was aware of professional 
guidelines that specifically addressed the genetic aspects of DRT276 and probably had 
knowledge of good reasons for regulating the genetic aspects of DRT.277  It therefore 
appears that the absence of genetic aspects of DRT from the Human Tissue Regulations 
was not the result of an oversight but rather intentional avoidance of this area by the 
FDA.   
                                                
273 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
274 It is likely that since, from the outset, the FDA defined the Human Tissue Regulations as 
directed exclusively to the communicable diseases aspects of DRT, it chose not to make public 
any comments it may have received that were related to the genetic aspects of DRT as, 
purportedly, irrelevant to the Human Tissue Regulations.  It is also possible that the FDA has 
made it so abundantly clear that the Human Tissue Regulations, by definition, were only meant to 
address communicable diseases aspects of human tissue, that commentators refrained from 
addressing the genetic aspects of DRT.  See infra Part IV.A. 
275 See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.   
276 For example, in 2004, the ASRM issued an updated version of its Guidelines, which the 
FDA referred to during the process of making the FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule.  See 69 Fed. 
Reg. 29819 (FDA May 25, 2004) (“Although ASRM has published guidelines for donor 
screening and testing and other aspects of oocyte donation . . . .”).  
277 Among the rationales for regulation mentioned in the FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule 
was concern for  public health that is equally applicable to genetic and communicable diseases 
aspects of DRT:  
Certain diseases are transmissible through the implantation, transplantation, infusion or 
transfer of [donated tissue] . . . To prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of such 
diseases, we consider it necessary to take appropriate measures to prevent the use of cells or 
tissue from infected donors.  Thus, these regulations require that, before the use of most [donated 
tissues], the cell or tissue donor must be determined to be eligible to donate, based on the results 
of screening and testing for relevant . . . diseases.  In most cases, a donor who . . . possesses 
clinical evidence of or risk factors for such a disease, would be considered ineligible, and cells 
and tissues from that donor would not ordinarily be used.  
See FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule, supra note 24, at 29787.  
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A. The FDA’s Statutory Authority to Regulate the Genetic Aspects of Donated 
Reproductive Tissue 
There are several possible explanations for the FDA’s failure to regulate the 
genetic aspects of DRT, the first of which is possible doubts regarding its legal authority 
to do so.  As mentioned earlier, in promulgating the Human Tissue Regulations, the FDA 
relied on PHSA § 361, which reads, in relevant part, as follows:278  
Regulations to control communicable diseases 
(a) Promulgation and enforcement by Surgeon General[279]  
The Surgeon General . . . is authorized to make and enforce such 
regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, 
transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries 
into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any 
other State or possession.  For purposes of carrying out and enforcing such 
regulations, the Surgeon General may provide for such inspection . . . 
destruction of animals or articles found to be so infected or contaminated 
as to be sources of dangerous infection to human beings, and other 
measures, as in his judgment may be necessary.  
Arguably, PHSA § 361 grants only the authority to promulgate regulations 
pertaining to the prevention of the transmission and spread of infectious diseases rather 
than genetic diseases.280  Under this construction of “communicable diseases,” PHSA § 
                                                
278 PHSA § 361 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 264).  
279 As mentioned earlier, the authority under PHSA § 361 was delegated to the FDA.  See 
supra note 62.  
280 This reading of PHSA § 361 relies on a construction of the definition of “communicable 
diseases” as only reasonably including diseases caused by infectious agents rather than by 
chromosomes and genes.  The term “communicable diseases” is not defined in the PHSA.  
However, 21 C.F.R. § 1240.3(b) defines “communicable diseases” as “[i]llnesses due to 
infectious agents or their toxic products, which may be transmitted from a reservoir to a 
susceptible host either directly as from an infected person or animal or indirectly through the 
agency of an intermediate plant or animal host, vector, or the inanimate environment.”  Notably, 
this restrictive definition was created pursuant to the legislation of PHSA § 361 and is in accord 
with its legislative history, which only sought to address infectious diseases as these are defined 
by the FDA.  Yet, under a liberal view on the duties and authorities of executive agencies, should 
the FDA ever choose to change its definition of “communicable diseases” to include genetic 
diseases, it may, arguably, be able to do so, subject the requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(5), 553.  Moreover, it is not clear how scientifically sound 
the 42 U.S.C. § 361 dichotomy between communicable and genetic diseases is and whether it is 
justifiable from a public health policy perspective.  For example, many diseases could be branded 
as both infectious and genetic (e.g., HIV, cervical cancer caused by a viral infection).  
Nonetheless, for purposes of the discussion herein, the term “communicable diseases” is 
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361 could not serve as a source of authority to regulate genetic aspects of DRT.  Such 
authority, however, exists elsewhere.   
Among the several other possible routes for regulation of genetic aspects of DRT 
suggested in the past,281 the most promising source of authority is PHSA § 351,282 which 
reads, in relevant part, as follows:283  
 
Regulation of biological products 
(a) Biologics license 
(1) No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into 
interstate commerce any biological product unless—  
(A) a biologics license is in effect for the biological 
product  
. . .  
(2) (A) The Secretary shall establish, by regulation, 
requirements for the approval, suspension, and revocation of 
biologics licenses.  
. . .  
(C) The Secretary shall approve a biologics license 
application— 
(i) on the basis of a demonstration that—  
(I) the biological product that is the subject 
of the application is safe, pure, and potent; 
and  
. . .  
(3) The Secretary shall prescribe requirements under which a 
biological product undergoing investigation shall be exempt 
from the requirements of paragraph (1).  
. . . 
 
(i) Definition; application 
In this section, the term “biological product” means a virus, therapeutic 
serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, 
allergenic product, or analogous product . . . applicable to the prevention, 
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings. 
(emphasis added) 
                                                                                                                                            
construed as exclusive of diseases having genetic background (but not diseases resulting from 
viral infections). 
281 See, e.g., Hodgson, supra note 96, at 360-85 (advocating treating the sale of sperm as a 
“sale” rather than as a “service” under the U.C.C.); Parens & Knowles, supra note 201, at S19 
(calling for the creation of an HFEA-like body in the United States which would license 
institutions participating in ART related activities).  
282 See Human Tissue and Organs, supra note 104, at 14, 19, 21-22; Peterson, supra note 69, 
at 88.    
283 PHSA § 351 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2007)).  
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The FDA construes the PHSA § 351(i) definition of “biological product” as 
follows:284  
Biological products include a wide range of products such as . . .  somatic 
cells . . . [and] tissues. . . .  Biologics . . . may be living entities such as 
cells and tissues.  Biologics are isolated from a variety of natural sources - 
human, animal, or microorganism . . . . 
Thus, according to the FDA, “biological products” include human cells and 
tissues.285  PHSA § 351(i) also clarifies that biological products do not necessarily have 
to be used as cures for diseases but could serve for the treatment of a condition of a 
human being.  Arguably, even if infertility cannot be categorized as a disease in the 
conventional sense,286 it could still fall within the boundaries of a “condition of a human 
being” which could be “prevented” or “treated” via the use of DRT.287  Thus, the PHSA § 
351(i) definition of “biological product” could conceivably encompass DRT such that 
PHSA § 351 would give the FDA authority to regulate DRT as a biological product.288 
Admittedly, it is possible to imagine several scenarios where the use of DRT does 
not fall within the PHSA § 351(i) definition of biologics.  For example, it is difficult to 
classify as “treatment” the use of donated sperm to impregnate a perfectly fertile woman 
whose husband suffers from infertility.289  Similarly, it is difficult to classify as 
                                                
284 See FDA, What Are "Biologics" Questions and Answers, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CBER/ucm133077.htm (last visited May 10, 
2010).   
285 Although the FDA’s definition only specifically mentions somatic cells, it does not exclude 
reproductive cells and the denominator “such as” indicates that somatic cells are only mentioned 
as an example.  Thus, it appears that reproductive cells could also be biological products under 
the FDA definition.  
286 See Andrews & Elster, supra note 70, at 37.  
287 See Peterson, supra note 69, at 88 (“[T]he phrase ‘analogous product’ easily could be 
interpreted to include semen samples . . . . The straws containing the frozen semen derivative 
could easily be categorized as a ‘biological product’ which is applicable to the ‘treatment or cure’ 
of human infertility diseases.”).   
288 Interestingly, this also appears to have been the opinion of the FDA’s General Counsel in 
1973.  See Human Tissues and Organs, supra note 104, at 5 (presentation of Stuart Nightingale, 
Associate Comm’r for Health Affairs, FDA); Merrill, supra note 23, at 9 (presenting the response 
of the Chief Counsel: “Human tissues . . . could be considered ‘analogous’ to materials such as 
blood, over which FDA had authority under section 351”).  Similar positions were presented by 
Paul Parkman, the Director of CBER in 2001.  See Human Tissues and Organs, supra note 104, 
at 22.  
289 The reason for this is that the person who is actually being “treated” (i.e., the female) is not 
the one actually suffering from infertility. 
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“treatment” the use of DRT due to a couple’s wish to avoid passing along a genetic 
condition existing in one of them.290  Even more significantly, it would be difficult and 
even disturbing to classify the use of sperm by single women or of DRT by single-sex 
couples as a “cure” or “treatment.”  Yet, there are obviously many situations in which the 
use of DRT would fall neatly within the boundaries of PHSA § 351(i) and which ought to 
be “sufficient,” from a regulatory perspective, to deem DRT suitable for regulation under 
PHSA § 351.291 
Furthermore, broad construction of the term “condition of human beings” could 
conceivably encompass almost any scenario involving the use of DRT and it does not 
have to be construed as relating to a medical condition but rather as relating to a social or 
familial situation or even status, e.g., infertility (as a couple or family), childlessness or 
the inability to have children on one’s own or with one’s chosen partner.  In view of the 
above, it is highly unlikely that courts would reject a construction of PHSA § 351(i) that 
would encompass reproductive tissue within the definition of biological products thereby 
facilitating the application of this section to DRT.292   
                                                
290 The reason is that it is not the genetic condition that is being treated.  Rather, the 
underlying reason for using DRT is the couple’s reproductive preferences. 
291 Examples of scenarios that fit into the PHSA § 351(i) framework would include the use of 
donated eggs to enable women who no longer ovulate to conceive, in which case the donated 
eggs could be perceived as “treatment” for such women’s “condition” of infertility; using donated 
sperm in tandem with IVF treatments, in which case the donated sperm is the “treatment” for the 
husband’s inability to provide sperm to fertilize the eggs in order to create embryos that would be 
implanted into his female partner or into a surrogate. 
292 It is well accepted that agencies have discretion to interpret their statutory authorities to 
enable their application in new ways to meet new challenges unforeseen by Congress and that 
they are expected to do so.  See infra note 297 and accompanying text.  Accordingly, although 
Congress might not have envisioned the use of PHSA § 351 for regulating DRT when it enacted 
the section, it is well within the power of the FDA to apply this section to such an end so long as 
its construction of the statutory language meets the Chevron standard.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (“We have long recognized that 
considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory 
scheme . . . .”).  Under what came to be called the “Chevron Doctrine,” courts generally grant 
agencies’ discretionary decisions and actions a great measure of deference and are not easily 
persuaded to set them aside so long as (1) “Congress has [not] directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue,” and (2) “the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”  See id. at 842-44.  According to the Supreme Court, if both conditions are met, then the 
agency’s construction of the statute it is entrusted to administer should receive “considerable 
weight” and “the principle of deference to administrative interpretations [should be] followed.”  
Id.  Given the plausibility of viewing DRT as biological products under at least some 
circumstances that fall neatly within the boundaries of PHSA § 351(i) and the fact that PHSA § 
351 does not address reproductive tissue in general or DRT in particular, it is likely that courts 
would accept an agency’s construction of PHSA § 351(i) as inclusive of DRT.  Notably, this 
entire regulatory conundrum could be resolved if Congress were to amend PHSA § 351(i) so it 
explicitly included reproductive tissue, thereby also indicating that DRT should be 
comprehensively regulated by the FDA. 
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Despite possible concerns that if DRT were to be regulated as a biological product 
every sperm sample would require its own separate approval and licensure, PHSA § 
351(a)(3) provides the FDA with the authority to exempt a biological product from the 
licensure requirements of PHSA § 351(a)(1).  Thus, when promulgating a regulatory 
framework that would address genetic aspects of DRT, the FDA could conceivably 
stipulate, for example, that DRT coming from a donor who was properly screened and 
tested in accordance with regulations promulgated under PHSA § 351(a)(2) would be 
exempt (under PHSA § 351(a)(3)) from the burdensome licensure requirements of PHSA 
§ 351(a)(1).   
PHSA § 351 also provides the FDA with effective enforcement tools that include 
(1) the authority to inspect DRT institutions engaging in collection, processing or 
distribution of DRT293 and (2) the authority to determine whether DRT originating from a 
specific donor would present an imminent or substantial hazard to public health and to 
issue orders for the recall of such DRT.294  Furthermore, in addition to any deterrents and 
incentives the FDA may include in regulations promulgated under PHSA § 351 to ensure 
effective enforcement of the regulation of biologics, violation of PHSA § 351 is a 
criminal offense, punishable by fines and up to one year in prison; it also sets a civil 
penalty of up to $100,000 per day for non-compliance with an order recalling a biological 
product.295  Thus, PHSA endows the FDA with ample authority and sufficient 
enforcement tools to effectively regulate the genetic aspects of DRT. 
B. Other Possible Reasons for the FDA’s Non-Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated 
Reproductive Tissue 
1. Lack of Authority to Tend to the Safety of Future People 
Under a narrow construction of the FDA’s authority under PHSA § 351, the 
FDA’s power is arguably limited only to the assurance of the safety of DRT recipients 
rather than that of DRT children.296  Such a reading of FDA authority appears to be 
unnecessarily and unjustifiably narrow, especially in light of the conventional 
understanding that agencies have discretion and are expected to interpret their statutory 
authority so it applies in new ways to meet new challenges that Congress did not 
                                                
293 42 U.S.C. § 262(c) (2007) (granting the FDA authority to inspect any establishments 
engaging in the propagation or manufacture and preparation of any biological product).  
294 Id. at § (d)(1).  
295 Id. at §§ (d)(2), (f). 
296 See, e.g., Council on Bioethics Report, supra note 100, at 177 (arguing that the FDA has no 
explicit legal authority to regulate on grounds of protection of a child resulting from ART as 
such).  
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foresee.297  Looking specifically at PHSA § 351, nothing in its language suggests that the 
FDA’s mandate to ensure the safety and efficacy of biologics is limited only to DRT 
recipients or even just to “currently existing people.”  Moreover, there are examples of 
cases where the FDA asserted its regulatory authority over matters involving “future 
individuals,” i.e. individuals not yet in existence when the treatment is carried out or the 
drug is administered.  One prominent example is the FDA’s prohibition on tests involving 
human cloning out of concern for the health of the future children that might be created 
by such a procedure.298  Furthermore, arguably at least in relation to the regulation of 
small molecule drugs (rather than biologics), in authorizing the FDA to require safety 
data analysis in relation to pregnant women, Congress granted the FDA the authority to 
tend to the safety of unborn children.299  At the very least, the abovementioned precedents 
indicate that it is not unreasonable for the FDA to construe its authority under PHSA § 
351 broadly enough to encompass a role for itself in ensuring the safety of future 
individuals, including DRT children.  Therefore, if the FDA were to construe its authority 
under PHSA § 351 as including the safety of DRT children, a court would most likely 
uphold that statutory construction under the Chevron doctrine.300   
2. Lack of Authority to Regulate in the Area of Genetic Aspects of DRT 
The issue of the FDA’s authority to regulate the genetic aspects of DRT comes up 
also in a federal context as part of the question of the Federal Government’s authority to 
                                                
297 See Merrill, supra note 23, at 1 (“It is conventional wisdom that regulatory agencies 
possess discretion to interpret their program statutes in new ways in order to meet challenges that 
the congressional authors did not, and in many cases could not, anticipate . . . we have come to 
expect that agencies will often confront new challenges by adapting traditional tools, rather than 
reflexively returning to the legislature for new authority or instructions.”).  
298 For the FDA’s controversial assertion of authority over human cloning due to concerns for 
the health and safety of individuals resulting from cloning procedures, see Letter from Stuart L. 
Nightingale, M.D., Associate Comm’r, FDA, to Inst. Review Boards 1 (Oct. 26, 1998), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/ucm150508.htm.  
Another controversial example is the FDA’s exceptional regulation of the drug thalidomide, 
known for its potential to cause severe birth defects out of concern for the unborn children. See 
generally Allen E. White, Thalidomide and the FDA: Authority Overstepped or Legitimate Safety 
Measures? (December 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=294563.   
299 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(C)(iv)(I) (2009).  
300 See supra note 292 (discussing the Chevron doctrine).  Congress has clearly not addressed 
the matter of genetic aspects of DRT in PHSA and thus the question becomes whether a 
construction of PHSA that would require screening and testing of DRT donors for genetic 
diseases to ensure the safety of DRT children is a permissible construction of PHSA § 351.  As 
argued above, such a construction is not only reasonable but also desirable.  Assuming that courts 
would not find this view fundamentally inconsistent with the statutory language, they should 
uphold a construction of PHSA § 351 that would grant the FDA authority to regulate the genetic 
aspects of DRT.  
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regulate in the field of healthcare.  DRT transactions routinely occur across state borders 
as well as over the Internet.301  Accordingly, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution 
provides the FDA, via congressional delegation, the authority to regulate DRT.302  
Furthermore, it is quite possible that the federal power to regulate DRT also extends to 
intrastate commerce in DRT.303  Thus, the FDA has the authority under PHSA § 351 to 
regulate genetic aspects of DRT so long as traditional state regulatory prerogatives are 
not impermissibly impinged upon.  
While the practice of medicine has traditionally been regulated by the states,304 
the Supreme Court has recognized the ability of the federal government to set uniform 
national standards for health and safety.305  Thus, to the extent that FDA regulation of the 
                                                
301 See Gail Schmoller Philbin, Web of Conception; Couples Turning to Internet Sites to 
Secure Donated Sperm, Chicago Trib., Aug 20, 2003 at 1 (“While the Web has transformed the 
way couples . . . find donor sperm, it has also changed the way sperm banks do business.”); Don 
Oldenburg, Sperm Banks Online: Going Too Far? Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 1999, at C4.  See also 
OTA’s Infertility Report, supra note 27, at 24 (“Sperm [is] sold by commercial sperm banks 
throughout the United States and [has] been for many years.”).  In the absence of exact DRT 
sales’ statistics it is difficult to estimate the volume of interstate transactions in DRT and their 
percentage out of the total number of DRT transactions.  However, it appears prudent to assume 
that a large portion of the DRT transactions occurring over the internet are not confined to within 
a single state’s borders.  The prevalence of the use of the internet as well as several advantages 
the internet offers to DRT purchasers (e.g., privacy, a large selection of potential donors, ease of 
access), all increase the prevalence of the internet in DRT transactions, thereby presumably 
increasing the quantity of interstate DRT transactions both in general and as compared to 
intrastate DRT transactions.     
302 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also OTA’s Infertility Report, supra note 27, at 181-82 
(discussing the use of the Commerce Clause to regulate in other fields of health care and medical 
laboratories). 
303 At least on one occasion, a federal court upheld an FDA ban on intrastate commerce based 
on authority granted by PHSA § 361, recognizing that such a ban was reasonable to prevent the 
interstate spread of disease.  See Louisiana v. Mathews, 427 F.Supp. 174, 176 (E.D. La. 1977).  
Notably, in so doing, the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana explicitly stated that 
“[i]t has long been established that businesses which affect interstate commerce may have their 
intrastate activities regulated.”  Id.  Thus, to the extent the regulation of intrastate commerce in 
DRT is necessary to prevent negative outcomes in interstate commerce, it is likely that the FDA 
could establish authority to regulate such intrastate commerce.  Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111 (1942) (holding that Congress’s power to regulate the production of wheat going into 
interstate commerce extends to wheat intended for personal use and not placed in interstate 
commerce.). 
304 See Annas, supra note 22, at 938 (“[T]he regulation of medicine . . . [has] historically been 
dealt with under state law, not federal law.”); Human Tissues and Organs, supra note 104, at 15 
(mentioning FDA’s policy of not regulating the practice of medicine).   
305 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 271 (2006) (internal citations omitted) (“Even though 
regulation of health and safety is primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern . . . there is 
no question that the Federal Government can set uniform national standards in these areas.”).  
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genetic aspects of DRT would touch upon the practice of medicine as some have 
argued,306 such regulation would be permissible307 and, at any rate, would not constitute a 
regulation of the practice of medicine any more than the well-accepted safety 
requirements of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.308    
Moreover, FDA regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT requiring the screening 
and testing of potential donors for genetic diseases would not directly impact the practice 
of medicine but would merely set the minimum safety standards for DRT intended for a 
later use by physicians.  For example, it would not influence the interaction between 
physicians and their patients.  Rather, the regulation would influence directly only the 
interaction between DRT institutions and practitioners with potential donors, and, only 
later on, affect DRT recipients.  Admittedly, it is likely that some of the employees of 
DRT institutions are physicians and that in small institutions it might be the same 
physician who would harvest the DRT and then dispense it to patients.  Yet, this fact does 
not automatically make the relationship between such physicians and donors a physician-
patient relationship.309  Finally, to the extent that FDA regulation of the genetic aspects of 
DRT may impinge upon state regulation of the practice of medicine, it would do so no 
more than the FDA’s existing regulation of the communicable diseases aspects of 
DRT.310 
                                                
306 When the FDA was just making its first steps into the regulation of DRT, professional 
organizations argued that it was “wading into the practice of medicine.”  See FDA Tissue 
Practices Rule is Criticized by Industry, Physicians, FDA Week, June 1, 2001, at 14.  Yet, even 
those who criticized the FDA’s intentions to regulate some of the transactions taking place 
between physicians and their patients agreed that regulation “at the sperm bank level” is justified 
and even desirable.  Id.  
307 Notably, an issue remains with respect to potential preemption of state laws by FDA 
regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT.  However, this issue exceeds the scope of this Article.  
308 Cf. Merrill, supra note 23, at 79 (“FDA has assumed oversight of other novel medical 
technologies and the common feature—use in the delivery of medical care—may lead to an 
assumption [that] Congress expects the agency to assume responsibility.”). 
309 See Annas, supra note 22, at 938 (“[T]o the extent that [ART] has become big business and 
to the extent that it is more accurately characterized as a commercial enterprise than as a medical 
or family-related enterprise, federal regulation of at least its interstate commercial aspects 
deserves consideration.”).  
310 A requirement in federal regulation to screen and test donors for genetic diseases would not 
represent more interference in the practice of medicine or in the standards of practice upheld by 
the states than the similar federal requirements that are already in place with respect to 
communicable diseases.  Furthermore, as stated by a former FDA official in the context of 
communicable diseases: “when one considers the obvious need to screen and test donors for 
communicable disease, [it makes] the practice of medicine issue less prominent.”  Human Tissues 
and Organs, supra note 104, at 11 (presentation of Stuart Nightingale, Associate Comm’r for 
Health Affairs, FDA).  A similar argument could be made with respect to the screening and 
testing for genetic diseases. 
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3. The Difficulty in Defining “Genetic Diseases”   
A conceptual difficulty that seems to haunt the discussion of genetic diseases is 
how to define the term “genetic disease.”  This difficulty is twofold:  in order to define 
“genetic disease” one must first define “disease”—an elusive concept which baffles 
healthcare professionals and policymakers.  Second, one must generally characterize the 
phenotypes that fall within the boundaries of the concept of “disease.”  The genetic 
context only complicates things further since many genetic traits cannot be characterized 
merely as either present or not-present but rather manifest themselves in many variations.  
For example, at what point (if at all) does one’s stature become debilitating enough to be 
considered a “disease?”  And are conditions such as dwarfism and genetic deafness 
“genetic diseases” that justify exclusion of those having them from the DRT donor 
pool?311  
These conceptual difficulties could pose a real obstacle to a regulation of the 
genetic aspects of DRT.312  Yet, regardless of whether the difficulties in defining “genetic 
diseases” played a role in the FDA’s decision not to regulate the genetic aspects of DRT, 
such difficulties should not serve as a justification for not pursuing regulation of this area.  
One does not have to be in possession of a clear and coherent definition of genetic 
diseases to determine that conditions such as Huntington’s disease and ADPKD are 
genetic diseases that should be screened out of any donor pool.  As for those genetic 
conditions in which a decision is not as easy, the FDA could elect to rely on the judgment 
of professional organizations, expert bodies and the like to determine whether they 
warrant exclusion from the donor pool in promulgating its regulations.313  
4. Bioethical Issues 
Another possible reason for the FDA’s avoidance of the genetic aspects of DRT is 
that regulation of this area would inevitably raise a variety of ethical issues.314  As 
                                                
311 See Robertson, supra note 222, at 441 (“Persons with disabilities are concerned about 
biases in genetic screening [and testing] programs that disfavor persons with disabilities.”); see 
also Martha A. Field, Killing “the Handicapped”—Before and After Birth, 16 Harv. Women’s 
L.J. 79 (1993); Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal 
Testing: Reflections and Recommendations, 29(5) Hastings Center Report at S1 (1999) (laying 
out the disabled-rights criticism of genetic screening and testing). 
312 See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 10, at 301-02.  
313 See infra note 336 (discussing the privatization of regulation).  Notably, reliance on bodies 
of experts has been a widely used method for tackling complicated public policy issues.  See, e.g., 
The Presidential Comm’n for the Study of Bioethical Issues, http://www.bioethics.gov (last 
visited Jun. 17, 2010).  A possible advantage of such expert bodies is that they serve as a “black 
box”—a socially acceptable decision-making method which is especially suited for issues that 
spur social controversy. 
314 Such issues may include the following:  which genetic diseases (if any) should render a 
candidate ineligible to become a donor?  How much choice should potential parents have in 
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recognized by several scholars, executive agencies are known to be averse to regulating 
matters that raise bioethical issues, especially in the context of ART, and therefore tend to 
refrain from regulating such matters to the extent possible.315  Others have suggested that 
the FDA might be trying to avoid the regulation of DRT because it wishes to prevent a 
hijacking of the regulatory process by interest groups wishing to promote their ethical 
preferences.316  Thus, it is conceivable that in avoiding the regulation of genetic aspects 
of DRT the FDA might have actually been trying to avoid the bioethical issues involved, 
thereby passing this hot potato along to others, e.g., professional organizations, state 
courts and expert commissions.   
If this is indeed the case, the FDA might be throwing the baby out with the bath 
water because in so doing it foregoes an opportunity to regulate aspects of this area that 
do not raise difficult ethical issues.317  Moreover, as discussed earlier with relation to the 
European model of regulation of DRT, it is possible to maintain the safety of DRT 
children without compromising ethics by deferring to and adopting into its regulation 
“ready-made” practical and ethical solutions devised by other authoritative institutions 
                                                                                                                                            
choosing the traits of their offspring?  Who should have access to a candidate’s genetic data or to 
that of her family members which she has unavoidably disclosed as part of the screening and 
testing process?  See Robertson, supra note 222, at 457-459 (addressing the impact of screening 
and testing on offspring and arguing that screening and testing are a “private” form of eugenics 
that is permissible); Terra Ziporyn, ‘Artificial’ Human Reproduction Poses Medical, Social 
Concerns, 255 JAMA 13, 14 (1986) (describing issues related to donors’ privacy).     
315 According to the President’s Council on Bioethics, “[t]he appeal of doing nothing in [the 
area of ART] is, frankly, rather great, not only because the costs of regulation may be high . . . but 
also because the areas of assisted reproduction, new genomic knowledge, and embryo research 
are socially and politically quite sensitive.”  Council on Bioethics Report, supra note 100, at 185; 
see also Eugene Bardach & Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory 
Unreasonableness 48-49 (1982) (arguing that “[r]egulatory officials . . . often are grateful for the 
opportunity to escape responsibility for the intellectually difficult and politically touchy task of 
making [risk vs. social benefit] trade-off decisions” and quoting former FDA commissioner, 
Donald Kennedy statement that “[f]ortunately, our statute does not allow us to weigh adverse 
health conditions against dollars”); Annas, supra note 22, at 937 (arguing that the United States 
has been slow to regulate the ART industry because of bioethical controversies); Judith Daar, 
Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 609, 639 
(1997) (suggesting that the lack of regulation of ART is a result, at least in part, of the fact that 
this area is politically charged).  
316 See Merrill, supra note 23, at 63 n.332 (“It is possible, perhaps even likely, that FDA was 
reluctant to acknowledge its authority to regulate a set of procedures that have excited intense 
interest, considerable controversy, and wide publicity . . . if the Agency were to enter the [area of 
assisted reproductive services], it would surely face pressure from opponents of many of these 
services to go much further than ‘mere’ public health concerns might lead it to go.”).  
317 For example, the merits of requiring the screening and testing of potential donors for 
ADPKD, Tay-Sachs and other lethal genetic conditions is not controversial. 
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such as professional organizations.318  Thus, hypothetically, if the FDA were to regulate 
the genetic aspects of DRT it could use practice guidelines and professional standards for 
determining which conditions should be screened and tested for.  In this way, the FDA 
could remain within its element—the safety of DRT recipients and DRT children—and 
avoid the need to address specific bioethical issues while deferring to and benefiting from 
thoughtful solutions devised by professionals, which usually reflect careful balances 
struck through a significant investment of resources and expertise.   
5. Cost Considerations 
Arguably, regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT would impose such costly 
requirements that it might make DRT more, and possibly even prohibitively, expensive 
for some potential DRT recipients.319  This might not only cause many DRT institutions 
to go out of business320 but also may encourage many potential consumers who would no 
longer be able to afford to pay for DRT to seek other, less strictly regulated sources of 
DRT (e.g., abroad) or even forego the option of using DRT altogether.   
Although there is no current estimate of the costs of applying the genetic 
screening and testing schemes recommended by the ASRM and AATB, it is possible to 
estimate the cost of such screening and testing.  First, all of the states fund programs for 
the genetic testing of newborns for various genetic conditions that, with proper care, 
could be treated if diagnosed at an early stage.321  New York State, for example, runs a 
Newborn Screening Program that performs over eleven million tests annually and tests 
                                                
318 Choosing this course of action may give rise to constitutional issues having to do with the 
delegation of FDA power to private entities.  See infra note 336.  
319 Requiring the routine testing of every potential DRT donor for various conditions could 
result in a considerable increase in the costs involved in the processing of DRT.  
320 The most costly elements of regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT would probably be 
the heightened screening and testing requirements.  There are a few other possible costs involved 
in such regulation, e.g., costs involved in inspection and complying with inspection requirements, 
costs involved in appropriate recordkeeping, costs of communicating adverse events, etc.  Yet, it 
appears that such costs would be very low, if not nominal.  For example, the FDA estimated the 
costs related to being subject to periodic inspections at approximately $768 per establishment per 
inspection.  See 69 Fed. Reg. 68663 (FDA Nov. 24, 2004).    
321 See Nat’l Newborn Screening & Genetic Resource Ctr., State Map Page, http://genes-r-
us.uthscsa.edu/resources/consumer/statemap.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).  For a list of genetic 
conditions for which newborns are tested, see the National Newborn Screening Status Report 
(July 7, 2009), available at http://genes-r-us.uthscsa.edu/nbsdisorders.pdf.  The existence of such 
genetic testing programs funded by all of the states also seems to reinforce the arguments in favor 
of genetic testing of DRT donors.  Specifically, if it is justifiable to conduct genetic testing after a 
child is born, then it is even more justified to screen beforehand, i.e. prior to the actual 
manifestation of the genetic risk which arguably occurs at the moment of conception.  In other 
words, genetic testing of DRT donors is a true preventative measure while newborn screening 
could at best guarantee appropriate treatment of an existing and irreversible genetic condition. 
121
Vol. XI The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2010 
 
   302 
over a quarter of a million newborns a year for more than forty genetic conditions as well 
as HIV and congenital hypothyroidism.322  The annual cost of all of the testing done by 
the New York Program is $11.9 million.323  Second, numerous private laboratories offer 
various genetic testing products and services:  for as little as $25, parents and physicians 
may acquire kits or sets of genetic tests.324  For instance, the University of Colorado 
offers a kit that tests for twenty disorders recommended by the American College of 
Medical Genetics (ACMG) for $25;325 another private laboratory offers testing for about 
fifty genetic conditions for $199.326  Third, some laboratories also offer prenatal genetic 
screening.  For example, for a price of $1,850, one private laboratory offers genetic 
testing of fetuses based on DNA chip technology that evaluates over 2,100 DNA 
sequences associated with over 100 genetic syndromes.327  These figures suggest that the 
average cost of genetic testing for a given genetic mutation could be estimated at about 
$1-3, depending on the technology used.  Thus, under a rough estimate, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that the genetic testing of potential DRT donors in accordance 
with professional guidelines would cost several hundreds of dollars per donor.328   
                                                
322 See Wadsworth Center Newborn Screening Program, 
http://www.wadsworth.org/newborn/index.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).  
323 Electronic mail letter from Deborah Rodriguez, Newborn Information Coordinator, 
Wadsworth Center, to author (July 21, 2009) (on file with author).  Based on these figures it is 
possible to roughly calculate the cost of testing at about $47.6 per newborn and $1.08 per test.  
324 See, e.g., Save Babies Through Screening Foundation, A Parent’s Guide to Newborn 
Screening 2 (May 2005), available at 
http://www.savebabies.org/library/HandoutAParentsGuidetoNBS.pdf.     
325 See Univ. of Colorado Health Sciences Ctr., Expanded Newborn Screening Program, 
http://www.uchsc.edu/newbornscreening/index.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).  
326 See PerkinElmer Genetics, Order StepOne®, 
http://www.perkinelmergenetics.com/OrderScreeningPacket.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).  For 
a list of the genetic conditions tested for, see 
http://www.perkinelmergenetics.com/DisordersScreened.htm (last visited Jun. 17, 2010).  
327 See The President’s Council on Bioethics, The Changing Moral Focus of Newborn 
Screening 80 (2008) [hereinafter Changing Moral Focus] available at 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/newborn_screening/index.html.  See also Signature 
Genomic Laboratories, Signature PrenatalChip®, 
http://www.signaturegenomics.com/prenatalchip.html (last visited May 9, 2010).   
328 This estimate is based on the assumption that professional guidelines would require testing 
for a few hundred known genetic mutations and that the cost of testing for each individual 
mutation is, as mentioned above $1-3.  It is probably also safe to assume that, in the future, as 
testing technologies advance and become more commonplace, genetic testing of DRT donors 
would become cheaper.  It is anticipated that by 2014, the sequencing of an entire human genome 
would cost only about $1,000.  See Changing Moral Focus, supra note 327, at 52.  Analysis of an 
entire individual’s genome would make it possible to analyze the genome of such individual for 
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It is important to note that not all potential DRT donors should be subject to such 
extensive testing; only the most promising candidates who make it through vigorous 
initial screening based on a physical examination and thorough questioning would merit 
such expenditure.  Thus, even if we assume that such extensive genetic testing of 
potential DRT donors would impose additional costs on DRT institutions and—by way of 
roll over—recipients, it is expected that such additional costs and expenditure would not 
make DRT significantly more costly or less accessible than it already is.329 
Moreover, if one is to accept the picture of institutional compliance with 
professional guidelines among DRT institutions portrayed by the FDA, it may well be 
that regulating the genetic aspects of DRT would not substantially affect the DRT 
industry.  According to the FDA, the twenty largest DRT institutions that account for 
95% of the DRT industry already screen and test potential DRT donors in accordance 
with professional guidelines.330  Thus, presumably, regulations requiring compliance with 
professional standards as they pertain to genetic aspects of DRT would not impose 
additional costs on most DRT transactions.  Rather, such regulations would only affect 
DRT institutions that do not already follow professional guidelines and recipients 
purchasing DRT from such institutions.331 
Another aspect of the costs involved in regulating the genetic aspects of DRT is 
the costs that such regulation would impose on the FDA itself.  Agencies’ ability and 
willingness to regulate are closely linked to the financial burden that the regulation would 
impose on their limited resources. Yet, the cost of regulation to agencies often tends to be 
                                                                                                                                            
all the genetic mutations known without having to resort to costly and cumbersome specific 
testing for specific genetic conditions, as is done now.  
329 With each sperm sample sold at a few hundreds of dollars and under the assumption that 
each sperm donor would be the source of at least dozens of samples, it may be assumed that the 
additional cost of extensive genetic testing would not significantly contribute to the cost of sperm.  
The cost of egg donations, on the other hand, is already so high, that arguably, the additional cost 
of proper genetic testing of potential donors is not expected to change it significantly.  
Notably, the area of DRT raises numerous issues related to the accessibility of DRT and 
related services to different income groups.  DRT in general and egg donations in particular are 
expensive propositions and, as such, are more available to individuals and families with higher 
income and/or better medical insurance coverage that includes DRT and related services.  Yet, 
given the above conclusion that proper genetic screening and testing of DRT is not expected to 
make DRT and related services significantly more expensive, it is also not expected that it would 
push DRT and related services further beyond the reach of lower income groups. 
330 According to the FDA, those institutions that were in compliance with AATB standards 
would have felt minimal impact as a result of the FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule, while the 
remaining 90 smaller institutions examined, which accounted for 5% of the industry, “[would] be 
more significantly affected.”  See FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule, supra note 24, at 29819.   
331 Regulatory requirement of genetic screening and testing that conforms to professional 
guidelines would therefore prevent a possible market failure where such non-compliant DRT 
institutions externalize the costs involved in appropriate screening and testing to DRT recipients 
and DRT children in the form of heightened risk.   
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overlooked.332   However, given that the FDA is already involved in the regulation of 
DRT and inspection of DRT institutions, applying the FDA’s Human Tissue Regulations’ 
framework to genetic aspects of DRT should not create a substantial additional financial 
burden for the FDA.333  
Finally, in performing the cost-benefit analysis in the context of genetic screening 
and testing of DRT, it is imperative to consider the possible long-term benefits that 
mandatory testing requirements may have on future healthcare expenditure on a societal 
scale.    
In conclusion, the regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT is likely to raise 
conceptual and bioethical issues and impose at least some additional costs on DRT 
institutions and recipients.  Yet, these obstacles are not unique to this area of regulation 
and should not deter the FDA.  Furthermore, as demonstrated above, FDA regulation of 
the area of genetic aspects of DRT could rely on solid legislative and constitutional 
grounds.  Accordingly, such regulation is not only desirable but also feasible.   
 
C. Some Recommendations for FDA Regulation of the Genetic Aspects of Donated 
Reproductive Tissue 
As mentioned earlier, this article does not purport to suggest exactly what FDA 
regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT should look like and what it should include; 
these issues are best left to the expertise of the FDA and DRT professionals.  However, it 
is possible to enumerate key elements that such regulation should include.  
Perhaps the most important purpose of regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT 
should be ensuring the health and safety of DRT children rather than just those of DRT 
recipients and donors.334  Just as in the context of communicable diseases, the regulation 
should be based on an understanding that the mere fact that a disease might occur in the 
general population—which does not have its reproductive cells and tissues screened and 
                                                
332 It is not unfathomable that one of the reasons that the FDA has not regulated the genetic 
aspects of DRT is simply a lack of resources.  For example, according to an FDA official, lack of 
manpower and resources to regulate sperm banks was the underlying reason for allowing self-
regulation in the area of DRT.  See Human Tissues and Organs, supra note 104, at 23-24 
(“[S]ince basically the entire scientific staff and other personnel devoted to sperm banking was 
myself about half-time, and because the American Association of Tissue Banks had been formed 
at the same time, we decided that we would maintain a liaison with AATB and allow voluntary 
standards to be used in the area of semen banking.”).  According to Merrill, the FDA appears to 
“confront more than its share of novel challenges” and thus may have to decide how to distribute 
its limited resources more frequently than other agencies.  See Merrill, supra note 23, at 2.  
333 See Merrill, supra note 23, at 80 (characterizing the FDA’s Human Tissue Regulations as 
striking “a reasonable balance between public health protection, on the one hand, and the 
constraints of its own budget and tissue bank resources on the other”). 
334 See Council on Bioethics Report, supra note 100, at 217.   
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tested—does not justify not taking measures to avoid it in DRT children.335  Thus, in 
regulating the genetic aspects of DRT, the FDA should strive to ensure that DRT 
institutions take all reasonable measures to prevent and avoid the occurrence of genetic 
diseases in DRT children. 
In promulgating regulations addressing the genetic aspects of DRT, especially in 
the context of screening and testing requirements, the FDA should consider the 
recommendations and guidelines of professional organizations.336  As explained above, 
the FDA could greatly benefit from the accumulated knowledge, experience and thinking 
in professional organizations and from solutions they have come up with through years of 
dealing with the issues that are going to become the focus of regulation.  By relying on 
professional standards, the FDA would not only ensure that its regulatory scheme is 
always reasonably up-to-date and relevant but also preserve the financial and political 
                                                
335 See Ziporyn, supra note 314, at 14 (quoting Lori Andrews’ argument that the position that 
there is no need to test DRT donors for medical and genetic defects because “normal” couples do 
not always undergo genetic testing before conception is “unscientific and unethical”); see also 
supra Part II.E.    
336 See Council on Bioethics Report, supra note 100, at 217 (recognizing that professional 
oversight has traditionally been the principal mechanism of regulation for the practice of 
medicine).  Notably, coordination with the recommendations and guidelines of professional 
organizations coincides with the FDA’s own preferences with relation to the regulation of human 
tissue.  See Zoon Statement, supra note 59, at 105 (“In the future . . . FDA intends to use various 
venues to continue our dialogue with industry organizations such as the AATB . . . [and] the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM)/Society or [sic] Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (SART).”).  
Importantly, deferment to and reliance on standards set by professional organizations raises 
the issue of “privatization as delegation.”  See generally Gillian Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 Col. L. Rev. 1367 (2003).  According to Metzger, when private entities “wield 
substantial power over government programs and their participants,” the government effectively 
delegates power to such private entities in a manner that might undermine “constitutional 
accountability.”  Id. at 1376-77.  Metzger argues that for such delegation of government power to 
private entities to be constitutional it must be sufficiently constrained, e.g., by ensuring 
government supervision over the private entities’ decision-making by creating a complaint or 
appeal system through which affected third-parties could challenge specific decisions, policies 
and procedures of the private entities that affect them.  Id. at 1471-72.  Arguably, per Metzger, 
FDA reliance on and deferment to professional guidelines (such as those of the AATB and 
ASRM) in the context of regulation of genetic aspects of DRT could constitute a delegation of 
government power to private entities because it may effectively enable such entities to act on 
behalf of the government in formulating professional standards of practice for third parties, i.e. 
DRT institutions.  Id. at 1462.  Accordingly, in order to ensure that such reliance on professional 
guidelines is endowed with sufficient constitutional accountability, the FDA could include in the 
regulations addressing the genetic aspects of DRT a mechanism that would enable DRT 
institutions affected by professional guidelines to challenge the inclusion of a particular guideline 
or standard in the regulations.  Notably, such a mechanism, the Tissue Reference Group (TRG) 
has already been established in the Human Tissue Regulations to resolve disputes arising from 
implementation of these regulations.  See 66 Fed. Reg. 5451 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001) (comment 7).  
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resources that it would otherwise need to expend on tackling complicated bioethical 
issues.337   
As for the screening and testing of potential donors, the FDA could rely on a 
protocol similar to the one it already employs in its Human Tissue Regulations, which 
requires, among other things, the collection of relevant medical records, including a 
donor’s medical history and physical examination report.338  The FDA should also 
require the collection of as detailed a family medical history as possible and its use to 
identify risk factors that may prompt further specific testing beyond that which would be 
required from every donor or from donors belonging to particular ethnic groups.339   
The FDA regulations should set up a national record-keeping system that includes 
information on all donors nationwide.  The database should assist in keeping track of the 
number of DRT children born from each donor’s gametes and include the medical history 
of donors, their contact information and adverse events in DRT children as they pertain to 
genetic conditions.  Such a database could assist in avoiding procreation between blood-
related DRT children.340  Even more importantly, it would ensure that DRT suspected of 
causing adverse effects is not used again and that the donor is not permitted to donate any 
more DRT anywhere in the country before the source of the genetic problem is 
verified.341    
Finally, as recommended by the GAO, the FDA regulations should require that 
prospective DRT recipients be made aware and receive an explanation of relevant genetic 
                                                
337 See supra Part IV.B.4.   
338 See FDA’s Guidance for Industry Announcement, supra note 50, at 12-14.   
339 Identifying risk factors and assessing them are also required by the FDA with respect to 
communicable diseases.  See id. at 15.   
340 See Cohen, supra note 23, at 363.  
341 Such a database would have helped in preventing cases such as that of the Michigan donor 
whose sperm was used for conceiving 11 children, five of whom were later found to have an 
extremely rare type of leukemia.  See Denise Grady, Sperm Donor Seen as Source of Disease in 5 
Children, N.Y. Times May 19, 2006, at A16.  According to experts, this particular genetic defect, 
which is passed along by an autosomal dominant gene, would probably not have been picked up 
as part of a regular screening and testing protocol.  Id.  However, a database would have enabled 
reporting of the discovery of the first case of leukemia in the donor’s progeny, thereby not only 
alerting other recipients (through their DRT institutions) regarding possible risks to their DRT 
children, but also ensuring that DRT institutions did not further use the compromised donor’s 
DRT.  Cf. Daar & Brzyski, supra note 15, at 1703 (calling for the institution of a national gamete 
donor registry to avoid such cases as the recently reported transmission of potentially lethal heart 
defect by a sperm donor to 9 out of 24 children conceived using his sperm, including the donor’s 
own child); Maron et al., supra note 5, at 1681-83 (reporting a case where a donor transmitted a 
unique genetic condition causing a lethal heart defect to at least 9 out of 24 children conceived 
from his sperm, including one of his own two sons, recommending assembling and sharing 
clinical data for all individuals born from the same donor’s DRT and emphasizing the importance 
of notifying gamete donors, recipients, and other affected parties about the occurrence of genetic 
diseases).   
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data of potential donors in accordance with existing informed consent standards.  DRT 
recipients should also be advised about the types of genetic testing, if any, performed on 
any particular DRT and the potential risks of genetic diseases embodied in that particular 
DRT as compared to the level of risk in the general population.342  In this manner, the 
FDA regulations would not only ensure that DRT recipients only use genetically 
compromised DRT after making an informed choice but also that they are made aware of 
the possible monetary and legal ramifications of such a choice.343   
V. CONCLUSION 
Three decades have passed since Curie-Cohen published the results of a survey 
revealing significant deficiencies in the practices of genetic screening and testing of 
sperm and yet, children born from donated reproductive tissue, whether sperm or ova, are 
still exposed to unnecessarily high levels of genetic risk.  Despite ongoing efforts by 
professional organizations, the extent of self-regulation of the donated reproductive tissue 
industry is unclear and its effectiveness is questionable.  Accompanied by inconsistent 
state regulation of the reproductive tissue industry and non-deterring relief afforded by 
                                                
342 Enforcing such a requirement would put DRT recipients in the place of other couples who 
undergo prenatal medical screening and testing for genetic diseases prevalent in their ethnic 
group and would enable them to make their own decision whether they wish to use the DRT at 
the risk of passing an identified genetic condition to their DRT child, forego the use of the 
particular DRT or utilize pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to test their embryo.  See 
Robertson, supra note 222, at 456-57 (describing the different possible choices prospective 
parents have);  see also GAO 1997 Report, supra note 182, at 31 (“We recommend that the 
Secretary . . . direct FDA to take action in several areas to improve the safety of [DRT] and to 
increase FDA’s ability to regulate tissue facility activities . . . FDA should also add to its 
oversight plans provisions that would require . . . disclosure of genetic tests that have been 
performed on donated reproductive tissue.”).  Interestingly, in its response to the GAO 1997 
Report, the FDA agreed with these requirements.  See Letter from Diane E. Thompson, Associate 
Commissioner for Legislative Affairs, DHHS, to Bernice Steinhardt, Director, HEHS, GAO (Oct. 
23, 1997) (“In general, FDA agrees that recipients of tissue should know, through appropriate 
labeling of the tissue, the results of testing performed.  Ethical, scientific and regulatory issues 
regarding genetic tests are currently under discussion within the Department of Health and 
Human Services in connection with the final report of the Task Force on Genetic Testing.”).  
Notably, the report of the Task Force on Genetic Testing mentioned in the FDA’s response does 
not mention the genetic screening or testing of DRT.  See Final Report of the Task Force on 
Genetic Testing (Neil A. Holtzman and Michael S. Watson eds. 1997), available at 
http://www.genome.gov/10001733. 
343 Some of the ramifications of choosing to use genetically-compromised DRT could include, 
for example, an implied waiver of possible claims against professionals involved in the 
preparation, distribution and use of the DRT.  Requiring disclosure and informed consent with 
respect to genetic conditions that might be passed along by particular DRT would also provide 
adequate response to any concerns regarding the reproductive freedom of recipients.  See 
Robertson, supra note 222, at 457 (“[W]anting information about the genetic makeup of 
prospective offspring and then acting on it fits squarely within conventional understandings of 
procreative liberty.”).   
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the courts in matters involving children born from genetically defective donated 
reproductive tissue, the genetic safety of individuals born from such tissue is a cause for 
concern.  
This Article described only a handful of publicized tragedies that befell children 
born from genetically defective reproductive tissue and their families.  There is no way of 
knowing how many more such cases actually occurred, and yet, without a fundamental 
change in the regulation of donated reproductive tissue to address genetic risks involved 
in the use of such tissue, more tragedies are very likely to occur.  As we accumulate 
knowledge about human genetics and develop more diagnostic means to test for and 
possibly prevent the transmission of genetic diseases through donated reproductive tissue, 
the need for regulation will only become more accentuated.  Furthermore, without 
appropriate regulation, the growing demand for donated reproductive tissue will further 
increase the genetic risks involved in the use of donated reproductive tissue.  
As recognized by the FDA, non-involvement of the federal government in the 
area of donated reproductive tissue jeopardizes the safety of the public.  Thus, at least as 
a matter of public health policy, the FDA’s distinction between communicable diseases 
and genetic diseases in the context of donated reproductive tissue cannot be justified.  
The Public Health Service Act endows the FDA with ample authority to regulate all 
aspects of donated reproductive tissue and provides it with all the tools necessary to 
ensure the safety of recipients of such tissue and their children.  Indeed, the regulation of 
genetic aspects of donated reproductive tissue would undoubtedly raise difficulties 
resulting, for example, from bioethical issues involved in this area and the need to 
carefully balance costs against potential benefits.  However, overcoming such difficulties 
is well within the capabilities of the FDA.     
Furthermore, regulations addressing the genetic risks involved in the use of 
donated reproductive tissue could offer “a unique opportunity to reduce or even eliminate 
genetic risks,”344 which would benefit generations to come.  Unfortunately, it appears that 
the regulation of genetic aspects of donated reproductive tissue is not on the FDA’s “to 
do list.”345  Hopefully, renewed interest in the regulation of sectors that are not 
sufficiently self-regulated will prompt the FDA to supplement its current regulation so as 
to also address the genetic aspects of donated reproductive tissue.  
                                                
344 See Conrad, supra note 10, at 298.  
345 In its June 2007 report, the FDA’s Human Tissue Task Force listed numerous 
“recommendations that may be implemented with additional planning and/or resources,” which 
would improve the breadth and depth of the FDA’s Human Tissue Regulations.  However, these 
recommendations did not include addressing genetic aspects of DRT.  See HTTF Report, supra 




Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do We 
Really Need Both?  
 
I. Introduction 
Over the past decade or so, the United States has been the arena of a boisterous debate 
regarding the institution of a regulatory framework for the approval of generic versions1 of 
biologics-based pharmaceutical products (also known as biological products and 
biologics2)3an important and increasingly growing class of drugs.4  The basic premise of 
                                                 
1
 In this Article, the terms generics or generic versions will be used to refer to imitations and follow-on versions 
of already approved drug products, which are the subject of an application for marketing submitted to the FDA.  
Applications for generic versions of drug products typically attempt to rely on FDA findings of safety and efficacy 
reached as part of its review of the already approved version of the relevant drug product.  
Notably, the term generic biologics in and of itself has spawned a considerable amount of controversy as 
the nomenclature in the area of biologics seems to be perceived as dictating the discussions results.  See e.g. Henry 
G. Grabowski, David B. Ridley & Kevin A. Schulman, Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 Managerial 
and Decision Economics 439 n. 2 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=992479 
(asserting that while [t]hroughtout the paper we refer to generic biologics for the sake of symmetry with generic 
pharmaceuticals[,] the term follow-on biologic might be more appropriate, . . . given that the product might be 
required to complete clinical trials to demonstrate similar safety and efficacy to the originator); Wendy H. Schacht 
& John R. Thomas, CRS Report for Congress: Follow-On Biologics: Intellectual Property and Innovation Issues, at 
3 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 CRS Report] (many experts do not describe competing biologic products as generics, 
as is the case for small-molecule pharmaceuticals; the term follow-on biologic is commonly used instead); 
Follow-On Protein Products: Hearing before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong., 3 
(March 26, 2007) (statement of Janet Woodcock, M.D., Deputy Commissioner, Chief Medical Officer, FDA), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2007/04/t20070326a.html [hereinafter Woodcock Statement] (addressing 
the issue of terminology and explaining why she prefers the term follow-on protein products).  The particular term 
used in the context of the new healthcare reform act to indicate an imitation of an already approved product is 
biosimilar (rather than biogeneric, generic biologic, follow-on biologic, generic biological product, etc.).  
However, given the genericity of the term generic to the legal discussion of regulated imitation-products and its 
wide use in the context of drug law, in this Article I will use the term generic as mentioned above.  
2
 The FDA defines biological products as any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, or analogous product 
applicable to the prevention, treatment or cure of diseases or injuries of man.  See 21 C.F.R. § 600.3(h).  According 
to the FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER),   
Biological products include a wide range of products such as vaccines, blood and blood 
components . . . somatic cells, gene therapy, tissues, and recombinant therapeutic proteins. 
Biologics can be composed of sugars, proteins, or nucleic acids or complex combinations of 
these substances, or may be living entities such as cells and tissues. Biologics are isolated from 




such a framework is the creation of a fast and less-costly route to FDA approval for biologics 
that would be similar or identical to already-approved biological products—typically ones that 
                                                                                                                                                             
biotechnology methods and other cutting-edge technologies . . . Biological products often 
represent the cutting-edge of biomedical research and, in time, may offer the most effective 
means to treat a variety of medical illnesses and conditions that presently have no other 
treatments available. 
. . .  
In contrast to most drugs that are chemically synthesized and their structure is known, most 
biologics are complex mixtures that are not easily identified or characterized. Biological 
products, including those manufactured by biotechnology, tend to be heat sensitive and 
susceptible to microbial contamination. Therefore, it is necessary to use aseptic principles from 
initial manufacturing steps, which is also in contrast to most conventional drugs.  
FDA CBER, What are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CBER/ucm133077.htm (“CBER FAQ”); see also the Public Health 
Service Act (PHSA) ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 § 351(i) (1944) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)): (“the term ‘biological 
product’ means a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, 
allergenic product, or analogous product . . . applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition 
of human beings.”).  Accordingly, in this Article, I will use the terms “biologics” and “biological products” to refer 
to pharmaceutical products whose manufacturing involves the use of living organisms and will distinguish them 
from “small molecule drugs” (or “drugs” for short).  For further discussion of the differences between biologics and 
small molecule drugs and the possible implications of these differences on frameworks for the approval of generic 
versions of biological products, see generally Donna M. Gitter, Innovators and Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed 
Legislation Implementing an Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-On Biologics in the United States, 35 Fla. 
St. U. L. Rev. 555, 560 (2008); Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-On Biologics, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 363, 367-
378 (2007); Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), The Difference with Biologics: The Scientific, Legal, and 
Regulatory Challenges of Any Follow-On Biologics Scheme, 6-8 (2007), 
http://www.bio.org/healthcare/followonbkg/WhitePaper.pdf [hereinafter BIO White Paper].       
3 See generally Tam Q. Dinh, Potential Pathways for Abbreviated Approval of Generic Biologics Under Existing 
Law and Proposed Reforms to the Law, 62 Food & Drug L.J. 77 (2007) (discussing the debate regarding the FDA’s 
authority to create an abbreviated regulatory pathway for the approval of generic versions of biological products); 
Jeremiah J. Kelly & Michael David, No Longer “If,” but “When”: The Coming of Abbreviated Approval Pathway 
for Follow-On Biologics, 64 Food & Drug L.J. 115, 116 (2009) (reviewing the history of the debate over a U.S 
regulatory scheme for the approval of generic biologics).  
4 See generally Robert J. Shapiro et al., The Potential American Market for Generic Biological Treatments and the 
Associated Cost Savings, at 1-3 (2008), available at 
http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/0208_GenericBiologicsStudy.pdf (describing the importance of biologics as a 
class of drugs, the growing numbers of biological products, important research done in the area of biologics and 
their economic impact); 2008 CRS Report, supra note 1, at 1-2 (discussing the importance of biologics as a class of 
drugs); Liang, supra note 2, at 363-64 (describing the prominence of biologics in the worldwide drug market).  The 
importance of biologics lies in their structural and functional variety which, in turn, embodies unprecedented 
therapeutic promise.  Already, approved biologics include “wonder drugs” used to treat diseases and maladies that 
could not be treated effectively by small-molecule drugs and in many cases used to be considered fatal.  Examples 
of biologics include anti-cancer antibodies such as Herceptin and Avastin, anti-arthritis products such as Enbrel and 
Remicade, insulin products such as Humulin for the treatment of diabetes, erythropoietin products such as Procrit, 
clotting factor VIII for the treatment of hemophilia and Aranesp for the stimulation of growth of red blood cells in 




are sold on the market at monopoly rates—thereby allowing for cheaper versions of such 
medicines to enter the market.  One of the main points of contention in creating the framework 
for the approval of generic biologics has had to do with the length of the exclusivity period that 
would be granted to developers of original biologics during which generic competitors would not 
be allowed to enter the market.5  On March 21, 2010, as part of the healthcare reform, Congress 
                                                 
5 Since the imposition of competition on a previously monopolized market is expected to be accompanied by a drop 
in the price of the biological product, it is in the best interest of the monopolist to make its monopoly period as long 
as possible.  There are a variety of positions on the appropriate length of the period of such exclusivity.  Different 
proposals raised over the past few years proposed setting the length of exclusivity period, in years, at 0, 3-6, 7, 10, 
12-12.5, 12-14.5, 12-15, 13-16, 17, etc.  See Gitter, supra note 2, at 615-616 (reviewing different positions on the 
length of exclusivity period that should be afforded to original biological products); Henry Grabowski, Follow-on 
Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between Innovation and Competition, 7 Nature Reviews Drug 
Discovery 479, 486 (2008) [hereinafter Grabowski 2008] (advocating a data exclusivity period of 12.9-16.2 years); 
Henry Grabowski, Genia Long & Richard Mortimer, Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics: Updating Prior 
Analyses and Responding to Critiques, 
http://econ.duke.edu/Papers/PDF/Data_Exclusivity_Periods_for_Biologics.pdf, at 2, 30 (2008) (reiterating 
Grabowski’s call for a 12-16 year exclusivity period) [hereinafter Grabowski et al.]. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 
Stimulating Innovation in the Biologics Industry: A Balanced Approach to Marketing Exclusivity (2008) (arguing 
that granting developers of original biologics exclusivity periods of 12-15 years would create too long monopoly 
periods that will distort the economy of pharmaceuticals and calling for limiting exclusivity periods in biologics to 
lengths such as those granted under the Hatch-Waxman Act); Alex M. Brill, Proper Duration of Data Exclusivity for 
Generic Biologics: A Critique, at 11 (2008), available at 
http://www.tevadc.com/Brill_Exclusivity_in_Biogenerics.pdf (bringing a critique of Grabowski’s determination that 
the proper data exclusivity period should be 12.9-16.2 years and arguing that under a “more plausible set of 
circumstances,” the proper data exclusivity period should be around ten years); Henry Grabowski & Joseph DiMasi, 
Biosimilar, Data Exclusivity, and the Incentives for Innovation: A Critique of Kotlikoff’s White Paper, 
http://econ.duke.edu/Papers/PDF/FinalDraft2_5_09.pdf, at 4-5 (2009) (criticizing Kotlikoff’s argument against 
granting a 12-15 year data and/or exclusivity period) [hereinafter Grabowski & DiMasi 2009]; Teva Discusses 
Follow-On Biologics, Initiatives for 2009, 8 Drug Industry Daily, Feb. 11, 2009 (discussing Teva’s call for a 7 year 
exclusivity period); Henry Grabowski, Data Exclusivity for Biologics: What Is the Appropriate Period of 
Protection?, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI)—Public Policy Outlook No. 10 (2009) 
[hereinafter Grabowski 2009] (reiterating his position, as expressed in previous articles, that the minimum period of 
exclusivity should be set at twelve years); Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), A Follow-On Biologics 
Regime Without Strong Data Exclusivity Will Stifle the Development of New Medicines, at 1 (2007) [BIO Data 
Exclusivity Position Paper] (advocating a data exclusivity period for biologics of “no less than 14 years”); John A. 
Vernon, Alan Bennett & Joseph H. Golec, Exploration of Potential Economics of Follow-on Biologics and 
Implications for Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics, B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 55 (2010) (“there should be 17 years 
of [] exclusivity for new biologics.”).  See also infra note 71.  But see Federal Trade Commission, Emerging Health 
Care Issues: Follow-on Biologic Drug Competition, at v-vii (2009) [hereinafter FTC Report] (recommending against 
granting statutory exclusivity in biological products in addition to existing patent protection and determining that it 
is likely that generic competition in biologics will develop without any special legislative incentives).   
Notably, in Europe, original biological products are afforded a 10-11-year statutory exclusivity consisting 
of 8 years of data exclusivity during which it is not possible to file applications for generic versions of the biological 




settled this debate by passing the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 
(‘BPCIA’), which provides statutory exclusivity6 periods of 12-12.5 years for original biologics 
from the date of FDA approval.7  This 12-12.5 year statutory exclusivity period predominantly 
overlaps with patent protection on the underlying biological product and is about 5-11 months 
shorter than the average remaining period of such patent protection on the original product.8  
This seeming redundancy raises questions regarding the need for and purpose of having 
patents in inventions related to biologics in addition to statutory exclusivities.  What justification 
                                                                                                                                                             
additional optional one year for approval of additional treatment indications for the same product.  See Regulation 
(EC) No. 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Art. 14(11) (2004).  For further discussion of the 
European regulatory framework for the approval of generic biologics, see generally Liang, supra note 2, at 397-408; 
Kelly & David, supra note 3, at 122-123.  
6 For purposes of the discussion in this Article, a “statutory exclusivity” is defined as the period of time designated 
in legislation during which the FDA or any other statutorily designated entity is barred from approving a generic 
version of a product or taking other action mandated in legislation which would pave the road for competition in that 
product. The effect of such statutory impediment is a de-facto grant of a competitive advantage to the party 
owning/making the original version of the product.  Cf. Bruce S. Manheim et al., ‘Follow-On Biologics’: Ensuring 
Continued Innovation In The Biotechnology Industry, 25 Health Affairs 394, 394 (2006), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/25/2/394 (defining “statutory exclusivity” as “the period of time in 
which the FDA is barred from approving a follow-on product.”).  For further discussion of statutory exclusivities 
and the difference between them and intellectual property rights such as patents see infra Part II.A.  Two examples 
of statutory exclusivities existing in the context of FDA regulation are those affected under the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 and the Orphan Drug Act.  See Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (Codified as amended 
in different sections of 15, 21, 35 and 42 U.S.C.); Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 6 Stat. 2049 (1983).  For 
further discussion of these Acts and the statutory exclusivities they confer see infra Part II.B.  
7 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-149, §§ 7001-7002, 124 Stat. 1025 (2010) (adding § 
351(k)(7) to the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (1944)).  See discussion infra III.B.  
Importantly, in February 2011, as part of its 2012 Budget Proposal, the Office of Management and Budget in the 
Executive Office of the President published a proposal to shorten this exclusivity period to 7 years.  See Office of 
Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2012 Terminations, Reductions and Savings – Budget of the U.S. 
Government, at 119 (“[t]he Administration is proposing to give consumers more access to affordable 
pharmaceuticals by . . . reducing the exclusivity period for brand biologics to encourage faster development of 
generic biologics . . . Under the Administration proposal, beginning in 2012, innovator brand biologic manufacturers 
would have 7 years of exclusivity).  Interestingly, this proposal appears to be in line with the Administration’s 
original position on the appropriate length of statutory exclusivity that should be awarded in approved original 
biological products.  See infra note 87.  Regardless, the discussion herein is based on the law as it currently stands 
under BPCIA.   




is there, if any, for such double-layered protection in biologics?  And, assuming that such 
justification or need for double protection does exist, why should pharmaceutical biologics be the 
only kind of technology to benefit from it?  Could the statutory exclusivity regime in 
pharmaceutical biologics mark the dawn of a new era in the protection and incentivizing of 
innovation and the beginning of a gradual replacement of the old patent system with modern 
schemes of statutory exclusivities; or is it just a peculiar case of a legal regime shaped by an 
unusually powerful industry?  In this article I will seek to answer these questions.  
Part II of this article will review fundamental patent theory concepts necessary for the 
discussion and compare them with statutory exclusivities with emphasis on the statutory 
exclusivity scheme created under the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Part III will describe the current 
regulation of biologics in the United States and review the framework for the approval of generic 
biologics under BPCIA.  Comparing statutory exclusivities and patent protection in the context 
of biologics, Part IV will discuss the “pros” and “cons” of these two regimes from a public 
policy perspective, address the possible ramifications of having both statutory exclusivities and 
patent protection in biologics and culminate in a call for the suspension of patent enforcement 
rights with relation to biological products that benefit from statutory exclusivities afforded under 
BPCIA for the duration of such exclusivities.  Part V will include broader conclusions regarding 
additional areas of technology which could benefit from the application of statutory exclusivities 






II. Statutory Exclusivities and Patents as Mechanisms of Protecting and Advancing 
Technological Innovation 
A. Patents  
Dating as far back as the 15th Century,9 patents10 are time-limited monopolies granting 
inventors the right to exclude others from using their patented inventions;11 i.e., for a predefined 
period of time, inventor-patentees can dictate whether and how third parties may practice their 
patented inventions and collect payments in exchange for their permission to do so.  The 
literature on patent theory is vast, but two theories dominate the underlying rationales for having 
patent systems.12  
 
 
                                                 
9 See Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 166, 169 (1948).   
10 In the context of this Article, unless stated otherwise, reference to “patents” is to the modern form of patents of 
invention—i.e. utility patents—as opposed to design patents, plant patents and other types of patents.  
11 In the United States, the right to exclude includes the making, using or selling of the invention or importation of 
the invention into the United States.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).  See also Fritz Machlup, Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights, & Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., An Economic Review of the 
Patent System at 1 (Comm. Print 1958) (“a patent confers the right to secure the enforcement power of the state in 
excluding unauthorized persons for a specified number of years, from making commercial use of a clearly identified 
invention”). 
12 The exact rationales for having patents remain the subject of debate. Although it is generally accepted that 
inventive activity is responsive to economic stimuli, the need for patents as effective and efficient means of 
providing such stimuli remains under debate.  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: 
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017, 1031 (1989) (“[t]here is considerable empirical 
evidence suggesting that technological change has been an extremely important source of economic growth over 
time, and that levels of invention are responsive to economic stimuli.  But it does not necessarily follow that patent 
protection is necessary to preserve adequate economic incentives for invention and innovation”).  Notably, the 
patent theory literature recognizes additional rationales for patents.  E.g. the proposition that patents are a natural 
right because inventors have natural property rights in their ideas and thus, to prevent theft of such ideas by 
unauthorized parties, society is morally obliged to afford inventors a proprietary right in their inventions that would 
confer exclusivity in the invention.  See Machlup, supra note 11, at 21.  Another somewhat archaic rationale for 
patents is the proposition that patents are means of securing appropriate rewards, namely, that principles of justice 
and “natural law” require that inventors receive rewards for their inventions proportional to the inventions’ 




1. Patents as Incentive to Disclose  
According to this theory, patents embody a pact between inventors and society: in 
exchange for revealing their inventions to society and the way to utilize them, society grants 
inventors monopoly rights in their inventions for a limited period of time.13  This patent theory 
presumes that inventors would have kept their inventions a secret for as long as possible but the 
exclusivity is sufficient to convince them to disclose and explain their inventions and thus benefit 
society.14  An underlying premise of this theory is that the required disclosure of the invention by 
the inventor, once made, will enable the public to use the technology.15  These assumptions have 
been the subject of critique, especially in view of arguments that many patents withhold vital 
information necessary for utilizing the inventions without additional, sometimes substantial, 
research and development (R&D).16  
2. Patents as Incentive to Invent/Invest 
A modern, broadly accepted perception of patents is as an instrument of incentivizing 
invention by affording inventors an extra-competitive advantage over their competitors.17  
                                                 
13 See Machlup, supra note 11, at 21 (the “exchange-for-secrets” thesis); Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1022, 1028-
1030 (“[i]n exchange for these exclusive rights, the patent statute requires the inventor to disclose the invention in 
the patent application in terms sufficient to enable others who are ‘skilled in the art’ to make it”).  
14 See Machlup, supra note 11, at 21; Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1028-1030.   
15 See Machlup, supra note 11, at 21.  
16 See Machlup, supra note 11, at 32-33 (“[t]he point that patent monopolies are often granted in exchange for 
incomplete disclosure is made by several writers . . . the unpatented secret knowledge which is necessary to use a 
patent is colloquially called the know how and is generally regarded as property distinct from the patent to which it 
applies”); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 621, 626 (2010) 
(recognizing that one critique of patents is that they “seldom teach enough so that someone can actually go out and 
actually do the invention without some additional work”).   
17 See Machlup, supra note 11, at 21 (the “monopoly-profit-incentive” thesis); Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1024-




Described as “the fundamental economic justification of patents,”18 the basic premise upon 
which this theory is based is that under competitive conditions the profit made by inventors 
would not be high enough to justify their investment and that in order to make the inventive 
activities worthwhile to inventors, society must ensure that they are able exploit their inventions 
to an extent that would sufficiently compensate them for their investment of time, money and 
effort.19 
Further evolvement of the incentive-to-invent theory views patents as vital not only for 
the inventive activity itself but also for the industrial application of resulting inventions,20 
                                                                                                                                                             
because inventions once made are easily appropriated by competitors of the original inventor who have not shared in 
the costs of invention.”).  Notably, this perception of patents also seems to lie in the basis of the Constitutional 
authorization of Congress to grant patents for the purpose of promoting scientific progress.  See U.S. Const. Art. I § 
8 Cl. 8 ([Congress shall have Power t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries”).  An important critique of the perception of 
patents as incentive-to-invent argues that Man would create and invent regardless of any prospect of gain.  See 
Machlup, supra note 11, at 34 (quoting Frank W. Taussig).  
18 Machlup, supra note 11, at 32.  
19 Id. at 32, 37, 39 (reviewing arguments made by several scholars, including A.T. Hadley and Joseph Schumpeter); 
Brill, supra note 5, at 6 (“[t]he purpose of the patent system is to ensure that the inventor of a patented product 
receives monopoly market conditions and can earn profit margins sufficient to induce the R&D costs associated with 
bringing the product to market.”).  
20 For purposes of the discussion herein, this hypothesis will be referred to as the “incentive-to-invest” theory. 
Notably, the invention/investment terminology used herein bears similarity to the distinction drawn by some 
scholars between “invention” and “innovation.”  For example, Eisenberg refers to the incentive-to-invest offshoot of 
the incentive-to-invent rationale as a separate patent theory according to which patents are meant to promote 
“innovation,” namely investment in practical and commercial development of existing inventions.  See Eisenberg, 
supra note 12, at 1024 note 29, 1037-1045.  See also Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: 
Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 803, 807 (1988) (“[a]n invention refers to the practical 
implementation of the inventor's idea. This often takes the form of a prototype or model. An invention, then, is more 
than a concept (it is usually a tangible thing), but less than the fully worked out product or process first offered for 





namely for the incentivizing of financing of the steps necessary for putting an invention on the 
market.21  
Despite extensive criticism of the incentive-to-disclose and incentive-to-invent/invest 
theories,22 they offer means for evaluating the utility of patents.  Thus, in examining patents in 
the context of biologics, I will assume that these patent theories are valid and capable of 
explaining, at least to some extent, the need for patent protection for inventions in general, and 
biotechnological inventions in particular.   
B. Statutory Exclusivities 
The classic view on monopolies, whether patent or otherwise, is that they are generally 
harmful to society, but “a temporary monopoly granted to an inventor [is] a good way of 
rewarding his risk and expense.”23  This maxim is equally applicable to both patents and other 
types of state-instituted monopolies, such as statutory exclusivities, as a way to incentivize and 
reward innovation.24 
                                                 
21 See id. Eisenberg; Machlup, supra note 11, at 36 (“[f]inancing the work that leads to the making of an invention 
may be a relatively small venture compared with that of financing its introduction, because costly development 
work, experimentation in production and experimentation in marketing may be needed before the commercial 
exploitation of the invention can begin”).  The incentive-to-invest theory is especially relevant to the medical 
products industry, in which the expense in the laboratory of identifying a promising drug or biologic is often not 
remotely as costly as putting it through clinical trials as required by the FDA.   
22 See e.g. Machlup, supra note 11, at 22-25 (describing critiques of arguments in favor of patent protection); 
Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1026-1030 (addressing the critiques on the incentive-to-disclose and incentive-to-invent 
theories); and 2008 CRS Report, supra note 1, at 18.  It is not within the scope of this Article to go into the details of 
such critiques.   
23 See Machlup, supra note 11, at 19.  But see Brill, supra note 5, at 11 (warning from the chilling effects of too-long 
monopoly periods and arguing that “excessive monopoly protection by the government creates windfalls to 
innovators, stifles competition and is costly to society.”).  
24
 E.g., the sui generis rights under the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), Pub. L. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) 
(codified as various sections in 7 U.S.C.) and the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 




As mentioned above, a statutory exclusivity is a time-limited monopoly in a product or 
products which is the result of a bar on the entry of competitors into the product’s market.25  The 
most significant example of statutory exclusivities is that of the exclusivity periods granted under 
the Hatch-Waxman Act.26  Creating the regulatory pathway for the approval of generic versions 
of small-molecule drugs, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides for several types of statutory 
exclusivities.  First, the Hatch-Waxman Act offers a five-year statutory exclusivity period 
available to original drug manufacturers for receiving marketing approval of drugs containing 
therapeutic chemical compounds that have not been previously approved for medical use.27  As I 
will explain later in this article, although the five-year NCE exclusivity and 12-12.5 year 
statutory exclusivity under BPCIA may seem like they are meant to function in the same way—
as though the 12-12.5 year market exclusivity is “NCE exclusivity for biologics”—their purpose 
                                                                                                                                                             
exclusivities in biologics—encouraging innovation and enabling innovators to gain sufficient profit—bear striking 
resemblance to the incentive-to-invent/invest patent rationale discussed above.  See infra notes 72-73 and 
accompanying text.  For further discussion of the resemblance between the rationales for granting patents and 
statutory exclusivities, see infra Parts IV.C.  
25 See supra note 6.  In terms of their effect, statutory exclusivities are highly similar to patents.  According to 
Machlup, patents have three characterizing features: conditionality, limitation of time and scope and their being 
awarded by society for a recognizable reason.  Machlup, supra note 11, at 26 (“most writers [writing about patents] 
want to make it understood that [patents] are not ”odious” monopolies but rather “social monopolies,” “general 
welfare monopolies,” or “socially earned” monopolies . . . [all patent monopolies] are “limited and conditional.”). 
26
 See Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 6.  For an overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its legislative history see 
generally Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development 
Process, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 187 (1999); Gitter, supra note 2, at 568-573.   
27 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(ii).  This exclusivity period is commonly known as ‘New Chemical Entity’ (NCE) 
exclusivity.  During the NCE period of exclusivity, a generic version of the same drug cannot be approved.  Id.  
However, a generic applicant may file an application for the approval of a generic version of the drug after four 
years by challenging the patents related to the original product under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II).  Such a 
challenge would normally prompt the filing of a lawsuit by the patent owner, which would trigger – regardless of the 
timing in which the challenge was made with relation to the NCE exclusivity – an additional period of 30 months (or 
7.5 years from the date of approval, if the filing was made between NCE years 4-5) during which the FDA may not 
approve the generic application.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  For further discussion of the NCE exclusivity 




is in fact quite different.28  Additionally, the Hatch-Waxman Act creates a three-year statutory 
exclusivity period for conducting additional clinical investigations that lead to the approval of an 
additional new medical use of an already approved drug.29  Finally, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
seeks to incentivize the creation of generic versions of drugs by granting a 180-day exclusivity 
period to companies that are first to file applications for the marketing of generic versions of an 
original drug product.30  However, in order to receive the 180-day exclusivity, a generic 
applicant must challenge patents related to the original drug.31  The flourishing generic drug 
market and the entire generic drug industry are commonly viewed as attributable to this statutory 
exclusivity scheme created under the Hatch-Waxman Act.32  
Another important example of a statutory exclusivity framework is that of the 
exclusivities granted under the Orphan Drug Act33 to developers of drugs for rare diseases34 such 
                                                 
28 See infra note 92 and accompanying discussion.  
29 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(iii)-(iv).  This additional exclusivity period is meant to incentivize further 
investment in R&D of a known drug.  
30 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  Notably, the benefit embodied in the 180-day exclusivity period for generic 
manufacturers lies in the recipient’s ability to charge near-monopoly prices for its generic version of the drug for the 
duration of the 180-day exclusivity period.  See Gitter, supra note 2, at 573 (noting that during the 180-day period 
the generic drug “shares duopoly prices with the Brand-name drug”).   
31 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II).  Thus, the Hatch-Waxman Act itself incentivizes the challenging of patents 
related to the original drug product.  In this respect, the Hatch-Waxman Act seeks to abolish one monopoly by 
offering another, shorter one.   
32 The Hatch-Waxman Act is considered a great success in terms of incentivizing R&D activities and in monetary 
terms due to the savings attributable to the approval of generic versions of innovative drugs.  See Gitter, supra note 
2, at 586-587 (reviewing the reasons for what she describes as the “overall success” of the Hatch-Waxman Act); 
Liang, supra note 2, at 365 (arguing that the Hatch-Waxman Act has been very successful in bringing cheaper 
generic versions of drugs to the market while maintaining incentives for continued innovation).  
33 Orphan Drug Act, Pub.L. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 360aa et seq.). 
34 See 21 U.S.C. §360bb(a)(2) (definition of “rare disease or condition”).  Notably, the definition of an orphan drug 




as Huntington’s disease, ALS (Lou Gehrig’s disease) and Tourette syndrome.35  Under the 
Orphan Drug Act, once an approved drug or biologic is approved and “designated under [21 
U.S.C §360bb] for a rare disease or condition, the [FDA] may not approve another application . . 
.  for such drug for such disease or condition for a [generic applicant] until the expiration seven 
years from the date of the approval of the [drug or biologic].”36  The idea behind the legislation 
of the Orphan Drug Act was to increase insufficient financial incentives under patent law (if any) 
by supplementing it with an additional exclusivity period that would make the development of 
drugs for rare diseases financially feasible.37  The addition of the statutory exclusivity period that 
is the crux of the Orphan Drug Act is considered to have achieved its desired effect: since its 
passage in 1983, more than 200 drugs and biologics for rare diseases have been brought into the 
market as compared with fewer than ten in the decade preceding the passage of the Act.38    
C. Patents and Statutory Exclusivities—Similarities and Differences 
The main difference between statutory exclusivities and patents involves the nature or 
type of “right.”39  Patents result from a grant by an executive agency—the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO)—and create a right to exclude others from using the object of 
                                                 
35 See Congressional Findings for the Orphan Drug Act § 1.     
36 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2).   
37 See Congressional Findings for the Orphan Drug Act, supra note 35, §§ 2, 4-5.  Notably, such orphan drug 
products may be entirely unpatentable and could still merit exclusivity under the Orphan Drug Act.  
38 See FDA, Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/developingproductsforrarediseasesconditions/default.htm; Frank R. Lichtenberg & 
Joel Waldfogel, Does Misery Love Company? Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets Before and After the Orphan 
Drug Act, 15 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 335, 348 (2009) (arguing that the Orphan Drug Act “works”). 
39 This part of the discussion will utilize the terminology and distinctions proposed by Hohfeld.  See Wesley 




the right, namely the invention.40  A patentee’s right to exclude is correlated with the duty of 
third parties not to use the invention without the patentee’s permission.41   
Statutory exclusivities, on the other hand, are the result of inaction by an executive 
agency that effectuates a de-facto monopoly status with respect to a particular product.  For 
example, the NCE exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman Act is a result of the prohibition of the 
FDA granting marketing approvals for generic versions of the original drug for a period of five 
years from the date of approval of that drug, thereby effectuating a five-year exclusivity in that 
drug on its developer.42  In other words, the benefits of statutory exclusivities to developers of 
original products are by-products of the preclusion of potential competitors by an executive 
agency’s withholding of its permission to partake in a regulated activity.43  
The difference in the nature of the right conferred by patents and statutory exclusivities 
dictates two additional important distinctions related to the enforceability of the respective rights 
and their susceptibility to legal challenges.  From an enforceability perspective, while patents 
                                                 
40 Notably, patents are commonly mistaken for a positive right to use an invention.  The distinction between a right 
to use and a mere right to exclude others may be best illustrated where a patentee is unable to use their own 
invention but still has the right to exclude others from using it.  For example, if A’s invention cannot be used 
without B’s  patented technology, then A would be unable to use B’s technology although it would certainly still be 
able to prevent C from using A’s technology even if C has a license from B to use B’s technology.  
41 See Hohfeld, supra note 39, at 32 (quoting Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Kurtz, 10 Ind. App., 60, 37 N. E., 303, 
304 (1894): “[a] duty or a legal obligation is that which one ought or ought not to do. ‘Duty’ and ‘right’ are 
correlative terms. When a right is invaded, a duty is violated”).  
42 See discussion of NCE exclusivities supra note 27 and accompanying text.  
43 I.e., the FDA does not owe an original drug manufacturer a five-year monopoly status for having a new chemical 
compound approved for medical use.  Rather, the FDA is merely obliged to refrain, for a period of 5 years, from 
approving generic versions of the particular chemical compound for the drug’s indicated medical use.  Put in 
Hohfeldian terms, statutory exclusivities are the result of a privilege granted to applicant A to partake in certain 
commercial activities requiring a license from an executive agency E.  Yet, the exclusivity itself is not the result of 
the privilege but rather of an immunity of A from having its monopoly status changed which correlates to a non-
ability of third parties C to abolish this monopoly status of A by securing approval of their own generic products 




give grantees the right to preclude others from taking certain actions as they relate to the 
inventions claimed by such patents,44  statutory exclusivities are merely immunities and confer 
no right per se (in the narrow Hohfeldian sense) on their bearer.45  Accordingly, enforcement of 
patent rights necessitates actively seeking relief from a court and, typically, requires significant 
investment of resources.  Statutory exclusivities, on the other hand, are “automatically enforced” 
by the regulatory bar that preempts the entry of potential competitors into the relevant market 
and, thus, require no enforcement action per se on the part of the parties benefiting from them.46   
Patents and statutory exclusivities also differ in their susceptibility to legal challenges.  
Patents, while presumed valid,47 are subject to several different types of challenges, including 
reexamination,48 defense arguments in patent infringement suits49 and suits for a declaratory 
                                                 
44 See supra notes 11 and 40 and accompanying text. 
45 It is possible to argue that from a legal standpoint the beneficiaries of statutory exclusivities could secure certain 
legal rights, e.g. if agency E, for some reason, goes ahead and approves an application of third party C prior to the 
expiration of the relevant statutory exclusivity period, applicant A may be entitled to recover damages from agency 
E the amount that A could have reasonably expected to gain from its monopoly status had agency E not approved 
C’s application.  In this regard, it is important to distinguish between the type of right per Hohfeld and the legal 
right.  See e.g. Hohfeld, supra note 39, at 43-44 (explaining that there are “innumerable cases in which the mental 
and physical facts . . . [are] confused with the legal relation which they create”). 
46 See Brill, supra note 5, at 6 (“[d]ata exclusivity is a definitive monopoly and a government grant, as it allows the 
innovator’s data to be protected without challenge”); Joyce Wing Yan Tam, Biologics Revolution: The Intersection 
of Biotechnology, Patent Law, and Pharmaceutical Regulation, 98 Geo. L.J. 535, 553 (2010) (“[m]arketing 
exclusivities are particularly powerful . . . This perfect monopoly protection is automatic and does not require the 
entity holding the market exclusivity to act—a sharp contrast to patent rights, which are only enforced when the 
patent holder prevails in a legal action.”).  However, a party benefiting from a statutory exclusivity could attempt to 
preserve and possibly even extend its monopoly by filing a citizens petition requesting the FDA to take certain 
actions (e.g. imposing increased testing requirements on generic applicants) or refrain from taking certain actions 
(e.g. approving a generic application).  See 21 C.F.R. § 10.30.   
47 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“[a] patent shall be presumed valid”).  
48
 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-305. 
49 Patent infringement suits initiated under the Hatch-Waxman Act normally fall under this category.  Namely, the 
third party generic applicant makes a certification under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) that the patents covering 




judgment.50  Such challenges could and often do result in the partial or complete invalidation of 
the challenged patents.51  Hence, it is possible to say that patents are substantially exposed to 
legal challenges throughout their term.   
Statutory exclusivity status, however, can only be contested by challenging the relevant 
agency’s inaction (i.e. omission), e.g., by disputing the agency’s “failure” to approve an 
application to partake in the particular regulated activity which is the subject of the exclusivity.  
Since such a challenge would essentially argue that the agency should have, purportedly, 
approved the additional, later application, its prospects of success in court are not high from the 
outset.52  Thus, statutory exclusivities are substantially less susceptible to legal challenges than 
patents. 
                                                                                                                                                             
which the application is submitted.”  Under patent law, such certifications constitute acts of infringement under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).  See discussion supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.  
50 Suits for declaratory judgment may be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, but see Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FFDCA) (Copeland Pure Food and Drugs Act) (Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) (FDCA) (Humphrey-Durham 
Act), ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040, §§ 505, 512 (1938). 
51 For example, patents are susceptible to challenges involving their novelty and non-obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 102-103, their compliance with the various requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, their being directed to patentable 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and so forth.  
52 Under current Supreme Court Precedent, challenging executive agencies’ inaction is likely to be unsuccessful.  
See Hackler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[t]his Court has recognized on several occasions over many 
years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision 
generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion).  This low likelihood of success of an attempt to challenge 
executive agencies’ inaction is especially true in the context of drug law.  See Hackler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 835-36 
(rejecting the argument that the FFDCA’s prohibitions of “misbranding” and the introduction of “new drugs” absent 
agency approval supply courts with “law to apply” and therefore do not provide a basis for judicial review of an 
FDA decision not to take enforcement action in the area of drug law).  See also Brill, supra note 5, at 6 (“[d]ata 
exclusivity is not challengeable in court”).   
Although statutory exclusivities per se may be relatively unsusceptible to legal challenges, it is quite 
possible that an agency’s interpretation and application of laws instituting such exclusivities would be subject to 
legal challenges.  However, such challenges would be subject to an exacting review standard of the Chevron 
Doctrine.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (holding that 
“considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme. . . .” and 




Having laid down some of the foundations necessary for a discussion of patents and 
statutory exclusivities in the context of biologics, I will now provide background on the 
regulation of biological products.  
III. The Regulation of Biologics in the United States 
A. The Approval of Biologics License Applications Under PHSA § 351 
In order to introduce a biological product (including biologics) into interstate commerce 
the product’s developer must first receive a biologics license from the FDA.53  Under FDA 
regulations, the FDA may grant a biologics license pursuant to the submission of a biologics 
license application (BLA) showing that the biological product is sufficiently safe, effective and 
pure.54  Demonstrating compliance with the FDA’s safety, efficacy and purity standards 
normally requires having the biological product undergo extensive and lengthy R&D and 
regulatory approval processes.55  Naturally, these R&D and approval efforts impose significant 
financial burdens on BLA applicants and the price of putting a new biological product on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
is based on a permissible construction of the statute” then “the principle of deference to administrative 
interpretations [should be] followed.”). 
53 Under PHSA § 351(a)(1)(A), “[n]o person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any 
biological product unless . . . a biologics license is in effect for the biological product.”  Notably, the FDA has 
approved several biologics through regulatory pathways created by FFDCA, e.g. human insulin products such as 
Humulin® and Humalog®, human growth hormone products such as Humatrope®, Norditropin® and Saizen® and 
more.  See Vernon et al., supra note 4, at 59-60 (discussing approval of some biologics under the framework of 
FFDCA).  These biologics have mostly been well known, less structurally-complex compounds and, in some cases, 
are versions of already-approved biologics that have gone off-patent.  However, such cases are an exception to the 
general rule that biologics are subject to the approval processes set forth primarily in PHSA and it is likely that the 
formation of a regulatory pathway for the approval of generic biologics under BPCIA (see infra Part III.C) would 
marginalize them even further.  Thus, in analyzing implications of BPCIA, I will assume that future regulation of 
biologics is going to be done almost primarily, if not exclusively, under PHSA.    
54 See PHSA § 351(a)(2)(B)(i)(I); 21 C.F.R. § 600.2 et seq.  
55 See e.g. 21 C.F.R. §§ 601.2(a), 601.20, 601.25, 601.27 and 601.70.  For further discussion of the typical length of 




market is commonly estimated at around $1.24-1.32 billion on average for a typical product.56  
As a result, biologics are usually very expensive.57   
While the high prices of biologics may be justified, they also give rise to concerns of 
possible abuses of market position by manufacturers of original biologics.  Some commentators 
have argued that manufacturers of original biological products use the high entry barriers into the 
biologics’ market58—the result of the significant time, money and expertise necessary in order to 
put biologics on the market—to charge very high prices for their products well after they have 
recouped their development costs.59  One of the proposed solutions for this perceived market 
failure is the creation of a regulatory pathway for the approval of generic versions of biologics.60   
                                                 
56 See Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different? 28 
Manage. Decis. Econ. 469, 475 (2007) (estimating the cost of putting a typical biologic on the market, including 
taking under account success in obtaining regulatory marketing approval, at around $1.24-1.33 billion (2005 US$)) 
[hereinafter DiMasi & Grabowski]; Gitter, supra note 2, at 567, 589 (reviewing the significant investment required 
from biologics’ manufacturers as compared to small-molecule drugs); Katlikoff, supra note 5, at 8 (“bringing a new 
biologic medication to market is exceptionally expensive—an estimated $1.24 billion.”); Vernon et al., supra note 4, 
at 66-68 (discussing the high costs involved in the development and manufacturing of biologics).  Notably, these 
high development costs are at least partially attributable to the fact that only about one in three biological products 
that start clinical trials eventually receive FDA approval.  See BIO White Paper, supra note 2, at 4 (“it is estimated 
that less than a third of the biopharmaceuticals that enter clinical trials ever receive marketing approval”). 
57 The annual price of some biologics tends to be very high and some of them could even cost over $100,000, and in 
rare instances even over $300,000 a year.  See Kathleen R. Kelleher, FDA Approval of Generic Biologics: Finding a 
Regulatory Pathway, 14 Mich. Telecom. & Tech. L. Rev. 245, 252 (2007) (discussing the reasons for the relatively 
high prices of biologics); Kendra Marr, Biotech Campaigns for Easier Access to Generic Drug Market, Wash. Post, 
Aug. 13, 2008 at D01 (“[t]reatment [with biologics] can cost a patient more than $30,000 a year, prohibiting many 
from obtaining drugs”); FTC Report, supra note 5, at i (”annual treatment for breast cancer with . . . herceptin can 
cost $48,000 and the annual treatment for rheumatoid arthritis with Remicade can cost approximately $20,000”); 
Editorial, When a Drug Costs $300,000, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 2008 at WK8, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/opinion/23sun3.html (discussing the high annual cost of some biologics used 
for treating rare diseases); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 4 (listing the high costs of several prominent biologics).   
58 See Gitter, supra note 2, at 589-590 (recognizing the high entry barriers faced by generic manufacturers seeking to 
enter the biologics market); Sarah Sorscher, A Longer Monopoly for Biologics?: Considering the Implications of 
Data Exclusivity as a Tool for Innovation Policy, 23 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 285, 304 (2009) (discussing the high entry 
barriers into the generic biologics market, especially as compared to the entry barriers faced by manufacturers of 
generic small-molecule drugs).  
59 See Dinh, supra note 3, at 79 (“[b]esides the expenses of R&D and clinical trials, the high cost of biologics results 




B. Regulatory Pathways for the Approval of Generic Pharmaceuticals—
Background  
As demonstrated by the generic scheme created under the Hatch-Waxman Act, regulatory 
frameworks for the approval of generic pharmaceuticals are established on the premise that 
identical or highly similar compounds could be assumed to be equally or similarly safe and 
effective61 and therefore require relatively little, if any, additional clinical testing prior to 
approval.62  The sought-after result of such lowered testing requirements is that the development 
costs of later products would be lower and, as a result, so would their prices, thereby increasing 
their affordability and accessibility. In other words, regulatory frameworks for the approval of 
generic versions of pharmaceuticals seek to save the high development costs involved in putting 
a candidate compound through all the stages of drug development by simply ensuring its identity 
                                                                                                                                                             
delays the market entry of competing products.”); Kelleher, supra note 57, at 252-253 (arguing that biologics are 
unjustifiably expensive and that the lack of competition in biologics costs the U.S. economy billions of dollars 
annually). 
60 The institution of a regulatory pathway for the approval of generic versions of an already approved drug was the 
solution chosen for a similar problem in the context of small-molecule drugs.  See Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 6.  
The legislation of the Hatch-Waxman Act (and the creation of the generic pharmaceutical industry that followed) 
was the result of the growing awareness during the 1970s and early 1980s to a similar situation that existed with 
relation to small-molecule drugs.  For additional possible solutions to the market failure existing in the area of 
biologics see Sorscher, supra note 58, at 301-302 (reviewing additional mechanisms for addressing the problem of 
diminished competition in the biologics market such as cost-sharing and prize funding that could potentially 
facilitate access to proprietary biological products’ clinical data and manufacturing know-how). 
61 See Dawn Willow, The Regulation of Biologic Medicine: Innovators’ Rights and Access to Healthcare, 6 Chi.-
Kent. J. Intell. Prop. 32 (2006) (“[t]he principle underlying [a determination that two compounds have the same 
safety and efficacy profiles] is that the greater the degree of similarity or identity between the two [compounds], the 
greater the confidence that their clinical performance will be similar or the same.”); BIO White Paper, supra note 2, 
at 10 (“[b]eing identical to the innovator product allows FDA to rely on the innovator’s safety and effectiveness data 
in determining that the generic version of the product will be safe and effective.”).   
62 See FTC Report, supra note 5, at ii (“[d]uplication of safety and efficacy information is costly, an inefficient use 
of scarce resources, and, as the FDA has explained, raises ethical concerns associated with unnecessary human 
testing”); Woodcock Statement, supra note 1, at 6 (“[b]y establishing that the drug product described in the [generic 
application] is the same as the approved innovator drug product, the []applicant can rely on the Agency’s finding of 
safety and effectiveness for the approved drug.  Therapeutic equivalents can be expected to have the same clinical 




to or interchangeability with the original product.63  Such identity or interchangeability, in turn, 
is deduced based on comparison of the original product with the generic product.64   
However, regulatory pathways for the approval of pharmaceutical products also invite 
free-riding by generic manufacturers who do not participate in the substantial investment 
normally involved in the R&D of pharmaceutical products.65  Thus, it is necessary to ensure that 
developers of original pharmaceuticals are able to recoup their investment and reap profits 
sufficient to incentivize them to continue their R&D efforts.  Both the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
BPCIA rely (at least to some extent) on statutory exclusivities for this purpose.66  These 
                                                 
63 Notably, the ability to achieve such identity or comparability between the biological compounds in the original 
biologic and the ones in a later, generic version of the biologic, thereby allowing recognition of the generic version 
of the biologic as interchangeable with the original product, has been a point of significant scientific and legal 
disagreement.  For further discussion of the issue of biosimilarity and bioequivalence of biological compounds see 
Gitter, supra note 2, at 590-609 (arguing that current scientific knowledge enables making determinations regarding 
comparability of two biologics sufficient to justify an abbreviated regulatory pathway for the approval of protein-
based biological products and making the case for such regulation); 2008 CRS Report, supra note 1, at 7-9 and 22-
23 (describing the scientific and legal dispute regarding comparability of biological products); Woodcock Statement, 
supra note 1, at 1, 4 and 7-12 (stating that there is general recognition that the idea of “sameness” is not applicable 
to biologics in the same manner it is to small molecule drugs, addressing the FDA’s definitions for the terms 
“comparability,” “therapeutic equivalents” and “interchangeability” and reviewing the scientific challenges involved 
in comparing proteins and approving two biologics as substitutable/interchangeable); Liang, supra note 2, at 370-78, 
415-17 (reviewing the difficulties in replicating biological compounds and the resulting safety concerns arising in 
the context of generic biologics); Marr, supra note 57 (describing the debate surrounding the ability to achieve and 
show similarity in biologics); Dinh, supra note 3, at 90-94 and 114-15.  Notably, the enactment of BPCIA seems to 
accept the premise that there is, perceivably, a way to achieve and ascertain identity or similarity between two 
biological compounds.  
64 The comparison is of both the structures of the respective compounds and their physiological effects.  See Willow, 
supra note 61 (“[b]y establishing that the drug product described in the [generic application] is the bioequivalent of 
the innovator drug product approved [by the FDA], the [generic] applicant can rely on the FDA’s finding of safety 
and effectiveness previously determined for its counterpart brand drug.”).  Notably, the generic applicant does not 
and is not expected to acquire the actual clinical safety and efficacy data for the original product, which—while 
submitted to the FDA as part of the approval process of the original product—is considered proprietary, but rather 
“refers” the FDA to such data already in the FDA’s possession.  See discussion infra note 160 ¶2.    
65 See 2008 CRS Report, supra note 1, at 20-21 (demonstrating the differences in cost and risk between development 
of an original new pharmaceutical and a generic version thereof). 
66 See, respectively, supra Part II.B and infra Part III.C.  I will argue later in this article that the statutory 
exclusivities afforded to developers of original pharmaceuticals under the Hatch-Waxman Act are different from the 




exclusivities, despite differences in their length and scope, all essentially guarantee that for a 
certain amount of time the government will not allow potential competitors to enter the relevant 
market or take steps toward doing so.67   
C. The Framework for the Approval of Generic Biologics Under the Biologics 
Price Competition and Innovation Act  
With the increase in the prevalence of biologics,68 there have been increasing calls and 
proposals for the institution of a framework for the approval of generic versions of biologics.69  
                                                                                                                                                             
also in their purpose and in the extent of protection that they afford to the interests of developers of original 
pharmaceutical products.  See discussion infra Part III.C.  
67 It is common to refer to two main types of exclusivities in the context of regulatory frameworks for approval of 
generic pharmaceuticals products: (1) “market exclusivity” (also sometimes referred to as “approval exclusivity”): a 
period during which potential competitors are not allowed to enter the particular product’s market, which is typically 
enforced by a prohibition on the FDA to approve applications for comparable products for the duration of the 
exclusivity period.  (Notably, market exclusivity granted to a generic product is sometimes referred to as “generic 
exclusivity.”); and (2) “data exclusivity,” which is a period of time during which potential competitors may not rely 
on FDA findings of safety and efficacy of an earlier approved product necessary to support the generic application, 
which is typically enforced by a prohibition on submission of generic applications for the duration of the exclusivity 
period.  See Mossinghoff, supra note 26, at 189 (explaining that a period of exclusivity during which a generic 
version of a drug cannot be approved is generally referred to as “data exclusivity”); Gitter, supra note 2, n. 113 
(defining “market exclusivity” and “generic exclusivity”); Kotlikoff, supra note 5, at 3, 5 (explaining what data and 
market exclusivities are).  Notably, the terms “market exclusivity” and “data exclusivity” have been defined rather 
loosely in the literature and sometimes have different meanings.  See e.g. Gitter, supra note 2, n. 108 (referring to 
“data exclusivity” as the period during which the FDA cannot approve an ANDA for a generic drug).  The Hatch-
Waxman Act establishes three market exclusivity periods (five years for NCE, three years for approval of a known 
drug for a new indication and 180 days for approval of a generic version further to challenging the patents related to 
the original drug) and a data exclusivity period of four to five years.  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(5)(F)(ii)-(iv).  
68 See supra note 4.  
69 See supra note 3.  Some prominent proposals for the institution of a regulatory pathway for approval of generic 
versions of biologics include H.R. 1038, 110th Cong., Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act (introduced Feb. 14, 
2007) (‘ALSMA’); H.R. 1956, 110th Cong., Patient Protection and Innovation Biologic Medicines Act of 2007 
(introduced Apr. 19, 2007) (‘PPIBMA’); S. 1695, 110th Cong., Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 
2007 (introduced June 26, 2007) (‘BPCIA 2007’); H.R. 5629, 110th Cong., Pathway for Biosimilars Act (introduced 
March 13, 2008) (‘PFBA’); H.R. 1427, 111th Cong., Promoting Innovation and Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act 
(introduced March 11, 2009) (‘PIALSMA’); H.R. 3590, 111th Cong., Biologics Price Competition and Innovation 
Act of 2009 §§ 7001-7002 (introduced Sep. 17, 2009) (‘BPCIA’); (introduced Sep. 17, 2009) (‘PPACA’) (the 
Senate vehicle for healthcare reform legislation; passed Senate by a Yay-Nay vote 60-39 on December 24, 2009); 
H.R. 3962, 111th Cong., Affordable Health Care for America Act §§ 2575-2577 (introduced Oct. 29, 2009) 




As could be expected, some of these proposals were more favorable to generic manufacturers 
while others better represented the interests of developers of original biological products.70  Yet, 
almost all of the proposals mandated the institution of some statutory exclusivity periods in 
original biologics, and especially a market exclusivity period of 12-15 years.71   
The reoccurrence of a twelve-year period in many of the proposals has not been 
coincidental. Rather, it was the result of a perception that “the effective patent life for 
pharmaceuticals—the time remaining following FDA approval—is approximately eleven to 
twelve years.”72  Thus, an exclusivity period of about 12 years would presumably provide 
developers of original biologics with the assurance that the return on their investment would 
justify the time, money, and effort they expended in developing their products.73  Notably, this 
                                                 
70 E.g. ALSMA and PIALSMA were considered more “pro-generic” as they generally set more lenient 
comparability standards, shorter exclusivity periods for original products and better incentives for potential 
competitors to enter the market than “pro-innovators” bills such as PPIBMA and PBA, which set stringent 
comparability standards and long exclusivity periods for developers of original biological products.  See ALSMA, 
relevant sections to be added as PHSA §§ 351(k)(4) and (10); PPIBMA, relevant sections to be added as PHSA §§ 
351(k)(2)(D) and (3)-(6); PIALSMA, relevant sections to be added as PHSA §§ 351(k)(1)-(3), (5)(B) and (8)-(11); 
and PBA, relevant sections to be added as PHSA §§ 351(k)(2), (4), (6)-(7) and (9).  
71 Under PPIBMA, developers of original biologics would have received exclusivity periods of 12-15 years; under 
BPCIA 2007, BPCIA and AHCAA, 12-12.5 years; under PFBA and PBA, 12-14.5 years; and under PIALSMA, up 
to six years.  The exception was ALSMA that did not provide for exclusivity to developers of original biologics.  
The length of exclusivity periods to be afforded to original biologics also was the subject of a heated debate 
regarding the optimum period of delay of generic entry into the market.  See Gitter, supra note 2, 613-616 
(reviewing some of the proposals for exclusivity periods in original biological products).  While it is beyond the 
scope of this Article to assess what is the “optimum period” of monopoly in the context of biologics, notably, 
according to Machlup, “there will always be the possibility of very expensive developments that cannot be profitable 
even if a 30- or 50-year monopoly grant were promised.”  See Machlup, supra note 11, at 39.      
72 See FTC Report, supra note 5, at vi (“[t]he economic model put forth by pioneer drug manufacturers to justify [a 
12-14-year exclusivity period] is based on the average time required to recoup the investment to develop and 
commercialize a typical biologic drug”); Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 4 (“[t]he average market exclusivity 
period for small molecule drugs in the United States is approximately twelve years.”); Gitter, supra note 2, at 616.  
But see Brill, supra note 5; Kotlikoff, supra note 5.  
73 See Kelleher, supra note 57, at 256 (“[b]iologics cost more to produce than [small-molecule] drugs, and thus a 




need for assurance in the case of biologics reflects an underlying assumption that patents alone 
cannot provide sufficient protection to the interests of developers of biological products.74    
Eventually, after years of debate, on March 21, 2010, Congress enacted BPCIA as part of 
the Obama Administration’s healthcare reform75 and on March 23, 2010, President Obama 
signed the act into law.76  Originally introduced on September 17, 2009 as part of the Senate’s 
healthcare reform bill, BPCIA is the reintroduction of BPCIA 2007.77  BPCIA amends PHSA § 
351,78 the FFDCA and patent law creating a regulatory pathway for the licensing of biological 
products as “biosimilar to”79 and/or “interchangeable with”80 an already approved biological 
                                                                                                                                                             
development of biologics . . . some have suggested that a twelve-year market exclusivity for pioneer biologics would 
be optimal because traditional drugs generally have slightly under 12 years of market exclusivity due to patent 
protection”); Kelly & David, supra note 3, at 139-140 (“[a] 12 to 14 year period of innovator exclusivity is not 
arbitrary: studies have shown that the point at which an innovator biological drug becomes profitable (the ‘break-
even’ point) is between 12.9 and 16.2 years.”).  
74 See Kelleher, supra note 57, at 256 (reviewing the flaws of patent protection for biological products and arguing 
that “while traditional new [small-molecule] drugs are generally protected by patents, biologics may be less 
effectively protected by the patent system”).  As I will argue later in this Article, for these same reasons (as well as 
others) patent protection for the underlying inventions related to biological products should be foregone during the 
period of statutory exclusivity under BPCIA.  See infra Part IV.C.1. 
75 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 7001-7003 (2010).   
76 See Sheryl Gal Stolberg and Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a Flourish, N.Y. Times, 
March 23, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html.  Notably, as 
discussed earlier, less than one year later, in February 2011, the same administration seems to have backed out of its 
earlier endorsement of BPCIA’s twelve-year exclusivity period and is currently trying to limit this exclusivity period 
to seven years.  See supra note 7.   
77 BPCIA is almost identical to BPCIA 2007 introduced two years earlier by the late Senator Ted Kennedy and 
cosponsored by Senator Orrin Hatch and former Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton.  See Library of Congress website, 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/thomas (‘Thomas’).  
78 Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262.  
79 Under BPCIA, term ‘biosimilar’ or ‘biosimilarity’ means that “the biological product is highly similar to the 
reference product notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive components” and that “there are no 
clinically meaningful differences between the biological product and the [original] product in terms of the safety, 




product (“reference product”81).82  Once a biological product is deemed “interchangeable with” a 
reference product, under BPCIA it may be substituted for the reference product without the 
intervention of the health care provider who prescribed the reference product.83   
BPCIA sets a twelve-year market exclusivity period in original biologics84 and a four-
year data exclusivity period for the data submitted in support of the application for the original 
biologic.85  BPCIA also provides for a possible extension of the twelve-year market exclusivity 
                                                                                                                                                             
80 Under BPCIA, the term ‘interchangeable’ or ‘interchangeability’ means that “the biological product may be 
substituted for the reference product without the intervention of the health care provider who prescribed the 
reference product.”  See BPCIA § 7002(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3)).  
81 Under BPCIA, the term ‘reference product’ means the single biological product licensed under PHSA § 351(a) 
(see supra Part III.A) against which a generic biological product is evaluated in an application submitted under 
BPCIA.  See BPCIA § 7002(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(4)). 
82  BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262).  BPCIA sets up numerous elaborate conditions and requirements 
for the establishment of biosimilarity to and/or interchangeability with a reference product.  See id. (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 262(k)(2)-(4)). 
83 See supra note 80.  A determination of interchangeability is the essence of generic legislation and the prize sought 
after by generic applicants.  Once made, the interchangeability determination facilitates the “interjection” of the 
generic biological product into the existing market for the original product and enables it to benefit from the 
reference product’s client base.  
84 BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A)).  
85 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B)).  Under BPCIA, during this period, generic applicants may not submit 
applications for the approval of their versions of biologics biosimilar to original biological products.  For further 
discussion of data exclusivity, see supra note 67.   
This interpretation of the BPCIA sections relating to the exclusivities grant has been contested and argued 
to be mistaken by a group of members of the House of Representatives who are identified as proponents in Congress 
of the brand-name pharmaceutical companies.  See Letter from Reps. Anna Eshoo, Jay Inslee and Joe Barton to the 
Food and Drug Administration dated Dec. 21, 2010 (“Eshoo letter”).  The stance advanced in the Eshoo letter is that 
BPCIA “does not provide ‘market exclusivity’ for innovator products.  Rather, it provides data exclusivity for 12 
years from the date of FDA approval.”  Id.  The Eshoo letter does not directly explain what the difference between 
the 12 and 4 year exclusivities established under BPCIA is but indirectly comments that “[BPCIA] does not prohibit 
or prevent another manufacturer from developing its own data to justify FDA approval of a similar of [sic] 
competitive product.”  Id.  The positions taken in the Eshoo letter have been criticized as opposed to good public 
policy as well as to the simple language of BPCIA.  See e.g. Letter from Senators Sherrod Brown, John McCain, 
Charles Schumer and Tom Harkin to Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Commissioner of the FDA, dated January 24, 2011.  
Notably, as a post-enactment statement, the FDA is not obliged to give the positions expressed in the Eshoo letter 
substantial weight in its construction of the statutory language of BPCIA.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 




and four-year data exclusivity by an additional six-month period for having the biological 
product tested and approved for use in pediatric populations.86  Thus, BPCIA creates market 
exclusivity periods in original biological products of up to 12.5 years and data exclusivity 
periods of up to 4.5 years.87  Importantly, the statutory exclusivities established under BPCIA do 
not guarantee exclusivity to an original developer of a biological product where another, 
different (later) developer may seek approval for its own version of the same biological 
compound for the same medical condition by conducting its own clinical trials; independently 
taking its product through the FDA approval processes irrespective of and without seeking to 
rely on the approval of the earlier “original” biological product.88  
In addition, BPCIA establishes market exclusivity periods of 12-42 months for a 
manufacturer of a first biological product approved as interchangeable with the reference 
product.89   
                                                                                                                                                             
inherently entitled to little weight”).  Moreover, even if one is to ignore the non-conformity between the construction 
suggested in the Eshoo letter and the language of BPCIA itself, the Eshoo letter’s statutory construction fails to 
explain the difference between the 12 and 4 year statutory exclusivities.  In other words, if the twelve-year statutory 
exclusivity is in fact data exclusivity, it appears to render the four-year statutory exclusivity established by the 
following subsection of BPCIA redundant.  Accordingly, for at least this reason it is unlikely that the FDA would 
adopt the statutory exclusivity proposed in the Eshoo letter.  
86 BPCIA § 7002(g) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(m)).  
87 Notably, the passage of BPCIA with its 12-12.5-year market exclusivity and 4-4.5-year data exclusivity periods is 
at odds with the Obama Administration’s outspoken opposition to such exclusivity periods, which it perceived as too 
long.  See Letter from Nancy-Ann DeParle, Director, Office of Health Reform and Peter Orszag, Director, Office of 
Management and Budget to Representative Henry A. Waxman (June 24, 2009), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090625/biologicsresponse.pdf (expressing the Obama 
Administration’s position that an exclusivity period for original biological products of seven years “strikes the 
appropriate balance between innovation and competition”).  
88 This scenario may come to be where the market for the biological product is large enough to financially justify 
taking the product through another, separate regulatory approval by the FDA rather than wait for the lapse of the 
applicable BPCIA statutory exclusivity periods.  
89 BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6)).  The determination of a market exclusivity period that 




Importantly, while the underlying rationales for market exclusivity under BPCIA and the 
5-year NCE statutory exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman Act (on which the BPCIA market 
exclusivity is modeled) are similar, their function/“mechanism of action” is different.  In both 
cases, the intention was to provide developers of pharmaceutical products with sufficient 
incentives to invest in R&D.90  However, while the 5-year NCE statutory exclusivity was meant 
to work its effect where no incentives existed from a patent perspective (e.g. where the drug 
product contains a well known active compound that is not patentable),91 the 12-12.5-year 
market exclusivity under BPCIA appears to have been devised as a “fallback” option to patents, 
namely, as “insurance” in case they fail.92 
BPCIA also creates an intricate dispute resolution scheme for patent disputes arising in 
relation to the submission of applications for approval of biological products as biosimilar to or 
                                                                                                                                                             
lawsuit was filed subsequent to the filing of the generic application for the approval of the biological product at bar 
and its outcome and the marketing status of such product.  Id. 
90 For the idea behind the NCE exclusivity established under the Hatch-Waxman Act, see Allan M. Fox and Alan R. 
Bennett, The Legislative History of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 at 60 
(1987) (“[t]he original Waxman Committee version . . . would have allowed granting four years of market 
exclusivity only to new chemical entities that for technical or scientific reasons are unpatentable”) and Remarks of 
Rep. Waxman, House Floor Debate, Cong. Rec. of Sep. 6, 1984, at H9113-H9114 (“the amendment provides a 5-
year period of exclusive market life for drugs approved for the first time after enactment of the legislation. This 
provision will give the drug industry the incentives needed to develop new chemical entities whose therapeutic 
usefulness is discovered late when little or no patent life remains.”).  For the idea behind the market exclusivity 
established under BPCIA see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
91 See id. Fox and Bennett. 
92 Notably, proponents of long market exclusivity periods in biological products have described such exclusivity as 
an “insurance policy” in case patents would fail.  See infra note 144 and accompanying text.  In other words, rather 
than provide protection in addition to patents or in case patents cannot be obtained, market exclusivity under BPCIA 
is meant to provide an “iron-clad, litigation-proof” protection of the interests of developers of biological products in 
case their patents fall short.  
An interesting question, which exceeds the scope of this article, is whether statutory exclusivities could be 





interchangeable with a reference product.93  Under BPCIA, within twenty days after acceptance 
of an application for a generic biologic by the FDA, the generic applicant is required to provide 
legal representatives of the reference product sponsor and other potential adversaries, under a 
duty of confidentiality, a copy of the application and additional information regarding the 
process used to manufacture the biological product.94  Within sixty days after receipt of the 
information from the generic applicant, the reference product sponsor is required to (1) provide 
the generic applicant with a list of all patents for which the reference product sponsor believes a 
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted against the generic applicant if it 
engaged in the making, using, offering to sell, selling or importation of the generic biological 
product, and (2) identify which of these patents it would be prepared to license to the generic 
applicant.95  BPCIA then stipulates that within sixty days of receipt of the reference product 
sponsor’s patent list, the generic applicant may (but does not have to) provide its own “counter-
list” of patents with respect to which it believes a claim of patent infringement could reasonably 
be asserted by the reference product sponsor.96  For each patent on the reference product 
sponsor’s list and the generic applicant’s counter-list, the generic applicant is required to provide 
either a “a detailed statement that describes, on a claim-by-claim basis, the factual and legal basis 
of the opinion of the [generic] applicant that such patent is invalid, unenforceable, or will not be 
infringed by the commercial marketing of the biological product” or a statement that it does not 
                                                 
93 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)). 
94 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(1)-(2)). 
95 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(A)).  Notably, BPCIA stipulates that a reference product sponsor would be 
unable to sue for infringement of patents which it did not include on its list.  Id. (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(6)). 




intend to begin commercial marketing before the date of patent expiry.97  Within sixty days of 
receipt of the generic applicant’s detailed statement, the reference product sponsor is required, in 
turn, to provide a “counter-detailed statement” explaining, for each patent claim addressed in the 
generic applicant’s detailed statement, “the factual and legal basis of the opinion of the reference 
product sponsor that such patent will be infringed by the commercial marketing of the biological 
product” as well as a response to the generic applicant’s statements of invalidity and 
unenforceability.98  Upon completion of the above exchanges of information and legal positions, 
BPCIA mandates that the parties must enter pre-litigation negotiations in order to decide, within 
fifteen days, which patents, if any, will be the subject of an infringement action.99   
 Further, BPCIA addresses different litigation scenarios.  First, BPCIA stipulates that 
within thirty days of the exchange of patent lists between the reference product sponsor and 
generic applicant or of the date of reaching an agreement on patents that would be the subject of 
an infringement action, the reference product sponsor is required to bring a patent infringement 
action with respect to the patents under dispute.100  Second, at least 180 days prior to a first 
commercial marketing of a generic biological product, BPCIA requires the generic applicant 
about to launch the product to provide notice of the planned launch to the reference product 
sponsor, which may then seek to enjoin the generic applicant from moving ahead with the 
                                                 
97 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(B)). 
98 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(C)). 
99 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4)-(5) and (7)).  If the parties fail to reach an agreement, BPCIA sets up an 
elaborate mechanism to decide on the number and identity of such patents that would be the subject of such an 
infringement action.  See id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(5)). 
100 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(6)).  Notably, under BPCIA, if the reference product sponsor fails to assert 
certain patents after that timeframe, then a reasonable royalty is the sole and exclusive remedy that a court may grant 




launch.101  Under BPCIA, such an injunction would hold until a court decision on pending issues 
of patent validity, infringement and enforceability arising with relation to patents included on 
any patent list previously exchanged by the parties under BPCIA.102  And third, BPCIA 
addresses declaratory judgment actions and mandates that if the generic applicant sent the 
reference product sponsor a copy of the generic product application as required, then declaratory 
judgment actions would be available to the parties only once the 180-day notice of commercial 
marketing is provided to the reference product sponsor.103  However, the reference product 
sponsor may bring such actions even earlier if the generic applicant fails to comply with other 
requirements set by BPCIA.104   
 The next part of this article will compare the current legal regimes under patent law and 
BPCIA as they pertain to biological products and examine the question of whether there is 
actually a need and justification for both types of protection in the context of biologics.   
IV. Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Products—Timeline, Public Policy 
and the Interests of Biologic License Holders 
A. Patent vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biologics: A Timeline 
The R&D and approval of biologics, from the first synthesizing of the biologic or a 
closely related compound through the approval of the BLA by the FDA,105 is a long process 
                                                 
101 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)). 
102 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(B)). 
103 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)). 
104 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(B)-(C)).   
105 Notably, one may also view the development of drugs and biologics as an ongoing process that includes further 




which typically spans over a period of over a decade.106  Although all development projects are 
different, a rough estimate of a typical timeline for the development of a biological product 
consists of about 4-5 years of preclinical studies,107 6-9 years dedicated to clinical trials prior to 
the submission of a BLA108 and another 12-16 months for the FDA to process and decide on the 
BLA.109  In sum, the development of a biological product typically takes 11-15.5 years.110  
                                                                                                                                                             
(defining phase IV clinical studies as “[p]ost-marketing studies to delineate additional information including the 
drug's risks, benefits, and optimal use.”). 
106 Grabowski 2008, supra note 5, at 481 (illustrating the length of the development process of biologics with the 
example of the anti-cancer biologic Avastin, whose active compound, bevacizumab, took about 15 years to develop 
and have approved by the FDA); Vernon et al., supra note 4, at 68 (“[b]ringing a single new product to market 
requires huge sums of investor capital and often takes well over a decade).  See also infra Part IV.B (discussing my 
finding that the average number of days between the filing of the first patent application pertaining to a biological 
product, which is indicative of R&D activities, and FDA approval of the product as pertaining to the seventy-nine 
biological products listed in Appendix A is 3728 days, i.e. about 10.2 years).  
107 See Dennis S. Fernandez et al., The Interface of Patents with the Regulatory Drug Approval Process and How 
Resulting Interplay Can Affect Market Entry, in ipHandbook of Best Practices 965, 966 (Krattiger et al. eds., 2007) 
(“[p]reclinical studies take an average of five years”); Grabowski 2008, supra note 5, at 486 (stating that preclinical 
R&D requires 4-5 years to produce several lead candidates); DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 56, at 475, Table 3 
(estimating that the time spent on preclinical studies of candidate biological products is about 52 months).  
“Preclinical studies” are the earliest phase in drug development beginning right after the identification of a 
candidate-compound and concluding with the filing of an investigational new drug application (IND) with the FDA.  
This step normally includes in-vitro and animal testing of the tested compound, pharmacodynamic studies and more.  
See Fernandez et al. at 966 (describing the discovery phase and preclinical studies of new drugs).  Once an IND is 
submitted, unless the FDA places a hold on the IND, the applicant may begin clinical trials after thirty days.  See 21 
C.F.R. §§ 312.40(b)(1), 312.42.  About 85% of all drugs for which an IND is filed are eventually approved for 
testing in clinical trials.  See Fernandez et al. at 966.  
108 The clinical trials stage of development is typically divided into three phases preceding the submission of a BLA.  
Phase I involves testing the candidate compound on humans for the first time for safety, determination of a dosage 
range and identification of potential side effects and includes about 20-80 healthy individuals; Phase II involves 
testing the drug/biologic on about 100-300 volunteers having the condition that the drug/biologic is meant to treat to 
determine if it is effective and to further evaluate its safety; Phase III for different drugs/biologics varies greatly but 
normally involves 1000-3000 patients and is meant to confirm the drug/biologic’s effectiveness, monitor side 
effects, compare the drug to commonly used treatments, and collect information that will allow the drug/biologic to 
be used safely.  See National Institutes of Health, Understanding Clinical Trials, 
http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/info/understand#Q18; telephone interview with FDA, CBER representative, Feb. 23, 
2010 (on file with author) [hereinafter CBER interview]; 21 C.F.R. § 312.21.  Notably, estimates of the length of the 
different phases of clinical trials vary among different commentators.  According to Fernandez et al. Phase I could 
take, on average, from 1-3 years, Phase II: 2 years and Phase III: 3-4 years.  See id. Fernandez et al. at 966.  
According to an unofficial estimate by a CBER staff-member, Phase I takes about one year on average, Phase II 
about two and Phase III, while varying greatly and depending on the amount to testing done by the applicant, 




Based on the abovementioned timeframes and in view of the fact that statutory 
exclusivities in biologics only “kick in” upon FDA approval, BPCIA dictates that (1) 
manufacturers of generic versions of biologics would only be able to file applications for generic 
versions of biologics after 15-20 years from the inception of development of the original 
biological product,111 and (2) the FDA may only approve such applications after 23-28 years 
from the inception of development of the original biologic.112   
Viewing the abovementioned timeframes from a patent perspective, it is important to 
acknowledge several additional milestones.  First, biologics may be and often are the subject of 
numerous patents that typically cover (1) specific biological compounds, namely the purified 
active biological compounds themselves (most frequently, proteins), their precursors, possible 
metabolites and other derivatives,113 (2) processes of making these compounds,114 (3) 
                                                                                                                                                             
trials take an average of about 6.8 years.  See DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 56, at 473, Figure 2 (estimating the 
time spent on clinical development of biologics at about 82 months). 
109 See id. CBER interview; DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 56, at 473, Figure 2 (estimating the time spent on 
approval of biologics at about 16 months). 
110 This calculation is based on adding the estimated 4-5 years of preclinical studies, 6-9 years of clinical trials and 
1-1.33 years it takes the FDA to approve BLAs and then rounding the result (11-15.33 years) to the closest half-year 
increment.  
111 This calculation is based on adding the estimated 11-15.5 years it takes to put a typical biologic on the market to 
the 4-4.5 years of data exclusivity under BPCIA.  
112 This calculation is based on adding the estimated 11-15.5 years it takes to put a biologic on the market to the 12-
12.5 years of market exclusivity under BPCIA.  
113 See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95 (103((C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (holding that the purified form of adrenalin—a compound existing in 
the human body—was patentable because the purification process transformed it into drug and therefore into “a new 
thing commercially and therapeutically”); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(holding that naturally occurring DNA sequences constitute patentable subject matter when “purified and isolated” 
as compared to their natural form); but see Association for Molecular Pathology, et al. v. United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, et al., 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  




formulations containing the compounds,115 and (4) methods of using the biological compound in 
the treatment of illnesses.116  Since the natural course of development of most biologics first 
involves the identification, making and isolation of a biologic having therapeutic properties (not 
necessarily in that order), the first patent applications commonly seek to claim the biological 
API, closely related compounds and methods of making them and are filed very early in the 
development process,117 typically between the time immediately pursuant to the identification of 
the biological API and right before the beginning of clinical trials in human subjects.118  In other 
words, if the beginning of the R&D efforts is marked as the “0” time-point and clinical trials 
normally begin after 4-5 years of preclinical studies, then the filing of the first patent application 
pertaining to the biological product would normally occur between “development years” 1 and 4-
                                                 
115 See Gitter id.  Formulations are the compositions of the final product, namely the active pharmaceutical 
ingredient (“API”) and different pharmaceutically inactive ingredients (also known as “excipients”) having certain 
functions in the composition, e.g., stabilization, dissolution, adjustment of pH, filling, etc. 
116 See Gitter id.   
117 Cf. Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F. 3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (essentially abolishing 
method claims directed to mechanisms of action per se, namely as standalone claims independent from sufficient 
disclosure of compounds that are used to achieve the desired action as part of the 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 written 
description requirement).  
118 See In Re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567-1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that an antitumor compound does not 
necessarily have to be tested in-vivo to fulfill the utility requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and that in-vitro tests 
using cell-line models may be sufficient; stating that “[t]he stage at which an invention in [the field of biologics] 
becomes useful is well before it is ready to be administered to humans”); In re '318 Patent Infringement Litigation, 
583 F.3d 1317, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“results from animal tests or in vitro experiments may be sufficient to satisfy 
the utility requirement”).  Notably, this estimated timeframe is confirmed by my findings that the average time 
period between the filing of the first patent applications pertaining to biological products and their approval by the 
FDA is about 3728 days, or 10.2 years.  See supra note 106.  Deducting the estimated 6-9 years of clinical trials and 
1-1.33 years of processing of BLAs it appears that the timeframe of filing of the first patent applications covering 
biological products is about 0-3 years prior to the beginning of clinical trials. 
A possible explanation to this patent filing strategy is that once a compound enters the stage of human trials 
it is exceedingly difficult to keep it as a trade secret and the early filing is meant to preserve the developer’s 
prospects of monopoly in any product that may result from its R&D efforts.  Another explanation is that early filing 
of patent applications mitigates pressure from in-house scientists to be allowed to publish their scientifically 




5 (depending on the length of the preclinical trials stage).119  Patents generally expire 20 years 
from the filing date of the original application.120  Thus, as a general proposition, the primary 
patents121 pertaining to biological products would be set to expire between “development years” 
21-25,122 whereas the market exclusivity period pertaining to the products covered by these 
patents would expire around “development years” 23-28.  
However, when comparing the term of statutory exclusivities to the term of primary 
patents, it is necessary to take into account patent term extensions that one primary patent per 
FDA-approved product may receive under 35 U.S.C. § 156.123  If we make the most patent-term-
favorable assumptions that virtually all first primary patents (i.e. the first primary patent to issue 
                                                 
119 Notably, the first patent application is not necessarily the first submission to the USPTO, which is frequently of a 
provisional application containing little more than preliminary data and a rudimentary concept of the invention and 
whose purpose is merely to “buy” the inventors another year for further development of their invention.  See 35 
U.S.C. §§ 111(b), 119(e).  For further discussion of provisional applications see USPTO, Provisional Application for 
Patent, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/types/provapp.jsp.  
120 See 35 U.S.C § 154.  This expiration date may be adjusted to compensate for delays in the processing of the 
application by the USPTO, a filing of a terminal disclaimer with respect to the issued patent and time lost during the 
examination and approval of the BLA by the FDA.  See infra Part IV.B.  
121 For purposes of the discussion herein, a “primary patent” is defined as a patent issued from one of the first patent 
applications to be filed early in the R&D of the biological product and covering, typically, the biological API itself, 
its manufacturing and/or the first known methods of using it.  
122 This calculation is based on adding the estimated 1-4 years from the onset of development—which is the period 
during which one could assume most early patents pertaining to a biological product would be filed—to the 20 year 
patent term.    
123 Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 156(a)(4), 156(c), 156(f)(2)(A), 156(g)(1), 156(g)(6), 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) and 42 U.S.C. § 
262(j), the term of patents pertinent to biological products “shall be extended by the time equal to the regulatory 
review period for the approved product” up to a total period of 14 years from the date of approval of the biological 
product but not exceeding 5 years, whereas the “regulatory review period” is calculated as half the time in which the 
product was in clinical trials, plus the period it took the FDA to review and approve the BLA.  See id.; see also 
Mossinghoff, supra note 26, at 190 (reciting and explaining the abovementioned patent term extension provisions 
and stating that “[t]he patent term restoration part . . . in title 35 of the United States Code . . . [consists of] very 
long, very complicated provisions . . . The length of the exclusivity periods are strictly arbitrary legislative numbers 




for any given biological product) would merit an extension of 4-5 years,124 then it is possible to 
argue that for any biological product there would be one patent whose term would be extended 
1.5-2 years beyond the expiration of the 12-12.5-year market exclusivity period.125  Thus, while 
generally the first patents covering biological products would expire within 21-25 years from the 
onset of development, under the above patent-term-favorable assumptions, one of the primary 
patents would expire within about 25-30 years from that date.126  However, in reality not all 
primary patents are entitled to a patent term extension, as in some instances the term of primary 
patents already extends beyond 14 years from the date of FDA-approval.  Thus, as I will argue in 
the next section, even with patent term extension, primary patents are expected to expire, on 
average, around 5-11 months subsequent to the expiration of the 12-12.5-year market exclusivity 
period under BPCIA.127 
 
 
                                                 
124 Given the length of clinical trials of biologics and the average 12-16 months needed for FDA review of BLAs, it 
is prudent to assume that the majority of biological products would merit the maximum patent term extension of half 
the clinical trials’ period plus the time needed for FDA review of the application up to a maximum of 5 years.  
Basing the calculation on the estimated times brought herein, the term extension could be roughly estimated as equal 
to ½ of 6-9 years plus 1-1.33 years, namely 4-5.83 years.  Given the upper limit of 5 years, a typical patent term 
extension period would be 4-5 years.   
125 Since under 35 U.S.C. § 156 patent term extension cannot extend the patent term beyond 14 years from the date 
of FDA approval of the product and the statutory market exclusivity under BPCIA extends for 12-12.5 years from 
that date, then, arguably, no patent term could be extended more than 2 years beyond the expiration of a twelve-year 
market exclusivity or 1.5 years beyond the expiration of a 12.5-year market exclusivity.  
126 This calculation is based on adding the estimated 4-5 years of patent term extension to the 21-25 years patent 
term from the inception of development.  The calculation would be slightly different if we were to add 2 or 1.5 years 
to the statutory exclusivity period of 23 to 28 years, resulting in a similar patent term extending 25-29.5 years from 
the beginning of development.  




B. Patent term vs. Market Exclusivity for Biologics—A Case Study 
In order to test the validity of the above timeframe estimates and compare the term of 
patents pertaining to biological products with the term of market exclusivity that such products 
would receive under BPCIA, I calculated (1) the term of the first-to-issue primary patents128 
pertaining to seventy-nine already-approved biological products listed in Table 1129 and (2) the 
hypothetical dates in which the market exclusivity in these products would have expired had 
these products been subject to BPCIA.130  Based on these dates, for each of the first-to-issue 
primary patents identified I calculated the time from expiration of the patent to the end of the 
twelve-year market exclusivity in the product and then, based on the results received, the average 
time for the seventy-nine products between the end of the twelve-year market exclusivity and the 
expiration of the primary patent.131  According to these calculations, the average time difference 
between the end of the twelve-year market exclusivity in a biological product and the expiration 
                                                 
128 See Table 1 included as Appendix A, note 248 and accompanying text.  The patent term calculation was based on 
the various sections of patent law and includes any patent term extensions awarded to patents under the Hatch-
Waxman Act as listed in the USPTO Listing of Patent Term Extensions under 35 U.S.C. 156, 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/terms/156.jsp and any patent term adjustments as reflected on the face of the 
patents and in the patent information available through the USPTO Patent Application Information Retrieval System 
(PAIR), http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair.  
129 The list consists of seventy-nine biological products for which primary patents could be identified, including 
sixteen out of the twenty-four best selling biological products in 2008 and excluding insulin and human growth 
hormone (hGH) products, for which generic (or “follow-on”) versions have already been approved by the FDA.  See 
LaMerie Business Intelligence, Top 20 Biologics 2008, R&D Pipeline News—Special Edition 1/2009, Mar. 9, 2009 
at 3-6 (including Enbrel, Remicade, Epogen, Rituxan, Avastin, Herceptin, Aranesp, Neulasta, Lantus, Avonex, 
Lucentis, Erbitux, Betaseron, Neupogen, Cerezyme, Synagis).  Notably, the above selection criteria for the analyzed 
sample of seventy-nine biological products might, admittedly, reflect selection biases.  At the same time, it is 
difficult to determine what would be considered a “representative sample” of biological products for the purpose of 
calculating the average length of primary patent life covering such products.  
130 See Appendix A, note 249 and accompanying text.  
131 See Appendix A, note 251 and accompanying text.  Notably, for purposes of the calculations herein, I refrained 
from making any assumptions regarding the potential addition of ½ year of market exclusivity for experimentation 




of the first-issued primary patent is about 327 days.132  In other words, the average term of the 
first identified primary patents pertaining to the seventy-nine biological products listed in Table 
1 extends about 11 months beyond the end of the twelve-year market exclusivity period in these 
products.  Furthermore, if we add the extension of 6 months to the market exclusivity period 
(making it 12.5 years) for having a product tested and approved for pediatric use,133 the average 
term of the first identified primary patents pertaining to the seventy-nine biological products 
listed in Table 1 would extend about five months beyond the end of the market exclusivity period 
in these products.  
In conclusion, patents in the family of the original application134 could be expected to 
expire roughly within 21-25 years from the onset of the development of the biological product135 
with one more patent expected to expire, on average, around 5-11 months after the period of 
market exclusivity under BPCIA.  Thus, arguably, based on the above calculations, the market 
exclusivity period under BPCIA would keep competition out of biologic markets, on average, for 
5-11 months less than the average monopoly period afforded by primary patents on inventions 
                                                 
132 The calculation of the average number of days between FDA approval and the expiration of the first-to-issue 
primary patent listed for each of the seventy-nine products is done as explained in note 251, adding the number of 
days for all seventy-nine products and then dividing by seventy-nine.  
133 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.   
134 A “patent family” includes all divisional, continuation and continuation-in-part applications (and issued patents 
thereof) stemming from a certain earlier parent application.  See USPTO, Manual of Patent Examination and 
Procedure §§ 201.04-201.08.   




pertaining to the biological product.136  These conclusions may be illustrated graphically as 
follows:  
 
These conclusions invite the question: what is the justification (if any) for this mostly 
overlapping protection of biological products under both BPCIA and patent law137 and what 
implications might there be to this “double-tiered” protection?   
 
                                                 
136 These conclusions are in accord with the rationale behind the twelve-year market exclusivity period for new 
biological products under BPCIA, namely, ensuring that original product developers would be able to monopolize 
their products for a period at least as long as that which their patents would have afforded them.  See supra notes 72-
74 and accompanying text.  Importantly, these conclusions are only valid with respect to primary patents covering 
the “first wave of inventions” rather than to patents covering inventions resulting from continuing research.  
137 Disagreements regarding the length of patent protection are not uncommon, given the complexity of patent law 
and the dependence of such calculation on numerous factors (e.g., timing of filing of patent applications, the 
ramifications of various different types of extensions, the prosecution of the patents, etc.)  However, even slight 
changes in the term of this patent or another do not change the fact that the effective result of BPCIA is the 




C. Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities for Biological Products: A Public Policy 
Perspective 
Comparing the rationales for granting statutory exclusivities with the patent theories 
discussed earlier, it appears that the reasoning behind both types of monopoly is quite similar if 
not identical, especially in the context of biologics.  In a nutshell, the incentive-to-disclose and 
incentive-to-invent/invest patent theories emphasize patents’ functional role of incentivizing the 
disclosure of existing inventions and the pursuit of further R&D activities leading to more 
inventions.138  Taking a closer look at the rationales for granting statutory exclusivities reveals a 
highly similar picture.  The purpose of statutory exclusivities in the context of pharmaceuticals is 
to provide assurance that developers of original biologics are able to reap the fruits of their 
investment, thereby ensuring the existence of sufficient incentive-to-invent/invest.139  Thus, 
arguably, both patent and statutory exclusivities regimes (1) recognize developers’ right to 
benefit from the fruit of their labor by creating means to exclude others from using the biologics 
they developed;140 (2) enable only the developers to reap profits from the biological products for 
a certain period of time; and (3) encourage and require developers of biologics to disclose to the 
public the products they develop and their uses as a pre-requisite to the developers’ ability to 
                                                 
138 See supra Part II.A.  
139 See Kelleher, supra note 57, at 255 (“[the New Chemical Entity five year market exclusivity provision of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act] was meant to alleviate concerns that a generic pathway would prohibit innovators from 
realizing the benefits of their investments”); Wing Yan Tam, supra note 46, at 553 (“[t]he policy behind marketing 
exclusivities is to incentivize pharmaceutical research entities to engage in ambitious, cutting-edge research for the 
development of new drugs and to develop greater understanding about existing drugs.”); see also Grabowski 2009, 
supra note 5, at 2 (recognizing that both patents and statutory exclusivities “address the need for innovators to have 
some period of returns before imitators can enter the market with an abbreviated filing”).  
140 In the case of patents, these means to exclude take the form of letters of patent enforceable by courts while in the 
case of statutory exclusivities they entail direct exclusion of potential competitors from the market for the particular 




receive exclusivity in their products.141  Accordingly, at least from a functional perspective, in 
the context of biologics, both patents and statutory exclusivities seek to achieve the same 
purpose and incentivize essentially the same behavior by inventors, investors and developers.   
Accordingly, the goal of technological advancement in the area of biological products 
could be served by affording any kind of effective exclusivity guaranteeing sufficient profits to 
investors in R&D regardless of whether the product of such R&D would eventually fit in the 
strict mold of a “patentable invention” under patent law.142  
1. Why Patents May Not Provide Sufficient Protection to the Interests of 
Developers of Biological Products (and Therefore Would Fall Short as 
Means of Incentivizing the Developments of Biological Products) 
The similarity of purpose and effect of statutory exclusivities and patent protection begs 
the question: why, if at all, is there a need for statutory exclusivities in addition to patents?  The 
justification that is most frequently offered for making statutory exclusivities in biological 
products available in addition to patents is the insufficiency of patents alone for protecting 
                                                 
141 In the context of patents, disclosure takes place as part of patents’ specifications.  In the context of statutory 
exclusivities, disclosure occurs in the submission of some publicly available information as part of the BLA.  Thus, 
the incentive-to-disclose rationale is inherent to the context of biologics for the reason that it is impossible to 
commercialize a biologic without prior approval by the FDA, which can only be granted subsequent to the 
submission of information regarding the product, including such publicly available information about the nature of 
the product and its intended medical uses.  In other words, the incentive to disclose information to the public about 
biologics exists regardless of any additional exclusivity that may or may not be granted to the products’ developers 
under patent law.  Interesting questions remain, however, as to the extent of disclosure incentivized by patent and 
statutory exclusivities regimes with respect to manufacturing “know-how” and actual clinical data.  For further 
discussion of these issues see infra Part IV.C.2(b) and note 160 ¶2 and accompanying text. 
142 As early as the 1950s, Machlup already recognized that it is “monopoly grant” in general, rather than patent 
monopoly in particular, that is necessary to incentivize the risks taken by financiers of industrial application of 
certain technology.  See Machlup, supra note 11, at 36-37 (“[t]he risks involved [in investment in technological 
R&D] may be too great to be undertaken except under the shelter of a monopoly grant”).  According to this logic, 




proprietary interests in biological products.143  Viewed in this light, in the context of biologics 
statutory exclusivities are sometimes referred to as “insurance policies” meant to protect the 
interests of developers of biological products where patents might fail in doing so.144  There are 
several reasons for the insufficiency of patents as means of protecting the interests of developers 
of biological products and for why they would prefer a statutory exclusivities’ regime such as 
that which has been established by BPCIA.    
(a) Acquiring Patents and Enforcing them Cost a Lot, Yet Patents 
Provide a Limited Degree of Legal Protection to Biologics 
The patent system suffers from inherent shortcomings that make the investment in 
obtaining and enforcing patents a risky and highly uncertain prospect.  The securing and 
enforcement of patent rights involve a long and tedious via dolorosa of intricate (and expensive) 
proceedings.  They require compliance with complicated legal criteria such as “novelty,” 
“usefulness” and “non-obviousness” as well as a plethora of procedural and technical 
requirements stemming from centuries of litigation and patent prosecution.145  This complexity, 
                                                 
143 See infra Parts IV.C.1(a)-IV.C.1(d).  Representatives of original biologics developers have made forceful 
assertions regarding the need for both statutory exclusivities and patent protection in biological products.  See e.g. 
BIO White Paper, supra note 2, at 22 and 37 (arguing that “[a]s was the case in the Hatch-Waxman Act, it will be 
important to consider patent exclusivity, along with market exclusivity provided through the regulatory approval 
mechanism, as an integral part of the follow-on biologic approval framework” and that “any statutory pathway for 
the approval of follow-on biologics must contain an appropriate mix of patent-based and market/data-based 
exclusivity to ensure effective market protection to incentivize investment and innovation”).   
144 According to Grabowski and DiMasi, the purpose of statutory exclusivities is to provide investors “with an 
‘insurance policy’ against the potential failings of patent protection for biologics.”  See Grabowski et al., supra note 
5, at 4; Grabowski & DiMasi 2009, supra note 5, at 8 (“[f]rom the standpoint of innovative firms, [statutory] 
exclusivity protection provides a back-up or insurance policy to the patent system”); BIO Data Exclusivity Position 
Paper, supra note 5, at 4 (“a 14-year period of data exclusivity serves essentially as an insurance policy that provides 
the innovator with some certainty of protection”).  
145 See Machlup, supra note 11, at 6 (“but just what an ‘invention’ is, and when it can be regarded as ‘novel’ and 
‘useful,’ is not self evident.  The questions of the ‘correct’ criteria of utility, novelty, and invention have been 
answered in many different ways, and the courts of several countries are constantly reconsidering earlier answers”).  




when combined with the high rate of patent invalidation in litigation,146 creates uncertainty 
regarding the outcome of patent litigation and undermines the ability of developers and 
entrepreneurs to rely on patents as reliable means of securing their investment.147  Machlup 
described the shortcomings of patents as follows:   
The patent system lacks logic.  It postulates something called ‘invention’ but in 
fact no satisfactory definition of “invention” has even appeared, and the courts, 
in their search for guiding rules, have produced an almost incredible tangle of 
conflicting doctrines.  This confusion has led to extensive and costly litigation.  
Its critics have described the patent right as merely “something which has to be 
defended in the courts” and, because it may put the individual inventor at a 
disadvantage against the larger corporations, as “a lottery in which it is hardly 
worthwhile taking out a ticket.”  The system, too, is wasteful.  It gives protection 
for 16 years (or thereabouts) whilst in fact over nine-tenths of the patents do not 
remain active for the whole of this period . . . It is almost impossible to 
conceive of any existing social institution so faulty in so many ways.  It 
survives only because there seems to be nothing better.148   
 
All of these shortcomings of the patent system appear to be further exacerbated in the 
context of pharmaceuticals in general and biologics in particular.149  First, as I will later argue, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the USPTO’s Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP).  See MPEP, 8th ed. (2001), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm.  
146 See Michael Meehan, Increasing Certainty and Harnessing Private Information in the U.S. Patent System: A 
Proposal for Reform, 2010 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2010) (“[n]early half of litigated patents are invalidated”).  
147 See Grabowski 2008, supra note 5, at 482 (warning that “if the relatively few large success[ful biological 
products that make it through development and approval] experience increased uncertainty due to patent challenges 
and the potential for early entry of generic versions, higher risk-adjusted rates of return will be demanded by venture 
capital firms as well as in initial public offerings and secondary offerings in public markets, yielding fewer 
candidates that meet this standard.”); Grabowski & DiMasi 2009, supra note 5, at 9 (“[u]ncertainty about 
recoupment periods and the ability to earn a risk adjusted return on particular new product candidates will result in 
fewer of these candidates being taken forward into development.”). 
148 Machlup, supra note 11, at 44.  Despite the fact that Machlup made these statements over 50 years ago – before 
the patent term was adjusted to 20 years from the date of filing and prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit – it 
appears that much of what Machlup described in 1958 remains true today in the context of biologics.   
149 See Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 2 (“[p]atents may provide less clear and less predictable intellectual 




due to some particular characteristics, biologics are subject to especially high barriers to 
patentability not existing in other areas of technology.150   
Second, the patent dispute resolution framework established by BPCIA would necessitate 
an even higher investment of resources by all of the parties involved.151  As discussed earlier, 
BPCIA sets up a highly complicated and elaborate framework for the resolution of patent 
disputes arising out of the filing of an application for biosimilar products.152  This framework 
would require potential adversaries to obtain extensive legal counseling153 and, possibly, litigate 
numerous patent disputes in several different legal proceedings over a prolonged period of 
time.154  Furthermore, protecting a single biological product normally involves more than one 
patent so it is prudent to assume that patent disputes arising in the context of biologics would not 
                                                                                                                                                             
than there was a decade ago that drugs will experience patent challenges and that they will occur much sooner after 
brand launch.”).   
150 See infra Part IV.C.1(b); See also BIO Data Exclusivity Position Paper, supra note 5, at 2-3 (arguing that patent 
law yields increasingly narrow patent claims to biologics).    
151 See Laura A. Coruzzi, Jonathan A. Muenkel & Lynda Q. Nguyen, The Crusade for Follow-On Biologics: The 
Next Wave of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation?, 2 No. 1 LANDSL 30, 31 (2009) (predicting that the passage of a 
framework for the approval of generic versions for biological products may “result in an influx of patent litigation in 
the field of biology”).  
152 See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.   
153 BPCIA dictates that the parties involved in the patent dispute partake in an exchange of patent lists and 
statements of their respective legal positions, to be followed by negotiations aimed at the resolution of possible 
patent disputes prior to and in lieu of resorting to any legal action in court.  See BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified as 42 
U.S.C. §§ 262(l)(2)-262(l)(4)).  Given these proceedings’ robustness, the necessary involvement of attorneys in 
these proceedings is unlikely to come at an insubstantial cost.  
154 The framework set up in BPCIA accounts for the possibility that patent disputes under BPCIA may involve 
several different legal proceedings spanning over the course of 8 years or more, beginning with the expiration of the 
data exclusivity period—four years after the approval of the original product—and ending with the conclusion of 
actions for declaratory judgment and/or injunction prompted by an advance notice of intent to market a biosimilar 
product given 180 days prior to the onset of marketing.  See BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 
262(k)(7)(B), 262(l)(6), 262(l)(8) and 262(l)(9)).  Notably, the existence of patents covering the biological product 
would automatically trigger the BPCIA patent dispute resolution proceedings even if the patents are set to expire 




only entail several legal proceedings over a prolonged period of time, but would also involve 
several patents directed at different types of inventions.155   
Finally, the scope afforded to patents pertaining to biologics by courts is even more 
unpredictable than that of patents in general due to the uncertainty surrounding the application of 
the doctrine of equivalents to this relatively new area of technology.156  Combining all of the 
above with the already increased likelihood of patent challenges characterizing the area of 
pharmaceuticals in recent years,157 the prospect of utilizing patents to protect proprietary 
                                                 
155 See Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 2-3 (“[b]iologics rely on multiple patents, including narrower product 
patents and process patents”); supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.  More patents represents a larger 
investment in prosecution and enforcement as well as increased uncertainty regarding the scope of the protected 
rights and the degree and extent of their enforceability. 
156 The doctrine of equivalents is a patent law construct meant to encompass within the scope of patent claims 
subject matter which does not squarely fall under the literal meaning of the claim but is nonetheless equivalent to the 
patented invention.  The most common legal standard for equivalence is the “function-way-result” test according to 
which a product or process is deemed an equivalent where “the accused product or process performs substantially 
the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result, as disclosed in the claim.”  
See Abbott Laboratories & Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. et al., 566 F.3d 1282, 1296-1297 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“[e]quivalency may also be proven where the differences between the invention as claimed and the accused product 
or process are insubstantial.”).  Thus, for example, even if a generic biological API would not literally infringe the 
relevant compound claim, it could trigger an issue of equivalents if the two compounds would have substantially the 
same structure enabling them to achieve substantially the same result in substantially the same way or are otherwise 
only different in an insubstantial way.  According to the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), 
“[b]iotechnology is considered an unpredictable field because it is often not known how even a minor change may 
affect the structure, behavior and biological activity of a protein.”  See BIO White Paper, supra note 2, at 28.  Thus, 
if even a seemingly minor change to a biological compound may drastically affect its structure, the way it functions 
and/or its biological result, then it is possible to say that such minor changes in a biological compound would affect 
the “function-way-result” aspects of such compound in a “not insubstantial way,” which, in turn, would render the 
scope of equivalents in such a compound highly unpredictable.  Accordingly, as recognized in the BIO White Paper, 
“there is no certainty that an innovator can obtain adequate patent protection covering variant proteins.”  See BIO 
White Paper, supra note 2, at 28.  See also Aljalian, supra note 168 at 55-57 and 66-72 (arguing that “[t]he 
application of the doctrine of equivalents in the realm of gene and protein patents, which appear to be the foundation 
of new medical breakthroughs, is highly significant . . .  Thus there is debate over its applicability” and calling for 
limiting the applicability of the doctrine of equivalents in such patents). 
157 See Grabowski & DiMasi 2009, supra note 5, at 19 (“the trend in recent years has been for patent challenges to 




interests of developers of biological products appears to be far from attractive, which may, in 
turn, result in a curbing of R&D.158  
Interestingly, these shortcomings of the patent system are “complemented” with claims 
that, at least in the context of biologics, patents do not serve their role as facilitators of disclosure 
of valuable information to the public.159  Biotechnology patents have been accused of not 
providing sufficient disclosure to benefit the public and of revealing only piecemeal portions of 
certain technologies, which are useless in and of themselves and which could only serve as part 
of larger mechanisms to which the public is not made privy.160  
                                                 
158 See 2008 CRS Report, supra note 1, at 24 (“several experts maintain that defending patents may divert support 
from on-going innovation, especially in small companies that make up a significant portion of the biotechnology 
sector). 
159 See supra Part II.A.1.  
160 See e.g. Sorscher, supra note 58, at 305 (“the patent for [biologics] may only cover early versions of the product 
produced in the laboratory setting, not the master cell lines and scaled-up industrial process used to produce the 
product eventually tested on patients and approved by the FDA. Firms can and do seek trade secret protection on 
these cell lines and processes, forcing follow-on manufacturers to start over after a long an expensive design 
process.”).   
 Arguably, the statutory exclusivities established under BPCIA would not do a better job at facilitating 
disclosure of meaningful/practical information to the public since the actual clinical data and manufacturing know-
how submitted as part of the original BLA is considered proprietary and therefore not accessible to the public.  See 
generally Letter from Prof. John C. Yoo to the Food and Drug Administration, Division of Dockets Management 
(Oct. 21, 2004), available at http://www.gphaonline.com/sites/default/files/UC-
Berkeley%20Professor%20Yoo's%20Analysis%20of%20the%20Takings%20Clause.pdf (addressing the 
constitutionality of the FDA’s reliance on safety and efficacy conclusions reached in approval proceedings of 
original biological products for the approval of generic versions of such products and determining that it is not a 
taking of such (admittedly) proprietary information under the Fifth Amendment).  Cf. generally Dinh, supra note 3, 
at 102-103 (arguing that drug developers have no property interest in the public fact that a certain drug was found to 
be safe and efficacious enough to be approved for marketing and because such reliance does not involve an actual 
disclosure of clinical data submitted by drug developers); Andrew Wasson, Taking Biologics for Granted? Takings, 
Trade Secrets, and Off-Patent Biological Products, 2005 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 4, 30 (2005) (arguing that “it is 
unlikely that the approval of off-patent biologics originally approved under the [F]FDCA would be a taking”); John 
C. Yoo, Takings Issues in the Approval of Generic Biologics, 60 Food & Drug L.J. 33, 43 (2005) (“[i]f FDA decided 
to use the knowledge acquired by a pioneer company in furtherance of a subsequent approval of a generic biologic 
drug, the agency likely would encounter no significant taking issue.”).  Some commentators have argued that the 
FDA should make full disclosure to the public of safety and efficacy data relied on as part of approval proceedings 
of new pharmaceuticals.  See e.g. Galbraith, supra note 205, at 712, 752-54, 762-767 (2009) (making a compelling 




FDA-granted statutory exclusivities, on the other hand, are obtained and enforced 
automatically, as a by-product of the FDA approval proceedings,161 and their practice does not 
require their beneficiary to take any specific action.162  They also do not lend themselves to the 
skirmishes that characterize patent infringement disputes.163  Thus, statutory exclusivities negate 
the need for long, cumbersome, expensive and uncertain proceedings such as those 
characterizing patent prosecution and enforcement, which makes statutory exclusivities highly 
appealing as means of protecting one’s investment in technology.164  Rather, statutory 
exclusivities provide a relatively predictable outcome in case of potential disputes, which, in 
                                                                                                                                                             
whether FDA approval is obtained or even sought”); see also See Ruckelshuus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 
1005-1009 (1984) (“the Trade Secrets Act cannot be construed as any sort of assurance against internal agency use 
of submitted data during consideration of the application of a subsequent applicant for registration.”).   
161 As discussed earlier, statutory exclusivities are conferred “automatically” on recipients of FDA marketing 
approvals and thus, securing them requires no direct additional investment on the part of developers of biologics.  
Putting a biologic through all the tests and clinical trials necessary for approval by the FDA is an essential and 
unavoidable part of its approval for marketing.  Therefore, the investment involved in obtaining FDA approval for 
biological products should be viewed as sunk costs, i.e. as a necessary expenditure that has to be invested regardless 
of the legal protection sought for the investment.  Hence, the direct investment in obtaining a statutory exclusivity 
could be viewed as $0 while obtaining and securing patents in related inventions would presumably involve 
additional costs.  Similarly, the enforcement of patents would require the developers of original biologics to invest 
significant amounts in bringing lawsuits against infringers.  As for statutory exclusivities, if anything, it would be 
the FDA that would bear the costs of litigating possible challenges of its decisions not to approve additional 
products for the treatment of a particular condition or having a certain chemical structure and not the developers of 
the original products.  
162 Under BPCIA, potential competitors would be barred from even attempting to enter the market while the 
statutory exclusivities are in place because the FDA would be unable to accept for evaluation any application for a 
follow-on biological product prior to the expiration of the data exclusivity period or approve such applications prior 
to the expiration of the market exclusivity period.  See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.  
163 As discussed earlier, statutory exclusivities are significantly less vulnerable to legal challenges than patents.  See 
supra Part II.B.  See also Brill, supra note 5, at 6 (“[p]atents can, and frequently are, subject to legal challenge and 
therefore contain some amount of uncertainty for the patent holder. Data exclusivity is not challengeable in court 
and therefore is not uncertain.”). 
164 See Brill id. at 6.  The application of statutory exclusivities would not be affected by the inherent uncertainty 
accompanying patent law, especially with regard to such matters as the application of the doctrine of equivalents, 




turn, represents not only significant cost savings but also minimization of investors’ risks, 
thereby creating a business environment favorable to investment in R&D.165 
(b) The ‘Product of Nature’ Doctrine and the Insufficiency of Patents 
as Means of Promoting Basic Research and Development in 
Biology and Biomedicine 
There are various types of biologics for which patentability is limited and yet for which 
R&D is highly desirable from a public policy perspective.166  In many of these instances, the 
impediment to patentability is the ‘product of nature’ doctrine according to which patents may 
only be granted for “nonnaturally occurring [articles of] manufacture or composition[s] of 
matter” that are “product[s] of human ingenuity.”167  In other cases, the obstacles may be the 
heightened standards of written description and enablement,168 best mode169 and utility170 and 
                                                 
165 In this respect, the legal certainty accompanying a regime of statutory exclusivities has a clear advantage over 
patents from an incentive-to-invent/invest public policy perspective.  
166 E.g. genes, naturally occurring nucleic acid sequences (DNA and RNA) which have not been fully sequenced, 
non-purified naturally occurring compositions containing antibodies, naturally occurring proteins and hormones and 
so forth.  See Kelleher, supra note 57, at 256 (“the patentability of some biological materials is extremely narrow 
due to stringent specification and enablement requirements”).  
167 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-310 (1980).  According to the Chakrabarty Court 
The laws of nature [and] physical phenomena . . . have been held not patentable. . .  Thus, a new 
mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. . . 
Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none.”  
Id. at 309 [internal citations omitted].  The ‘product of nature’ doctrine bears particular relevance to the context of 
biologics because so many biological products are in fact naturally occurring molecules, e.g. human growth 
hormone, insulin, erythropoietin, etc.  See 2008 CRS Report, supra note 1, at 3 n. 19, 13 (addressing the 
implications of the ‘product of nature’ doctrine on biologics).  
168 See e.g. In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1392 (CCPA 1970) (requiring making a deposit of microorganisms to a 
publicly available depository as part of meeting the written description and enablement requirements under 35 
U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[a]n adequate written 
description of a DNA requires more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a potential 
method for isolating it; what is required is a description of the DNA itself”); Natasha L. Aljalian, The Role of Patent 
Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 1, 28-30 (2005) (arguing that “biotechnology has 




other issues specific to the area of biotechnology.171  As a result, there is an ongoing concern that 
such impediments to patentability might hinder highly desirable R&D of some types of biologics 
by making them insufficiently attractive to potential investors.172   
Various solutions have been proposed over the years to ease this tension between the 
need to encourage “basic research” (i.e. research that is aimed at the discovery and understanding 
of natural phenomena) and patentability.173  However, these solutions have usually been partial 
                                                                                                                                                             
to strictly comply with these requirements”); BIO White Paper, supra note 2, at 30-32 (arguing that biotechnology is 
subject to “strict written description and enablement” requirements); Wing Yan Tam, supra note 46, at 544-47 
(reviewing issues pertaining to enablement of biological inventions and arguing that many patents pertaining to 
biologics may be invalid for lack of enablement).  See also generally Karen G. Potter, Getting Written Description 
Right in the Biotechnology Arts: A Realist Approach to Patent Scope, 28 Biotechnology L. Rep. 1, 17 (2009) 
(describing the uncertainty surrounding the law of written description in biotechnological patents).  
169 See e.g. Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry’ s Unintended Admission That Biotech 
Patents Fail Enablement, 11 Va. J.L. & Tech 8, 66-77 (2006) (arguing that patents directed to biological products 
are generally not enabled as they do not provide sufficient detail to enable practicing the inventions in terms of 
manufacturing know-how).  
170 See John R. Thomas, CRS Report for Congress: An Examination of the Issues Surrounding Biotechnology 
Patenting and Its Effect Upon Entrepreneurial Companies, at 18-26 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 CRS Report] 
(addressing the application of the utility requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 101 to biotechnologies). 
171 See e.g. Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d at 1206 (“when an inventor is unable to envision the detailed constitution of 
a gene so as to distinguish it from other materials, as well as a method for obtaining it, conception has not been 
achieved until reduction to practice has occurred, i.e., until after the gene has been isolated.”).  See also 2000 CRS 
Report, supra note 170 at 11-18 (addressing potential obstacles to patentability due to what the author describes as 
“ethical concerns”).  
172 One such type of research involves the identification of particular genes and naturally occurring mutations in the 
human genome.  Among the most prominent types of genetic diseases whose exact genetic background remains 
unknown at this time are: asthma, various types of cancer, epilepsy and many more.  See National Heart Lung and 
Blood Institute, What Causes Asthma?, http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/Asthma/Asthma_Causes.html 
(“[r]esearchers think a combination of factors (family genes and certain environmental exposures) interact to cause 
asthma to develop”); National Cancer Institute, Cancer Genetics Overview PDQ—Introduction, 
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/pdq/genetics/overview/HealthProfessional/page2 (“[the] expanding knowledge 
[of cancer genetics] has implications for all aspects of cancer management, including prevention, screening, and 
treatment”); National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NINDS Epilepsy Information Page, 
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/epilepsy/epilepsy.htm (“[r]esearchers are working to identify genes that may 
influence epilepsy”). 
173 For example, courts have created an exception for naturally occurring compounds if such compounds are 




at best and, thus far, have failed to bring a conclusion to the debate over the patentability of 
specific types of biologics.174  
Contrary to the seemingly arbitrary and stringent requirements for obtaining a patent in 
the context of biologics, the statutory exclusivities regime set up by BPCIA does not give rise to 
similar impediments.  Rather, it facilitates granting statutory exclusivities independent of 
external criteria such as “patentability” and depends only on the FDA’s finding of biological 
products as sufficiently safe and effective.175  Thus, the statutory exclusivities regime established 
by BPCIA would incentivize any kind of R&D project that may eventually lead to biological 
products regardless of its patentability, including research that may lead to the discovery of 
naturally occurring and/or non-isolated biological compounds.176   
 
                                                 
174 A recent example of an ongoing ambiguity of the patentability of biologics is the re-heated debate regarding the 
patentability of naturally occurring DNA sequences (e.g. genes) and obvious variations thereof (e.g. cDNA, 
diagnostic products thereof, etc.).  See Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, et al. v. United States Patent and Trademark 
Office, et al., --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 1233416 (S.D.N.Y.), 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1683 (holding that DNA sequences 
are unpatentable subject matter even in their purified form because they are not “markedly different” from native 
DNA and that methods of analyzing DNA strands for certain sequences not tied to a particular apparatus/machine 
are equally non-patentable subject matter).  
175 See discussion infra Part IV.C.1(a)0.  
176 A notable exception to the broad applicability of statutory exclusivities and their potential as means of 
incentivizing R&D in biomedical technology exists in relation to the development of means of diagnosing certain 
diseases, including by using identified DNA and RNA sequences.  For the reasons mentioned above, newly 
identified genes and diagnostics thereof are currently held unpatentable.  See supra note 174.  However, they also 
seem to not fall under the definition of biologics under PHSA § 351(i) (see supra note 2).  Nonetheless, genetic 
diagnostics have an important role in the prevention and treatment of certain diseases and genetic predispositions 
which could not have otherwise been detected.  For example, the tests for the presence of mutations in the BRCA1 
and BRCA2 genes associated with increased risk of developing breast and ovarian cancers, while not serving as 
means of preventing such cancers per se, assist in recognizing the need for medical surveillance and preventive 
treatment for individuals having these mutations.  See National Cancer Institute, Fact Sheet: BRCA1 and BRCA2: 
Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA.  Thus, it is desirable to 
grant some form of statutory exclusivities—even if shorter than those afforded by BPCIA—in genetic diagnostics so 




(c) Patents Provide Insufficient Protection to Biological APIs and the 
Processes of Making Them 
Patent compound claims177 and claims directed to methods of making them might prove 
ineffective in protecting particular biological compounds.178  As explained earlier, biological 
compounds are highly complex molecules and are often made of hundreds, sometimes 
thousands, of building blocks arranged in intricate three-dimensional structures.179  Thus, 
biological compounds and the processes of making them normally lend themselves to an 
enormous number of potential variations, which could be used for “designing-around” patent 
claim limitations in order to yield highly similar compounds or highly similar processes of 
making them.180 
Moreover, for the reasons discussed, the doctrine of equivalents would probably not 
provide effective means for encompassing such “design-arounds” within the scope of the 
                                                 
177 Compound claims are patent claims drafted specifically to cover a particular chemical or biological compound or 
a group of particular compounds defined by structure, function and/or characteristics (e.g. melting point, X-ray 
diffraction pattern, solubility, density, etc.).  
178 See Kelleher, supra note 57, at 256 (“[t]he complexity of most biologics may allow a biogeneric manufacturer to 
design around an innovator’s patents[sic], but still secure regulatory approval through its “biosimilarity” to the 
pioneer biologic”); Grabowski et al., supra note 5, at 4 (“[p]atent protection alone may be insufficient for biologics 
in the context of biosimilars”).  
179 See supra note 2.  
180 See Gitter, supra note 2, at 612 (explaining that generic versions of biologics “might be sufficiently similar to the 
innovator biologic to rely on the FDA’s findings of safety and effectiveness for the innovator product, but at the 
same time prove different enough from the innovator product to avoid a patent infringement claim”); Jim 
Hollingshead & Rob Jacoby, Avoiding No Man’s Land: Potential Unintended Consequences of Follow-On 
Biologics, at 16 (2009), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_lshc_avoiding%20no%20man's%20land_FOB_033009(1).pdf (“many 
industry participants are concerned that innovators’ patents will prove relatively easy to circumvent. The very size of 
these molecules opens the possibility that a very small change to the molecule that preserves the core design . . .  
could circumvent the IP of the innovator company without technically infringing on its patent. Similarly, it is 
theoretically possible that [a generic manufacturer] could create a nearly identical molecule through a different 
process, and again be deemed technically to not be in violation of patents.”); BIO Data Exclusivity Position Paper, 




relevant claims.181  Given the innumerable possibilities of “design-arounds” existing for many 
biological compounds and the general unpredictability of the results of even minor changes to 
biological compounds, the application of the doctrine of equivalents to biotechnological 
inventions might prove extremely difficult.182  Even if we assume that the changes to the 
biological compound do not substantially affect the way it achieves a “substantially same” result, 
there would still remain the difficult question: what is “substantial structural similarity” in 
biologics for equivalence purposes?  Apparently, the likelihood of establishing infringement of a 
biological compound claim under the doctrine of equivalents (at least at this point in time) is low 
at best, making it easier for generic manufacturers to enter the market before developers of 
original biologics had a chance to reap the profits that would make their efforts worthwhile.183  
                                                 
181 See supra note 156.  In view of the size of some proteins, it is quite possible that generic manufacturers could 
develop proteins that would be substantially structurally different from the original biological compound and yet 
have biological activity identical or highly similar to that of the original compound and therefore fall under the 
definition of “biosimilar” under BPCIA.  See also Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 2-3 (“[b]iologics rely on 
multiple patents, including narrower product patents and process patents that may be more vulnerable to inventing 
around than small molecule product patents . . . it is possible that biosimilars may be different enough not to infringe 
on patents, but similar enough to qualify for an abbreviated approval pathway.”); Potter, supra note 168, at 14-15 
(“[i]in practice, the Courts are reluctant to apply [the doctrine of equivalents] in biotechnology cases . . . It is far 
from certain how much variation in a protein a court would deem to be an “insubstantial” change.  In sum, the 
[doctrine of equivalents] is so restrictive as to ‘eviscerate the applicability and potency of the [doctrine of 
equivalents] in almost all imaginable situations’”).  
182 See Marr, supra note 57 (“[b]ecause biosimilars aren’t exactly duplicates of the original drugs, they don’t violate 
the original drug’s patent, enabling legal distribution before patent expiration.”); BIO White Paper, supra note 2, at 
30 (explaining that two structurally different proteins could be biologically equivalent and still there would be no 
patent infringement); Vernon et al., supra note 4, at 69 (arguing that it would be easy to “design around” biologics 
to avoid patent infringement violations while maintaining biosimilarity to an original biological product and that 
“[t]his artifact of intellectual property rights law places a greater emphasis on [statutory] exclusivity provisions for 
biologic products”).   But see FTC Report, supra note 5, at vi (“there is no evidence that patents claiming a biologic 
drug product have been designed around more frequently than those claiming small-molecule products.”); Potter, 
supra note 168, at 1, 14-15 (describing a hypothetical case in which strict written description requirements make a 
patentee narrowly claim its invention thereby “inviting” imitations that do not fall within the scope of the invention 
as claimed).   
183 The author is not aware of any final court decision finding infringement of a biological compound claim under 
the doctrine of equivalents.  Cf. Amgen v. Hoechst, 126 F.Supp.2d 69, 132-35 (D. Mass 2001) (finding that a patent 




The statutory exclusivities framework established under BPCIA would not give rise to 
such potential uncertainties and would eliminate the need to litigate altogether.  The BPCIA 
statutory exclusivities’ framework institutes a clear choice: if one wishes to rely on a previous 
FDA approval of a certain biological product without having to invest the vast amounts of 
money necessary in order to obtain approval of her own product, she would have to wait until the 
expiration of the relevant statutory exclusivity periods.184  Under a statutory exclusivities regime, 
a generic manufacturer need only seek to obtain approval for its product to trigger the statutory 
exclusivity bar forbidding the FDA from approving its application regardless of whether or not 
the biological compounds are similar enough to be used interchangeably and what their degree of 
similarity is. 
(d) Patents Provide Poor Protection to Biologics’ Manufacturing 
Know-How 
For many biologics, one of the most difficult and important aspects of bringing the 
product to the market is the development of manufacturing know-how.185  However, for various 
reasons, know-how is especially difficult to protect under patent law.  First, viewed through a 
                                                                                                                                                             
infringing molecule had only one more amino acid on the C terminus and achieved substantially the same clinical 
result in the same way and holding that there was no prosecution history estoppel) r’ ved 457 F.3d 1293, 1308-12 
(Fed. Cir. 2006).  
184 Notably, the possibility of approval of two parallel, potentially identical APIs for treatment of the same medical 
condition raises the separate issue of inefficiencies involved in parallel development of pharmaceutical products.  A 
possible way of avoiding the waste of resources associated with such situations—at least those resulting from the 
respective developers’ unawareness of the competing project—would be to have the FDA publish preliminary 
details regarding INDs it receives.   
185 See BIO White Paper, supra note 2, at 3 (explaining some of the difficulties involved in the manufacturing of 




patent-law prism, the majority of manufacturing techniques are “well known in the art.”186  Thus, 
the manufacturing recipes of most biological products could, arguably, be developed through 
‘routine experimentation’ and would therefore be obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).187  Second, 
as explained earlier, patent claims covering manufacturing processes could, and often are, 
“designed-around,” namely, evaded by making the same products in a different way, thereby 
rendering them irrelevant to protecting the substantial investment involved in the development of 
manufacturing know-how.188  
A grant of statutory exclusivities under BPCIA, on the other hand, would not require 
disclosure of manufacturing know-how to third parties (e.g. generic manufacturers).189  
Similarly, third parties would not be able to circumvent statutory exclusivities under BPCIA by 
“designing around” the protected products (at least not if the applicant wishes to rely on the 
original product for approval of its own generic version thereof).190   
 
 
                                                 
186 I.e. “well known” to persons of ordinary skill in the pertinent forms of art, such as molecular biology, 
biochemistry, etc. 
187 See Ritchie v. Vast Resources, 563 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[a]mong the inventions that the law deems 
obvious are those modest, routine, everyday, incremental improvements of an existing product or process that confer 
commercial value . . . but do not involve sufficient inventiveness to merit patent protection. This class of inventions 
is well illustrated by efforts at routine experimentation [where] method[s] of creation are well known, making 
successful results of the experimentation predictable.”).    
188 See Grabowski 2009, supra note 181 and accompanying text; see also BIO White Paper, supra note 2, at 32 (“[i]t 
is rare that a patented process of chemical synthesis will be able to block any and all means of producing the 
product”).  
189 See infra note 160 ¶2.  




2. Why Concurrent Patent and Statutory Exclusivities Protection in 
Biological Products Might Have Undesirable Ramifications 
In view of the above, it is not surprising that developers of biological products advocated 
vehemently in favor of long statutory exclusivity periods for original biological products.191  
However, even though the literature is replete with arguments in favor of making statutory 
exclusivities available to biological product developers in addition to patents,192 the author is not 
aware of similar arguments having been made regarding a supposed need for patent protection in 
addition to and concurrent with the term of statutory exclusivities such as those provided under 
BPCIA; nor is the author aware of any justification for affording such protection.193  In other 
words, no one seems to argue that statutory exclusivities, while they last, provide insufficient 
protection to the interests of developers of biological products such that they should be 
supplemented by patent protection.  Rather, it appears that affording protection under both patent 
and statutory exclusivities regimes while both of them are in effect is likely to have undesirable 
ramifications. 
 
                                                 
191 See e.g. Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 3 (listing the advantages of statutory exclusivities and how they would 
remedy the shortcomings of patents in the context of biologics).   
 Arguably, the most straightforward way of addressing the inadequacy of the patent system for protecting 
biotechnological inventions would be to “fix” the patent system itself, namely by tailoring specific solutions that 
would encompass the type of product of biotechnological research and development activities that policy-makers 
seek to incentivize within the scope of what patent law would deem patentable subject matter.  However, this route 
would not be preferable to statutory exclusivities because such highly specific biotechnology-oriented solutions 
might increase the transaction costs involved in obtaining and enforcing biotechnology patents, which, as explained 
above, is an already expensive and highly uncertain prospect.      
192 See e.g. references cited supra note 5.  
193 As explained earlier, statutory exclusivities would negate the need for patent protection at least for the underlying 




(a) Concurrent Protection by Both Patents and Statutory Exclusivities 
Would Likely Lead to a Waste of Societal Resources 
The enforcement of patents is an expensive prospect not only for the individual parties 
involved but also for society at large.  Patent systems require substantial investment in education 
and training necessary to administer patent prosecution and litigation.194  Moreover, maintaining 
a patent system with all its numerous elements, including a patent office, the various tribunals 
partaking in the administration and enforcement of patent laws195 and highly trained personnel196 
requires a significant ongoing investment of societal resources.197  Thus, the investment of 
resources in the enforcement of patent rights where statutory exclusivities already cover 
biological products would constitute a waste of the relative portion of societal resources (out of 
the entire societal investment in maintaining and administering a patent system) which is 




                                                 
194 Hypothetically, had these resources not been invested in this manner they could have been invested in other, 
equally or possibly more socially beneficial avenues.   
195 E.g. the Board of Patent Interferences and Appeals and federal courts.  
196 E.g. judges, administrative judges, patent examiners and all their professional and administrative staff.  
197 Notably, the administration of the patent dispute resolution scheme established in BPCIA would require even 
further investment of societal resources such as those described herein.  See further discussion of the BPCIA patent 
dispute resolution scheme supra Part IV.C.1(a). 
198 To clarify: the argument here is not that the entire societal investment of resources in the creation and 
maintenance of a patent system constitutes waste, but rather that the relative portion of such an investment which is 
necessary to support the handling of patent disputes as they pertain to biological products which are being covered 




(b) Concurrent Protection by Both Patents and Statutory Exclusivities 
Would Give Rise to Unnecessary and Avoidable Risks of Abuse 
Monopoly—any monopoly—creates an inherent risk of abuse.199  Thus, affording patent 
protection for biological products in parallel to FDA-instituted exclusivities would likely 
increase the risk of occurrence of abuse by developers of biological products in a variety of ways 
and disserve the public interest that both regimes were created to promote.200   Such abuse might 
result in an anti-competitive impact on incentives-to-invent/invest in biologics’ R&D, which 
would, almost inevitably, diminish public access to biological products.201   
BPCIA accounts for the risk of abuse of statutory exclusivities by specifically and 
explicitly disallowing grants of market and data exclusivities under certain circumstances.  First, 
                                                 
199 Machlup defines “abuse” as a situation where “the social objectives which [the monopoly] is supposed to serve 
are not promoted but rather jeopardized by the way it is used . . . when the temporal, functional, or material limits of 
the monopoly intended by the [monopoly] grant are overstepped and the actually achieved monopolistic control is 
extended in time, in scope or in strength.”  See Machlup, supra note 11, at 10.  
200 For example, numerous commentators have expressed concerns regarding patent abuse practices commonly 
referred to as “evergreening.”  See e.g. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Clearing the Way to Low-Cost Biogenerics, Boston 
Globe, Oct. 26, 2008, available at 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2008/10/26/clearing_the_way_for_low_cost_bi
ogenerics/ (warning against granting developers of original biologics 12-14 years of statutory exclusivity alongside 
with patent protection and arguing that such protection would increase the risk that developers of original biologics 
would attempt to evergreen their biological products).  According to Katlikoff, evergreening is “mak[ing] relatively 
minor changes to existing products in order to restart their monopoly protection clocks. These changes include 
changing the medication strength of pills . . . changing the form of medication (e.g., switching from pill to capsule), 
modifying the method of delivery (e.g., from injection to inhalation), expanding indications (applying the medicine 
to additional conditions), pegylation (which has the effect of reducing doses per time period via time-release 
mechanisms), and glycosolation[sic] (adding sugar molecules to the medication).”  Katlikoff, supra note 5, at 9.  See 
also Brill, supra note 5, at 7 (“[e]vergreening is a process whereby the holder of the patents for a biologic drug, 
using incremental changes to its original product, is able to shift the market to a newer product so as to limit a 
generic competitor’s market opportunity”).     
201 See Machlup, supra note 11, at 10-11 (“[p]atentees may succeed in extending the time period of control [e.g.]. . . 
through incomplete disclosure, making it impossible for those without special “know-how” to use the invention even 
after expiration of the patent; . . . through the successive patenting of strategic improvements of the invention which 
make the unimproved invention commercially unusable after expiration of the original patent . . . The patentee may 
succeed in extending the scope and strength of the monopoly beyond that intended by the law”), 28 (reviewing 
different arguments made by others that patents have been misused in various ways to inhibit fair and free 
competition regardless of efficiency) and 31 (quoting Edwards’s statement that “[there] are cases in which one 




BPCIA stipulates that applications for the approval of biologics that are “supplements” to an 
original BLA cannot re-trigger the market and data exclusivity provisions.202  Second, BPCIA 
determines that applications filed by the same manufacturer or its “licensor, predecessor in 
interest, or other related entity” would not merit data or market exclusivity if the application is 
merely for a “modification to the structure of the biological product that does not result in a 
change in safety, purity, or potency.”203  Finally, under BPCIA, an application filed by the same 
manufacturer for a non-structural change of the biologic and “that results in a new indication, 
route of administration, dosing schedule, dosage form, delivery system, delivery device, or 
strength” would, similarly, not award the manufacturer with an exclusivity period on top of that 
already awarded for the original biological product.204   
                                                 
202 See BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(k)(7)(C)(i)). 
203 See BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(I)).  
204 See BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(II)).  Notably, these provisions leave open the 
possibility of granting new data and/or market exclusivity terms for approval of applications for biological products 
submitted by the same manufacturer that entail a structural change to an original biological product and that results 
in a new indication, route of administration, dosing schedule, dosage form, delivery system, delivery device, or 
strength.  Yet, arguably, such re-triggering of the exclusivity period is justifiable since the manufacturer would have 
to put the biological product through what essentially would be a new approval process, including full blown clinical 
trials, and will therefore need to “re-invest” in R&D of what may well be viewed a new and different biological 
product.  Notably, the BPCIA anti-evergreening provisions are in accord with Prof. Katlikoff’s recommendations for 
such measures.  See supra 5 at 9 (proposing to award full monopoly protection only for the discovery and marketing 
of a new biologic).   
By not affording additional statutory exclusivity for approval of additional indications of the same 
biological product, the statutory exclusivity scheme created by BPCIA differs from that of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
in that BPCIA does not incentivize additional clinical research leading to the approval of the same biologic for the 
treatment of additional medical conditions.  See discussion of the Hatch-Waxman Act supra note 29 and 
accompanying text.  In providing such exacting criteria for the grant of statutory exclusivities for already-approved 
drugs, BPCIA might actually curb much needed follow-up research of already-approved biological products, 
especially with relation to indications that require more complicated or elaborate R&D efforts which, as such, tend 
to be “pushed back” for later approval, once more easily provable medical benefits of the biological product have 




Patents, on the other hand, do not seem to have the same kind of safeguards against abuse 
and remain relatively susceptible to evergreening.205  Furthermore, the elaborate patent dispute 
resolution scheme established in BPCIA might also, conceivably, give rise to different types of 
abuse similar to those that have been affected under the Hatch-Waxman Act.206  Thus, protecting 
biological products under patent law in addition to the statutory exclusivities framework 
available under BPCIA would create an opening for abuses of the patent system that would delay 
the entry of generic biologics into the market.    
3. Biological Products Should Not Receive Concurrent Protection Under 
Both Patent Law and the Statutory Exclusivities Afforded under BPCIA  
The conclusion from the discussion thus far is that concurrent protection of biologics 
under both patent and statutory exclusivities regimes is not only unnecessary but also 
undesirable.  Rather, it would be preferable that any particular biological product be subject to 
protection under only either of these regimes, namely, BPCIA instituted statutory exclusivities or 
patents covering the underlying inventions pertaining to the biological product.   
                                                 
205 See Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know: a Demand for Genuine Public Access to Clinical Trial Results Data, 
78 Miss. L.J. 705, 759 (2009) (“pharmaceutical companies have recently employed a wide variety of “evergreening” 
strategies to artificially extend the date a medication officially goes off patent”).  A comprehensive review of the 
numerous possible “methods” of patent abuse and “evergreening techniques” in the context of biologics is beyond 
the scope of this article.  Yet, for illustrative purposes it is worth mentioning a prominent example, namely when 
developers of original pharmaceutical products obtain patents on new methods of using an original biological 
product in combination with other pharmaceuticals, whereas the latter are enumerated in the patient prescribing 
information (PPI) for the original pharmaceutical products and then asserting inducement of infringement claims 
against generic manufacturers using the same PPIs (in accordance with FDA requirements) with their generic 
versions of such products.     
206 See e.g. FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study (2002) (describing several types of 
patent abuse “techniques” used to keep generic competition off the market); see also FTC Report, supra note 5, at 
viii (“early start [of pre-approval litigation] does not guarantee early resolution . . . based on the experience under 
Hatch-Waxman, a pre-approval patent resolution process also is likely to lead to consumer harm . . . [by using] the 
pre-approval patent regulations to delay generic entry.  In addition, generic and branded competitors have entered 
into “pay-for-delay” patent settlements that delay entry, not encourage it.”).  Arguably, similar abuses could occur 




As explained earlier, statutory exclusivities have numerous advantages over patents.207  
At least in the context of biologics, patents are a cumbersome, inefficient and often ineffective 
way of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”208  FDA granted statutory 
exclusivities, on the other hand, appear to be more comprehensive and easily enforceable, would 
significantly reduce costs involved in litigation, are less prone to abuse and would create legal 
certainty that is currently missing from the protection of technological innovation under patent 
law.   
Furthermore, statutory exclusivities guarantee that only “worthy technologies” are 
granted monopolies.  A constant concern in the context of technological advances is that 
monopoly grants may be squandered on “unworthy” technologies.  For instance, it is not 
uncommon that inventions that lack any value to society are granted patents just because they 
happen to “satisfy” the requirements of patent law.209  As opposed to the patent examination 
process, which mostly utilizes standards not directly relevant to any particular technology, 
evaluation of new technologies by specialized agencies directly gauges the “social worth” of 
such technologies.  
The FDA’s expertise and understanding in the area of biologics enables it to evaluate the 
potential medical benefits of biologics and weigh them against possible risks, thereby directly 
                                                 
207 See infra Part IV.C.1.  
208 U.S. Const. Art. I § 8 Cl. 8.   
209 Examples of what may be described as ridiculous patents covering socially worthless technologies are never in 




determining the true societal value of specific biological products.210  On the other hand, the 
patent system utilizes an array of “surrogate” or “proxy”—arguably irrelevant—standards to 
indirectly appraise the societal value of advancements, including biological products.211  Thus, at 
least in the context of biologics, a statutory exclusivities regime has an economic advantage over 
a patent regime as it is more likely to guarantee that monopolies are only awarded for “socially 
valuable” technologies.  
4. A Proposed Amendment to Limit Patent Protection Where BPCIA 
Statutory Exclusivities are in Force 
As discussed above, in the area of biologics, a statutory exclusivities regime is preferable 
to a patent regime.  To avoid the negative ramifications of concurrent protection by both 
statutory exclusivities and patents, it is advisable that upon the onset of the statutory exclusivity 
period under BPCIA, developers of the approved products would no longer be able to enforce 
their patents as they pertain to the biological product as approved against generic manufacturers 
applying for the approval of generic versions of such products (“proposed amendment”).212   
                                                 
210 Direct examination by the FDA presumably guarantees that pharmaceuticals only receive monopoly via statutory 
exclusivities based on the criterion of whether they carry sufficient benefit to the public health per se rather than 
based on surrogate criteria for measuring their social worth, which may or may not guarantee that they actually 
convey any benefit to the public. 
211 E.g. novelty, nonobviousness, written description, enablement, and more.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.  The FDA 
evaluation is directed at the crux of the issue of benefit for the public, namely, whether the biological product is safe 
and efficacious enough to be approved as a medicine and therefore merits statutory exclusivity, regardless of 
whether or not a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious or in compliance with 
other seemingly irrelevant criteria enumerated in patent law. 
212 One way of achieving this result would be to amend Title 35 of the U.S. Code to limit section 271 so that it 
would create causes of action against generic applicants under BPCIA only if no statutory exclusivity under BPCIA 
is in effect with relation to the product covered by the patent whose enforcement is sought.  A possible “softer” 
version of such a sweeping prohibition of enforcement of pertinent patents is to have developers of biological 
products elect how to protect their proprietary interests in their products, namely by choosing to benefit from the 
statutory exclusivities scheme afforded under BPCIA or having the ability to enforce their patents covering the 




Importantly, this proposal would “strip” biological products of any additional period of 
protection under their primary patents subsequent to the expiration of the market exclusivity 
under BPCIA.213  The potential loss214 of this additional protection under patent law (flawed and 
partial as it may be215) is justified because it reflects payment for insurance embodied in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
version of the proposed amendment, BPCIA could be amended to stipulate that the FDA would refrain from taking 
the actions related to the approval of generic versions of the biological products as prescribed under BPCIA § 
7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)) only pursuant to a commitment by a BLA applicant to be estopped from 
enforcing its patents pertaining to the approved biological product against such generic applicants and/or so long as 
developers of biological products do not seek enforcement of their patents covering inventions pertaining to their 
biological products against parties seeking approval for generic versions of such product in accordance with BPCIA.  
See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.  This “softer” version may circumvent possible challenges of the 
proposed amendment as an unconstitutional taking of one’s proprietary rights in its patents in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution.  Importantly, this amendment is not meant to prevent developers of biological 
products from enforcing their patents against later applicants seeking approval not under BPCIA.  Namely, under no 
circumstances would developers of biological products be unable to sue for infringement of their patents where a 
competitor might seek FDA approval of the same biological compound for the treatment of the same medical 
condition by conducting their own clinical trials, i.e. without relying on the approval of the original biological 
product under BPCIA.   
 A possible question is why leaving things the way they are, namely “for the market to take care of,” would 
not provide a sufficient and satisfying solution to the problems discussed above arising out of affording double 
protection to original biological products under both patent and statutory exclusivities regimes.  Arguably, if patents 
are “so deficient” as a means of protecting one’s proprietary interests in biological products that alternative means – 
completely outside of patent law – are necessary to incentivize R&D of biologics, then developers of original 
biological products would be unlikely to seek or pursue enforcement of any patents covering their biological 
products and the whole issue of double protection would be moot.  However, the need for the proposed measure 
limiting the protection afforded to original biological products is the risk of abuse of patent law (rather than its use 
for the purposes for which it was intended).  In other words, allowing developers of original biological products to 
benefit, in the broad sense, from both patent and statutory exclusivity regimes might lead to their using the 
exclusivities under BPCIA for their intended purpose but misusing the protection afforded to their products under 
patent law in a manner that does not comport with the purpose for which patents were created.  The measures 
proposed herein seek to eliminate the risk of such patent abuse by making patent enforcement unavailable in a 
narrowly defined set of circumstances without derogating from the incentives for R&D of biological products.  
213 See supra Part IV.B.  
214 Notably, the 5-11 months term of primary patents beyond the expiration of the market exclusivity period under 
BPCIA is an average number.  Thus, while some products would probably be covered by primary patents whose 
term is more than 5-11 months beyond the market exclusivity period under BPCIA, other products may only be 
covered by primary patents (if any) whose term is shorter than the market exclusivity period under BPCIA.  See 
infra note 219.  




statutory exclusivities afforded under BPCIA.216  In other words, developers of original 
biological products would surrender about 5-11 months on average of exclusivity under patent 
law in return for 12-12.5 years of litigation-free and other legal risks’-free market exclusivity 
(and 4-4.5 years of data exclusivity).   
Further, making it impossible for developers of original biological products to enforce 
their primary patents against generic applicants filing for generic versions of biological products 
under BPCIA (including after the expiration of the market exclusivity period) would prevent 
“double dipping” by developers of original biological products.217  Arguably, the length of the 
market exclusivity period granted under BPCIA218 should be sufficient to incentivize R&D in the 
area of biological pharmaceuticals.  There is no justification for “windfalls” in the form of 
additional monopoly periods conferred by primary patents extending beyond the end of the 
market exclusivity period in some of the biological products that would further curb public 
access to these products.219  
                                                 
216 See discussion supra notes 92 and 144 and their accompanying texts.  
217 To clarify, “double dipping” in this context would be the benefit from both patent and statutory exclusivities 
regimes in the context of approval of generic biologics under BPCIA.  
218 The length of the market exclusivity period of 12-12.5 years under BPCIA is in line with the proposals raised by 
original biologics industry advocates as necessary for the industry to maintain proper incentives for R&D.  See 
supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.  
219 E.g. of the seventy-nine products listed in Table 1, the term of the primary patents covering 53 of them would 
extend beyond the end of the twelve-year market exclusivity while the term of the primary patents covering 26 of 
them would not (the ratio shifts to 49 to 30 for a market exclusivity period of 12.5 years). 
Importantly, primary patents covering biological products (which would, under the proposal herein, be 
unenforceable against generic manufacturers seeking approval of their products under BPCIA) would still be 
enforceable against independent developers of the same biological product and third parties who do not seek to 




The proposed amendment is unlikely to discourage continued R&D of approved 
biological products (which is intended to lead to improvements of approved biological products 
and, possibly, to the development of new ones).220  This is because the proposed amendment 
would only apply to patents that cover biological products as originally approved by the FDA.221  
To avoid unnecessary legal disputes there may also be merit in explicitly limiting the proposed 
amendment so that it would only apply to primary patents and would not prevent enforcement of 
secondary patents covering inventions stemming from continued R&D.222  Such explicit 
limitation, while potentially opening the door to abundant litigation involving secondary patents 
(with all of its risks of evergreening and patent abuse), would assist in providing the necessary 
incentive for continued R&D of already-approved biologics, which is currently missing from 
                                                 
220 It is common in the context of pharmaceuticals that primary patents applied for early in a product’s development 
process are followed by additional patents claiming (1) particular ways of formulating the product, (2) additional 
methods of manufacturing the API or any of the intermediate compounds involved in making it and (3) additional 
methods of using the product or API for treating additional medical conditions [hereinafter “secondary patents”].  
For example, the biologic Enbrel, which was originally approved for the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis, later 
proved effective in the treatment of other autoimmune diseases such as psoriasis and Crohn’s disease and Avastin, 
which was originally approved for treatment of colorectal cancer, was later approved for treating non-small cell lung 
cancer and breast cancer.  See Grabowski & DiMasi 2009, supra note 5, at 4-5 (arguing that new indications are an 
important source of innovative advances in biologics); Grabowski 2009, supra note 5, at 4 (reviewing three drugs 
approved for one condition which were later approved for other conditions). 
221 In the “softer” version, BLA holders should be estopped only from enforcing patents covering the original 
formulation of the approved biologic, the originally approved indications, the original structure of the biological 
API, etc. 
The author is aware that in leaving an opening for additional monopoly periods subsequent to the 
expiration of the 12-12.5-year statutory exclusivity period in biological products there remains a risk of abuse by 
evergreening which would likely need to be addressed in litigation. 
222 Since there is clear societal interest in encouraging such continued R&D, there is merit in offering additional 
incentives for such research in the form of either patents or statutory exclusivities.  As explained earlier, statutory 
exclusivities under BPCIA are unavailable for most types of modifications of a previously-approved biological 
product.  See supra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.  Yet, patents may still be available—limited and 
insufficient as they might be—as a means of incentivizing invention, investment in R&D and disclosure of 
technology in the context of pharmaceuticals.  See supra Parts IV.C.1(a), IV.C.1(b) and IV.C.1(d).  By limiting the 
proposed amendments to primary patents, it would be possible to preserve patents as means of encouraging further 




BPCIA.  An alternative solution to the problem of lack of incentive for continued R&D of 
already-approved biological products would be to amend 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(II) so as to 
allow for an additional short period of market exclusivity for the approval of additional medical 
indications for already-approved biological products similar to that afforded under the 3-year 
additional statutory exclusivity period granted under the Hatch-Waxman Act.223  
The proposed amendment could also raise concerns that the limitations it imposes on 
patent recourse might contradict undertakings by the United States under patent treaties not to 
deny patent protection to classes of technologies as such.224  However, arguably, the proposed 
amendment would not deny protection but rather create a quid pro quo arrangement wherein in 
order to benefit from statutory exclusivities under BPCIA, developers of biological products 
would only be limited in enforcement of their (undeniable) patent rights under a narrow set of 
circumstances.225   
Finally, the proposed amendment would not seem to be at odds with Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 8 of the Constitution226 as the Constitutional language does not grant a positive right to 
                                                 
223 See supra notes 29 and 204 and accompanying text.   
224 For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights of the World Trade Organization (TRIPS) both stipulate that “each Party shall make patents 
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology.”  See North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1709(1), 32 I.L.M. 605; The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including Trade in 
Counterfeit Goods (“TRIPS”), Apr. 15, 1994, art. 27(1), 1994 WL 1711191 (Trty.).  See also 2000 CRS Report at 
26-27 (“[t]he potential for limiting the patentability of living inventions is moderated by several factors. One source 
of restraints consists of international agreements to which the United States is a signatory.”). 
225 Notably, this challenge, too, could be overcome by adopting the “softer” version of the proposed amendment 
under which it would be developers of biological products who would have the option to pursue their rights under 
patent law or benefit from the statutory exclusivities scheme under BPCIA.  
226 See U.S. Const. Art. I § 8 Cl. 8 ([The Congress shall have Power t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 




obtain patents as such.  Rather, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 authorizes Congress to devise 
means of promoting the progress of science and useful arts as it sees fit, which is exactly what 
BPCIA does and would continue to do with the proposed amendment.227  Furthermore, if the 
legal situation remains at its present state, and developers of biological products continue to be 
able to utilize both patents and statutory exclusivities concurrently to protect their proprietary 
interests in their products, one could argue that the cumulative protection afforded in biological 
products is too strong and operates to obstruct the progress of science and useful arts in 
abrogation of Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution.228 
5. Why Patents Still Have a Role to Play in Incentivizing R&D in Biologics 
The above conclusions and proposed amendment raise the following question: if statutory 
exclusivities are so clearly preferable to patents in the context of biological products and if 
patents are not only deficient but possibly even harmful to the interests of developers of 
biological products and public interest alike, wouldn’t it simply be better to forego patent 
protection in biological products altogether? 
The answer to this question is in the negative.  Despite their numerous shortcomings and 
the clear advantages statutory exclusivities have over them, patents still have important functions 
                                                 
227 Once again, the “softer” version of the proposed amendment could resolve any constitutional difficulty that may 
arise in this regard under more conservative constitutional construction.  Namely, even if one is to construe Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution narrowly as only granting Congress the ability to “secure[] . . . to . . . 
Inventors . . . exclusive Rights” (rather than deny such rights), under the proposed amendments inventors would 
choose to benefit from statutory exclusivities by electing to refrain from enforcing their patents.  In other words, it 
will not be Congress that would deny the inventors’ ability to “secur[e] . . . exclusive [r]ights,” but rather the 
inventors themselves who will be making the choice to limit their own already “secure[d] . . . exclusive [patent 
r]ights” in exchange for the ability to benefit from the statutory exclusivities afforded under BPCIA.   
228 Such arguments could rely on the various ways in which patents could be abused and misused in an anti-
competitive manner.  See supra Part IV.C.2(b).  Notably, a constitutional analysis of Congress’s power to create the 




to fulfill in incentivizing the development of biological products during the period prior to the 
approval of biological products by the FDA.  Patents serve an important fundraising tool, which 
enables R&D entities to raise the funds necessary to support their research projects.229  In this 
respect patents have a vital function in the development of pharmaceutical products and, even 
more so, of biological products—given their high R&D costs—as they make it possible for 
developers of such products to raise the funds necessary to traverse the various, numerous 
expensive steps of clinical development prior to being eligible to benefit from the statutory 
exclusivities under BPCIA (subsequent to approval of the biological product by the FDA).    
A possible explanation of the “sway” patents may have in convincing investors to 
commit funds to certain R&D projects is their ability to prevent situations of a “race to 
register.”230  In this respect, patents serve not only as a signaling device between companies but 
also as means of blocking one’s competitors from entering into such a “race to register” in the 
first place.  This explanation appears to be especially valid in the context of the biologics 
industry which consists of a significant portion of small to medium R&D firms.  In “race to 
register” situations, patents would improve the survivability of such small to medium R&D firms 
competing against major pharmaceutical corporations during the development stages of 
biological products prior to their approval by the FDA.231  Thus, patents would make it possible 
                                                 
229 Although patents may not provide any additional monopoly period to that afforded by the statutory exclusivities 
under BPCIA or directly attest to the prospects of success of an R&D project that may lead to a biological product, 
patents carry substantial weight with investors.  
230 A “race to register” occurs when two companies undertake a similar research project and are competing to have 
their respective products approved by the FDA first. 
231 Since large corporations usually have more resources, it is expected that with everything else being equal, they 




for small to medium R&D outfits to stay in the market to see another day (and, perhaps, another 
research project).232      
Accordingly, during the period prior to approval of biological products by the FDA and 
the onset of statutory exclusivities under BPCIA, patents would actually serve as “insurance 
policies” that would make the achievement of statutory exclusivities possible further down the 
road.  In addition, as discussed earlier, follow-on patents would also have an important role to 
play subsequent to the expiration of statutory exclusivity periods under BPCIA.233  To 
summarize: there is merit in affording biological products sequential (rather than concurrent) 
protection from (1) any primary patents pertaining to the underlying technology in such products 
prior to the onset of statutory exclusivities under BPCIA, (2) statutory exclusivities in the FDA 
approved products themselves and (3) any secondary patents pertaining to substantial234 further 
developments of the originally approved biological product.  
V. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Products—A Peculiar Case or the Future of 
Incentivizing Innovation  
In view of the foregoing conclusions one cannot help but wonder: is the regulation of 
generic biologics a harbinger of a new type of intellectual property regime wherein patents and 
statutory-exclusivity work in tandem to incentivize R&D?  Can we expect to see similar regimes 
put in place with respect to other areas of technology?  And are there areas of technology in 
                                                 
232 Alternatively, early patent applications and patents issued from them would make it possible for small-medium 
R&D firms to get, at the very least, through the initial proof-of-concept or pre-clinical testing stages that would 
enable them to sell their research project to major pharmaceutical corporations. 
233 See supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text.  
234 Notably, the inclusion of the “substantiality” language is meant to clarify that sequential protection of 
insubstantial developments of the biological product—which are essentially evergreening—are not within the scope 




which it would be desirable to replace the traditional patent regime with a new regime of 
statutory exclusivities altogether?  As the pattern of technical advance varies significantly from 
field to field and from one industry to another,235 statutory exclusivity frameworks would not 
necessarily be similarly suitable for all fields and industries.  However, it is quite possible that 
because of their lower transaction costs and the legal certainty they provide statutory 
exclusivities could complement patents in some areas of technology and possibly even obviate 
patents altogether in others.  It would thus be beneficial to make some observations regarding the 
characteristics of areas of technology that may be “candidates” for such a change in technology-
protection regime.236   
Yet, before making any such observations, it is worth highlighting two “pre-requisites” 
for the administration of statutory exclusivities’ regimes.  First, to be a “candidate” for 
implementation of a statutory exclusivity framework—just like in the area of pharmaceuticals—a 
technological area must be subject to regulation by a dedicated and qualified impartial body, e.g. 
an executive agency, capable of administering the regulatory framework instituting the 
exclusivities regime.  Such a body ought to routinely regulate the pertinent technological area or 
have direct bearing to that particular area and must have a substantial amount of expertise in 
evaluating technologies in that area.  Given its particular expertise, arguably, such a body would 
be better suited than the USPTO to evaluate relevant technologies in its area of expertise and 
                                                 
235 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 
880 (1990).  
236 Notably, such an approach is in concert with the Federal Circuit’s general approach of adapting the legal 
framework to particular areas of technology.  See Aljalian, supra note 168, at 18-19 (“patent scope has come to be 
largely dependent on the technology at issue. The Federal Circuit actively tailors patent law and policy to the 
technology under consideration. This new approach is viewed as having ‘a significant impact’ on advances in 




would therefore be in a better position to make merit assessments with respect to such 
technologies from a public benefit perspective.   
A second prerequisite for the implementation of statutory exclusivities regimes is that the 
practical application of technology in the regulated area would require some kind of regulatory 
approval or the removal of a regulatory bar.  This requirement is essential for the administration 
of statutory exclusivities regimes because it is the withholding of the approval to use the 
technology or the imposition of the regulatory bar that would effectuate the exclusivities.  
Notably, once a technological area is recognized as a potential candidate for the implementation 
of a statutory exclusivity framework, it would be possible to fulfill the aforementioned 
prerequisites—the regulation of the technological area by a dedicated and qualified impartial 
body and the existence of a requirement for regulatory approval or removal of a regulatory bar in 
order to put technology in that area into practical application—via appropriate legislation.  
Statutory exclusivities regimes would be, primarily, suitable in areas of technology in 
which (1) additional incentives to invent/invest are necessary because the existing incentives 
provided under patent law are insufficient, and/or (2) the circumstances of the particular market 
pertaining to the regulated technological area lend themselves to inefficiencies such as abuse of 
market share.  Statutory exclusivities regimes ought not to be considered in areas that do not call 
for additional incentives, e.g., areas in which development of technology is relatively cheap, does 
not require substantial amounts of know-how and expertise or the risks of not recouping one’s 
investments are low.237  Ideally, statutory exclusivities regimes should be implemented in 
                                                 
237 Awarding statutory exclusivities in areas that do not require further incentives to invent, invest in R&D or 




technological areas that have high entry barriers—financial, technological or both—and where 
the prospects of return on investment are unpredictable or involve substantial risks.  
As for the question of when, if ever, should statutory exclusivities replace patents 
altogether, it is difficult to establish a bright line rule regarding the circumstances which would 
necessitate and justify such replacement.  However, as stated above, it is possible to propose 
some parameters that would, potentially, assist in identifying technological areas which may be 
suitable for excepting technology from protection under patent law in favor of protection under a 
statutory exclusivities regime.  Presumably, these areas would be such that exhibit extreme cases 
of the aforementioned characteristics, namely where patent protection provides very little to no 
incentives (or even negative incentives238) to invent/invest or to disclose new technology and/or 
where the market in the technology which utilizes the pertinent technology is plagued by 
constant inefficiencies.  Statutory exclusivities may be especially fitting as replacement for 
patents in technological areas that are particularly susceptible or prone to patent abuse. 
Notably, the implementation of statutory exclusivities regimes itself is also not devoid of 
risks of inefficiencies and abuse.  With statutory exclusivities regimes being based on reliance on 
expert regulators, risks of regulatory/agency capture become more prominent.239  In the context 
of approvals of pharmaceutical products by the FDA, for example, this risk is evident in the fact 
that FDA personnel is in regular contact with representatives of certain corporations who are 
                                                 
238 Hypothetically, there could be areas of technology where the traditional patent regime is so deficient that it 
actually creates negative incentives to invent/invest and/or disclose, in which case patent protection should be 
forgone and a statutory exclusivities regime ought to be made the sole method of protecting technology.  
239 Regulatory/agency capture occurs when a regulatory body or agency created to regulate certain industries or 
sectors in the public interest, instead, advances the commercial or special interests of the industries or sectors of 




prominent and repeated actors in the regulated area and who are also, frequently, former 
members of the FDA themselves.  Being aware of such risks of regulatory/agency capture is 
therefore essential for making sure that there are sufficient checks within agencies that are to 
administer statutory exclusivities regimes and which may be provided for by appropriate 
institutional design.240  
Example of areas that meet the above criteria and may be suitable for the application of 
statutory exclusivities in addition to or in lieu of patents are the regulation of foods, cosmetics, 
veterinary pharmaceuticals and vaccines,241 medical devices242 and diagnostics and plant 
breeds.243  It is quite possible that technological advancements in other areas and regulation 
thereof would render more and more areas of technology candidates for supplementation (or, 
possibly even replacement) of the traditional patent regime with statutory exclusivities.    
VI. Conclusion 
The most important function of patents and statutory exclusivities alike is to ensure that 
those partaking in technological R&D would not only survive to continue their activity but 
would also prosper and seek to continue their R&D activities in the future.  However, in some 
technological areas, patents might not serve this purpose as well as statutory exclusivities would.   
                                                 
240 See generally Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. 
Rev. 15 (2010).  
241 See generally http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/vet_biologics/.  
242 See generally 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprovalsandClearances/510kClearanc
es/default.htm.  
243 Notably, all of these areas are regulated by the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the FDA in the Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS).  Unfortunately, the scope of this article does not allow for examination of 




This article does not purport to propose a “patentless world” or portray patents as 
dinosaurs—ancient relics of a once glorious past.  As explained above, statutory exclusivities 
would and should only serve as an addition to patents in a narrow class of well defined 
circumstances; the emergence of statutory exclusivities should not be perceived as hailing the 
demise of the patent system.  Yet, at least in some technological areas, patents may be a less than 
preferable way of promoting innovation and should be substituted by statutory exclusivities, 
where possible.244  Thus, this article advocates the substitution of patent enforcement rights with 
statutory exclusivities of appropriate lengths in those areas where there is a regulatory body 
capable of evaluating and granting licenses to partake in activities involving particular types of 
patentable technologies and in which the public has an interest in encouraging further 
technological development.245  Biologics represent such a case.  
As discussed in this article, in the context of generic biologics the statutory exclusivities 
instituted by BPCIA make primary patents redundant and, by comparison, an inferior way of 
ensuring the proprietary interests of developers of biological products in their technology.  The 
statutory exclusivities afforded under BPCIA have been tailored to the needs of developers of 
                                                 
244 See 2008 CRS Report, supra note 1, at 18 (recognizing that patents may not be “the most successful mechanism 
for capturing the benefits of investment” in every industry and arguing that “[t]he utility of patents to companies 
varies among industrial sectors”). 
245  This proposition coincides with Machlup’s belief that  
[w]hile the student of the economics of the patent system must, provisionally, disqualify himself 
on the question of the effects of the system as a whole on a large industrial economy, he need not 
disqualify himself as a judge of proposed changes in the existing system. While economic analysis 
does not yet provide a basis for choosing between “all or nothing,” it does provide a sufficiently 
firm basis for decisions about “a little more or a little less” of various ingredients of the patent 
system.   




biological products in the context of generic competition and should thus be held as sufficient for 
accommodating those needs.  Allowing developers of biological products to benefit from the 
protection of primary patents alongside and concurrent with such statutory exclusivities would 
cause waste and could lead to abuse of the patent system.  Further, it is important to remember 
that patents, despite their long legal history and well known status as instruments of incentivizing 
innovation, are only a means to an end.  Assuming this “end” is as well or even better served by 
other means (e.g. statutory exclusivities), patents may lose their allure and become redundant, 
and possibly even harmful.  A substitution of primary patent enforcement rights where statutory 
exclusivities in FDA-approved biological products are in force is the best means to incentivize 
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expiration of patent 
term to end of 
twelve-year market 
exclusivity251  
Activase® (alteplase) 4766075 5/5/1982 6/18/1996 8/23/2005 6/18/2008 5158 1030 
Aldurazyme® (laronidase) 6426208 11/12/1999 4/30/2003 11/12/2019 4/30/2015 1265 -1657 
Amevive® (Alefacept) 5547853 3/12/1991 1/30/2003 1/30/2017 1/30/2015 4342 -731 
Angiomax® (bivalirudin) 5196404 8/18/1989 12/15/2000 3/23/2010 12/15/2012 4137 998 
Apidra® (insulin glulisine) 6221633 6/18/1998 4/16/2004 6/18/2018 4/16/2016 2129 -793 
Aranesp™ (darbepoetin 
alfa) 5856298 10/13/1989 9/17/2001 1/5/2016 9/17/2013 4357 -840 
Arcalyst® (Rilonacept) 5470952 10/20/1993 2/27/2008 11/28/2012 2/27/2020 5243 2647 
Avastin™ (bevacizumab) 6884879 4/7/1997 2/26/2004 4/7/2017 2/26/2016 2516 -406 
Avonex® (interferon beta-
1a; recombinant) 4530901 2/4/1980 5/17/1996 7/23/2002 5/17/2008 5947 2125 
BeneFix™ (coagulation 
factor IX) 5171569 3/13/1986 2/11/1997 2/11/2011 2/11/2009 3988 -730 
Betaseron® (Interferon 
beta-1b) 4588585 10/19/1982 7/23/1993 7/7/2007 7/23/2005 3930 -714 
Bexxar® Therapeutic 
Regimen (Tositumomab 
and Iodine I-131 
Tositumomab) 
5595721 9/16/1993 6/27/2003 1/21/2014 6/27/2015 3571 522 
Byetta® (exenatide)  5424286 5/24/1993 4/28/2005 12/1/2016 4/28/2017 4357 148 
Cerezyme® (imiglucerase) 5236838 12/23/1988 5/23/1994 8/17/2010 5/23/2006 1977 -1547 
Cimzia® (Certolizumab 
pegol) 200 mg/ml 7094872 2/19/2004 5/13/2009 7/6/2024 5/13/2021 1910 -1150 
Elaprase® (Idursulfase) 5932211 11/12/1991 7/27/2006 9/3/2019 7/27/2018 5371 -403 
Elitek® (rasburicase) 5382518 7/13/1990 7/12/2002 7/12/2016 7/12/2014 4382 -731 
                                                 
246 All times are in days; all time difference calculations were conducted using date calculation tools available at 
http://www.timeanddate.com/. 
247 Filing date is the patent application effective U.S. filing date for term calculation purposes.  
248 Patent expiration date includes any term extensions and adjustments.  
249 Calculated by adding 12 years to the date of FDA approval (column IV). 
250 Calculated as the difference in days between the FDA approval date (column IV) and the patent application filing 
date (column III).   
251 Calculated as the difference in days between the twelve-year market exclusivity expiration date (column VI) and 
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expiration of patent 
term to end of 
twelve-year market 
exclusivity251  
Enbrel® (etanercept) RE36755  9/5/1989 11/2/1998 10/23/2012 11/2/2010 3345 -721 
Epogen® (epoietin alfa) 4703008 12/13/1983 6/1/1989 10/27/2004 6/1/2001 1997 -1244 
Erbitux™ (cetuximab) 7060808 6/7/1995 2/12/2004 6/7/2015 2/12/2016 3172 250 
Fabrazyme® (agalsidase 
beta) 5356804 10/24/1990 4/24/2003 9/27/2015 4/24/2015 4565 -156 
Forteo® (teriparatide) 4698328 4/4/1985 11/26/2002 4/4/2005 11/26/2014 6445 3523 
Fuzeon™ (Enfuvirtide) 6133418 6/7/1993 3/13/2003 11/17/2014 3/13/2015 3566 116 
Geref® (sermoreline 
acetate) 4703035 10/4/1982 12/28/1990 12/28/2004 12/28/2002 3007 -731 
Gonal-F® (follitropin alfa) 5156957 11/2/1983 9/29/1997 9/29/2011 9/29/2009 5080 -730 
Herceptin® (trastuzumab) 5677171 1/12/1988 9/25/1998 10/14/2014 9/25/2010 3909 -1480 
Humira™ (adalimumab) 6090382 2/9/1996 12/31/2002 12/31/2016 12/31/2014 2517 -731 
Ilaris® (Canakinumab) 7446175 8/20/2001 6/17/2009 12/22/2022 6/17/2021 2858 -553 
Increlex™ (mecasermin) 5681814 6/7/1990 8/30/2005 9/18/2017 8/30/2017 5563 -19 
Infergen® (interferon 
alfacon-1) 4695623 5/6/1982 10/6/1997 9/22/2009 10/6/2009 5632 14 
Intron A® (alpha-
interferon) 4496537 12/23/1981 6/4/1986 1/29/2002 6/4/1998 1624 -1335 
Iplex™ (mecasermin 
rinfabate [rDNA origin]) 5681818 3/31/1988 12/12/2005 5/11/2019 12/12/2017 6465 -515 
Kepivance® (palifermin) 5677278 6/29/1993 12/15/2004 10/14/2014 12/15/2016 4187 793 
Kineret™ (anakinra) 5075222 5/27/1988 11/14/2001 12/24/2013 11/14/2013 4919 -40 
Lantus® (insulin glargine) 5101013 8/9/1988 4/20/2000 12/3/2011 4/20/2012 4272 139 
Leukine® (Sargramostim - 
granulocyte macrophage 
colony-stimulating factor) 
5391485 8/6/1985 3/5/1991 2/21/2012 3/5/2003 2037 -3275 
Lucentis® (Ranibizumab) 6884879 4/7/1997 6/30/2006 4/7/2017 6/30/2018 3371 449 
Luveris® (lutropin alfa for 
injection) 5639639 11/2/1983 10/8/2004 6/20/2011 10/8/2016 7646 1937 
Macugen® (pegaptanib) 6051698  6 June 1997 12/17/2004 5/19/2015 12/17/2016 2751 578 
Mircera® 
(Methoxypolyethylene 
glycol epoetin beta) 
6583272 6/27/2000 11/11/2007 8/26/2020 11/11/2019 2697 -289 
Myobloc® (Botulinum 
Toxin Type B) 6290961 12/28/1993 8/12/2000 12/28/2013 8/12/2012 2419 -503 
Myozyme® 
(Alglucosidase alfa) 7351410 12/6/1999 4/28/2006 10/29/2020 4/28/2018 2335 -915 
Naglazyme® (Galsulfase) 6972124 5/1/2000 5/31/2005 7/17/2020 5/31/2017 1856 -1143 
Natrecor® (nesiritide) 5114923 5/31/1988 8/10/2001 5/19/2014 8/10/2013 4819 -282 
Neulasta™ (pegfilgrastim) 5582823 8/23/1985 1/31/2002 12/10/2013 1/31/2014 6005 52 
Neumega® (oprelvekin) 5215895 11/22/1989 11/25/1997 11/25/2011 11/25/2009 2925 -730 
Neupogen® (filgrastim) 4810643 8/23/1985 2/20/1991 3/7/2006 2/20/2003 2007 -1111 
Nplate® (Romiplostim) 6835809 10/22/1999 8/22/2008 10/22/2019 8/22/2020 3227 305 
Orencia™ (abatacept) 5851795 6/27/1991 12/23/2005 11/25/2017 12/23/2017 5293 28 
Orthoclone OKT3® 




I II III IV V VI VII VIII 

























expiration of patent 




chorionic gonadotropin) 4840896 11/2/1983 9/20/2000 4/29/2009 9/20/2012 6167 1240 
PEG-Intron™ (pegylated 
interferon alfa-2b) 5951974 11/10/1993 1/19/2001 1/19/2015 1/19/2013 2627 -730 
Proleukin, IL-2®  
(aldesleukin) RE33653 10/19/1982 5/5/1992 5/5/2006 5/5/2004 3486 -730 
ProstaScint®(Capromab 
Pendetide) 5162504 6/3/1988 10/28/1996 10/28/2010 10/28/2008 3069 -730 
Raptiva™ (efalizumab) 6037454 11/20/1997 10/27/2003 11/20/2017 10/27/2015 2167 -755 
ReFacto® (antihemophilic 
factor) 4868112 4/12/1985 3/1/2000 2/28/2010 3/1/2012 5437 732 
Regranex® (Becaplermin) 4845075 2/25/1985 12/16/1997 10/29/2010 12/16/2009 4677 -317 
Remicade® (infliximab) 5656272 3/18/1991 8/24/1998 8/12/2014 8/24/2010 2716 -1449 
Remodulin™ (treprostinil 
sodium) 5153222 6/16/1989 5/21/2002 10/6/2014 5/21/2014 4722 -138 
Retavase™ (reteplase) 5223256 2/6/1990 10/30/1996 10/30/2010 10/30/2008 2458 -730 
Rituxan™ (rituximab) 5763137 7/29/1996 11/26/1997 7/29/2016 11/26/2009 485 -2437 
Roferon (Interferon alfa-
2a) 4503035 11/24/1978 4/6/1986 3/5/2002 4/6/1998 2690 -1429 
Simulect® (Basiliximab) 6521230 3/14/1991 12/5/1998 2/18/2020 12/5/2010 2823 -3362 
Soliris® (Eculizumab) 6074642 5/2/1994 3/16/2007 5/2/2014 3/16/2019 4701 1784 
Somavert® (pegvisomant) 5849535 9/21/1995 3/25/2003 3/25/2017 3/25/2015 2742 -731 
Stelara™ (Ustekinumab) 6902734 8/1/2001 9/25/2009 7/26/2022 9/25/2021 2977 -304 
Synagis™ (palivizumab) 5824307 12/23/1991 6/19/1998 10/20/2015 6/19/2010 2370 -1949 
Tarceva® (Erlotinib)  5747498 6/6/1995 11/18/2004 11/8/2018 11/18/2016 3453 -720 
Thyrogen® (thyrotropin 
alfa) 5240832 6/20/1989 11/30/1998 8/31/2010 11/30/2010 3450 91 
TNKase™ (tenecteplase) 5385732 5/20/1988 6/2/2000 6/2/2014 6/2/2012 4396 -730 
Tysabri® (natalizumab) 5840299 1/25/1995 11/23/2004 4/27/2017 11/23/2016 3590 -155 
Vectibix® (Panitumumab) 6235883 5/5/1997 9/27/2006 5/5/2017 9/27/2018 3432 510 
Velcade™ (bortezomib for 
injection) 5780454 10/28/1994 5/13/2003 5/3/2017 5/13/2015 3119 -721 
Verluma (Nofetumomab) 4897255 1/14/1985 10/13/1998 8/20/2010 10/13/2010 5020 54 
Visudyne™ (verteporfin 
for injection) 5095030 1/20/1987 4/12/2000 9/9/2011 4/12/2012 4831 216 
Xigris™ (drotrecogin alfa) RE37806  4/9/1986 11/21/2001 11/21/2015 11/21/2013 5705 -730 
Xolair® (omalizumab) 6267958 3/14/1996 6/20/2003 6/20/2017 6/20/2015 2654 -731 
Zenapax (Daclizumab) 5530101 12/28/1988 10/12/1997 6/25/2013 10/12/2009 3210 -1352 
Zevalin™ (ibritumomab 
tiuxetan) 5776456 11/13/1992 2/19/2002 2/19/2016 2/19/2014 3385 -725 
Average           3728.35 -326.95 
 
 
 
 
